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Abstract
Resilience is the property of a system to remain trustworthy despite changes.
Changes of a different nature, whether due to failures of system components
or varying operational conditions, significantly increase the complexity of
system development. Therefore, advanced development technologies are re-
quired to build robust and flexible system architectures capable of adapting
to such changes. Moreover, powerful quantitative techniques are needed to
assess the impact of these changes on various system characteristics.
Architectural flexibility is achieved by embedding into the system de-
sign the mechanisms for identifying changes and reacting on them. Hence
a resilient system should have both advanced monitoring and error detec-
tion capabilities to recognise changes as well as sophisticated reconfiguration
mechanisms to adapt to them. The aim of such reconfiguration is to ensure
that the system stays operational, i.e., remains capable of achieving its goals.
Design, verification and assessment of the system reconfiguration mech-
anisms is a challenging and error prone engineering task. In this thesis,
we propose and validate a formal framework for development and assess-
ment of resilient systems. Such a framework provides us with the means to
specify and verify complex component interactions, model their cooperative
behaviour in achieving system goals, and analyse the chosen reconfiguration
strategies. Due to the variety of properties to be analysed, such a framework
should have an integrated nature. To ensure the system functional correct-
ness, it should rely on formal modelling and verification, while, to assess
the impact of changes on such properties as performance and reliability, it
should be combined with quantitative analysis.
To ensure scalability of the proposed framework, we choose Event-B as
the basis for reasoning about functional correctness. Event-B is a state-
based formal approach that promotes the correct-by-construction develop-
ment paradigm and formal verification by theorem proving. Event-B has a
mature industrial-strength tool support – the Rodin platform. Proof-based
verification as well as the reliance on abstraction and decomposition adopted
in Event-B provides the designers with a powerful support for the develop-
ment of complex systems. Moreover, the top-down system development
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by refinement allows the developers to explicitly express and verify critical
system-level properties.
Besides ensuring functional correctness, to achieve resilience we also need
to analyse a number of non-functional characteristics, such as reliability and
performance. Therefore, in this thesis we also demonstrate how formal de-
velopment in Event-B can be combined with quantitative analysis. Namely,
we experiment with integration of such techniques as probabilistic model
checking in PRISM and discrete-event simulation in SimPy with formal de-
velopment in Event-B. Such an integration allows us to assess how changes
and different reconfiguration strategies affect the overall system resilience.
The approach proposed in this thesis is validated by a number of case studies
from such areas as robotics, space, healthcare and cloud domain.
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Sammanfattning
Resiliens a¨r ett systems egenskap fo¨r att fo¨rbli p˚alitligt trots fo¨ra¨ndringar.
Fo¨ra¨ndringar av olika karakta¨r, antingen p˚a grund av fel i systemkompo-
nenter eller varierande driftsfo¨rh˚allanden, o¨kar avseva¨rt p˚a komplexiteten
i systemutveckling. Da¨rfo¨r beho¨vs avancerade utvecklingsteknologier fo¨r
att bygga robusta och flexibla systemarkitekturer som kan anpassa sig till
s˚adana fo¨ra¨ndringar. Dessutom beho¨vs kraftfulla kvantitativa metoder fo¨r
att bedo¨ma effekterna av dessa fo¨ra¨ndringar p˚a olika systemegenskaper.
Arkitektonisk flexibilitet uppn˚as genom att bygga in mekanismer i sys-
temdesignen fo¨r att identifiera fo¨ra¨ndringar och reagera p˚a dem. Da¨rfo¨r
bo¨r ett resilient system ha b˚ade avancerad o¨vervaknings- och fel uppta¨ck-
ningsfo¨rm˚aga fo¨r att ka¨nna igen fo¨ra¨ndringar samt sofistikerade omkonfig-
ureringsmekanismer fo¨r att anpassa sig till dem. Syftet med en s˚adan omkon-
figurering a¨r att se till att systemet fo¨rblir i drift, det vill sa¨ga, fortfarande
kan uppn˚a sina m˚al.
Design, kontroll och utva¨rdering av systemets omkonfigureringsmekanis-
mer a¨r en utmanande och felbena¨gen ingenjo¨rsuppgift. I denna avhandling
fo¨resl˚ar vi och validerar ett formellt ramverk fo¨r utveckling och utva¨rdering
av resilienta system. Ett s˚adant ramverk ger oss mo¨jlighet att specificera
och verifiera komplexa komponentinteraktioner, modellera deras koopera-
tiva beteende fo¨r att uppn˚a systemets m˚al och analysera de valda omkonfig-
ureringstrategierna. P˚a grund av de olika egenskaper som skall analyseras,
bo¨r ett s˚adant ramverk har en integrerad karakta¨r. Fo¨r att sa¨kersta¨lla sys-
temets funktionella korrekthet bo¨r det bygga p˚a formell modellering och
verifiering, men fo¨r att ocks˚a kunna bedo¨ma effekterna av fo¨ra¨ndringar p˚a
s˚adana egenskaper som prestanda och tillfo¨rlitlighet bo¨r det kombineras med
kvantitativ analys.
Fo¨r att sa¨kersta¨lla skalbarhet av det fo¨reslagna ramverket, va¨ljer vi
Event-B som grund fo¨r resonemang om funktionell korrekthet. Event-B
a¨r ett tillst˚andsbaserat formellt metod som fra¨mjar correct-by-construction
utvecklingsparadigmen fo¨r att uppn˚a korrekthet och formell verifiering med
hja¨lp av teorembevisning. Event-B har ett va¨lutvecklat verktygssto¨d med in-
dustriell styrka – Rodin-plattformen. Bevis-baserad verifiering samt beroen-
det av abstraktion och problem uppdelning som anva¨nds i Event-B ger de-
v
signers ett kraftfullt sto¨d fo¨r utveckling av komplexa system. Dessutom
till˚ater top-down systemutvecklingen med precisering utvecklarna att ut-
tryckligen beskriva och verifiera kritiska p˚a systemniv˚a egenskaper.
Fo¨rutom att sa¨kersta¨lla funktionell korrekthet, m˚aste vi fo¨r att uppn˚a
resiliens ocks˚a analysera ett antal icke-funktionella egenskaper s˚asom tillfo¨rl-
itlighet och prestanda. Da¨rfo¨r visar vi i denna avhandling ocks˚a hur formell
utveckling i Event-B kan kombineras med kvantitativ analys. Na¨mligen,
vi experimenterar med integrering av s˚adana tekniker som probabilistiskt
model-checking modellpro¨vning i PRISM och diskret simulering i SimPy
med formell utveckling i Event-B. En s˚adan integration ger oss mo¨jlighet
att bedo¨ma hur fo¨ra¨ndringar och olika omkonfigureringsstrategier p˚averkar
det o¨vergripande systemets resiliens. Den metod som fo¨resl˚as i avhandlin-
gen valideras med ett antal fallstudier fr˚an s˚adana omr˚aden som robotik,
flygindustri, sjukv˚ard och molntja¨nsk.
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Research Summary
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Chapter 1
Motivation and Research
Objectives
Modern software systems are becoming more complex, diverse, distributed
and heterogeneous. Moreover, often they operate in dynamically chang-
ing environments in a highly autonomous manner. Since computer-based
software-intensive systems are increasingly used in various safety- and money-
critical domains, we need to create powerful development techniques ensur-
ing their trustworthiness, i.e., guaranteeing that an incorrect system be-
haviour would not result in loss of human life, damage to the environment,
or devastating economic consequences.
The concept of resilience [106] has been introduced to represent an ability
of a system to deliver its services in a trustworthy way despite changes. It
is a generic concept that essentially expresses the demand for the systems
that can reliably adapt to changes caused by a broad spectrum of reasons –
from component failures to the need to utilise the available resources more
efficiently.
The design for resilience poses a significant engineering challenge and
requires novel development methods and tools that are versatile, powerful
and scalable enough to embrace the complexity of building adaptable yet
safe and reliable systems. They should facilitate building robust and recon-
figurable systems as well as assess the impact of changes on various system
characteristics. Moreover, they should allow us to specify and verify com-
plex component interactions, model their cooperative behaviour in achieving
system goals, and analyse the chosen system reconfiguration strategies.
Resilience is a multi-facet system property. Therefore, to develop re-
silient systems, we need to combine different techniques for modelling and
analysis into an integrated approach that can address various design needs.
To ensure functional correctness, such an approach should rely on formal
modelling and verification, while, to assess the impact of changes, it should
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be combined with quantitative analysis.
The main objective of this thesis is to propose a scalable integrated
approach to development of complex resilient distributed systems. It should
satisfy the following criteria:
• to support rigorous development of such systems in a systematic man-
ner, while enabling reasoning about the system behaviour at different
levels of abstraction – from the top-level goals to component interac-
tions;
• to guarantee functional correctness of complex distributed systems,
with the incorporated mechanisms to ensure system resilience;
• to facilitate systematic construction of complex reconfigurable archi-
tectures as the means to enhance system resilience;
• to provide the developers with a powerful platform for quantitative
assessment of resilience and finding optimal trade-offs between system
reliability and performance.
We also intend to validate the proposed approach in a number of crit-
ical domains to ensure its benefits for development of resilient distributed
systems.
Organisation of the thesis. The thesis consists of two parts. Part I
contains an overview of the research presented in the thesis, while Part II
consists of reprints of the original research publications. Part I is structured
as follows. In Chapter 2 we introduce the main concepts that we rely on
in this thesis: resilience, goal-oriented development and reconfiguration. In
Chapter 3 we give an overview of our modelling and assessment techniques
– the Event-B method, the probabilistic PRISM model checker and discrete
event simulation framework in SimPy. In Chapter 4 we present our main
contributions – a formal approach to development of resilient reconfigurable
systems and integrated quantitative resilience assessment. In Chapter 5 we
give a detailed description of the research results published in each original
paper. In Chapter 6 we overview the related work. Finally, in Chapter
7 we discuss the achieved results and outline the possible future research
directions.
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Chapter 2
Background: Concepts
In this chapter, we give an overview of the main phenomena concepts and
properties appearing in the development of resilient distributed systems.
We consider the notion of “resilience” as an evolution of the dependability
concept and discuss how goal-oriented development facilitates engineering
of resilient systems. In particular, we focus on the dynamic system recon-
figuration as the main mechanism for achieving system resilience.
2.1 Resilience Concept
Resilience is a fairly new concept that has been intensively discussed over
the last years. Though various interpretations exist, in this thesis we rely on
the dependability-based definition that was proposed by Laprie [105, 106]:
System resilience is used to designate an ability of the system to per-
sistently deliver its services in a dependable way even when facing changes.
Resilience is an evolution of the dependability concept that focuses on study-
ing the impact of changes on system trustworthiness. A change is a broad
term that may be viewed differently in various domains. The changes can
be systematised according to their nature, prospect and timing issues [106]:
• nature: functional, environmental or technological;
• prospect: foreseen, foreseeable, unforeseen (or drastic) changes;
• timing: short term (e.g., seconds to hours), medium term (e.g., hours
to months) and long term changes (e.g., months to years).
Resilience extends the dependability concept by emphasising the need to
build systems that are flexible and adaptive. It requires implementation of
the advanced reconfiguration mechanisms and flexible strategies for efficient
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utilisation of the system components to cope with changes and tolerate faults
[160].
Since resilience is an evolution of the notion of dependability, majority
of its concepts are grounded in the classical definitions proposed for depend-
ability that are discussed next.
2.2 Dependability: Basic Definitions
Dependability is one of the main requirements that we impose on a broad
range of computer-based systems. It can be defined as the ability of a system
to deliver services that can be justifiably trusted [9, 8]. Dependability is an
integrated concept that includes such key attributes as:
• availability: the ability of the system to provide a service at any given
instant of time;
• reliability: the ability of the system to provide a service over a specified
interval of time;
• safety: the ability of a system to deliver a service under given con-
ditions without catastrophic consequences to the user(s) and environ-
ment;
• integrity: the absence of improper system alterations;
• maintainability: the ability of a system to be restored to a state in
which it can deliver correct service;
• confidentiality: the absence of unauthorised disclosure of information.
Different threats may introduce undesirable deviations in service pro-
visioning and thus jeopardise dependability. Traditionally, threats can be
classified into the following categories: failures, errors and faults [9, 8]. Es-
sentially, these terms designate the chain of propagation of a fault to the
system boundary as defined below:
• a failure: an event that occurs then the delivered service deviates from
the desirable (correct) service;
• a error: an internal system state that may lead to the subsequent
system failure;
• a fault: a defect within the system. By their nature, faults can be
internal (e.g., a software bug, a memory bit “stuck”) or external (e.g.,
a production defect, a human mistake, an electromagnetic perturba-
tion). In general, a fault might be an origin of an error. However, not
all faults produce errors.
6
Traditionally, engineering dependable systems relies on four main tech-
niques: fault prevention, fault removal, fault forecasting and fault tolerance
[9, 8].
Fault prevention is a set of techniques aimed at preventing an introduc-
tion of faults during the system development process. It comprises, among
others, a choice of rigorous development methodologies as well as adopting
a suitable standard of quality. Fault removal techniques are used to identify
and remove errors in the system. The activities of fault removal process
include system verification as well as corrective and preventive maintenance
of the system. Fault forecasting methods are based on prediction and evalu-
ation of the impact of faults on the system behaviour. The evaluation might
have both qualitative and quantitative aspects. The qualitative assessment
helps to identify and classify failures as well as define combinations of com-
ponent faults that may lead to a system failure. The quantitative analysis
is performed to assess the degree of satisfaction for the required attributes
of dependability. Finally, fault tolerance techniques are used to develop the
system in a such way that it is able to continue its functioning despite the
faults.
All these techniques provide the designers with different means to cope
with faults. The techniques complement each other and allow the design-
ers to ensure a high degree of system dependability. In this thesis, fault
prevention is implemented via formal modelling, fault removal employs the-
orem proving to verify various system properties, while probabilistic model
checking and discrete event simulation are used for fault forecasting. More-
over, we extensively rely on a variety of fault tolerance mechanisms in our
development of resilient systems. Since faults constitute the most common
class of changes with which a resilient system should cope, next we give an
overview of the fault tolerance concepts in more detail.
Fault Tolerance. Fault tolerance techniques aim at ensuring that the sys-
tem continues to deliver the required service even in the presence of faults.
Fault tolerance is usually implemented in two main steps – error detection
and system recovery. Error detection is used to identify the presence of er-
rors. In its turn, system recovery aims at eliminating the detected errors (via
error recovery) and preventing faults from re-activation (via fault handling)
[71].
Error recovery takes one of the following three forms:
• backward recovery: bringing the system back to a previous (correct)
state;
• forward recovery: moving the system into a new state, from which it
can operate (sometimes, in a degraded operational mode);
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• compensation: putting the system into an error-free state (which relies
on the condition that the system has enough redundancy to mask the
detected error without service degrading).
In its turn, fault handling is a process aimed at preventing faults from
being activated again. It can be conducted in three steps. The first step
– fault diagnosis – determines the causes of errors. The next step is isola-
tion. It comprises the actions required to prevent the faulty component(s)
from being invoked in the further executions. The last step is system re-
configuration. It consists of modifying the (part of the) system structure in
such a way that the system continues to provide an acceptable, but possibly
degraded, service.
Fault tolerance is achieved by the reliance on redundancy. Different
forms of redundancy allow the system either to mask a failure, i.e., nul-
lify its effect at the system level, or to detect a fault and provide (usually
temporary) degraded services in the presence of failures. While redundancy
enables fault tolerance, it also increases complexity of the system.
Traditionally, the fault tolerance techniques are applied to cope with a
number of anticipated situations including failures of software components
as well as other abnormal system states. It is desirable to ensure that a
system under construction reacts predictably in the presence of such abnor-
mal situations. In this thesis we demonstrate that this task can be greatly
facilitated by formal modelling.
Faults can be considered as a simple form of changes, and hence, fault
tolerance constitutes an essential mechanism of achieving resilience. Fault
tolerance ensures that faults do not prevent the system from delivering its
services, i.e., allows it to achieve its goals. Since goals provide us with a
suitable mechanism for representing the behaviour of a complex resilient
system, next we give a detailed overview of this concept.
2.3 Goal-Based Development
Goals are the functional and non-functional objectives of a system [171, 172].
In software engineering, goals have been recognised as useful primitives for
capturing system requirements. The reasoning in terms of goals promotes
structuring the top-down system design. Goals allow the designers to ex-
plore different architectural alternatives. They constitute suitable basics for
reasoning about the system behaviour. In particular, resilience can be seen
as a property that allows the system to progress towards achieving its goals.
Usually, the system has different types of goals. They are often inter-
dependent. Goals can be structured, e.g., to form a hierarchy. Generally,
they can be formulated at different levels of abstraction: high-level goals
represent the overall system objectives, while lower-level goals might define
8
the objectives to be achieved by subsystems or components [171, 172]. Links
between goals represent various interdependencies, i.e., the situations where
goals affect each other. Traditionally, AND/OR decomposition-abstraction
links are introduced to represent the intended goal structure. The process
of goal detailisation (i.e., decomposition into subgoals) is performed until a
certain level of granularity is reached, i.e., when a subgoal can be assigned
to and consecutively realised by the system components – agents [171, 172].
Agent is an active component that performs a task and contributes to goal
achievement [172, 171, 170].
The agent concept provides us with a powerful and expressive abstrac-
tion for handling complexity of distributed system development. Definition
of the term agent varies across the software engineering field [66]. In this
thesis, an agent designates a software component that is associated with a
certain functionality and is capable to act autonomously in order to meet
the design objectives [58, 94]. Correspondingly, multi-agent systems are typ-
ically decentralised distributed systems composed of agents asynchronously
communicating with each other [127]. In this thesis, we consider a decen-
tralised agent system to be a system that operates without a control of
central authority.
Typically, agents interact with each other in order to achieve their in-
dividual or common goals. Interactions might be simple, e.g., information
exchange, or complex, e.g., involving requests for service provisioning from
one agent to another [94].
Interactions enable agent cooperation. The level and type of coopera-
tion between particular agents is defined by a system organisation. Tradi-
tionally, we distinguish between three types of organisations: hierarchical
organisation (i.e., one agent may be the manager of the other agents), flat
organisation (i.e., agent may work together in a team and communicate with
each other directly) and hybrid organisation [94].
Agent interactions are achieved by communication. Communication al-
lows the individual agents to share their local information with others agents
to facilitate goal achievement. Traditionally, the employed communication
mechanism is defined by a certain protocol describing the rules of agent
interactions.
The aim of this thesis is to study resilience of multi-agent systems.
Therefore, we should explicitly represent off-nominal situations such as agent
failures or agent disconnections and assess their impact on the system be-
haviour. As a result of these off-nominal conditions, agents usually lose an
ability to perform their predefined tasks. These might prevent the system
from achieving its goals and jeopardise such essential property as safety.
The system should recognise such situations and autonomously reconfigure
itself to prevent possible harm. Next we give an overview of the aspect of
autonomous reconfiguration in detail.
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2.4 System Autonomy and Reconfiguration
The concept of system autonomy has been introduced to designate sys-
tems that are able to manage themselves [98] without human intervention.
Removing humans from the control has been motivated by such reasons
as unfeasibility or danger of direct human involvement (due to remote or
dangerous environment), a possibility to increase system performance (soft-
ware usually reacts much quicker than humans) or decrease of system costs
[62, 49]. The original concept of system autonomy included such “self”
mechanisms as self-configuration, self-repairing, self-healing, self-protection
[98, 84]. However, nowadays the autonomic computing paradigm has been
broadened and generalised.
System autonomy can be considered from different perspectives, includ-
ing autonomy of the individual elements forming the system and auton-
omy of the whole system in general. The autonomic computing paradigm
has been widely adopted in various applications and with different degree
of autonomy ranging from semi-controlled by humans systems to fully au-
tonomous [62]. Autonomous systems are currently being deployed in many
critical applications such as robotics, intelligent monitoring (e.g., healthcare
monitoring, traffic jam monitoring), autonomous road vehicles (“driverless
cars”), etc.
Typically, the autonomic aspect assumes that a system is capable to
monitor its behaviour and dynamically adjust it, if needed. From the re-
silience perspective, system autonomy can be achieved via dynamic adapta-
tion to various changes and volatile operating conditions. Often adaptation
is performed by taking actions that transfer a system from one configura-
tion to another. In general, the adaptation can take a form of parame-
ter adaptation or structural adaptation. The parameter adaptation means
changing the measurable system characteristics. The structural adaptation
is typically performed via dynamic reconfiguration. Essentially, a system
configuration can be viewed as a specific arrangement of the elements (com-
ponents) that constitute the system. A configuration is defined by rela-
tionships and dependencies between system elements that are established
to support achieving system goals. Dynamic reconfiguration in its turn as-
sumes that the system is capable to evolve from it current configuration
to another one. Dynamic system reconfiguration may imply removal or re-
placement of configurable elements, which consequently leads to changing of
interdependencies between the components. Moreover, reconfiguration may
also affect component interactions. The aim of reconfiguration is to ensure
that the system remains operational, i.e., capable of achieving its goals and
maintaining safe and correct delivery of its services.
In this thesis, we study the reconfiguration aspects in the goal-oriented
and service-oriented development paradigms. In particular, the purpose of
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reconfiguration is to ensure that the system goals remain achievable. In this
thesis, the reconfiguration is based on reallocation of responsibilities between
agents either to ensure that the healthy agents can substitute the failed
ones (thereby, we ensure handling of negative changes) or to enable more
efficient utilisation of agents (hence, we address positive changes). Within
service-oriented framework the reconfiguration aims at ensuring that a ser-
vice can be delivered despite failures of some service-providing components.
Reconfiguration here aims at utilising the available service components to
re-execute a failed service.
To effectively adapt to changes in the system and its environment, we
need also to assess various reconfigurable strategies and architectural alter-
natives. Indeed, they can guarantee different resilience characteristics, e.g.,
expressed in the form of performance/reliability ratio. Hence, while devel-
oping a resilient distributed system, it is important to consider not only
qualitative aspects of system resilience but also its quantitative characteris-
tics. In general, the desirable properties and characteristics to be assessed
are identified according to the system goals. In this thesis, we focus on the
design-time assessment of resilience properties.
Obviously, the design and verification of system resilience is a complex
multifacet problem. It requires integrated approaches combining different
methods and tools for modelling, verification and quantitative analysis. In
the next chapter, we give an overview of the techniques that are used in this
thesis to address problems in designing resilient systems.
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Chapter 3
Methods and Techniques for
Formal Development and
Quantitative Assessment
In this chapter, we describe the approaches and tools that we relied on in our
modelling, verification and assessment of resilient distributed systems. We
also motivate our use of formal techniques as well as the need for integrated
approaches.
3.1 Development Methodologies
Development of a resilient system is a challenging engineering task that can
be significantly facilitated by the use of formal model-based techniques. It
allows the developers to build a system in a rigorous way and verify that the
system specification meets the requirements. Moreover, formal modelling
facilitates systematic derivation of fault tolerance mechanisms and complex
reconfiguration solutions.
Traditionally, the methods that have rigorous mathematical basis are
called formal methods. Formal techniques provide the developers with a
strong mathematically-grounded argument about correctness of the system
design. The main idea behind the formal modelling and verification is to
rely on mathematics and formal logic to avoid imprecision, ambiguity, in-
completeness or misunderstanding of system requirements described in nat-
ural language [148], and enable formal verification guaranteeing the system
under consideration system model adheres to the given specification. Unlike
testing, formal techniques allow us to ensure full coverage of possible system
behaviours for achieving system resilience.
Traditionally, we distinguish between proof-based and model checking
approaches. The general idea behind the automated proof-based verifica-
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tion is following: for given a mathematical or logical statement a computer
program (prover) attempts to construct a proof that the statement is true.
Typically, theorem proving approaches are used to ensure that a model sat-
isfies the desired system properties. Verification is performed without actual
model execution or simulation, therefore it allows us to explore the full model
state space with respect to the specified properties. Some well-known exam-
ples of theorem proving software systems are Isabelle [167, 126], Coq [39],
PVS [129, 128], Z3 [45], CVC3 [22, 162, 24], Vampire [140, 141], etc.
In contrast to the proof-based approach, model checking is a verification
technique that explores all possible system states in a brute-force manner
[17, 38]. Specifically, a model checker examines system scenarios in a sys-
tematic manner and, thereby, shows whether a given system model satisfies
a certain property. Model checking helps us to find violation of the property
in specifications by providing counterexamples. There is a big variety of
model checkers tools that can be used in verification, e.g., SPIN [80, 81],
UPPAAL [26], ProB [168], PRISM [134].
Formal methods are successfully applied in development and verification
of complex dependable systems [185]. They are used in such domains as
transportation systems [16, 90, 23], space and avionic system [120, 57, 149],
traffic management and signaling systems [82, 12], medical devices [30, 95],
etc.
Significant advances in integrating formal methods to industrial practice
have been achieved in the Deploy project [89]. The project has advanced
development of the industrial-strength platform Rodin for state-based mod-
elling and verification of complex resilient systems in the Event-B formalism
[3]. This has motivated our choice of Event-B as the formal development
framework to be employed in this thesis.
3.2 Event-B Method
In this section, we present our formal development framework – Event-B.
The Event-B formalism – a variation of the B Method [2] – is a state-based
formal approach that promotes the correct-by-construction development ap-
proach and verification by theorem proving [3]. The Event-B framework was
influenced by the Action Systems [13, 14, 15] – a formal approach to model
distributed, parallel, and reactive systems.
Modelling in Event-B. In Event-B, a system model is specified using
the notion of an abstract state machine [3]. An abstract state machine en-
capsulates the model state represented as a collection of model variables,
and defines operations on the state. Therefore, machine describes the be-
haviour of the modelled system. A machine may also have the accompanying
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component, called context. A context may include user-defined carrier sets,
constants and their properties formulated as model axioms. A general form
of the Event-B models is given in Figure 4.9.
Machine M name
Sees C name
Variables v
Invariants I
Events
Initialisation
event1
· · ·
eventn
sees→
Context C name
Sets D
Constants C
Axioms A
Figure 3.1: Event-B machine and context
An Event-B machine has a name M name. The model state variables, v,
are declared in the Variables clause and initialised in the Initialisation event.
In Event-B, the model variables are strongly typed by the constraining pred-
icates I called invariants given in the Invariants clause. The invariants also
specify the properties that should be preserved during the system execution.
The dynamic system behaviour is defined by the set of atomic events speci-
fied in the Events clause. An event is essentially a guarded command that,
in the most general form, can be defined as follows:
event =̂ any vl where G then R end
where vl is a list of new local variables, G is the event guard, and R is the
event action.
The guard is a state predicate that defines the conditions under which
the action can be executed, i.e., when the event is enabled. If several events
are enabled at the same time, any of them can be chosen for execution non-
deterministically. If none of the events is enabled then the system deadlocks.
The occurrence of events represents the observable behaviour of the system.
In general, the action of an event is a parallel composition of determin-
istic or non-deterministic assignments. A deterministic assignment, x :=
E(x, y), has the standard syntax and meaning. A non-deterministic assign-
ment is denoted either as x :∈ S, where S is a set of values, or x :| P (x, y, x′),
where P is a predicate relating initial values of x, y to some final value of
x′. As a result of such a non-deterministic assignment, x can get any value
belonging to S or according to P .
The semantics of Event-B actions is defined using so called before-after
(BA) predicates [3]. A before-after predicate describes a relationship be-
tween the system states before and after execution of an event, as shown in
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Table 3.1. Here x and y are disjoint lists (partitions) of the state variables,
and x′, y′ are their values in the after-state.
Table 3.1: Before-after predicates
Action (R) BA(R)
x := E(x, y) x′ = E(x, y) ∧ y′ = y
x :∈ S ∃z · (z ∈ S ∧ x′ = z) ∧ y′ = y
x :| P (x, y, x′) ∃z · (P (x, z, y) ∧ x′ = z) ∧ y′ = y
Event-B Refinement. Event-B employs a top-down refinement-based ap-
proach to the system development. Development in Event-B starts from
an abstract system specification that models the most essential functional
requirements. In a sequence of refinement steps, we gradually reduce non-
determinism and introduce detailed design decisions. Refinement usually
affects both the context and the machine. Context refinement is a simple
extension of the current context achieved by adding new constants, sets
and axioms. A machine can be refined in two possible ways either using
data refinement or superposition refinement. In particular, we can replace
abstract variables by their concrete counterparts, i.e., perform data refine-
ment. In this case, the invariant of the refined machine formally defines the
relationship between the abstract and concrete variables. Via such a gluing
invariant – “refinement relation” – we mathematically establish a correspon-
dence between the state spaces of the refined and the abstract machines.
During superposition refinement, new implementation details are intro-
duced into the system specification by means of new events and new vari-
ables. These new events can not affect the variables of the abstract specifi-
cation and only define computations on newly introduced variables.
The new events correspond to the stuttering steps that are not visible
at the abstract level, i.e., they refine implicit skip. To guarantee that the
refined specification preserves the global behaviour of the abstract machine,
we should demonstrate that the newly introduced events converge. To prove
it, we have to define a variant – an expression over a finite subset of nat-
ural numbers – and show that the execution of new events decreases it.
Sometimes, convergence of an event cannot be proved due to a high level
of non-determinism. In that case, the event obtains the status anticipated.
This obliges the designer to prove, at some later refinement step, that the
event indeed converges.
The correctness and consistency of Event-B models, i.e., verification of
the model well-formedness, invariant preservation, deadlock-freeness, cor-
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rectness of the refinement steps, is demonstrated by proving the relevant
verification theorems – proof obligations. Proof obligations are expressed
as logical sequences, ensuring that the transformation is performed in a
correctness-preserving way [3].
Modelling, refinement and verification of Event-B models is supported
by an automated tool – Rodin platform [142]. The platform provides the
designers with an integrated modelling environment, supports automatic
generation and proving of the necessary proof obligations by means of wide
range of automated provers. Moreover, various plug-ins created for Rodin
platform allow a modeller to transform models from one representation to
another, e.g. from UML to Event-B language [157, 150], or from Event-B
specification to programming languages C/C++ [119, 118], ADA [55, 54],
etc.
The Event-B refinement process allows us to gradually introduce imple-
mentation details, while proving preservation of functional correctness. Such
an approach seamlessly weaves verification into the model development and
allows us to construct detailed models of complex systems is highly auto-
mated incremental manner. By providing an immediate feedback on the
correctness of model transformations, it helps us to cope with complexity of
the system development. Another important mechanism for handling com-
plexity of formal development is decomposition. Model decomposition helps
the designers to separate component development from the overall system
model but ensure that the components can be recomposed into overall sys-
tem in a correctness–preserving way [79]. Event-B is equipped with three
forms of decomposition: shared-variable [4, 77, 33], shared-event [33] and
modularisation [88], all of which are supported by the corresponding Rodin
plug-ins [155, 143]. In this thesis we rely on a modularisation extension of
Event B [88].
Modularisation. Modularisation extension allows the designers to de-
compose a system into modules. Modules are components containing groups
of callable atomic operations [88, 143]. Modules may have their own (ex-
ternal and internal) state and invariant properties. In general, they can
be developed separately and then composed with the main system, when
needed. Since decomposition is a special kind of refinement, such a model
transformation is also a correctness-preserving step that has to be proven
by discharging the relevant proof obligations.
A module description consists of two parts – module interface and module
body. Let M be a module. A module interface is a separate Event-B com-
ponent that has the unique name MI name. A module interface consists
of the external module variables w, the module invariants MI Inv(c, s, w),
and a collection of module operations, characterised by their pre- and post-
conditions defined in the Operations clause. In addition, a module inter-
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Interface MI name
Sees IC name
Variables w
Invariants MI Inv(c, s, w)
Initialisation · · ·
Processes
P1 = any vl where g(c, s, vl, w) then S(c, s, vl, w,w′) end
· · ·
Operations
O1 = any p pre Pre(c, s, vl, w) post Post(c, s, vl, w,w′) end
· · ·
Figure 3.2: Module interface
face may contain a group of standard Event-B events under the Processes
clause. These events model autonomous module thread of control, expressed
in terms of their effect on the external module variables. In other words, they
describe how the module external variables may change between operation
calls. The overall structure of a module interface is shown on Fig.3.2.
A formal development of a module starts with the deciding on its inter-
face. Once an interface is defined, it cannot be changed in any manner during
the development. This ensures that a module body may be constructed in-
dependently from a system model that relies on the module interface. A
module body is an Event-B machine. It implements the interface by provid-
ing a concrete behaviour for each of the interface operations. To guarantee
that each interface operation has a suitable implementation, a set of addi-
tional proof obligations are generated. When the module M is imported into
another Event-B machine (specified by a special clause Uses), the importing
machine may invoke the operations of M and read the external variables of
M .
We can create several instances of the given module and import them
into the same machine. Different instances of a module operate on disjoint
state spaces. Identifier prefixes can be supplied in the Uses clause of the
importing machine to distinguish the variables and the operations of differ-
ent module instances or those of the importing machine and the imported
module. Alternatively, the pre-defined constant set can be supplied as a
additional parameter. In the latter case, module instances are created for
each element of the given set, thus producing an indexed collection (array)
of module instances. A detailed description of indexed modules is given in
[86].
The modularisation extension of Event-B facilitates formal development
of complex systems by allowing the designers to decompose large specifi-
cations into separate components and verify system-level properties at the
architectural level. As a result, proof-based verification as well as reliance
on abstraction and decomposition adopted in Event-B offers the designers a
scalable support for the development of complex distributed systems.
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3.3 Quantitative Assessment
Formal modelling in Event-B allows the designers to derive a complex sys-
tem architecture, formulate and prove logical system properties and formally
verify correctness of the system behaviour. While functional correctness con-
stitutes an important aspect of resilience, we also need to provide the devel-
opers with techniques for quantitative resilience assessment. Quantitative
assessment plays an important role in the process of resilient system devel-
opment because it allows the developers to predict the impact of changes
on such vital aspects as, e.g., reliability and performance. Moreover, quan-
titative analysis helps to find suitable trade-offs between these properties as
well as evaluate the impact of different architectural alternatives on system
resilience. Therefore, in this thesis, we investigate possibility of integration
of formal development in Event-B with quantitative resilience assessment.
In particular, we study integration with the probabilistic symbolic model
checker PRISM [99], and discrete event simulation in SimPy[156].
3.3.1 PRISM model checker
PRISM model checker [99] is one of the leading software tool for formal
modelling and verification of systems that exhibit probabilistic behaviour.
It provides support for analysis of three types of Markov process – discrete-
time Markov chains (DTMC), continuous-time Markov chains (CTMC) and
Markov decision processes (MDP). Additionally, it supports modelling of
(priced) probabilistic timed automata and stochastic games (as a generali-
sation of MDP) [100]. The state-based modelling language of PRISM relies
on the reactive modules formalism [7].
A PRISM model consists of a number of modules which can interact with
each other. The behaviour of each module is described by a set of guarded
commands that are quite similar to Event-B events. The latter fact signif-
icantly simplifies transformation of Event-B machines to the corresponding
PRISM specifications.
While analysing a PRISM model, one can define a number of temporal
logic properties to be evaluated by the tool. To assess resilience, we can rely
on verifying the time-bounded reachability and reward properties. In the
property specification language of PRISM, they can be formulated using the
supported temporal logics – PCTL (Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic)
[73] for discrete-time models and CSL (Continuous Stochastic Logic) [10, 18]
for continuous-time models.
Similarly to Event-B, the PRISM language is a high-level state-based
modelling language. Essentially, PRISM supports the use of constants and
variables. The variables in PRISM are finite-ranged and strongly typed.
They also can be global or local, i.e., associated with a particular module.
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A PRISM specification is constructed as a parallel composition of modules
that can be synchronised using the standard CSP parallel composition. In
addition to local variables, each module has a number of guarded commands
that determine its dynamic behaviour. Each command consists of a guard
and one or more updates over local and global system variables. Each update
is annotated with a probabilistic weight (in discrete-time models) or rate (in
continuous-time models). Similarly to events in Event-B, a guarded com-
mand can be executed (i.e., is enabled) only if its guards evaluate to TRUE.
If several guarded commands are enabled at the same time, then the choice
between them is defined by the model type – it is non-deterministic for MDP
models, probabilistic for DTMC models or modelled as an (exponential) race
condition for CTMC models.
PRISM tool has been successfully employed in many domains includ-
ing distributed coordination algorithms, wireless communication protocols,
security as well as dependability and biological models.
To enable probabilistic analysis of Event-B models in PRISM, we rely
on the continuous-time probabilistic extension of the Event-B framework
[164, 165]. This extension allows us to annotate actions of all model events
with real-valued rates and then transform a probabilistically augmented
Event-B specification into a continuous-time Markov chain. It also implicitly
introduces the notion of time into Event-B models: for any state, the sum
of action rates of all enabled in this state events defines a parameter of the
exponentially distributed time delay that takes place before some enabled
action is triggered.
3.3.2 Discrete-event simulation
Due to similarity between PRISM and Event-B languages, the translation
from a Event-B model to a PRISM specification is rather straightforward.
It makes the use of PRISM model checker attractive for the performing
quantitative assessment. However, the model checking technique does not
always scale to large applications. In such case, simulation offers a viable
alternative for quantitative analysis of resilience.
Traditionally, simulation is called the process of imitating how an actual
system behaves over time [20]. A simulation generates an artificial system
history, thereby enabling analysis of system general behaviour. Simulation
is build around the notion of event – an occurrence that changes the state
of the system. The system state variables are viewed as a collection of all
information that is required to define what is happening within the system
at a given moment of time.
A widely-used type of simulation is known as discrete-event simulation
(DES). In a DES, system state remains constant over an interval of time
between two consecutive events. Thus events signify occurrences that change
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the system state. Events can be classified as either internal or external.
Internal events occur within the modelled system, while external events
occur outside the system, but still might affect it. A simulation is run by
a mechanism that repeatedly moves simulated time forward to the starting
time of the next scheduled event, until there are no more events [152].
From the architectural perspective, a DES system consists of a number
of entities (e.g., components, processes, agents, etc.), which are either pro-
ducers or recipients of discrete events. Static entities (e.g., queues, buffers,
etc.) can often be represented as resources. Resources have limited availabil-
ity, leading to competition among entities. Waiting for a particular event
to occur can lead to a delay, lasting for an indefinite amount of time. In
other cases, the time estimate may be known in advance. Events can be
also interrupted and pre-empted, e.g., in reaction to component failures or
pre-defined high-priority events.
There are four primary simulation paradigms [20]: process-interaction,
event-scheduling, activity scanning, and the three-phase method. In this
thesis, we use SimPy [156] – a simulation framework based on process-
interaction in Python. Essentially, SimPy is a discrete-event simulation
library written in Python. The behaviour of active entities (e.g., customers,
requests) is modelled by means of processes. All processes settle in an envi-
ronment and interact with the environment and with each other via events.
Processes are described by simple Python generators. During their life-
time, they create events and yield them in order to wait for them to be
triggered. When a process yields an event, the process gets suspended.
SimPy resumes the process, when the event occurs. Timeout is an impor-
tant event type. Events of this type are triggered after a certain amount of
(simulated) time has passed. SimPy also provides various types of shared
resources to model limited capacity congestion points (like servers, queues,
buffers, etc.).
Discrete-event simulation represents an attractive technique for quanti-
tative evaluation of different system characteristics. It allows the designers
to perform various“what-if” type of analysis that demonstrates sensitivity
of the service architecture to changes of its parameters. For instance, it
gives an understanding on how the system reacts on peak-loads, how adding
new resources affects its performance, what is the relationships between the
degree of redundancy and fault tolerance, etc. Moreover, while simulat-
ing the behaviour, the designers can also obtain the information on which
parameters should be monitored at run-time to optimise a resource allo-
cation strategy. However, to obtain all the above-mentioned benefits, the
designers have to ensure that the simulation models are correct and indeed
representative of the actual system. In particular, this can be achievable via
integration of simulation technique with formal modelling.
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Chapter 4
Formal Development and
Quantitative Assessment of
Resilient Distributed
Systems
4.1 Overview of the Proposed Approach
In this chapter, we present the main technical contribution of the thesis
– an integrated approach to development and assessment of resilient dis-
tributed systems. Our approach relies on formal development by refinement
in Event-B, which is augmented with quantitative resilience assessment in
the probabilistic model checker PRISM and discrete event simulation in
SimPy.
Unreliability of system components and communication channels, com-
plex component interactions as well as highly dynamic operating conditions
make the problem of developing resilient distributed systems challenging.
To address this problem, we need advanced methods that are able to cope
with the complexity inherent to such systems.
The Event-B framework relies on three main mechanisms for coping with
complexity: abstraction, decomposition and proofs. Development of a dis-
tributed system in Event-B starts from creating an abstract system specifi-
cation (model). Often such a specification gives a “black-box” model of the
system behaviour, i.e., it focuses on defining the externally observable be-
haviour while abstracting away from the system component architecture and
the internal functional behaviour. The initial Event-B model represents a
centralised system that exhibits the desired externally observable behaviour
and properties. The following refinement steps aim at transforming the ab-
stract model into a detailed system specification by gradually unfolding the
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system architecture, precisely defining the functional behaviour as well as
deriving a detailed representation of component interactions.
In this chapter, we show how the described above generic approach to
development of distributed systems by refinement can be tailored to support
resilience-explicit development of different types of systems. The resulting
approach shares the common idea of using refinement as the main vehicle for
unfolding the system architecture and dynamics. Refinement facilitates sys-
tematic introduction of the mechanisms for ensuring system resilience while
defining various inter-relationships between the system elements. Moreover,
since quantitative assessment of different resilience characteristics is an es-
sential part of the system design for resilience, we show how Event-B models
can be augmented with quantitative data and, as a result, serve as a basis
for quantitative resilience assessment.
Resilience-explicit development based on functional decomposi-
tion. To present our approach, we start first by considering the systems
that perform a predefined scenario that can be implemented by a determin-
istic sequential execution flow. Such kind of the system behaviour is typical
for a certain class of systems, which includes, among others, service-oriented
and control systems. In service-oriented systems, a service can be often mod-
elled as a sequential composition of subservices. Such a composite service
can be provided only if each subservice is successfully executed. A similar
type of reasoning can be used for modelling control systems. Since control
systems are cyclic, each execution cycle can be represented as a sequential
execution of certain functional blocks.
In our approach, we explicitly define the resilience-explicit refinement
process for such systems. Specifically, we demonstrate that modelling of not
only the nominal system behaviour but also a possibility of system failures
already at the abstract level can facilitate a rigorous systematic derivation
of the required fault tolerance mechanisms. Then we discuss generic func-
tional decomposition as a refinement step that results in defining a high-level
execution flow. We explain how to establish a connection between a global
system failure and the corresponding failures in the execution flow. Further,
we demonstrate how refinement can be used for deriving the component-
based system architecture and linking component failures with those in the
system execution flow. Moreover, establishing the connection between the
functionality of the system and that of its components allows us to sys-
tematically derive the system reconfiguration mechanisms that are based on
reallocation of execution of certain functional tasks from the failed compo-
nents to the healthy ones. Finally, to evaluate the impact of reconfiguration
on the system performance and reliability, we augment the resulting Event-B
models defining various reconfiguration scenarios with the necessary proba-
bilistic information and demonstrate how to quantitatively assess different
reconfiguration strategies.
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Modelling component interactions. After presenting the generic resi-
lience-explicit development process for systems with a deterministic sequen-
tial execution flow, we focus on detailed analysis of component interactions
while providing a certain function (service) or participating in a specific col-
laboration. To perform the required functions while ensuring fault tolerance,
the system components should interact and cooperate with each other. To
facilitate reasoning about such cooperative behaviour, we treat components
as agents and a resilient distributed system as a multi-agent system. The
multi-agent modelling perspective helps us to define the essential proper-
ties of cooperative agent activities. As a result, we derive the constraints
that should be imposed on agent interactions to ensure correct and safe
functioning despite component and communication failures.
Resilient-explicit goal-oriented refinement process. Another large
class of distributed systems includes the systems whose execution flow is
highly non-deterministic, with a loose connection between functional blocks.
Typical examples of such systems are standard multi-agent systems whose
components (agents) have some degree of autonomy. For such kind of sys-
tems, it is convenient to adopt the goal-oriented reasoning style. In the
Section 4.4 of this chapter, we propose a development method for such sys-
tems that formalises the resilient-explicit goal-oriented refinement process.
Resilience can be defined as the ability of a system to achieve its ob-
jectives – goals – despite failures and other changes. We define a set of
specification and refinement patterns that reflect the main concepts of the
goal-oriented development. The refinement approach is employed to support
the goal decomposition process, thus allowing us to define the system goals
at different levels of abstraction. We follow the same generic strategy for
development of distributed goal-oriented systems by refinement. Namely,
we start by abstractly defining system goals, then perform goal decom-
position by refinement, and finally introduce a representation of system
agents, whose collaborative activities ensure goal reachability. Therefore,
our resilience-explicit goal-oriented refinement approach aims at ensuring
goal reachability “by construction”. It allows the developers to systemati-
cally introduce the required reconfiguration mechanisms to ensure that the
system progresses towards achieving its goals despite agent failures (thereby,
address “negative” changes) or becomes more performant by using its agents
more efficiently (thereby, address “positive” changes).
We consider a dynamic reconfiguration as a powerful technique for achiev-
ing system resilience because it allows the system to adapt to changes by
modifying its structure, inter-agent relationships and dependencies. How-
ever, ensuring correctness of the incorporated reconfiguration mechanisms
is a complex task. To address this issue, we formalise the possible inter-
dependencies between goals and agents as well as formulate the conditions
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for ensuring goal reachability in a reconfigurable multi-agent system. The
proposed formalisation gives a formal systematisation of the introduced con-
cepts and can be seen as generic guidelines for designing reconfigurable sys-
tems.
In our resilience-explicit goal-oriented development approach we assume
that the agents are sufficiently reliable, i.e., some agents will stay operational
during the whole process of goal achieving. To validate such an assumption
and derive the constraints on agents reliability, we need to employ quantita-
tive analysis. Quantitative assessment is also required to evaluate the impact
of various architectural solutions on the system performance and reliability.
Integration with probabilistic model checking in PRISM allows us to achieve
these objectives. We augment our Event-B models with quantitative data
and transform them into input models for the PRISM model checker. As a
result, quantitative assessment allows the designers to make informed design
choices and develop systems with predictable resilience characteristics.
Modelling and assessment of resilient architectures Finally, in the
last part of this chapter, we investigate how a resilient-explicit refinement
approach can be adopted to derive distributed architectures with the incor-
porated fault tolerance mechanisms. We consider a particular approach to
ensure fault tolerance – write-ahead logging (WAL) – and experiment with
deriving several alternative architectures implementing it. Each architec-
tural solution exhibit different reliability and performance characteristics.
We demonstrate how to derive different architectures by refinement and
formally define data integrity and consistency properties that logically for-
mulate reliability characteristics.
Moreover, we propose a graphical notation which facilitates resilience as-
sessment of architectural alternatives by discrete event simulation in SimPy
– a library and development framework in Python. The quantitative anal-
ysis in SimPy allows us to evaluate the impact of a particular architectural
solution on the system reliability/performance ratio.
4.2 Resilience-Explicit Development Based on
Functional Decomposition.
In this section, we present our resilience-explicit refinement process for the
systems that perform a certain predefined scenario. Our aim is to facilitate
rigorous modelling of both nominal and off-nominal system behaviour and
to support structured derivation of a functional system specification that
integrates the required fault tolerance mechanisms. This is achieved by an
explicit representation of the failure behaviour at all levels of abstraction.
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Let us assume that the system under construction should provide a ser-
vice that can be represented as a composition of certain functional blocks
as shown in Fig.4.1.
Figure 4.1: Generic execution control flow
In the context of service-oriented systems, the functional blocks corre-
spond to subservices, while in the context of control systems they represent
the steps of a single iteration of a control loop. The resulting sequence of
functional blocks defines the system execution flow.
In our initial specification, presented in Fig.4.2, we abstractly model the
changing status of service execution. Initially the system is idle and can be
activated to provide a service, as modelled by the event Activation. This
results in changing the value of the boolean variable idle from TRUE to
FALSE. Upon service activation, the event Execution becomes enabled. It
models the progress of service execution by non-deterministically changing
the value of the variable process. The set PSTATES = {FINISHED, UN-
FINISHED, ABORT} represents the possible status of the service execution
process. The value of process remains UNFINISHED until all the functional
blocks of the service are successfully executed. Upon completion of the ser-
vice execution, the variable process obtains value FINISHED, which in turn
enables the event Finish. This event changes the status of the system to
inactive, i.e., the variable idle obtains the value TRUE.
The value ABORT of the variable process designates the occurrence
of an unrecoverable failure. The corresponding event Abort deadlocks the
specification, i.e., models the fact that the software halts its execution.
Machine abs behaviour
Variables idle, process
Invariants
idle ∈ BOOL
process ∈ PSTATES
idle = TRUE⇒ process = UNFINISHED
Events
Activation =̂
where idle = TRUE
then idle := FALSE
end
Execution =̂
where idle = FALSE∧ process = UNFINISHED
then process :∈ PSTATES
end
Finish =̂
where idle = FALSE ∧ process = FINISHED
then idle, process = TRUE,UNFINISHED
end
Abort =̂
when process = ABORT
then skip
end
Figure 4.2: Abstract System Behaviour Model
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Functional Decomposition by Refinement. Next we refine the ab-
stract specification by introducing an explicit representation of the execution
flow, i.e., by modelling an execution sequence of the predefined functional
blocks. For illustrative purposes, we consider only a simple case of sequen-
tial execution. However, in general, we can define any complex scenario
(including branching, rollbacking, etc.) by formulating the corresponding
axioms in the model context.
For simplicity, we assume that the “id” of each block is defined by its
execution order, i.e. block1 is executed first and so on. To explicitly model
the impact of failures of individual block executions on the overall service
provisioning, we define the following function block state:
block state ∈ 1..n→ BSTATES,
where BSTATES = {NI, OK, POK, NOK} is an enumerated set of the pos-
sible status values for block execution. Initially, none of the block is ex-
ecuted, i.e., the status of each block is NI. The block execution can lead
to successful completion (block state gets the value OK ), an unrecoverable
failure (NOK ), or a failure that can be recovered by resigning the block to
a different available component (POK ).
To model functional decomposition, we replace the abstract variable pro-
cess by the variable block state, i.e., perform data refinement. The gluing
invariants for such data refinement are given below. An excerpt from the
refined specification is shown in Fig. 4.3.
The introduced events Start and Progress model execution of the corre-
sponding functional blocks. They specify the process of sequential selection
of one block after another until either all blocks are executed, i.e., the service
is completed, or execution of some blocks fails, i.e., service provisioning fails.
The sequential order between the events is enforced by the corresponding
guards. In particular, the guards ensure that the execution of all previous
blocks has been successful completed.
Machine ref1
Variables idle, block state
Invariants ...
Events
// first block execution
Start =̂ refines Execution
any res
when res ∈ {OK,POK,NOK} ∧
block state(1) 6= OK ∧
block state(1) 6= NOK
then block state(1) := res
end
// block execution
Progress =̂ refines Execution
any j, res
where j > 0 ∧ j < n ∧
res ∈ {OK,POK,NOK} ∧
block state(j) = OK ∧
block state(j + 1) 6= OK ∧
block state(j + 1) 6= NOK
then block state(j + 1) := res
end
...
Figure 4.3: Flow Modelling
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We formulate and prove the following invariants defining some essential
properties of the defined execution flow. The properties postulate that a
next block can be chosen for execution only if execution of all the previously
chosen blocks was successfully completed and, moreover, the subsequent
block was not executed yet:
∀l · l ∈ 2 .. n ∧ block state(l) 6= NI⇒ (∀i · i ∈ 1 .. l − 1⇒ block state(i) = OK),
∀l · l ∈ 1 .. n− 1 ∧ block state(l) 6= OK⇒ (∀i · i ∈ l + 1 .. n⇒ block state(i) = NI).
The refined model should guarantee that the execution process pro-
gresses towards completion of service provisioning. This is ensured by the
gluing invariants that establish the relationship between the abstract speci-
fication and the functional decomposition introduced by refinement:
block state[1 .. n] = {OK}⇒ process = FINISHED,
(block state[1 .. n] = {OK,POK,NI } ∨ block state[1 .. n] = {NI })⇒
process = UNFINISHED,
(∃i · i ∈ 1 .. n ∧ block state(i) = NOK)⇒ process = ABORT.
Component Modelling. The purpose of the Component Modelling re-
finement step is to link the functional blocks with the corresponding system
components that are responsible for executing them.
We define a variable representing the current state for each system com-
ponent:
comp state ∈ COMPONENTS→ CSTATES,
where COMPONENTS represents the set of all system components, while
CSTATES stands for an enumerated set {NA, OPERATIONAL, FAILED}.
A component has a status NA if it is not currently involved into the execution
process. A healthy active component has the status OPERATIONAL, while
a failed component obtains the status FAILED.
To define the relationship between the functional blocks and the com-
ponents that are responsible for executing them, we introduce the variable
exec:
exec ∈ COMPONENTS↔ 1..n.
Here we do not impose any additional restrictions on the “component-
block” interdependency. However, one can specify a certain condition that
should hold during the execution, e.g., postulate that a component should
be responsible for executing at least one block. We refine the events mod-
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// successful block execution
SuccessProgress =̂ refines Progress
any j, c
when j > 0 ∧ j < n ∧
block state(j) = OK ∧
block state(j + 1) 6= OK ∧
block state(j + 1) 6= NOK
comp state(c) = OPERATIONAL
then block state(j + 1) := OK
exec := exec ∪ {c 7→ j + 1}
end
// unrecoverable failure
FailProgress =̂ refines Progress
any j, c
when j > 0 ∧ j < n ∧
block state(j) = OK ∧
block state(j + 1) 6= OK ∧
block state(j + 1) 6= NOK
comp state(c) = FAILED
then block state(j + 1) := NOK
exec := exec ∪ {c 7→ j + 1}
end
Figure 4.4: Component Modelling
elling three cases of the block execution. Below, Fig. 4.4 presents the events
modelling the successful and unrecoverable failed execution of blocks.
To link the status of block execution with the status of the component re-
sponsible for executing it, we formulate and prove the invariant, establishing
relationship between them:
∀i · i ∈ 1 .. n ∧ block state(i) = OK⇒ (∃c · c ∈ COMPONENTS ∧
(c 7→ i) ∈ exec ∧ comp state(c) = OPERATIONAL).
Abstract Reconfiguration Modelling. At this refinement step we intro-
duce an abstract model of reconfiguration that is performed by reassigning
responsibility to execute a certain functional block from a failed component
to a healthy one. In particular, we define a new function variable assign to
represent a block assigned to be executed to a component:
assign ∈ COMPONENTS↔ 1..n.
We add new events AssignFirstBlock and AssignBlock modelling block as-
signment (see Fig. 4.5 ). In the guard of the events SuccessStart, FailStart,
// block assignment
AssignBlock =̂
any j, c
when ...
comp state(c) = OPERATIONAL
j /∈ ran(assign) ∧
c /∈ dom(exec) ∧ c /∈ dom(assign)
then assign := assign ∪ {c 7→ j}
end
// successful block execution
SuccessProgress =̂ refines SuccessProgress
any j, c
when ...
(c 7→ j + 1) ∈ assign ∧
comp state(c) = OPERATIONAL
then block state(j + 1) := OK
exec := exec ∪ {c 7→ j + 1}
assign := assign \ {c 7→ j + 1}
end
Figure 4.5: Block Reallocation Modelling
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SuccessProgress and FailProgress, we add the additional conditions where we
check that the corresponding block has been assigned before to the compo-
nent. In our modelling, we assume that a component may fail only during
its block execution.
Let us note that in our specification we model error detection in a highly
abstract way. However, we can further refine the model to elaborate on the
involved error detection mechanism, for instance, by defining component
pinging.
The proposed resilience-explicit refinement process is generic. It ab-
stracts away from the concrete functionality that the system under con-
struction should implement and defines only what kind of the refinement
steps should be performed and which types of properties that should be
defined and verified. The final refinement step can be seen as a starting
point for introducing different reconfiguration strategies and, consequently,
employing quantitative assessment technique.
Each reconfiguration alternative (i.e., a different reconfiguration strategy
or mechanism) results in creating the corresponding Event-B model. To
evaluate the impact of different reconfiguration alternatives, we transform
the models into inputs to the PRISM model checker. To achieve this, we
augment the corresponding Event-B models with the following probabilistic
data:
• the lengths of time delays required by components to execute specific
functional blocks;
• the occurrence rates of possible failures of these components.
Moreover, we replace all the local nondeterminism with the (exponen-
tial) race conditions. Such a transformation allows us to represent the be-
haviour of Event-B machines by continuous time Markov chains and use
the probabilistic symbolic model checker PRISM to evaluate reliability and
performance of the proposed models. Since the quantitative assessment was
done primarily by the colleagues of the author of this thesis, the detailed
description of this part of approach is omitted in this thesis.
The proposed approach is a generalisation of more detailed formal devel-
opments of two case studies presented in Paper I and Paper II of this thesis.
In Paper I we undertake modelling and quantitative assessment of an on-
board satellite system. We follow the generic resilience-explicit refinement
process described above and derive two alternative versions of the reconfig-
urable system architecture: the triplicated and duplicated ones. From the
functional point of view, both architectural alternatives are equivalent, i.e.,
they implement the same service. To evaluate their resilience aspect, we
perform quantitative analysis. The main goal of the analysis is to explore
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at design-time whether the duplicated architecture that exploits the dy-
namic system reconfiguration mechanisms has acceptable performance and
reliability characteristics in comparison with the more resource-expensive
triplicated alternative.
In the Paper II, to facilitate the formal development process in Event-B,
the event refinement structure approach is implemented. It augments Event-
B refinement with a graphical notation that allows us to explicitly represent
the relationships between the events at different abstraction levels as well as
define the required event sequence in a model. In this work, we experiment
with modelling the system execution flow in the presence of parallelism and
block interdependencies.
4.3 Modelling Component Interactions with Multi-
Agent Framework
In our resilience-explicit refinement process presented above, we abstracted
away from modelling component interactions while performing the prede-
fined functions. Usually, execution of a certain functional block and espe-
cially achieving fault tolerance relies on the assumption that the components
behave in a cooperative way. For instance, when execution of a functional
block is being reallocated from a failed component to a healthy one, the
healthy component needs to accept the new responsibility, i.e. behave co-
operatively.
The multi-agent modelling paradigm facilitates reasoning about the co-
operative component behaviour. We adopt this paradigm to demonstrate
how to reason about resilience of complex component interactions. It al-
lows us to treat the components of a resilient distributed system as agents
and execution of system functions or services as cooperative agent activi-
ties. Next we present our formal approach to resilience-explicit modelling of
agent interactions.
We formally reason about agents, their attributes and behaviour as well
as agent cooperative activities. The formalisation allow us to establish logi-
cal connections between agents and define the conditions under which agents
interactions result in correct execution of a cooperative activity. Moreover,
the established dynamic connections (called relationships) between agents
allow us to explicitly reason about resilience of complex agent interactions.
A multi-agent system MAS is a tuple (A, µ,R, Σ,E,Active,Rel), where
A is a set of all the system agents, µ is the system middleware, R is a
set of all possible relationships between agents in a MAS, Σ is the system
state space, and E is a collection of system events (reactions). Moreover,
the dynamic system attributes Active and Rel map a given system state to a
set of the active (healthy) system agents and a set of dynamic relationships
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between the active agents respectively.
The system dynamics is modelled as a set of system events E, where
each event e ∈ E can be formally represented as a relation on input and
output system states, i.e., e : Σ ↔ Σ. The dynamic system attributes
Active and Rel are then simply functions from Σ, i.e., Active : Σ → P(A)
and Rel : Σ→ P(R), returning respectively the current sets of active system
agents and dynamic relationships between them. Intuitively, two or more
system agents being in a dynamic relationship means that these agents are
currently involved in a specific collaboration needed to provide a predefined
system function or service.
Each system agent belongs to a particular agent class. Essentially these
classes represent a partitioning of the system agents into different groups
according to their capabilities. In general, there can be many agent classes
Ai, i ∈ 1..n, such that Ai ⊆ A. We assume that all of them are disjoint.
The system middleware µ can be considered as a special kind of the
system agent that is always present in the system. The main responsibil-
ity of the middleware is to ensure communication between different agents,
detect appearance of new agents or disappearance (both normal and abnor-
mal) of the existing agents, recover from the situations when the required
connections between the agents are lost, etc.
The system state space Σ consists of all possible states of agents and
the middleware. The system events E then include all internal and external
system reactions (state transitions). We assume that each agent may have a
number of dynamic attributes that can be changed during these transitions.
The values of these attributes in a particular state also determine whether
a particular agent is currently “eligible”, i.e., can be involved in execution
of specific system events.
Each interaction activity between different agents (or an agent and the
middleware) may be composed of a set of events. Moreover, system events
may model appearance or disappearance of agents, sending request from one
agent to another, recovery of lost connections, etc.
A set R defines all possible dynamic relationships or connections between
agents of the same or different classes. We assume the existence of a number
of available data constructor functions to create elements of R. More pre-
cisely, for each relationship r ∈ R, r is modelled as a result of an application
of some data constructor function
r = R Constri(a1, a2, ..., am),
where R Constri : A
∗
i1
× A∗i2 ... × A∗im  R for some m ∈ N1 and each
A∗ij = Ak ∪ {?} for some agent type Ak. Here  designates an injection
function and “?” stands for an unknown agent of the corresponding class.
A relationship can be pending, i.e., incomplete. This is indicated by
putting the question marks instead of a concrete agent,
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e.g., R Constri(a1, a2, ?, a4, ?). Pending relationships are often caused by
disappearance or a failure of the agents previously involved in a relationship.
Moreover, an existing active agent may initiate a new pending relationship.
Once a pending relationships is resolved (completed), the question mark is
replaced by a concrete agent.
While R represents all possible agent relationships, Rel stores the cur-
rently active (both complete and pending) relationships. For a relationship
to be active, all the involved in it agents should be active as well. In other
words, for any σ ∈ Σ and r ∈ Rel(σ), if a concrete agent ai is involved in r,
it should be an active one, i.e., ai ∈ Active(σ).
Let us now consider some expected properties that should be hold for
interactions between agents as well as between agents and the middleware.
Property 1. Let EAA and EAµ be all interaction activities (sets of events)
defined between agents or between agents and middleware respectively. More-
over, for each agent a ∈ A, let Ea be a set of events in which the agent a
might be involved. Then
∀σ, a· a ∈ Active(σ)⇒ Ea(σ) ∈ EAA ∪ EAµ
and
∀σ, a· a /∈ Active(σ)⇒ Ea(σ) ∈ EAµ.
The property restricts agent interactions with respect to the agent activity
status. For instance, this property implies that, when an agent is recovering
from a failure, it cannot be involved into any cooperative activities with
other agents. Therefore, while modelling agent interactions, we have to take
into account the agent status.
To represent such a behaviour in Event-B, we define the following events
modelling agent activities with the middleware. In particular, the events
Appearance and Disappearance model joining and leaving the system by
agents (of any classes).
Appearance =̂
any a
when a ∈ AGENTS ∧ a /∈ Active
then Active := Active ∪ {a}
end
Disappearance =̂
any a
when a ∈ Active
then Active := Active \ {a}
end
Here AGENTS defines a set of all system agents (i.e., A), while Active
represents the subset of active agents.
In a similar way, only active agents can interact with each other as shown
by the event Interaction.
Interaction =̂
any a1, a2
when a1 ∈ Active ∧ a2 ∈ Active ∧
Elig1(a1) = TRUE ∧ Elig2(a2) = TRUE ∧ ...
then ...
end
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Here Elig1(a1) and Elig2(a2) abstractly model specific eligibility conditions
on the agents that should be checked before their interaction.
The next expected property concerns collaborative activities between the
agents and how these activities are linked with the inter-agent relationships.
Property 2. Let EAA be all the interactions in which active agents may be
involved. Moreover, for each active agent a, let Ra be all the relationships
it may be involved in. Finally, for each collaborative activity CA ∈ EAA,
let ACA be a set of all agents involved in it. Then, for each CA ∈ EAA and
a1, a2 ∈ ACA,
Ra1 ∩ Ra2 6= ∅.
This property restricts the interactions between the agents: only the
agents that are linked by dynamic relationships (some of which may be
pending) can be involved into cooperative activities.
To specify abstractly a collaborative activity between agents in Event-B,
we define an event CollabActivity. In the event guard, we check that both
agents, participating in a collaboration, are active, eligible to be involved,
and there is a pre-existing relationships that permits their interactions:
CollabActivity =̂
any a1, a2
when
a1 ∈ Active ∧ a2 ∈ Active ∧
Elig1(a1) = TRUE ∧ Elig2(a2) = TRUE ∧
RConsti(a1 7→ a2) ∈ Rel
then ...
end
Here RConsti is a data constructor for a specific kind of agent relationships,
which is formally specified in the model context. In a similar way, we can
model collaborating activities involving any number of agents.
We can specify initiation of a new relationship between agents in two
ways. In the case, when all the required agents are active, eligible and
ready to enter the relationship, it can be defined by the following event
InitiateRelationship.
InitiateRelationship =̂
any a1, a2
when a1 ∈ Active ∧ a2 ∈ Active ∧
Ellig(a1) = TRUE ∧ Ellig(a2) = TRUE
then Rel := Rel ∪ RConsti(a1 7→ a2)
end
The opposite situation, when some agent of the initiated relationship is
still unknown, can be defined by the following event InitiatePendingRelationship.
Here the pre-defined element None, None ∈ AGENTS, is used to designate
a missing agent in the pending relationship (i.e., the special agent “?” in the
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above formalisation). In the event shown below, an agent a1 initiates a new
pending relationship, where the place for a second agent of the particular
type is currently vacant (i.e., is marked by None). The resulting pending
relationships is added to Rel.
InitiatePendingRelationship =̂
any a1
when a1 ∈ Active ∧ Ellig(a1) = TRUE
then Rel := Rel ∪ RConsti(a1 7→ None)
end
Essentially, all the relationships containing None in the place of any their
elements denote pending relationships.
To resolve the pending relationship RConsti(a1 7→ None), the corre-
sponding agent has to join this collaborative activity. This situation is ab-
stractly modelled by the event AcceptRelationship.
AcceptRelationship =̂
status anticipated
any a1, a2
when a1 ∈ Active ∧ a2 ∈ Active ∧ Ellig(a2) = TRUE ∧
RConsti(a1 7→ None) ∈ Rel
then Rel := (Rel \ RConsti(a1 7→ None)) ∪ RConst i(a1 7→ a2)
end
The system middleware µ keeps track of the pending relationships and
tries to resolve them by enquiring suitable agents to confirm their willingness
to enter into a particular relationship. We can also distinguish a special sub-
set of the pending relationships that have a priority over the others. These
relationships are linked with executing critical functions, and hence called
critical. A responsibility of the middleware is to detect situations when
some of the established or to be established relationships become pending
and guarantee eventual resolution of them. Essentially, this means that no
pending request is ignored forever and the middleware tries to enforce the
given preferences, if possible.
While developing a resilient MAS, we should ensure that all high priority
relationships will be established. Therefore, we have to verify that corre-
sponding cooperative activities, establishing these critical relationships, once
initiated, are successfully completed. More precisely, we have to verify the
following property:
Property 3. Let EAAcrit, where EAAcrit ⊆ EAA, be a subset containing
critical collaborative activities. Moreover, let Rpen and Rres, where Rpen ⊆ R
and Rres ⊆ R, be the subsets of pending and resolved relationships defined
for these activities. Finally, let RCA, where CA ∈ EAA and RCA ⊆ R,
be all the relationships the activity CA can affect. Then, for each activity
CA ∈ EAAcrit and relationship R ∈ RCA,
(R ∈ Rpen) (R ∈ Rres),
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where  denotes “leads to” operator.
This property postulates that eventually all the pending relationships should
be resolved for each cooperative activity.
To verify this property in Event-B, we have to prove that the event
AcceptRelationship converges, i.e., eventually gets enabled. We achieve this
by requiring that, at the abstract level, the event AcceptRelationship has the
anticipated status. This means that “resolving” of a pending relationship is
postulated rather than proved. However, at some refinement step, this event
status also obliges us to prove that the event or its refinements converge,
i.e., to prove that the process of resolving a relationship will eventually
terminate.
An application of the proposed approach to reasoning about resilient
multi-agent systems is illustrated by a case study – development of a hospital
MAS. The case study is presented in Papers III-IV included in this thesis.
4.4 Goal-Oriented Modelling of Resilient Systems
In this section, we propose the resilience-explicit refinement process that
aims at facilitating development of complex distributed systems whose ex-
ecution flow is highly non-deterministic, with a loose connection between
functional blocks. Typical examples of such systems are multi-agent sys-
tems. For such kind of systems, it is convenient to adopt the goal-oriented
reasoning style. Goals provide us with a suitable basis for reasoning about
system resilience. Indeed, resilience can be considered as an ability of a
system to achieve its objectives – goals – despite failures and changes.
4.4.1 Pattern-Based Formal Development of Resilient MAS
To support the goal-oriented development of multi-agent resilient systems
in Event-B, we define a set of Event-B specification and refinement patterns
that reflect the main concepts of the goal-oriented engineering. Patterns
define generic reusable solutions that facilitate development of complex sys-
tems [67, 78, 87].
In the context of formal development in Event-B, patterns represent
generic modelling solutions that can be reused in similar developments via
instantiation. Usually, an Event-B pattern contains abstract types, con-
stants and variables. The context component of such a model defines the
properties that should be satisfied by concrete instantiations of abstract data
structures. Moreover, the invariant properties of a pattern, once proven, re-
main valid for all instantiations.
Let us assume that we have defined a collection of Event-B patterns:
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P1, P2, ..., Pn that refine each other in the following way:
P1 is refined by P2 ,..., Pn−1 is refined by Pn.
Such a refinement chain expresses a generic development by refinement. Ab-
stract data structures of all the involved patterns become generic parameters
of the development. Each pattern abstractly defines a solution for specifying
a certain modelling aspect. The initial pattern P1 presents a generic model
(specification pattern), serving as a starting point of such a development.
Each refinement step focuses on formulating specific modelling aspects that
should be introduced as a result of the corresponding refinement transforma-
tion. The result of such a refinement transformation is called a refinement
pattern.
Our proposed specification and refinement patterns interpret some essen-
tial activities of the goal-oriented engineering within the Event-B refinement
process:
• Goal Modelling Pattern: explicitly defines high-level system goal(s) in
Event-B and postulates goal reachability;
• Goal Decomposition Pattern: demonstrates how to define the system
goals at different levels of abstraction in Event-B (i.e., how to decom-
pose high-level system goal(s) into subgoals). An application of the
pattern results in introducing a goal hierarchy;
• Agent Modelling Pattern: allows the designers to introduce agents into
a specification and associate them with the system goals;
• Agent Refinement Pattern: explicitly defines the static and dynamic
agent characteristics (attributes).
Next, we describe the proposed patterns in more detail. The full de-
scription is presented in Paper V included in this thesis.
Goal Modelling Pattern. We use the concept of a state transition sys-
tem to reason about the system behaviour. To formulate the Goal Modelling
Pattern, we start by introducing an abstract type GSTATE defining the sys-
tem state space. Moreover, Goal is a non-empty subset of GSTATE that
abstractly defines the given system goal(s). We say that the system has
achieved the desired goals if its current state belongs to Goal.
While modelling a system in Event-B, we should ensure that the system
under development achieves the desired goal. We can formally express this
by requiring that the system terminates in a state belonging to Goal. The
process of accomplishing such a goal is modelled by the event Reaching Goal.
The event is enabled while the goal is not reached. The variable gstate might
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eventually change its value from not reached to reached (i.e., gstate becomes
∈ Goal), thus designating achievement of the goal:
Reaching Goal =̂
status anticipated
when
gstate ∈ GSTATE \Goal
then
gstate :∈ GSTATE
end
end
The system terminates when Reaching Goal event becomes disabled, i.e.,
when a state satisfying Goal is reached. Note that the event Reaching Goal
has the status anticipated. Hence, at this stage reachability is postulated
rather than proved, postponing the proof of convergence to some later re-
finement step. However, later when we introduce more system details, we
will be able to prove that the event (or one of its refinements) converges.
Goal Decomposition Pattern. The main idea of goal-oriented develop-
ment is to decompose the high-level system goals into a set of corresponding
subgoals. Essentially, the resulting subgoals define intermediate stages of
the process of achieving the main goal(s). The objective of the Goal De-
composition Pattern is to explicitly introduce such subgoals into the system
specification.
While defining the lower-level goals, we should ensure that the high-
level goals remain achievable. Hence our refinement pattern should reflect
the relation between the high-level goals and their subgoals. Moreover, it
should ensure that high-level goal reachability is ensured and can be defined
via reachability of the corresponding lower-level subgoals. We assume that
the subgoals are independent of each other. This means that reachability of
any subgoal does not affect reachability of another one.
To model this pattern in Event-B, we assume (for simplicity, and without
losing generality) that the system goal Goal is achieved by reaching three
subgoals. The subgoals are defined as corresponding variables: Subgoal1,
Subgoal2, and Subgoal3. The goal independence assumption allows us to
partition the high-level goal state space GSTATE into three non-empty
subsets: SG STATE1, SG STATE2 and SG STATE3.
The following mapping function State map establishes the gluing re-
lationship between the new state spaces SG STATEi, i ∈ 1..3, and the
abstract state space:
State map ∈ SG STATE1× SG STATE2× SG STATE3GSTATE.
Here designates a bijection function. Essentially it partitions the original
goal state space into three independent parts.
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To postulate interdependence between reachability of the main goal and
that of its subgoals, we rigorous express the following property: the main
goal is reached if and only if all three subgoals are reached:
∀sg1, sg2, sg3· sg1 ∈ Subgoal1 ∧ sg2 ∈ Subgoal2 ∧ sg3 ∈ Subgoal3
⇔ State map(sg1 7→ sg2 7→ sg3) ∈ Goal.
In general, we can logically relate the main goal with any expression on its
subgoals.
A refinement step performed according to the Goal Decomposition Pat-
tern is an example of Event-B data refinement. We replace the abstract
variable gstate with the new variables gstatei ∈ SG STATEi, i ∈ 1..3. The
new variables model the state of the corresponding subgoals. The following
gluing invariant allows us to prove data refinement:
gstate = State map(gstate1 7→ gstate2 7→ gstate3).
Now the event Reaching Goal of the abstract machine is decomposed
into three similar events Reaching SubGoali, i ∈ 1..3, modelling the process
of achieving of the corresponding subgoals, as shown below:
Machine M GD
Reaching SubGoal1 =̂ refines Reaching Goal
status anticipated
when
gstate1 ∈ SG STATE1 \ Subgoal1
then
gstate1 :∈ SG STATE1
end
...
The proposed Goal Decomposition Pattern can be repeatedly used to
refine subgoals into the subgoals of a finer granularity until the desired level
of detail is reached.
Agent Modelling Pattern. The proposed Abstract Goal Modelling and
Goal Decomposition patterns allow us to specify the system goal(s) at dif-
ferent levels of abstraction. In multi-agent systems, (sub)goals are usually
achieved by system components – agents, which are independent entities
that are capable of performing certain tasks. In general, the system might
have several types of agents that are distinguished by the type of tasks that
they are capable of performing. Our next refinement pattern – Agent Mod-
elling Pattern – allows us to model system agents and associate them with
goals.
We introduce the set AGENTS that abstractly defines the set of sys-
tem agents. Additionally, we distinguish three non-empty sets EL AG1,
EL AG2, and EL AG3 of the agents that are capable of achieve the corre-
sponding subgoals.
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Agent might fail while trying to achieve a certain subgoal. To reflect
this in the specification, we introduce dynamic sets of the eligible agents
represented by the variables eligi, eligi ⊆ EL AGi, where i ∈ 1..3. We say
that an agent is eligible to perform a certain goal if it is active and capable
to accomplish it.
Agent failures have direct impact on the process of subgoals achievement,
i.e., the goal assigned to the failed agent cannot be reached. To reflect this
assumption in our model, we refine the abstract event Reaching SubGoali by
two events Successful Reaching SubGoali and Failed Reaching SubGoali, i ∈
1..3, which respectively model the successful and unsuccessful reaching of
the subgoal by some eligible agent, as shown below:
Machine M AM
Successful Reaching SubGoal1 =̂ refines Reaching SubGoal1
status convergent
any ag
when
gstate1 ∈ SG STATE1 \ Subgoal1 ∧ ag ∈ elig1
then
gstate1 :∈ Subgoal1
end
Failed Reaching SubGoal1 =̂ refines Reaching SubGoal1
status convergent
any ag
when
gstate1 ∈ SG STATE1 \ Subgoal1 ∧ ag ∈ elig1 ∧ card(elig1) > 1
then
gstate1 :∈ SG STATE1 \ Subgoal1
elig1 := elig1 \ {ag}
end
...
In the guard of the event Failed Reaching SubGoal1, we restrict possible
agent failures by postulating that at least one agent associated with the
subgoal remains operational: card(elig1) > 1. This assumption allows us
to change the event status from anticipated to convergent. In other words,
we are now able to prove that, for each subgoal, the process of reaching it
eventually terminates. In practice, the constraint to have at least one op-
erational agent associated with our model can be validated by probabilistic
modelling of goal reachability, which we discuss later in this chapter.
Agent Refinement Pattern. In the Agent Modelling Pattern, we have
defined the notion of agent eligibility quite abstractly by formulating the
relationship between subgoals and the corresponding agents that are capable
of achieving them. Our Agent Refinement Pattern aims at elaborating on
the notion of agent eligibility. We introduce agent attributes – agent types
and agent statuses, and redefine an eligible agent as an operational agent
that belongs to a particular agent type.
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We define an enumerated set of agent types AG TYPE={TYPE1, TYPE2,
TYPE3} and establish the correspondence between abstract sets of agents
and the corresponding agent types by the following axioms:
∀ag · ag ∈ EL AGi ⇔ atype(ag) = TYPEi, i ∈ 1..3.
We consider an agent as capable to perform a certain subgoal if it has the
type associated with this subgoal.
To model explicitly the dynamic operational status of each agent, we
add a new variable astatus:
astatus ∈ AGENTS→AG STATUS.
Here set AG STATUS = {OK, KO}, where OK and KO designate opera-
tional and failed agents correspondingly.
Now we can data refine the abstract variables eligi, i ∈ 1..3. The follow-
ing gluing invariants associate them with the concrete sets:
eligi = {a | a ∈ AGENTS ∧ atype(a) = TYPEi ∧ astatus(a) = OK},
for i ∈ 1..3.
In our case, the dynamic set of agents eligible to perform a certain
subgoal becomes a set of active agents of the particular type. The event
Failed Reaching SubGoal1 is now refined to take into account the concrete
definition of agent eligibility. The event also updates the status of the failed
agent.
Successful Reaching SubGoal1 =̂ refines Successful Reaching SubGoal1
any ag
when
gstate1 ∈ SG STATE1 \ Subgoal1 ∧ astatus(ag) = OK ∧ atype(ag) = TYPE1
then
gstate1 :∈ Subgoal1
end
Failed Reaching SubGoal1 =̂ refines Failed Reaching SubGoal1
any ag
when
gstate1 ∈ SG STATE1 \ Subgoal1 ∧ astatus(ag) = OK ∧ atype(ag) = TYPE1 ∧
card({a|a ∈ AGENTS ∧ atype(a) = TYPE1 ∧ astatus(a) = OK}) > 1
then
gstate1 :∈ SG STATE1 \ Subgoal1 ‖ astatus(ag) := KO
end
An illustration of our approach based on the proposed patterns is de-
scribed in the formal development of a multi-robotic system, presented in
Paper V and Paper VI of thesis.
As mentioned above, to prove the defined goal reachability property, we
had to make the assumptions related to agent reliability, i.e., assume that
some agents remain operational to successfully complete the goal achieving
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process. To validate this assumption, we can employ quantitative assessment
– probabilistic model checking techniques (as described in Paper VII of this
thesis). To enable probabilistic analysis of Event-B models in the proba-
bilistic model checker PRISM, we rely on the continuous-time probabilistic
extension of the Event-B framework [165]. The idea of this approach is as
follows. We annotate actions of all model events with real-valued rates (e.g.,
failure rate, service rate) and then transform such a probabilistically aug-
mented Event-B specification into a continuous-time Markov chain, which
we represent in PRISM. Then we can assess the probability of achieving the
goal as well as to compare several alternative system configurations.
The resilience-explicit goal-oriented refinement approach presented above
allowed us to identify the key concepts required for formal development of
resilient MAS. It has inspired as to propose a conceptual framework for
goal-oriented reasoning about resilient MAS that puts a specific emphasis
of rigorous definition of system reconfigurability. Next we overview the pro-
posed formalisation.
4.4.2 Formal Goal-Oriented Reasoning About Resilient Re-
configurable MAS
In this section we overview our proposed formalisation of the reconfigura-
bility concept within a multi-agent goal-oriented framework. Our aim is
to gradually define the notions of system goals and agents together with
their different interrelationships. We systematically introduce the necessary
constraints on the system dynamics to facilitate derivation of a necessary
reconfiguration mechanism. Here we consider reconfigurability as an ability
of agents to redistribute their responsibilities and associations to ensure goal
reachability.
To reason about the system behaviour, we rely on the standard concept
of a state transition system that we extend with relevant attributes. Next
we give a brief overview of the proposed framework. The full description is
presented in Paper VIII included in this thesis.
Goal-oriented State Transition System. We start by extending the
standard definition of a state transition system (including the set of all
system states Σ, the next-state relation Trans, and the set of initial system
states Init) with the notion of goals that a system is trying to accomplish.
More specifically, we introduce the set of all possible system goals G and the
function GMap mapping a given system goal to a subset of system states:
GMap : G → P(Σ).
Essentially, the function GMap assigns semantics to any goal from G by
associating it with a non-empty set of states (a predicate) of Σ.
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Further we extend our goal-oriented state transition system with the
notion of subgoals. To introduce inter-relationships between the system
goals, e.g., distinguishing particular goals and their subgoals, we define two
structures – the relation on goals G graph and the function SGMap:
G graph : G ↔ G and SGMap : G → P(Σ).
Essentially, G graph describes relationships between different goals, e.g., how
a particular goal can be decomposed into its subgoals and so on. SGMap(g)
stands for mapping an arbitrary expression on subgoals of g into a set of
states, corresponding to achieving the parent goal g. Intuitively, SGMap(g)
stands for the nessessary precondition for achieving goal g.
Essentially, achieving any of subgoals must contribute to reaching the
parent goal:
∀g, g′ : G. g′ ∈ Subgoals(g) ⇒ SGMap(g) ∩ GMap(g′) 6= ∅,
where Subgoals(g) = {g′ : G | (g 7→ g′) ∈ G graph}.
Introducing Agents. Next, we extend a goal-oriented state transition
system by introducing agents that can carry out tasks required for achieving
the system goals. We introduce the type (set) A for all possible system
agents and define the function Active to distinguish a subset of active agents
in the current system state:
Active : Σ→ P(A).
By “active” agents we mean the agents that can carry out the tasks in order
to achieve the system goals. In its turn, the inactive agents are either the
agents which are not currently present in the system or those which failed
and thus incapable to carry out any tasks.
To reflect the heterogeneous nature of multi-agent systems, next we in-
troduce possible agent attributes. Namely, we associate certain classes of
agents with specific types of system goals they are able to accomplish. To
formalise it, we first introduce classifications of system agents and goals and
then define relationships between the introduced classes.
The following functions
atype : A → AType and gtype : G → GType,
associate each agent and goal with their respective type, where AType and
GType are abstract types containing all possible agent and goal types re-
spectively.
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The separate goals of the same goal type can be achieved independently,
i.e., can be assigned to different agents that work in parallel to accomplish
them:
∀g1, g2 : G, gt : GType. gtype(g1) = gt ∧ gtype(g2) = gt ∧ g1 6= g2 ⇒
GMap(g1) ∩GMap(g2) = ∅,
To represent interrelationships between different agent and goal types,
we introduce the relation AG Rel:
AG Rel : AType↔ GType.
This formalises a connection between the corresponding agent and goal types
clarifies which agents can be given the tasks related to specific system goals.
Agent Subordination and Supervision. Defining agent types and hier-
archy of goal types allows us to introduce a subordination structure between
agent types. Essentially, subordination means that one agent may be the
“master” (manager) of the other agent(s). Naturally, agent subordination
supposes that some agents “supervise” activities of other agents. More-
over, a supervising agent can give concrete goal assignments to subordinate
agents, which, in turn, should “report” to its supervisors once the assigned
goal has been accomplished. The unreached system goals can be also dy-
namically partitioned among the supervisor agents, essentially modelling
accepted responsibilities of those agents for supervision over some goals.
To introduce such subordination, we define a relation on agent types,
called A Sub:
A Sub : AType↔ AType.
Moreover, for each pair of subordinated agent types, there should exist (at
least one) pair of the related goal types such that goals of the parent goal
type can be handled by agents of the “master” agent type, while goals of
the subgoal type can be handled by agents of the subordinate agent type.
Let us note that the introduced notions of agent types, subordination,
ability to accomplish or supervise a particular goal, constitute static proper-
ties of a multi-agent goal-oriented system. On the other hand, since agents
can change their active/inactive status during system execution, the func-
tion Active expresses a dynamic system characteristic. To formally define
a system configuration and the corresponding reconfiguration mechanism
for tolerating system changes, we need to define additional dynamic system
characteristics. First, in a specific dynamic system state, a particular agent
can be attached to another agent, which serves as its supervisor. A spe-
cific goal that has not been yet reached can be put under responsibility of
a particular supervisor agent. Moreover, a specific goal can be assigned by
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a supervisor to one of its subordinate agents. Later, the assigned goal can
be executed by the corresponding agent. If the agent fails to achieve the
assigned task, its goal can be reassigned to another agent capable to achieve
it.
We formulate these dynamic notions formally. For instance, agent at-
tachment is defined as the function Attached, such that
1. Attached : Σ→ P(A×A),
2. ∀σ : Σ, a1, a2 : A. (a1 7→ a2) ∈ Attached(σ) ⇒
a1 ∈ Active(σ) ∧ a2 ∈ Active(σ) ∧ atype(a1) 7→ atype(a2) ∈ A Sub ∧
¬(∃a3 : A. a3 6= a1 ∧ (a3 7→ a2) ∈ Attached(σ)).
Therefore, for any agents a1, a2 and system state σ, the expression (a1 7→
a2) ∈ Attached(σ) implies that (i) both agents are active in σ, (ii) the agent
type of a2 is subordinate to that of a1, and (iii) the agent a2 is not currently
attached to any other supervisor agent.
Moreover, a goal-oriented multi-agents system supports agent attach-
ment if, at any point where the conditions for agent attachment are satisfied,
the system has an opportunity (but not an obligation) to do such an action.
Similarly to agent attachment, we define goal responsibility (the corre-
sponding function called Responsible) and goal assignment (the correspond-
ing function called Assigned) as system dynamic attributes (i.e., they depend
on the current system state). Goal responsibility specifies the relationships
between certain goals and the agents currently supervising them. In its
turn, goal assignment defines the relationships between the goals and pair
of agents that supervise and perform these goals respectively. Moreover,
a goal-oriented multi-agents system supports goal responsibility and goal
assignment if, at any point where the conditions for these properties are
satisfied, the system is able to do these actions.
Now, the introduced above notions and characteristics allow us to define
notion of a reconfigurable system and reason about system reconfigurability.
Reasoning about System Reconfiguration Towards Goal Achieve-
ment. Based on our definitions, we can explicitly define multi-agent sys-
tems that support system dynamic reconfiguration. Specifically, these are
the systems that allow redistributing (unassigned) goals to different respon-
sible agents or reattaching (unassigned) agents to different supervisor agents.
Moreover, the following properties must hold
∀σ : Σ, g : G, : a1, a2 : A. (g 7→ a1) ∈ Responsible(σ) ∧
gtype(g) ∈ AS goals(atype(a2)) ∧
¬(∃a3 : A. (g 7→ a1 7→ a3)) ∈ Assigned(σ)) ⇒
∃σ′ : Σ. (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans ∧ (g 7→ a2) ∈ Responsible(σ′)
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and
∀σ : Σ, a1, a2, a3 : A. (a1 7→ a2) ∈ Attached(σ) ∧
(atype(a3) 7→ atype(a2)) ∈ A Sub ∧
¬(∃g : G. (g 7→ a1 7→ a2)) ∈ Assigned(σ)) ⇒
∃σ′ : Σ. (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans ∧ (a3 7→ a2) ∈ Attached(σ′).
Essentially, these two properties require the existence of state transitions
allowing to redistribute goal responsibility and agent attachment. Here the
condition gtype(g) ∈ AS goals(atype(a2)) checks that the type of the agent
a2 allows the agent to supervise the goal g, while the condition (atype(a3) 7→
atype(a2)) ∈ A Sub requires that the agent type of a2 is subordinate to that
of a3.
Finally, we formulate and prove a theorem about goal reachability in a
reconfigurable multi-agent system (for proof, see Paper VIII).
Theorem: Goal reachability in a reconfigurable agent system.
For a reconfigurable goal-oriented multi-agent system (G,Σ, Init,Trans,GMap,
A,Active), the following property is true:
∀σ : Σ, g : G. σ ∈ dom(Trans) ∧ σ /∈ GMap(g) ⇒
∃σ′ : Σ. (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans+ ∧ σ′ ∈ GMap(g).
Essentially, theorem states, that for a reconfigurable goal-oriented multi-
agent system, any goal that is not yet reached at any (non-final) system state
is reachable. Let us note that the theorem is proved to formally demonstrate
that all the introduced notions and mechanisms are sufficient to ensure goal
reachability in such a system.
The goal-oriented framework provides us with a suitable basis for rea-
soning about reconfigurability. It allows us to define reconfiguration as an
ability of agents to redistribute their responsibilities to ensure goal reacha-
bility. The proposed formal systematisation of the involved concepts can be
seen as generic guidelines for formal development of reconfigurable systems.
In particular, in Paper VIII we show such guidelines can be interpreted
within the Event-B framework.
4.5 Modelling and Assessment of Resilient
Architectures
In this section, we focus on the problem of formal modelling and quantita-
tive assessment of resilient architectures. In particular, we experiment with
different architectural alternatives implementing a well-known fault tolerant
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mechanism for distributed systems (WAL). Each alternative provide the de-
velopers with different reliability guarantees expressed in the terms of data
consistency and data integrity properties. However, since higher reliability
usually results in lower performance, it is desirable to quantitatively assess
this ratio under different configurations parameters and loads.
We start this section by briefly describing the WAL mechanism. Then
we demonstrate how to use the employed refinement approach to derive
resilient architectures. Finally, we propose a graphical notation facilitating
construction and validation of models for resilience assessment in SimPy –
a library and development framework in Python.
WAL mechanism and data base replication. In Paper IX we focus
on defining and verifying the data consistency and data integrity properties
under possible failure scenarios using the write-ahead logging (WAL) mech-
anism [121, 133] combined with replication techniques [97, 158, 96, 183].
The WAL mechanism is a standard data base technique for ensuring data
integrity. The main principle of WAL is to apply the requested changes to
data files only after they have been logged, i.e., recorded into a log file and
the file has been stored in a persistent storage. If the system crashes, it
can be recovered using the log file. Therefore, the WAL method ensures
fault tolerance. Moreover, the WAL mechanism helps to optimise the sys-
tem performance, since only the log file (rather than all the data changes)
should be written to the persistent storage to guarantee that a transaction
is (eventually) committed.
However, an implementation of a persistent storage, i.e., the guarantee-
ing that the node containing the log file never crashes, is hard to achieve.
To ensure resilience, the proposed mechanism can be combined with the
required replication techniques as follows. In a distributed data store con-
sisting of a number of nodes distributed across different physical locations,
one of the nodes, called master, is appointed to serve incoming data requests
from distributed data store clients and transmit back the outcome of the re-
quest, i.e., acknowledge success or failure of a transaction. The remaining
nodes, called standby or worker nodes, contain replicas of the stored data.
Each request is first recorded in the master log and then applied to
the stored data. After this, an acknowledgement is sent to the client.
The standby nodes are constantly monitoring and streaming the master log
records into their own logs, before applying them to their persistent data
in the same way. Essentially, the standby nodes are continually trying to
“catch up” with the master. If the master crashes, one of the standby nodes
is appointed to be the master in its stead. At this point, the appointed
standby effectively becomes the new master and starts serving all data re-
quests. A graphical representation of the system architecture is shown in
Fig 4.6.
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Figure 4.6: Distributed Data Base System Architecture
A distributed data store can implement different models of logging. In
the asynchronous model, the client request is acknowledged after the master
node has performed the required modifications in its persistent storage. The
second option – the cascade master-standby – is a semi-synchronous archi-
tecture. The client receives a response after both the master and its warm
standby (called upper standby) has performed the necessary operations. Fi-
nally, in the synchronous model, only after all replica nodes have written
into their persistent storage, i.e., fully synchronised with the master node,
the transaction can be committed. Obviously, such logging models deliver
different resilience guarantees in the cases of component crashes.
Modelling Distributed Data Store in Event-B. In this thesis, we pro-
pose a refinement based approach to deriving various system architectures.
For each architecture we formulate and prove system-level logical properties
– data consistency and data integrity. Within the described system, the
data consistency properties express the relationships between the requests
handled by the master and those handled by the standby nodes. Since any
standby node is continuously copying the master log, we can say that any
standby node is logically “behind” the master node. The degree of consis-
tency depends on the chosen architecture.
Within the described system, the data integrity property ensures that the
corresponding log elements of any two storages (master or standby replicas)
are always the same. In other words, all logs are consistent with respect
to the log records of the master node. Essentially it means, that different
replicas all do the same operations according to the log records.
We rely on the Event-B refinement technique to gradually unfold the
system architecture and functionality. This allows us to represent the sys-
tem components, model their change (both normal and abnormal) as well
as introduce a generic mechanism for changing the master node. We also
mathematically formulate the data consistency and data integrity properties
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for different architectural models. Additionally, formal modelling allows us
to identify situations, where the desired properties can be violated.
Below, the refinement process is illustrated for the asynchronous sys-
tem architecture. It consists of the abstract model and two refinements as
depicted in Fig. 4.7. A brief outline of each step is given as follows:
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Figure 4.7: Overview of the Development Strategy: Asynchronous model
Initial model. It abstractly represents the overall system architecture. In
particular, its describes the behaviour of the master node, which is
responsible for receiving and processing of incoming requests. More-
over, here we model a possible change in the set of active nodes and
introduce an abstract representation of the procedure of a new master
selection.
First refinement. This is a refinement of the abstract specification. Here
we introduce the behaviour of the standby nodes and their interac-
tions with the master. We model how the received data requests are
transferred through the different processing stages on the master and
standby sides. Moreover, we explicitly model possible node failures,
and therefore elaborate on the procedure of selection of new master.
At this step we are able to formulate the data consistency properties
expressing the relationships between the requests handled by the mas-
ter and those by the standby nodes, respectively. A short transitional
period may be needed for the new master to “catch up” with some of
the standby nodes that got ahead by handling the requests still not
committed by the new master. To address this problem, we intro-
duce an explicit representation of the transition period and redefine
the consistency property.
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Second refinement. This model explicitly introduces the sequential log-
ging mechanism and the resulting interdependencies between the mas-
ter and standby logs. The model is obtained as a result of a data
refinement. An introduction of the sequential representation of the
component log allows us to refine some proven invariants as well as
prove some new ones. In particular, we formulate and prove the log
data integrity properties as the following model invariants:
∀c1, c2, i·c1 ∈ comp ∧ c2 ∈ comp ∧ i ∈ 1 .. index written(c1) ∧
i ∈ 1 .. index written(c2) ⇒ log(c1)(i) = log(c2)(i).
The property states that the corresponding log elements of any two storages
are always the same.
The formal development of the semi-synchronous and synchronous archi-
tectures is essentially repeats the refinement steps presented for the asyn-
chronous model. However, in the semi-synchronous case, in the abstract
model we also introduce the upper standby component and its interopera-
tions with the master node. In both cases, we implement specific architec-
tural solutions for the corresponding architecture and respective restrictions
on the component behaviours. Therefore, the data consistency properties
for each architecture are reformulated and proved. In its turn, the data
integrity property is architectural-independent and remains the same. The
resulting Event-B formal models can be served as a starting point for future
development of a specific distributed application.
The outlined refinement process supports qualitative reasoning about
resilience. However, it is also desirable to quantitatively assess sensitivity of
the architecture to changes of its configuration parameters. To enable such
quantitative assessment of resilience characteristics, in particular, to anal-
yse the performance/fault tolerance ratio of the architectural alternatives,
we integrate formal modelling in Event-B with discrete-event simulation in
SimPy. Next we overview the proposed integrated approach.
Quantitative Assessment of Resilient Characteristics. To facilitate
integration of the described formal modelling with discrete-event simulation,
we introduce an intermediate graphical notation called a process-oriented
model. The proposed notation contains only the main concepts of the do-
main together with the key artefacts required for both formal modelling and
simulation. It relies on the following assumptions:
• A system consists of a number of parallel processes, interacting asyn-
chronously by means of discrete events;
• System processes can be grouped together into a number of compo-
nents;
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• Within a process, execution follows the pre-defined scenario expressed
in terms of functional blocks (activities) and transitions between them.
Each such functional block is typically associated with particular in-
coming events the process reacts to and/or outgoing events it produces;
• A system component can fail and (in some cases) recover. The compo-
nent failures and recovery mechanisms are described as special com-
ponent processes simulating different types of failures and recovery
procedures of the component;
• Some events (e.g., component failures) should be reacted on imme-
diately upon their occurrence, thus interrupting the process current
activities. Such special events (interrupts) are explicitly described in
the component description.
An example of such a component is graphically presented on Fig.4.8. The
component interface consists of one incoming event (arrival evn) and two
outgoing events (rejection evn and completion evn). The component itself
contains two processes describing its “nominal” behaviour: the first one
stores requests to perform a certain service, and the second one performs
a requested service and returns the produced results. The internal event
perform evn triggers the request execution by the second process. In addi-
tion, the component includes the processes Failure and Recovery to simulate
possible component failures and its recovery.
Integration Formal Modelling with Simulation in SimPy. A process-
oriented model serves as a basis for both Event-B development and system
simulation in SimPy. Translating a process-oriented model into Event-B
gives us the starting point for formal development with the already fixed
system architecture and the control flow between main system components.
The corresponding system properties are explicitly formulated and proved
as system invariants.
While translating a process-oriented model to SimPy, we augment the
resulting code with concrete values for its basic quantitative characteristics,
Figure 4.8: Example of a system component
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Figure 4.9: Synchronous model
such as data arrival, service, and failure rates. This allows us to compare the
system performance and reliability for different system parameter configu-
rations. If satisfactory configuration values can be found and thus re-design
of the base process-oriented model is not needed, the simulation results does
not affect the Event-B formal development and can be considered completely
complementary to it.
We apply the proposed approach to evaluate architectural alternatives
combining WAL and replication. We consider two different system archi-
tectures: asynchronous and synchronous models. The resulting process-
oriented models for the node components of synchronous architecture is
presented in Fig. 4.9.
The graphical notation facilitates development of SimPy code. Discrete
event simulation in SimPy allow us to evaluate how different parameters
affect the results within the considered architecture.
Fig.4.10 and Fig.4.11 show the results of a simulation involving two mod-
els – asynchronous and synchronous. With identical operating conditions
and parameters, the asynchronous model has higher throughput, complet-
ing 99.3 % of requests in 1 hour. This is expected, because the asynchronous
model has shorter delay in comming transactions than the synchronous one,
which completes 97.2 % of requests in 1 hour (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Results from model comparison
Completed (%) Rejected (%) Failed (%)
asynchronous 99.3 0 0.2
synchronous 97.2 1.6 0.7
Moreover, for each architecture, we can perform sensitivity analysis.
Specifically, we can evaluate the impact of the buffer capacity and the mean
failure rate on the throughput of the system. Further experiments can re-
veal more information about the system. For example, we can evaluate
how changing the number of standby node affects the performance of the
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Figure 4.10: Asynchronous model. Mean arrival rate is 7.5/min, service time
is 5s, buffer capacity is 5 and mean failure rate is 1.8/h.
Figure 4.11: Synchronous model. Mean arrival rate is 7.5/min, service time
is 5s, buffer capacity is 5 and mean failure rate is 1.8/h.
models and the mean failure rates. In general, the desirable properties and
characteristics to be assessed are identified according to the system goals.
To summarise the results of this section, we can conclude that our prag-
matic approach to integrating formal modelling in Event-B and discrete-
event simulation in SimPy offers a scalable solution to integrated engineering
of resilient architectures. Modelling in the Event-B framework allows us to
reason about correctness and data integrity properties of the corresponding
architectures, while discrete-event simulation in SimPy enables quantita-
tive assessment of performance and reliability. The full description of the
proposed approach is presented in Paper IX and Paper X of this thesis.
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Chapter 5
Overview of the Original
Publications
This thesis is built on the results of ten scientific publications. This chapter
gives a short summary of them.
Paper I: Formal Development and Assessment of a Reconfigurable
On-board Satellite System
In this paper, we discuss a formal approach to modelling and assessment of
a reconfigurable fault tolerant satellite system. Fault tolerance of satellite
system is vital for achieving goals of the space mission. Since the use of
redundancy is restricted by the size and the weight of the on-board equip-
ment, dynamic system reconfiguration should be employed to achieve the
desired level of reliability.
In this work, we define the design rules for stepwise development of a dy-
namically reconfigurable system in Event-B. Furthermore, we demonstrate
how to formally assess the chosen reconfiguration strategy as well as evaluate
whether the incorporated fault tolerance mechanism fulfils the reliability and
performance objectives. The proposed method is illustrated by a case study
– development and assessment of the reconfigurable satellite Data Process-
ing Unit (DPU). We derive a complex system reconfigurable architecture by
refinement and formally verify correctness of the established relationships
between component failures and goal reachability. Further, we enrich the
resulting Event-B specification with explicit probabilistic information about
the reliability of its components and the duration of time required to execute
the tasks assigned to these components. Then, using the probabilistic model
checker PRISM, we compute and compare the reliability and performance
measures of a system by employing two different fault tolerance mechanisms:
the one that realises a standard redundancy scheme and the other one that
is based on dynamic reconfiguration. The proposed approach guarantees
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correct design of complex fault tolerance mechanisms as well as facilitates
finding suitable trade-offs between system reliability and performance.
Paper II: Formal Derivation of Distributed MapReduce
In this work, we undertake a formal study of the MapReduce framework.
MapReduce is a powerful distributed data processing model that is currently
adopted in a wide range of domains to efficiently handle large volumes of
data. The main principle of MapReduce is to parallelise processing of data
by first mapping them to multiple processing nodes (the map stage) and then
merging the obtained results (the reduce stage). The goal of this paper is
to investigate the applicability of the Event-B framework and its refinement
technique for modelling MapReduce.
To facilitate development of the MapReduce computations, we formally
model the control flow and mathematically define possible data interdepen-
dencies between the map and reduce stages of MapReduce. This formali-
sation allows us to propose an alternative architectural solution that weak-
ens blocking between the stages and, as a result, achieves a higher degree
of parallelisation of the MapReduce computations. Next, we demonstrate
that, by relying on the proposed formalisation, we can derive two models
of MapReduce – blocking and partially blocking models. The proposed ap-
proach relies on stepwise refinement in Event-B and, in particular, the event
refinement structure approach – a diagrammatic notation facilitating formal
development.
The proposed formalisation of the MapReduce framework is generic,
i.e., it can be instantiated by different values for specific configurations of
MapReduce. The static part of the modelled system is formally defined in
the corresponding context component. The definitions of static data struc-
tures in the context are abstract, i.e. they state only the essential properties
to be satisfied. This makes them generic parameters of the whole formal
development. In its turn, such formal development becomes generic, repre-
senting a family of the systems that can be described by providing suitable
concrete values for the generic parameters. The proposed formal model can
be used then as a starting point for future development of a specific MapRe-
duce application. The actual concrete values can be supplied by either the
end-user or the developer of the MapReduce framework.
Paper III: Formal Development of Critical Multi-Agent Systems:
A Refinement Approach.
This paper presents an approach for modelling and verification of critical
multi-agent systems. In this work, we focus on studying agent interactions
and activities whose incorrect execution may jeopardise safety of multi-agent
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applications. We demonstrate that the Event-B formal development based
on refinement allows the designers to rigorously specify complex agent in-
teractions and verify their correctness and safety properties.
In the first part of the paper, we define general principles of formal
reasoning about MAS. We define notions and properties that allow us to
represent agent classes and attributes as well as agent activities and their
interactions. In particular, the proposed properties determine the rules for
regulating interactions between the agents and define properties of collab-
orative agent activities. Next, we demonstrate by a case study how our
formalisation can facilitate a rigorous development of a complex hospital
system. Specifically, we investigate safety of the doctor-patient agent in-
teractions. In our development, we explicitly introduce a fault tolerance
mechanism that guarantees that the system functions correctly even in the
presence of doctor and patient failures or their disconnections. Specifically,
we verify by proofs correctness and safety of two agent activities – han-
dling patient emergencies and consistent updates of patient data records.
The formal verification process based on Event B refinement allows us to
systematically capture complex requirements. Moreover, the proposed re-
finement approach facilitates derivation of the constrains that should be
imposed on the system to guarantee its safety.
Paper IV: A Refinement-Based Approach to Developing Critical
Multi-Agent Systems
Paper IV can be considered as a revised and expanded version of the Pa-
per III. Here, we further demonstrate the benefits of a refinement-based
approach to modelling and verification of critical multi-agent systems. We
further expand the obtained formal development of the considered hospital
system and derive a distributed architecture by a special kind of refinement
– decomposition.
Following the system approach [75], we start our development from an
abstract centralised model and then gradually unfold the system function-
ality by augmenting the specification with detailed design decisions. At a
certain refinement step, when the required system functionality is introduced
and required safety properties are proved, we explicitly define the commu-
nication between agents and then perform the system decomposition as a
special form of refinement. We distribute agent activities between differ-
ent modules which correspond to agent classes (i.e., patients and doctors).
By decomposing the system-level model, we derive the required interfaces
of the resulting system components and guarantee that their activities do
not violate the safety requirements imposed on the system. As a result of
the decomposition step, we arrive at a specification of a distributed hospital
MAS.
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We argue that a formal approach based on refinement in Event-B ad-
vocated in this paper provides us with a suitable and scalable method for
development of complex multi-agent systems. Firstly, the reliance on the
proof-based verification does not impose any restrictions on the size of the
model, number of agents, etc. Secondly, the proposed method gives full ben-
efits of the systems approach and allows us to reason about such system-level
properties as safety.
Finally, the adopted top-down development technique allows us to effi-
ciently cope both with the complexity of requirements as well as the com-
plexity of modelling and verification processes by adopting an incremental
development approach. Thereby, we conclude that the refinement in Event-
B constitutes a suitable scalable technique for formal development of critical
MAS.
Paper V: Formal Goal-Oriented Development of Resilient MAS in
Event-B
In this work, we investigate the use of the goal-oriented requirement analy-
sis with combination of a refinement-based approach to develop a resilient
system. Specifically, we reason about system resilience in terms of goals.
To ensure system resilience, we should guarantee that the system achieves
its goals despite system changes. This work demonstrates how to rigorously
define goals in Event-B and ensure goal reachability “by construction” using
refinement.
We formalise goal-oriented development by defining a set of modelling
and refinement patterns that interpret essential activities of the goal-oriented
engineering in terms of the Event-B refinement. Specifically, we demonstrate
how to define goals at different levels of abstraction (e.g., using decomposi-
tion) and then gradually introduce the desire system functionality. Rigorous
modelling of the impact of agent failures on goal achievement allows us to de-
rive a dynamic goal reallocation mechanism. It guarantees system resilience
in the presence of agent failures. The defined set of modelling and refine-
ment patterns represents generic solutions common to formal modelling of a
multi-agent system and can be applied to a wide spectrum of such systems.
We illustrate our approach by a case study – a development of a cleaning
multi-robotic system. We perform its formal development via instantiation
of the proposed patterns. While modelling the behaviour of a multi-robotic
system, we show that the refinement process allows us to discover the re-
strictions that we have to impose on the system behaviour to guarantee
its resilience. Our approach demonstrates a good scalability and facilitates
development of such complex distributed systems as multi-robotic systems.
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Paper VI: A Case Study in Formal development of a Fault Tolerant
Multi-Robotic System
The Paper VI further exploits a combination of the goal-oriented develop-
ment and the Event-B refinement for modelling complex distributed systems.
The aim of this work is to perform a large-scale validation by extending our
multi-robotic cleaning system case study with new functionalities and focus
on modelling component cooperation and system reconfigurability. The re-
sulted system has a heterogeneous architecture and consists of different types
of components that might fail. The goal of our development is to formally
derive a specification of a robotic system and verify that the proposed design
ensures goal reachability despite unreliability of the system components. By
relying on the results discussed in Paper V, here we demonstrate how to de-
fine a system goal and decompose it into the corresponding subgoals of finer
granularity until the desired level of details is reached.
While modelling the chosen system, we gradually introduce a represen-
tation of the main system elements and dependencies between them. More-
over, we introduce the notions of local and global knowledge to capture a
discrepancy between agent perception of its goal and the actual global sys-
tem state. We propose an advanced reconfiguration mechanism that relies
on goal reallocation to guarantee goal reachability. During the development
process, we identify the main system-level properties (e.g., consistency be-
tween the global and local knowledge) and demonstrate how to formally
specify and verify them as a part of the refinement process.
We find the refinement approach to be beneficial for deriving precise re-
quirements of the multi-robotic system and finding appropriate modelling
solutions. During the refinement process, we discovered a number of sub-
tleties in the system requirements. In particular, we had to impose addi-
tional restrictions on the behaviour of a base station when it takes a new
responsibility for other subgoals and robots.
Paper VII: Formal Development and Quantitative Assessment of
a Resilient Multi-robotic System
This paper present an integrated approach to formal development and as-
sessment of a resilient system. Specifically, we demonstrate how to integrate
probabilistic analysis into the refinement process. This work complements
our previous works on modelling and verification of multi-robotic systems.
To prove the goal reachability (and therefore guarantee system resilience),
we have made artificial assumptions concerning component failures. In this
paper, we employ quantitative analysis techniques to evaluate these artifi-
cial assumptions. To facilitate an integrated development and assessment,
we augment our formal models with statistical data and rely on probabilis-
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tic verification. Namely, we use the probabilistic model checker PRISM to
assess the probability of achieving the system goal in the presence of com-
ponent failures.
The general idea of the proposed approach is as follows. In a number of
Event-B refinement steps we gradually define the system functionality and
prove the desired system properties. When a detailed logical architecture
is derived by refinement, we augment the obtained Event-B model with
the probabilistic information required to conduct the probabilistic resilience
assessment. In particular, we annotate actions of all model events with the
real-valued rates and then transform a probabilistically augmented Event-
B specification into a continuous-time Markov chain. Then, we use the
probabilistic model checker PRISM to compute the probability of achieving
the global system goal in the presence of components failures. Moreover,
we show how we can conduct different assessment of the sources of system
failures, system performance, etc. As a result, our approach allows us to
compare several alternative system configurations.
Paper VIII: Formal Reasoning about Resilient Goal-Oriented Multi-
Agent Systems
This paper presents a formalisation of a resilient goal-oriented multi-agent
system and its essential properties. Our formalisation covers the notions of
system goals and agents as well as various formal structures defining differ-
ent interrelationships between these notions. Moreover, our formalisation
defines constraints on the system dynamics allowing a multi-agent system
to become more reconfigurable and thus resilient in order to achieve the
system goals. We rely on the goal-oriented paradigm because it provides us
with an especially suitable basis for reasoning about reconfigurability. In
particular, it allows us to define reconfigurability as an ability of agents to
redistribute their responsibilities to ensure goal reachability. Our proposed
formal systematisation of the involved concepts can be seen as generic guide-
lines for formal development of reconfigurable systems. Specifically, in the
second part of the paper, we demonstrate how such guidelines can be defined
within the Event-B framework.
Paper IX: Formal Modelling of Resilient Data Storage in Cloud
Reliable and highly performant handling of large data stores constitutes one
of the major challenges of cloud computing. The paper presents a formalisa-
tion of an industrial approach to implementing a resilient cloud data store.
The solution combines the write-ahead-logging (WAL) mechanism with log
replication.
In our work, we rely on the Event-B refinement to derive specifications of
the synchronous, semi-synchronous and asynchronous replication architec-
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tures. Event-B allows us to exlicitly express the required data consistency
and data integrity properties as model invariants and compare them in all
three models. During the development, we identify situations that may
lead to data loss and introduce an explicit representation of the transition
period to mitigate these losses. In general, these properties inform the in-
dustry practitioners on the resilience guarantees provided by each solutions.
The proposed modelling approach can facilitate early design exploration and
evaluate benefits of different fault tolerance mechanisms in implementing re-
silience requirements.
Paper X: Integrating Event-B Modelling and Discrete-Event Sim-
ulation to Analyse Resilience of Data Stores in the Cloud
Paper X is a logical continuation of Paper IX. The approach proposed in
Paper IX allows us represent and verify logical system-level properties and
qualitatively evaluate them. In its turn, discrete-event simulation in SimPy
enables perform the quantitative system analysis. In particular, it allow us
to evaluate some performance and reliability characteristics that are crucial
for services in the cloud.
To facilitate integration with SimPy and discussions with the industrial
engineers, we have created a simple graphical notation – a process-oriented
model. The proposed notation introduces only the core concepts of the
domain together with key artefacts required for formal modelling and sim-
ulation. Such a graphical model defines the component interactions, rep-
resentation of statistical parameters, reactions on different stimulus (e.g.,
faults).
The proposed process-oriented model plays the role of an unifying blue-
print of the system and allows us to define the required structure of the
Event-B and simulation models as well as provide an easy-to-comprehend
visual representation to the engineers. Once the initial models are derived
from the created process-oriented model, the resulting Event-B model is re-
fined to represent and verify data integrity properties, while the correspond-
ing simulation model is executed to analyse the performance/reliability ratio,
e.g., under different service and failure rates.
Author’s contribution: The author of this thesis was responsible for the
Event-B development of the all case studies presented in Papers I-X. The
author has also made contribution to investigating the theoretical results
proposed in the papers under supervision of Assoc. Prof. Elena Troubit-
syna and Docent Linas Laibinis. Probabilistic modelling and verification in
PRISM presented in Paper I and Paper VII was conducted by Dr. Anton
Tarasyuk. The discrete-event simulation in SimPy presented in Paper X
was done by M.Sc. Benjamin Byholm.
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Chapter 6
Related Work
In this chapter we survey the fields of research relevant to the objectives
of this thesis. Specifically, we start by giving an overview of the research
done on goal-oriented development. Next, we summarise the methods for
modelling and verification multi-agent systems. Then, we briefly review the
works done on integration of simulation techniques with formal modelling.
Finally, we consider the field of self-management, system adaptation and
dynamic reconfiguration, listing several research directions and works on
the frameworks and techniques for managing these aspects.
6.1 Goal-Oriented Development
Significant work has been done on goal-oriented requirement engineering
approaches. The foundational work on goal-oriented development belongs
to van Lamsweerde [40, 171, 172]. The proposed KAOS framework [40] in-
troduces a goal-oriented approach for requirements modelling, specification,
and analysis as well as addresses both functional and non-functional system
requirements. Based on the KAOS framework, Lamsweerde [170] has pro-
posed a method for deriving the software architecture from its requirements.
Specifically, according to the method, a software specification is developed
from the given system requirements and then used to build the architec-
tural system design. The design is developed by consecutive refinements,
which take into account the system constraints and non-functional goals.
The KAOS approach is supported by the GRAIL tool [40].
Over the last decade, the goal-oriented approach has also received sev-
eral extensions that allow the designers to link it with formal modelling
[103, 131]. In particular, the work [103] presents a translation technique
of KAOS operational models into event-based tabular specifications, which
can be then analysed by the SCR* toolset [76]. The technique consists of
a number of transformation steps, each of which solves semantic, structural
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or syntactic differences between the KAOS and SCR (Software Cost Reduc-
tion) languages.
A significant body of research has been also devoted for translating for-
mal specifications built according to the KAOS goal-oriented method into
event-based transition systems. For example, the work [107] presents an
approach to use the formal analysis capabilities of LTSA (Labelled Transi-
tion System Analyser) to analyse and animate KAOS operational models.
The mapping allows the designers to translate goal-oriented operational re-
quirements into a black-box event-based model of the software behaviour,
expressed in a formalism appropriate to reason about system behaviours at
the architectural level.
One of the first attempts to bridge the KAOS goal-oriented framework
with the B formalism was presented in [132]. More recently, the study to
formalise KAOS requirements in Event-B was attempted in [11]. The paper
proposes a constructive approach that allows linking of high-level system re-
quirements expressed as linear temporal logic formulae to the corresponding
Event-B elements. The notion of a triggered event is used to translate time
operators that are used in KAOS models. Similar, Matoussi et al. [116, 117]
present works on coupling requirements engineering methods with formal
methods. In contrast, in our work we have relied on goals to facilitate struc-
turing of the system behaviour, while connecting them with the required
agent collaboration and system reconfiguration mechanisms.
The goal behind our research is to both formally model and verify sys-
tems with intricate relationships between agent and goal structures, that
are able to dynamically reconfigure themselves in order to tolerate various
failures or changes.
6.2 Modelling and Verification of Multi-Agent
Systems
The field of design of multi-agent systems has considerable evolved over the
last decade. Surveying the literature on MAS reveals a significant amount of
research devoted to different agent organisation concepts, agent specification
languages and platforms, modelling and verification of the agent behaviour,
etc. The resulting approaches vary significantly in terms of the covered top-
ics, such as agent interoperability, communication, roles, goals and beliefs.
Below we outline only a few works most relevant to our research.
The Tropos methodology [32] supports analysis and design in the de-
velopment of agent-based software systems. UML diagrams are used to
represent the system goals, agents, their capabilities and interdependencies,
as well as system properties and agent interactions. An extension of this
work [123] also supports modelling of agent errors and recovery activities.
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Another proposed methodology – Multi-Agent System Engineering (MaSe)
[46] – guides the designer through the software lifecycle of a multi-agent sys-
tem. It allows a graphical representation of the system goals, the associated
use cases and agent roles. Finite state automata are used to express com-
munications between agent classes. The accompanied tool, the Agent Tool,
supports the agent system development following the MaSe methodology.
An extension of this work, Organization-based MaSE (O-MaSe) [47], pro-
vides a mechanism for defining agent interactions with the environment via
external actors as well as defining interaction protocols between the system
and the actors. O-MaSE makes use of UML class diagrams and does not
support formal notation.
Formal modelling of agent systems has been undertaken by [147, 146,
144, 145]. The authors have proposed an extension of the UNITY frame-
work to explicitly define such concepts as mobility and context-awareness.
The mobile UNITY [147] extension proposes a notation to express mobile
computations and a logic for reasoning about component temporal proper-
ties. It also supports formal reasoning about mobile components and their
behaviour. On the other hand, the Context UNITY extension [145] for-
malises context-aware computing, with a proposed notation to represent the
system context. The sensed aspects of the environment are used by the sys-
tem to adjust its behaviour. In our formalisation we have pursued a different
goal – we aimed at formally guaranteeing that the specified agent behaviour
with the incorporated mechanisms facilitates achieving the defined system
goals. We also have studied the problem of ensuring access to the fresh con-
text. However, in [145] this problem is solved at the level of the matching
agent attributes, while in our approach we rely on the scoping mechanism
[110, 102, 85] to achieve this.
Formal modelling of fault tolerant MAS in Event-B has been also un-
dertaken by Ball and Butler [19]. They have proposed a number of infor-
mally described patterns that allow the designers to incorporate well-known
(static) fault tolerance mechanisms into formal models. In our approach
we consider fault tolerance as a part of ensuring dependability and safety of
MAS. Moreover, we have formalised a more advanced fault tolerance scheme
that relies on goal reallocation and dynamic reconfiguration to guarantee
goal reachability. Application of Event-B in a formal development of situ-
ated multi-agent systems has been investigated in work [104]. In particular,
the Event-B framework has been used to develop a case study focused on a
platoon of vehicles and verify the safety properties related to their simulta-
neous movement.
Significant amount of works is dedicated to the specification and veri-
fication of multi-agent systems based on the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI)
model of agency [41]. The research is mostly focus on studying the mental
agent characteristics such as agent beliefs, desired and intentions.
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An approach to formal development of multi-agent systems based on
temporal logic is presented in the work [61]. The paper describes how formal
specification, verification and refinement techniques can be used to represent
and analyse both the behaviour of individual agents and the behaviour of
multi-agent systems. The approach mostly focused on representation of
agent’s beliefs, desires and intentions introduced in BDI framework [70]. In
our work we have not aimed at modelling the mental attributes of system
agents. In contrast, we use an agent concept as a powerful and expressive
abstraction for expressing inter-connections and collaborations of different
system components.
The use of model-checking techniques for reasoning about MAS proper-
ties has been actively researched as well (see, e.g., [28, 29, 111, 74, 112]). In
particular, [29] presents a framework for verification of agent programs with
the respect to given BDI agent specifications. In the proposed approach,
an agent system is first programmed using the logic-based agent oriented
programming language AgentSpeak(F). Then the obtained AgentSpeak(F)
programs are translated into Promela – the specification language of the
SPIN model checker – to verify the resulting system. Ferrari et al. [59] de-
scribe verification of the chosen pi-calculus based process algebra for mobile
agents, while [112] presents modelling of fault-tolerant agents by stochastic
Petri nets. The paper [111] describes the symbolic model checker MCMAS,
specifically tailored for verification of MAS. The MCMAS tool takes as in-
puts models describing both agents and working environment of a multi-
agent system and applies the epistemic logic to analyse it. However, model
checking approaches typically suffer from the state space explosion prob-
lem, which is especially acute for large systems. Since Event-B is based on
theorem proving, this helps us to avoid the mentioned problem.
There is a number of papers that discuss the use of probabilistic model
techniques for analysis of multi-agents systems. For example, in [83], the
authors address model-checking of probabilistic knowledge (relative to the
agent knowledge) by developing an algorithm in the MCK model checker,
while in [74], the authors represent a MAS as a discrete-time Markov chain
and verify such system properties as convergence and convergence rate in
the PAT model checker. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, the approaches
combining both theorem proving and verification via model checking are
still missing.
Proactive agent behaviour has been traditionally modelled in terms of the
system goals that agents aim to achieve in order to meet their objectives.
There are many works focussed on the notion of a goal from the agent
perspective, e.g., [31, 173, 166, 184]. For example, the work [173] presents a
unifying framework for goals, treating them as LTL formulae that describe
desired goal progressions: adoption, pursuit, and dropping of goals. Later,
in [184] the Winikoff investigates the required interactions between goals and
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provides a framework for reasoning about such interactions. In our work,
we focus on studying inter-connections between the system goals as well as
between goals and agents required to perform such goals.
6.3 System Resilience
The research investigating software architectures with respect to their de-
pendability properties has received recent attention [72, 44, 43]. Guerra et
al. propose in [72] the concept of a idealised fault-tolerant component that
can be employed as a building block within the architectural description of
a system. The concept allows the designers to identify the system parts that
are responsible for coping with faults. Therefore, the system in general is
viewed as a set of components interacting within the architecture designed
to handle software faults, thus providing a higher level of dependability.
However, these approaches are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty
in achieving fault tolerance that is unsuitable for class of the safety-critical
systems that we focus on.
The problem of system reconfiguration and its connection to predictable
dynamic resilience is presented in works [154, 153]. The proposed archi-
tectural framework – MetaSelf – is suitable to development of dynamically
resilient systems using a specific architectural model. The main idea of
the approach is to separate the functional and non-function descriptions of
the system components, formulate necessary resilience policies and reason
about system reconfiguration based on these policies. The key feature of
the proposed solution is the need for metadata – information about system
components – sufficient to enable decision-making about dynamic system
reconfiguration. The metadata are used to guide the system reconfigura-
tion with respect to the given reconfiguration policies. In [153] the authors
present a system development method for the MetaSelf framework. They
identify the phases and tasks that should be performed during the MetaSelf
development process and illustrate the method application on two examples:
dependable Web services and industrial assembly systems. Despite the pro-
vided evidence of the applicability of the proposed framework, there is a
lack of architectural models, languages, and notations for the description of
system configuration changes.
A body of research done on quantitative assessment of system resilience
aspects is presented in works [159, 169, 6]. The paper [6] discusses bench-
marking of resilience of self-adaptive systems, while [169] and [159] deal
with resilience in the context of network systems. The measurable aspects
of network resilience as a function of time have been studied in [21]. In this
paper, resilience is intertangled with the notions of system vulnerability and
recoverability. The authors study the resilience-based component impor-
tance measures. Specifically, they investigate which components are most
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influential regarding the performance and reliability issues, and therefore
affect the resilience of the entire network. The problem of empirical assess-
ment of resilience is discussed in work [130]. Pataricza et al. review the
main requirements on the statistical background needed for resilience char-
acterisation and present an approach based on Exploratory Data Analysis
(EDA) helping to understand the impact of changes and their quantitative
characterisation.
It is also worth mentioning the ReSIST project [139] that addresses
achieving sufficient resilience in the complex systems of ever evolving net-
works of computers and mobile devices. The research conducted within this
project covers such system characteristics as evolvability, assessability, us-
ability and diversity. These characteristics are studied in the context of fault
tolerant agreement protocols [114, 122], wireless sensor network algorithms
[25], testing in mobile settings [175, 124], evolving resilient usable systems
[115, 125], and others.
The similar idea of modelling a dynamic system architecture with the
integrated reconfiguration mechanisms and assessing system resilience char-
acteristics is presented in paper [101]. Using Event-B and its refinement
technique, the authors derive a complex architecture of data processing ca-
pabilities of CPS. To assess the resilience of the obtained data processing
architecture, the authors rely on the statistical model checking UPPAAL.
6.4 Simulation and Formal Modelling
There is a significant amount of work on the topic of modelling and simu-
lation of distributed systems. The problem of integration of model-based
formal methods with discrete-event models in the development of com-
plex embedded systems is addressed within the DESTECS project [52].
The research proposes an approach to the model-based design through co-
simulation of discrete-event models in the Vienna Development Method
(VDM) and continuous-time models in 20-sim [1]. These models are cou-
pled by a co-simulation tool that coordinates execution of the developed
models in their respective simulators. The resulting models can be also
augmented with descriptions of potential failures and fault tolerance mech-
anisms [64, 63, 65].
The problem of formal verification and simulation-based validation is
also addressed in the ADVANCE project [5]. However, the main focus of
the proposed methodologies is related to cyber-physical systems, which are
characterised by a mixture of discrete-event and continuous-time compo-
nents. The proposed simulation based approach combines the Event-B de-
velopment and co-simulation with tool independent physical components
via the FMI interface [151]. An approach on combining formal modelling
with a simulation technique for Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is presented
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in works [91, 92]. The proposed approach is based on co-simulation using
Event-B models of WSN and the MiXiM environment simulation engines.
In contrast, in our work we deal with discrete-event systems and focus on
integrating separate approaches for qualitative and quantitative reasoning
about such systems.
The Ptolemy project [135] studies modelling, simulation, and design of
concurrent, real-time, embedded systems. It proposes a component-based,
actor-oriented approach in which components are concurrent and interact by
message-passing [42], and which supports heterogeneous modelling and de-
sign for Modelica [56]. The key underlying focus in the project is the use of
well-defined models of computation that govern interactions between com-
ponents. However, the dependability issues, e.g., fault tolerance modelling,
are not properly supported within the proposed framework.
The problem of inadequate integration between formal reasoning about
correctness and simulation has also been identified by Boer et al [27]. They
propose to explicitly represent the notion of resources into an abstract be-
haviour specification language. In our case, Event-B allows us to formally
represent and verify system-level properties, while in [27] the stress is put on
creating executable specifications and analysis of the corresponding traces.
Our proposed process-oriented model described in Paper X is similar to
Activity Cycle Diagrams (ACD) [60, 53] – a graphical notation to model
discrete events and interactions. In particular, [60] presents an extension of
ACS to enable automatic translation of them to Java programs, while [53]
proposes extended ACD to represent the relationship between conditions
and events in a discrete event system that are not covered by the classical
ACD. In contrast, our process-oriented models allow us to represent a high
level system architecture in terms of components, processes and their in-
teractions. Moreover, our proposed models can be both used as a basis to
formal modelling and simulation at the same time.
6.5 Self-*, Adaptive and Reconfigurable Systems.
The topic of system adaptability has been significantly studied since the
middle of 60’s years [113]. Different interpretations and concepts have been
proposed by the research community since then, e.g., self-organising, self-
adaptive and reconfigurable systems [49, 84]. These paradigms are all in-
trinsically intertangled and act to enable system autonomy, while maintain
system capabilities. MAPE-K (Monitor, Analyse, Plan, Execute, Knowl-
edge) control-loop model was proposed for autonomous architectures [98].
The idea of autonomic control loop is to collect and evaluate system parame-
ters, analyse them (i.e., determine whether adaptation actions are required),
plan mitigation actions if needed and execute them. The planning compo-
nent is intended to identify alternative configurations that satisfy current
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contextual requirements and constraints.
Self-adaptation has been widely recognised as an effective approach to
deal with the complexity and dynamicity of modern software systems [182].
Formal methods provide the means to rigorously specify and verify the be-
haviour of self-adaptive systems. Formal methods have been applied during
system development, but also during runtime to provide guarantees about
the required properties of self-adaptive systems [186, 174, 163].
Software architecture-based self-adaptation, employing the MAPE loops
into system design, is presented in works [68, 69, 37, 36]. The proposed
Rainbow framework provides a reusable architectural model as well as the
means to reason about constraint violation and system adaptation capabil-
ities at runtime. The framework adopts the standard component-connector
paradigm of the software architecture which allows the designers to iden-
tify system elements as well as the relationships between them as well as
their interactions. Moreover, the additional values and constrains might be
annotated on the architectural elements such as throughput, latency. The
obtained model is extended with adaptation operators and strategies. The
adaptation operators define a set of actions that might change the system
configuration, while the adaptation strategies define the rules and properties
for changing the current configuration. Though various implementations of
the proposed framework are presented, no rigorous formal technique is used
in the construction of the resulting architecture.
In work [176] the authors propose a goal-oriented approach for self-
reconfiguration by employing the idea of monitoring feedback loop. The
proposed framework uses goal models as software requirements models, and
employs SAT solvers to check the current execution records against the
models to diagnose task failures. The monitoring component monitors re-
quirements and record data, while the diagnostic component analyses the
recorded data and identifies failures of the system behaviour. In our work, we
focus on modelling the system behaviour and dependencies between compo-
nents, while not distinguishing the system components to be the monitoring
or diagnostic ones. However, this idea can be incorporated into our system
design.
A number of architectural patterns and design choices for self-adaptation
via feedback loops are proposed in [186, 136, 181]. In works [136, 186] au-
thors propose new design solutions to support monitoring, decision making,
and reconfiguration of adaptive systems. In [180] the authors introduce the
FORMS model (FOrmal Reference Model for Self-adaptation) that allows
designers to describe and evaluate alternative design choices for self-adaptive
systems. The FORMS model defines a shared vocabulary of adaptive prim-
itives that can be used to precisely define complex self-adaptive systems.
A large variety of the dynamic reconfiguration aspects has been studied
in the last decade. For instance, Wermelinger et al. [179] have proposed a
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high-level language for specifying dynamically reconfigurable architectures.
They focus on possible modifications of architectural components and model
reconfiguration by the algebraic graph rewriting. In our work, we see recon-
figurability as an ability of components to redistribute their responsibilities
to ensure system goals. Therefore, the proposed reconfiguration mecha-
nisms are build by changing links and associations between components. In
addition, we also focus on the functional aspects of reasoning about recon-
figuration.
Significant research efforts are invested in finding suitable models of trig-
gers for run-time adaptation. Such triggers monitor performance [35] or
integrity [177] of the application under consideration and initiate reconfig-
uration when the desired characteristics are not achieved. In our work, we
consider system reconfiguration as means to achieve system resilience. We
perform the assessment of possible reconfiguration strategies at the develop-
ment phase that allows us to rely on the existing error detection mechanisms
to trigger dynamic reconfiguration. Moreover, to analyse non-functional
characteristics such as reliability and performance, we integrate formal de-
velopment with quantitative analysis.
An extensive body of research investigates the quality of service charac-
teristics of dynamically reconfigurable service-oriented systems. Among the
most prominent works in this area is the approach proposed by Calinescu
et al. [34]. It aims at defining the optimal configuration with respect to
quality of service by assessing the quality of service attributes of various
service components that are available at run-time. We use similar proba-
bilistic verification techniques to assess system reliability and performance.
However, in our work we consider a system with the predefined set of com-
ponents. This allows us to assess possible reconfiguration strategies at the
development phase and thus simplify the reconfiguration process.
The idea to employ agent-based architectures for building autonomous
systems has been realised in studies [50, 108, 178, 109]. According to the pro-
posed research, an autonomous system has a distinguished decision-making
component – agent, which behaviour can be formally verified by model-
checking techniques. In particular, it allows one to explore all possible
choices the agent might make and why [51, 178]. The works adopt the
BDI approach [137, 138] and use the GWENDOLEN language [48] for pro-
gramming rational agents.
The idea of achieving system dependability via reconfiguration is de-
scribed in work [161]. The authors present a method for constructing sys-
tems where general properties of reconfiguration can be ensured via formal
proofs. The idea of the proposed approach is to introduce a formal def-
inition of reconfiguration as well as a set of hight-level properties. Then
a system architecture is introduced which guarantees those reconfiguration
properties. In our research, we follow the same idea to enable the system to
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be reconfigurable already at a hight-level system specification.
In [93], Inverardi et al. investigate system adaptation based on the
assume-guarantee concept. In particular, they propose a framework that
allows the developers to efficiently define under which conditions adaptation
can be performed by still preserving the desired system invariant properties.
The framework also allows the designers to split the system into parts that
can be substituted. In order to guarantee the correctness of adaptation, the
special conditions are formulated and have to be proven at run-time. In
our approach, the reconfiguration strategies are already defined at develop-
ment phase and are incorporated into the system architecture. In the case
of failures or changes, the system is able to reconfigure by changing interde-
pendencies among components, as well as between the components and the
system goals.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future
Work
In this chapter we summarise the main achievements of this thesis, discuss
the limitations of the proposed approaches and point out future research
directions.
7.1 Research Conclusions
Formal methods are traditionally used in the development and verification
of critical computer-based systems to ensure system correctness and trust-
worthiness. However, a highly dynamic nature of modern software-intensive
systems requires further advances of formal techniques to facilitate reason-
ing about system resilience – an ability of the system to adapt to changes
while remaining trustworthy. In this thesis, we propose a formal integrated
approach that addresses this challenge.
Our approach relies on formal modelling and refinement in Event-B. The
Event-B framework offers a powerful scalable basis for correct-by-construction
development of complex distributed systems. In this thesis, we demonstrate
how to specialise a generic process of distributed system development by
refinement to explicitly address system resilience at different levels of ab-
straction.
We also discuss how, by modelling of not only the nominal system be-
haviour but also failures of the system components, rigorous systematic
derivation of the required fault tolerance and reconfiguration mechanisms
can be facilitated. Moreover, we investigate how the employed refinement
approach can be used as a basis for the gradual unfolding of component-
based system architectures where dynamic system reconfiguration is used
as the means to enhance system resilience. As another source for system
resilience, complex component interactions and their cooperative behaviour
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are formally studied as a part of this thesis.
In the thesis, we have aimed at proposing a scalable formal develop-
ment approach that can facilitate development of different types of resilient
distributed systems. To achieve this objective, we combine refinement with
goal-oriented development and define the resilience-explicit goal-oriented re-
finement process to facilitate development of complex multi-agent systems.
Our proposed approach allows the developers to systematically introduce the
necessary reconfiguration mechanisms to ensure that the system progresses
towards achieving its goals despite agent failures or becomes more perfor-
mant by using its agents more efficiently. Since reconfiguration is a powerful
technique for achieving resilience, we propose a formalisation of the reconfig-
urability concept, by connecting it with the system goals, agents, and their
inter-relationships.
Since quantitative assessment of different resilience characteristics is an
essential part of the design for resilience, in the thesis we also show how
Event-B models can be augmented with quantitative data and serve as a
basis for quantitative resilience assessment during the design time.
We have validated our approach by a number of case studies from differ-
ent domains, such as robotics, space, healthcare and cloud. However, we are
also well aware of some limitations of the presented research. The formal
models resulting from the proposed refinement-based development are still
very abstract, with most of the system complexity hidden. Even if they al-
low us to investigate some essential properties of reconfigurable distributed
systems, further refinement steps, bringing the models closer to a prototype
implementation of the suggested resilience mechanisms in a chosen domain,
are required to fully evaluate the approach potential. Moreover, to exploit
the benefits of the proposed integration of formal modelling and quantita-
tive assessment, the automatic support for translation between the involved
modelling languages is sorely needed. The mentioned limitations also lead
us to several possible future research directions that we discuss next.
7.2 Future Work
Resilience is a rapidly developing area that offers many opportunities for the
research. One possible research direction is to experiment with deriving re-
silience monitors (i.e., monitoring components) from the formally developed
system models to enable proactive resilience. Moreover, it will be inter-
esting to focus on a specific domain and specialise our resilience-modelling
approach for the concrete domain needs.
To facilitate the quantitative system assessment of Event-B models, it is
necessary to develop of a plug-in for the Rodin platform that would support
Event-B models augmented with probabilistic information. Such a plug-in
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could be used to derive the corresponding Markov model from an augmented
Event-B specification. This would make it possible to automatically generate
PRISM specifications for performing further quantitative analysis.
Moreover, it would be beneficial to create a tool for automatic translation
of Event-B models in SimPy. Such a tool would allow the designers to
automatically generate a code skeleton for SimPy models. Finally, it would
be advantageous to enhance our proposed intermediate graphical notation
for visualisation of system components, processes and their interactions as
well as provide tool support for it.
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Abstract. Ensuring fault tolerance of satellite systems is critical for
achieving goals of the space mission. Since the use of redundancy is
restricted by the size and the weight of the on-board equipments, the
designers need to rely on dynamic reconfiguration in case of failures of
some components. In this paper we propose a formal approach to devel-
opment of dynamically reconfigurable systems in Event-B. Our approach
allows us to build the system that can discover possible reconfiguration
strategy and continue to provide its services despite failures of its vital
components. We integrate probabilistic verification to evaluate reconfig-
uration alternatives. Our approach is illustrated by a case study from
aerospace domain.
Keywords: Formal modelling, fault tolerance, Event-B, refinement, prob-
abilistic verification.
1 Introduction
Fault tolerance is an important characteristics of on-board satellite systems.
One of the essential means to achieve it is redundancy. However, the use of
(hardware) component redundancy in spacecraft is restricted by the weight and
volume constraints. Thus, the system developers need to perform a careful cost-
benefit analysis to minimise the use of spare modules yet achieve the required
level of reliability.
Despite such an analysis, Space System Finland has recently experienced a
double-failure problem with a system that samples and packages scientific data
in one of the operating satellites. The system consists of two identical modules.
When one of the first module subcomponents failed, the system switched to the
use of the second module. However, after a while a subcomponent of the spare
has also failed, so it became impossible to produce scientific data. To not lose
the entire mission, the company has invented a solution that relied on healthy
subcomponents of both modules and a complex communication mechanism to
restore system functioning. Obviously, a certain amount of data has been lost
before a repair was deployed. This motivated our work on exploring proactive
solutions for fault tolerance, i.e., planning and evaluating of scenarios imple-
menting a seamless reconfiguration using a fine-grained redundancy.
In this paper we propose a formal approach to modelling and assessment of
on-board reconfigurable systems. We generalise the ad-hoc solution created by
Space Systems Finland and propose an approach to formal development and
assessment of fault tolerant satellite systems. The essence of our modelling ap-
proach is to start from abstract modelling functional goals that the system should
achieve to remain operational, and to derive reconfigurable architecture by re-
finement in the Event-B formalism [1]. The rigorous refinement process allows
us to establish the precise relationships between component failures and goal
reachability. The derived system architecture should not only satisfy functional
requirements but also achieve its reliability objective. Moreover, since the re-
configuration procedure requires additional inter-component communication, the
developers should also verify that system performance remains acceptable. Quan-
titative evaluation of reliability and performance of probabilistically augmented
Event-B models is performed using the PRISM model checker [8].
The main novelty of our work is in proposing an integrated approach to formal
derivation of reconfigurable system architectures and probabilistic assessment
of their reliability and performance. We believe that the proposed approach
facilitates early exploration of the design space and helps to build redundancy-
frugal systems that meet the desired reliability and performance requirements.
2 Reconfigurable Fault Tolerant Systems
2.1 Case Study: Data Processing Unit
As mentioned in the previous section, our work is inspired by a solution proposed
to circumvent the double failure occurred in a currently operational on-board
satellite system. The architecture of that system is similar to Data Processing
Unit (DPU) – a subsystem of the European Space Agency (ESA) mission Bepi-
Colombo [2]. Space Systems Finland is one of the providers for BepiColombo.
The main goal of the mission is to carry out various scientific measures to explore
the planet Mercury. DPU is an important part of the Mercury Planetary Orbiter.
It consists of four independent components (computers) responsible for receiv-
ing and processing data from four sensor units: SIXS-X (X-ray spectrometer),
SIXS-P (particle spectrometer), MIXS-T (telescope) and MIXS-C (collimator).
The behaviour of DPU is managed by telecommands (TCs) received from the
spacecraft and stored in a circular buffer (TC pool). With a predefined rate, DPU
periodically polls the buffer, decodes a TC and performs the required actions.
Processing of each TC results in producing telemetry (TM). Both TC and TM
packages follow the syntax defined by the ESA Packet Utilisation Standard [12].
As a result of TC decoding, DPU might produce a housekeeping report, switch
to some mode or initiate/continue production of scientific data. The main pur-
pose of DPU is to ensure a required rate of producing TM containing scientific
data. In this paper we focus on analysing this particular aspect of the system
behaviour. Hence, in the rest of the paper, TC will correspond to the telecom-
mands requiring production of scientific data, while TM will designate packages
containing scientific data.
2.2 Goal-Oriented Reasoning about Fault Tolerance
We use the notion of a goal as a basis for reasoning about fault tolerance. Goals
– the functional and non-functional objectives that the system should achieve –
are often used to structure the requirements of dependable systems [7, 9].
Let G be a predicate that defines a desired goal and M be a system model.
Ideally, the system design should ensure that the goal can be reached “infinitely
often”. Hence, while verifying the system, we should establish that
M |= 23G.
The main idea of a goal-oriented development is to decompose the high-level
system goals into a set of subgoals. Essentially, subgoals define the intermediate
stages of achieving a high-level goal. In the process of goal decomposition we as-
sociate system components with tasks – the lowest-level subgoals. A component
is associated with a task if its functionality enables establishing the goal defined
by the corresponding task.
For instance, in this paper we consider “produce scientific TM” as a goal of
DPU. DPU sequentially enquires each of its four components to produce its part
of scientific data. Each component acquires fresh scientific data from the cor-
responding sensor unit (SIXS-X, SIXS-P, MIXS-T or MIXS-C), preprocesses it
and makes available to DPU that eventually forms the entire TM package. Thus,
the goal can be decomposed into four similar tasks “sensor data production”.
Generally, the goal G can be decomposed into a finite set of tasks:
T = {taskj | j ∈ 1..n ∧ n ∈ N1},
Let also C be a finite set of components capable of performing tasks from T :
C = {compj | j ∈ 1..m ∧m ∈ N1},
where N1 is the set of positive integers. Then the relation Φ defined below asso-
ciates components with the tasks:
Φ ∈ T ↔ C, such that ∀t ∈ T · ∃c ∈ C ·Φ(t, c),
where ↔ designates a binary relation.
To reason about fault tolerance, we should take into account component un-
reliability. A failure of a component means that it cannot perform its associated
task. Fault tolerance mechanisms employed to mitigate results of component fail-
ures rely on various forms of component redundancy. Spacecraft have stringent
limitations on the size and weight of the on-board equipment, hence high degree
of redundancy is rarely present. Typically, components are either duplicated or
triplicated. Let us consider a duplicated system that consists of two identical
DPUs – DPUA and DPUB . As it was explained above, each DPU contains four
components responsible for controlling the corresponding sensor.
Traditionally, satellite systems are designed to implement the following sim-
ple redundancy scheme. Initially DPUA is active, while DPUB is a cold spare.
DPUA allocates tasks on its components to achieve the system goal G – pro-
cessing of a TC and producing the TM. When some component of DPUA fails,
DPUB is activated to achieve the goal G. Failure of DPUB results in failure of
the overall system. However, even though none of the DPUs can accomplish G
on its own, it might be the case that the operational components of both DPUs
can together perform the entire set of tasks required to reach G. This observation
allows us to define the following dynamic reconfiguration strategy.
Initially DPUA is active and assigned to reach the goal G. If some of its
components fails, resulting in a failure to execute one of four scientific tasks
(let it be taskj), the spare DPUB is activated and DPUA is deactivated. DPUB
performs the taskj and the consecutive tasks required to reach G. It becomes fully
responsible for achieving the goal G until some of its component fails. In this case,
to remain operational, the system performs dynamic reconfiguration. Specifically,
it reactivates DPUA and tries to assign the failed task to its corresponding
component. If such a component is operational then DPUA continues to execute
the subsequent tasks until it encounters a failed component. Then the control
is passed to DPUB again. Obviously, the overall system stays operational until
two identical components of both DPUs have failed.
We generalise the architecture of DPU by stating that essentially a system
consists of a number of modules and each module consists of n components:
C = Ca ∪ Cb, where Ca = {a compj | j ∈ 1..n ∧ n ∈ N1} etc.
Each module relies on its components to achieve the tasks required to accomplish
G. An introduction of redundancy allows us to associate not a single but sev-
eral components with each task. We reformulate the goal reachability property
as follows: a goal remains reachable while there exists at least one operational
component associated with each task. Formally, it can be specified as:
M |= 2Os, where Os ≡ ∀t ∈ T · (∃c ∈ C ·Φ(t, c) ∧ O(c))
and O is a predicate over the set of components C such that O(c) evaluates to
TRUE if and only if the component c is operational.
2.3 Probabilistic Assessment
If a duplicated system with the dynamic reconfiguration achieves the desired
reliability level, it might allow the designers to avoid module triplication. How-
ever, it also increases the amount of intercomponent communication that leads
to decreasing the system performance. Hence, while deciding on a fault tolerance
strategy, it is important to consider not only reachability of functional goals but
also their performance and reliability aspects.
In engineering, reliability is usually measured by the probability that the
system remains operational under given conditions for a certain time interval. In
terms of goal reachability, the system remains operational until it is capable of
reaching targeted goals. Hence, to guarantee that system is capable of performing
a required functions within a time interval t, it is enough to verify that
M |= 2≤tOs. (1)
However, due to possible component failures we usually cannot guarantee the
absolute preservation of (1). Instead, to assess the reliability of a system, we need
to show that the probability of preserving the property (1) is sufficiently high.
On the other hand, the system performance is a reward-based property that can
be measured by the number of successfully achieved goals within a certain time
period.
To quantitatively verify these quality attributes we formulate the following
CSL (Continuous Stochastic Logic) formulas [6]:
P=?{G ≤ t Os} and R(|goals|)=?{C ≤ t }.
The formulas above are specified using PRISM notation. The operator P is used
to refer to the probability of an event occurrence,G is an analogue of 2,R is used
to analyse the expected values of rewards specified in a model, while C specifies
that the reward should be cumulated only up to a given time bound. Thus, the
first formula is used to analyse how likely the system remains operational as
time passes, while the second one is used to compute the expected number of
achieved goals cumulated by the system over t time units.
In this paper we rely on modelling in Event-B to formally define the architec-
ture of a dynamically reconfigurable system, and on the probabilistic extension
of Event-B to create models for assessing system reliability and performance.
The next section briefly describes Event-B and its probabilistic extension.
3 Modelling in Event-B and Probabilistic Analysis
3.1 Modelling and Refinement in Event-B
Event-B is a state-based formal approach that promotes the correct-by-construc-
tion development paradigm and formal verification by theorem proving. In Event-
B, a system model is specified using the notion of an abstract state machine [1],
which encapsulates the model state, represented as a collection of variables, and
defines operations on the state, i.e., it describes the behaviour of a modelled sys-
tem. Usually, a machine has an accompanying component, called context, which
includes user-defined sets, constants and their properties given as a list of model
axioms. The model variables are strongly typed by the constraining predicates.
These predicates and the other important properties that must be preserved by
the model constitute model invariants.
The dynamic behaviour of the system is defined by a set of atomic events.
Generally, an event has the following form:
e =̂ any a where Ge then Re end,
where e is the event’s name, a is the list of local variables, the guard Ge is
a predicate over the local variables of the event and the state variables of the
system. The body of the event is defined by the next-state relation Re. In Event-
B, Re is defined by a multiple (possibly nondeterministic) assignment over the
system variables. The guard defines the conditions under which the event is
enabled. If several events are enabled at the same time, any of them can be
chosen for execution nondeterministically.
Event-B employs a top-down refinement-based approach to system develop-
ment. Development starts from an abstract specification that nondeterministi-
cally models the most essential functional requirements. In a sequence of refine-
ment steps we gradually reduce nondeterminism and introduce detailed design
decisions. In particular, we can add new events, split events as well as replace
abstract variables by their concrete counterparts, i.e., perform data refinement.
When data refinement is performed, we should define gluing invariants as a part
of the invariants of the refined machine. They define the relationship between the
abstract and concrete variables. The proof of data refinement is often supported
by supplying witnesses – the concrete values for the replaced abstract variables
and parameters. Witnesses are specified in the event clause with.
The consistency of Event-B models, i.e., verification of well-formedness and
invariant preservation as well as correctness of refinement steps, is demonstrated
by discharging the relevant proof obligations generated by the Rodin platform
[11]. The platform provides an automated tool support for proving.
3.2 Augmenting Event-B Models with Probabilities
Next we briefly describe the idea behind translating of an Event-B machine into
continuous time Markov chain – CTMC (the details can be found in [15]). To
achieve this, we augment all events of the machine with information about the
probability and duration of all the actions that may occur during their execution,
and refine them by their probabilistic counterparts.
Let Σ be a state space of an Event-B model defined by all possible values of
the system variables. Let also I be the model invariant. We consider an event e
as a binary relation on Σ, i.e., for any two states σ, σ′ ∈ Σ:
e(σ, σ′)
def
= Ge(σ) ∧Re(σ, σ′).
Definition 1. The behaviour of an Event-B machine is fully defined by a tran-
sition relation →:
σ, σ′ ∈ Σ ∧ σ′ ∈ ∪
e∈Eσ
after(e)
σ → σ′ ,
where before(e) = {σ ∈ Σ | I(σ) ∧Ge(σ)}, Eσ = {e ∈ E | σ ∈ before(e)} and
after(e) = {σ′ ∈ Σ | I(σ′) ∧ (∃σ ∈ Σ · I(σ) ∧Ge(σ) ∧Re(σ, σ′))}.
Furthermore, let us denote by λe(σ, σ
′) the (exponential) transition rate from
σ to σ′ via the event e, where σ ∈ before(e) and Re(σ, σ′). By augmenting all
the event actions with transition rates, we can modify Definition 1 as follows.
Definition 2. The behaviour of a probabilistically augmented Event-B machine
is defined by a transition relation
Λ−→:
σ, σ′ ∈ Σ ∧ σ′ ∈ ∪
e∈Eσ
after(e)
σ
Λ−→ σ′
, where Λ =
∑
e∈Eσ
λe(σ, σ
′).
Definition 2 allows us to define the semantics of a probabilistically augmented
Event-B model as a probabilistic transition system with the state space Σ, tran-
sition relation
Λ−→ and the initial state defined by model initialisation (for prob-
abilistic models we require the initialisation to be deterministic). Clearly, such
a transition system corresponds to a CTMC.
In the next section we demonstrate how to formally derive an Event-B model
of the architecture of a reconfigurable system.
4 Deriving Fault Tolerant Architectures by Refinement
in Event-B
The general idea behind our formal development is to start from an abstract goal
modelling, decompose it into tasks and introduce an abstract representation of
the goal execution flow. Such a model can be refined into different fault tolerant
architectures. Subsequently, these models are augmented with probabilistic data
and used for the quantitative assessment.
4.1 Modelling Goal Reaching
Goal Modelling. Our initial specification abstractly models the process of
reaching the goal. The progress of achieving the goal is modelled by the variable
goal that obtains values from the enumerated set STATUS = {not reached,
reached, failed}. Initially, the system is not assigned any goals to accomplish,
i.e., the variable idle is equal to TRUE. When the system becomes engaged
in establishing the goal, idle obtains value FALSE as modelled by the event
Activation. In the process of accomplishing the goal, the variable goal might
eventually change its value from not reached to reached or failed, as modelled
by the event Body. After the goal is reached the system becomes idle, i.e., a new
goal can be assigned. The event Finish defines such a behaviour. We treat the
failure to achieve the goal as a permanent system failure. It is represented by
the infinite stuttering defined in the event Abort.
Activation =̂
when idle = TRUE
then idle := FALSE
end
Body =̂
when idle = FALSE ∧ goal = not reached
then goal :∈ STATUS
end
Finish =̂
when idle = FALSE ∧ goal = reached
then goal, idle := not reached, TRUE
end
Abort =̂
when goal = failed
then skip
end
Goal Decomposition. The aim of our first refinement step is to define the
goal execution flow. We assume that the goal is decomposed into n tasks, and
can be achieved by a sequential execution of one task after another. We also
assume that the id of each task is defined by its execution order. Initially, when
the goal is assigned, none of the tasks is executed, i.e., the state of each task
is “not defined” (designated by the constant value ND). After the execution,
the state of a task might be changed to success or failure, represented by the
constants OK andNOK correspondingly. Our refinement step is essentially data
refinement that replaces the abstract variable goal with the new variable task
that maps the id of a task to its state, i.e., task ∈ 1..n→ {OK,NOK,ND}.
We omit showing the events of the refined model (the complete development
can be found in [13]). They represent the process of sequential selection of one
task after another until either all tasks are executed, i.e., the goal is reached, or
execution of some task fails, i.e., goal is not achieved. Correspondingly, the guards
ensure that either the goal reaching has not commenced yet or the execution of
all previous task has been successful. The body of the events nondeterministically
changes the state of the chosen task to OK or NOK. The following invariants
define the properties of the task execution flow:
∀l · l ∈ 2 .. n ∧ task(l) ̸= ND⇒ (∀i · i ∈ 1 .. l − 1⇒ task(i) = OK),
∀l · l ∈ 1 .. n− 1 ∧ task(l) ̸= OK⇒ (∀i · i ∈ l + 1 .. n⇒ task(i) = ND).
They state that the goal execution can progress, i.e., a next task can be chosen for
execution, only if none of the previously executed tasks failed and the subsequent
tasks have not been executed yet.
From the requirements perspective, the refined model should guarantee that
the system level goal remains achievable. This is ensured by the gluing invariants
that establish the relationship between the abstract goal and the tasks:
task[1 .. n] = {OK}⇒ goal = reached,
(task[1 .. n] = {OK,ND} ∨ task[1 .. n] = {ND})⇒ goal = not reached,
(∃i · i ∈ 1 .. n ∧ task(i) = NOK)⇒ goal = failed.
Introducing Abstract Communication. In the second refinement step we
introduce an abstract model of communication. We define a new variable ct that
stores the id of the last achieved task. The value of ct is checked every time when
a new task is to be chosen for execution. If task execution succeeds then ct is
incremented. Failure to execute the task leaves ct unchanged and results only
in the change of the failed task status to NOK. Essentially, the refined model
introduces an abstract communication via shared memory. The following gluing
invariants allow us to prove the refinement:
ct > 0⇒ (∀i · i ∈ 1 .. ct⇒ task(i) = OK), ct < n⇒ task(ct+ 1) ∈ {ND,NOK},
ct < n− 1⇒ (∀i · i ∈ ct+ 2 .. n⇒ task(i) = ND).
As discussed in Section 2, each task is independently executed by a separate
component of a high-level module. Hence, by substituting the id of a task with
the id of the corresponding component, i.e., performing a data refinement with
the gluing invariant
∀i ∈ 1..n · task(i) = comp(i),
we specify a non-redundant system architecture. This invariant trivially defines
the relation Φ. Next we demonstrate how to introduce either a triplicated archi-
tecture or duplicated architecture with a dynamic reconfiguration by refinement.
4.2 Reconfiguration Strategies
To define triplicated architecture with static reconfiguration, we define three
identical modules A, B and C. Each module consists of n components execut-
ing corresponding tasks. We refine the abstract variable task by the three new
variables a comp, b comp and c comp:
a comp ∈ 1..n→ STATE, b comp ∈ 1..n→ STATE, c comp ∈ 1..n→ STATE.
To associate the tasks with the components of each module, we formulate a
number of gluing invariants that essentially specify the relation Φ. Some of these
invariants are shown below:
∀i · i ∈ 1 .. n ∧module = A ∧ a comp(i) = OK⇒ task(i) = OK,
module = A⇒ (∀i · i ∈ 1 .. n⇒ b comp(i) = ND ∧ c comp(i) = ND),
∀i · i ∈ 1 .. n ∧module = A ∧ a comp(i) ̸= OK⇒ task(i) = ND,
∀i · i ∈ 1 .. n ∧module = B ∧ b comp(i) ̸= OK⇒ task(i) = ND,
∀i · i ∈ 1 .. n ∧module = C⇒ c comp(i) = task(i),
module = B⇒ (∀i · i ∈ 1 .. n⇒ c comp(i) = ND).
Here, a new variable module ∈ {A,B,C} stores the id of the currently active
module. The complete list of invariants can be found in [13]. Please note, that
these invariants allows us to mathematically prove that the Event-B model pre-
serves the desired system architecture.
An alternative way to perform this refinement step is to introduce a dupli-
cated architecture with dynamic reconfiguration. In this case, we assume that our
system consists of two modules, A and B, defined in the same way as discussed
above. We replace the abstract variable task with two new variables a comp and
b comp. Below we give an excerpt from the definition of the gluing invariants:
module = A ∧ ct > 0 ∧ a comp(ct) = OK⇒ task(ct) = OK,
module = B ∧ ct > 0 ∧ b comp(ct) = OK⇒ task(ct) = OK,
∀i · i ∈ 1 .. n ∧ a comp(i) = NOK ∧ b comp(i) = NOK⇒ task(i) = NOK,
∀i · i ∈ 1 .. n ∧ a comp(i) = NOK ∧ b comp(i) = ND⇒ task(i) = ND,
∀i · i ∈ 1 .. n ∧ b comp(i) = NOK ∧ a comp(i) = ND⇒ task(i) = ND.
Essentially, the invariants define the behavioural patterns for executing the tasks
according to dynamic reconfiguration scenario described in Section 2.
Since our goal is to study the fault tolerance aspect of the system archi-
tecture, in our Event-B model we have deliberately abstracted away from the
representation of the details of the system behaviour. A significant number of
functional requirements is formulated as gluing invariants. As a result, to verify
correctness of the models we discharged more than 500 proof obligations. Around
90% of them have been proved automatically by the Rodin platform and the rest
have been proved manually in the Rodin interactive proving environment.
Note that the described development for a generic system can be easily in-
stantiated to formally derive fault tolerant architectures of DPU. The goal of
DPU – handling the scientific TC by producing TM – is decomposed into four
tasks that define the production of data by the satellite’s sensor units – SIXS-X,
SIXS-P, MIXS-T and MIXS-C. Thus, for such a model we have four tasks (n=4)
and each task is handled by the corresponding computing component of DPU.
The high-level modules A, B and C correspond to three identical DPUs that
control handling of scientific TC – DPUA, DPUB and DPUC , while functions
a comp, b comp and c comp represent statuses of their internal components.
From the functional point of view, both alternatives of the last refinement
step are equivalent. Indeed, each of them models the process of reaching the
goal by a fault tolerant system architecture. In the next section we will present
a quantitative assessment of their reliability and performance aspects.
5 Quantitative Assessment of Reconfiguration Strategies
The scientific mission of BepiColombo on the orbit of the Mercury will last for
one year with possibility to extend this period for another year. Therefore, we
should assess the reliability of both architectural alternatives for this period of
time. Clearly, the triplicated DPU is able to tolerate up to three DPU failures
within the two-year period, while the use of a duplicated DPU with a dynamic
reconfiguration allows the satellite to tolerate from one (in the worst case) to
four (in the best case) failures of the components.
Obviously, the duplicated architecture with a dynamic configuration min-
imises volume and the weight of the on-board equipment. However, the dynamic
reconfiguration requires additional inter-component communication that slows
down the process of producing TM. Therefore, we need to carefully analyse the
performance aspect as well. Essentially, we need to show that the duplicated
system with the dynamic reconfiguration can also provide a sufficient amount of
scientific TM within the two-year period.
To perform the probabilistic assessment of reliability and performance, we
rely on two types of data:
– probabilistic data about lengths of time delays required by DPU components
and sensor units to produce the corresponding parts of scientific data
– data about occurrence rates of possible failures of these components
It is assumed that all time delays are exponentially distributed. We refine
the Event-B specifications obtained at the final refinement step by their proba-
bilistic counterparts. This is achieved via introducing probabilistic information
into events and replacing all the local nondeterminism with the (exponential)
race conditions. Such a refinement relies on the model transformation presented
in Section 3. As a result, we represent the behaviour of Event-B machines by
CTMCs. This allows us to use the probabilistic symbolic model checker PRISM
to evaluate reliability and performance of the proposed models.
Due to the space constraints, we omit showing the PRISM specifications in
the paper, they can be found in [13]. The guidelines for Event-B to PRISM model
transformation can be found in our previous work [14].
The results of quantitative verification performed by PRISM show that with
probabilistic characteristics of DPU presented, in Table 11, both reconfiguration
strategies lead to a similar level of system reliability and performance with in-
significant advantage of the triplicated DPU. Thus, the reliability levels of both
systems within the two-year period are approximately the same with the differ-
ence of just 0.003 at the end of this period (0.999 against 0.996). Furthermore,
the use of two DPUs under dynamic reconfiguration allows the satellite to han-
dle only 2 TCs less after two years of work – 1104 against 1106 returned TM
packets in the case of the triplicated DPU. Clearly, the use of the duplicated
architecture with dynamic reconfiguration to achieve the desired levels of relia
bility and performance is optimal for the considered system.
1 Provided information may differ form the characteristics of the real components. It is
used merely to demonstrate how the required comparison of reliability/performance
can be achieved
Table 1. Rates (time is measured by minutes)
TC access rate when the system is idle λ 1
12·60 SIXS-P work rate α2
1
30
TM output rate when a TC is handled µ 1
20
SIXS-P failure rate β2
1
106
Spare DPU activation rate (power on) δ 1
10
MIXS-T work rate α3
1
30
DPUs “communication” rate τ 1
5
MIXS-T failure rate β3
1
9·107
SIXS-X work rate α1
1
60
MIXS-C work rate α4
1
90
SIXS-X failure rate β1
1
8·107 MIXS-C failure rate β4
1
6·107
Finally, let us remark that the goal-oriented style of the reliability and per-
formance analysis has significantly simplified the assessment of the architectural
alternatives of DPU. Indeed, it allowed us to abstract away from the configura-
tion of input and output buffers, i.e., to avoid modelling of the circular buffer as
a part of the analysis.
6 Conclusions and Related Work
In this paper we proposed a formal approach to development and assessment
of fault tolerant satellite systems. We made two main technical contributions.
On the one hand, we defined the guidelines for development of the dynamically
reconfigurable systems. On the other hand, we demonstrated how to formally
assess reconfiguration strategy and evaluate whether the chosen fault tolerance
mechanism fulfils reliability and performance objectives. The proposed approach
was illustrated by a case study – development and assessment of the reconfig-
urable DPU. We believe that our approach not only guarantees correct design of
complex fault tolerance mechanisms but also facilitates finding suitable trade-offs
between reliability and performance.
A large variety of aspects of the dynamic reconfiguration has been studied
in the last decade. For instance, Wermelinger et al. [17] proposed a high-level
language for specifying the dynamically reconfigurable architectures. They focus
on modifications of the architectural components and model reconfiguration by
the algebraic graph rewriting. In contrast, we focused on the functional rather
than structural aspect of reasoning about reconfiguration.
Significant research efforts are invested in finding suitable models of triggers
for run-time adaptation. Such triggers monitor performance [3] or integrity [16]
of the application and initiate reconfiguration when the desired characteristics
are not achieved. In our work we perform the assessment of reconfiguration strat-
egy at the development phase that allows us to rely on existing error detection
mechanisms to trigger dynamic reconfiguration.
A number of researchers investigate self* techniques for designing adaptive
systems that autonomously achieve fault tolerance, e.g., see [4, 10]. However,
these approaches are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty in achieving
fault tolerance that is unsuitable for the satellite systems. The work [5] proposes
an interesting conceptual framework for establishing a link between changing
environmental conditions, requirements and system-level goals. In our approach
we were more interested in studying a formal aspect of dynamic reconfiguration.
In our future work we are planning to further study the properties of dynamic
reconfiguration. It particular, it would be interesting to investigate reconfigura-
tion in the presence of parallelism and complex component interdependencies.
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Abstract. MapReduce is a powerful distributed data processing model
that is currently adopted in a wide range of domains to efficiently handle
large volumes of data, i.e., cope with the big data surge. In this paper, we
propose an approach to formal derivation of the MapReduce framework.
Our approach relies on stepwise refinement in Event-B and, in particu-
lar, the event refinement structure approach – a diagrammatic notation
facilitating formal development. Our approach allows us to derive the
system architecture in a systematic and well-structured way. The main
principle of MapReduce is to parallelise processing of data by first map-
ping them to multiple processing nodes and then merging the results.
To facilitate this, we formally define interdependencies between the map
and reduce stages of MapReduce. This formalisation allows us to pro-
pose an alternative architectural solution that weakens blocking between
the stages and, as a result, achieves a higher degree of parallelisation of
MapReduce computations.
Keywords: formal modelling, Event-B, refinement, event refinement
structure, MapReduce
1 Introduction
MapReduce is a widely used framework for handling large volumes of data [5].
It allows the users to automatically parallelise computations and execute them
on large clusters of computers. Essentially, the computation is performed in two
stages – map and reduce. The first stage maps the input data to multiple process-
ing nodes, while the second stage performs parallel computations to merge the
obtained results. Typically, execution of the map stage is blocking, i.e., execu-
tion of the reduce stage does not start until the map stage is completed. Though
MapReduce is already a highly performant framework, to keep pace with the
drastically increasing volume of data, it would be desirable to loosen the cou-
pling between the stages and hence exploit the potential for parallelisation to
the fullest.
In this paper, we undertake a formal study of the MapReduce framework. We
formally model the control flow and data interdependencies between the map and
reduce tasks, as well as derive the conditions under which the execution of the
reduce stage can overlap with the execution of the map stage. Our formalisation
of the (generic) MapReduce framework relies on the Event-B method and the
associated Rodin platform. Event-B [1] is a formal approach that is particularly
suitable for the development of distributed systems. The system development in
Event-B starts from an abstract specification that is transformed into a detailed
specification in a number of correctness-preserving refinement steps. In this pa-
per, the Event Refinement Structure approach [3, 6] is used to facilitate the
refinement process. The technique provides us with an explicit graphical repre-
sentation of the relationships between the events at different levels of abstraction
and helps to gradually derive the complex MapReduce architecture.
Event-B relies on proof-based verification that is integrated into the devel-
opment process. The Rodin platform [10] automates development in Event-B by
generating the required proof obligations and automatically discharging a part
of them. Via abstraction, proof and decomposition, Event-B enables reasoning
about system-level properties of complex distributed systems. In particular, it
allows us to explicitly define interdependencies between the processed data and
derive the conditions under which an execution of the reduce stage can start
before completion of the map stage. We believe that the proposed approach
provides the designers with a formally grounded insight on the properties of
MapReduce and enables fine-tuning of the framework to achieve a higher degree
of parallelisation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the
generic MapReduce framework and our formalisation of it. In Section 3 we give an
overview of the Event-B formalism and the Event Refinement Structure (ERS)
approach. In Section 4 we present our formal derivation of the MapReduce frame-
work in Event-B using the ERS approach. As a result, we derive two alternative
architectures of the MapReduce framework – blocking and partially blocking. In
Section 5 we overview the related work and present some concluding remarks.
2 MapReduce
2.1 Overview of MapReduce
MapReduce is a programming model for processing large data sets. It has been
originally proposed by Google [5]. The framework is designed to orchestrate the
work on distributed nodes, run various computational tasks in parallel, providing
at the same time for redundancy and fault tolerance. Distributed and parallelised
computations are the key mechanisms that make the MapReduce framework very
attractive to use in a wide range of application areas: data mining, bioinformat-
ics, business intelligence, etc. Nowadays it is becoming increasingly popular in
cloud computing. There exist different implementations of MapReduce, among
them open-source Hadoop [2], Hive [11], and others.
The MapReduce computational model was inspired by the map and reduce
functions widely used in functional programming. A MapReduce computation
is composed of two main steps: the map stage and the reduce stage. During
the map stage, the system inputs are divided into smaller computational tasks,
which are then performed in parallel (provided there are enough processors in the
cluster). The obtained collective results then become the inputs for the reduce
stage, which combines them in some way to produce the overall output. Once
again, the reduce inputs are split into smaller computational tasks that can be
executed in parallel.
The MapReduce framework can be tuned to perform different data transfor-
mations by the user-supplied map and reduce functions. These functions encode
basic mapping and reduction tasks to be performed in single nodes. The MapRe-
duce framework then incorporates the provided functions and orchestrates the
overall distributed computations based on them.
A typical example illustrating MapReduce computations is counting the word
occurrences in a large set of documents. The input data set is split into smaller
portions and the user-provided map function is applied to each such data block.
The map function simply assigns to each word it encounters the value equal to
1. Overall, the map stage produces a collection of (word,1) pairs as intermediate
results. Then, during the reduce stage, the user-supplied reduce function takes
a portion of these intermediate data related to a particular word and sums all
the occurrences of that word. Such a computation is done for each encountered
word. The overall result is a set of (word,number) pairs.
2.2 Towards Formal Reasoning about MapReduce
In this section, we present a formalisation of the MapReduce framework. Specif-
ically, we mathematically represent all MapReduce execution stages, i.e., the re-
quired data and control flow, and identify the computational (map and reduce)
tasks that can be executed in parallel. Moreover, we formally define possible
data interdependencies between the map and reduce tasks. The latter allows us
to propose an alternative architectural solution, which weakens blocking between
the MapReduce phases and, as a result, achieves a higher degree of parallelisa-
tion of MapReduce computations. In Section 4, we will propose two alternative
formal developments of the MapReduce framework in Event-B, both of which
rely on the formalisation presented below.
Let IData be an abstract type defining the input data to be processed within
the MapReduce framework and OData be an abstract type defining the result-
ing output data. In a nutshell, a MapReduce computation processes the given
input data and generates some result. Thus, it can be formally represented as a
function:
MapReduce ∈ IData → OData.
More specifically, a MapReduce computation can be defined as a functional
composition of the following phases: MSplit, Map, RSplit, Reduce, and Combine:
MapReduce = MSplit; Map; RSplit; Reduce; Combine.
Let us note that the phases MSplit and Map together correspond to the map
stage mentioned in Section 2.1, while the phases RSplit and Reduce belong to
the reduce stage.
The MapReduce process starts with the MSplit phase. During this phase,
the input data are split into a number of blocks (portions of the input data),
which can be handled independently of each other. In the following Map phase,
the user-provided map function is applied to each such input block. Next, in the
RSplit phase, the MapReduce framework groups together all the intermediate
results obtained after the Map phase to prepare for the reduce computations.
Similarly to the MSplit phase, the data are divided into blocks that can be
handled separately. After that, the Reduce phase is executed, during which the
user-supplied reduce function is repeatedly applied (once per each block). Fi-
nally, in the Combine phase, all the obtained results are combined into the final
output.
Formalisation of the MapReduce execution phases. Next we define all the
MapReduce execution phases in more detail. In the MSplit phase, the input data
are split into a number of blocks that are later supplied to the map function. To
emphasise the independent nature of map computations, we associate the notion
of a map task with such a portion of the input data to be processed separately.
Let MTask be a set of all possible map tasks and MData be an abstract type
defining the data obtained after the splitting. Then the MSplit phase can be
mathematically represented as follows:
MSplit ∈ IData→ (MTask 7→MData).
Essentially, MSplit produces a partitioning of the input data to be used in the
Map phase among different map tasks. Note that the result of MSplit is a partial
function since only a subset of MTask may be needed for particular input data.
We assume that the input data fully determines the number and the subset of
involved map tasks.4 To extract this information, we use the following functions
mtasks ∈ IData→ P1(MTask), mnum ∈ IData→ N1
defined as
∀idata ∈ IData · mtasks(idata) = dom(MSplit(idata)),
∀idata ∈ IData · mnum(idata) = card(MSplit(idata)),
where dom and card are the function domain and set cardinality operators.
The Map phase involves transformation of all the data obtained by the MSplit
phase into the intermediate form to be used in the later phases. Let RData be
an abstract type defining the intermediate data obtained after the Map phase.
Then Map phase can be mathematically represented as the following function:
Map ∈ (MTask 7→MData)→ P1(MTask ×RData).
Therefore, Map takes the map data partitioning produced by MSplit and returns
the transformed data associated with the map tasks that produced them. These
results then become the input data for the following reduce computations.
In our formalisation the Map results consist of a set of (mtask, rdata) pairs,
without assuming any further structure among them. This is done intentionally,
since grouping and partitioning of these data will be performed in the RSplit
phase.
4 This applies only to the involved computational tasks. Actual software components
that will be employed to carry out the necessary computations can be dynamically
assigned and re-assigned for a specific map or reduce task.
All the involved map tasks should be performed within the Map phase. For-
mally, this requirement can be formulated as follows:
∀f ∈MTask 7→MData · f 6= ∅ ⇒ dom(f) = dom(Map(f)).
Next the results obtained by the Map phase are grouped together to prepare
for reduce computations. Similarly to the MSplit phase, they should be first
partitioned among the individual reduce tasks.
Let RTask be a set of all possible reduce tasks. Then the RSplit phase can
be formally defined as the following function:
RSplit ∈ P1(MTask ×RData)→ (RTask 7→ P1(RData)).
Essentially, the function takes the intermediate results produced by the Map
phase and produces data partitioning among the involved reduce tasks.
We can reason about the actual number and the subset of the involved reduce
tasks. Once again, this is determined by the original input data. Formally, we
introduce the functions
rtasks ∈ IData→ P1(RTask), rnum ∈ IData→ N1
defined as
∀idata ∈ IData · rtasks(idata) = dom(RSplit(Map(MSplit(idata)))),
∀idata ∈ IData · rnum(idata) = card(RSplit(Map(MSplit(idata)))).
The RSplit phase only rearranges the intermediate data, producing their par-
titioning among the reduce tasks. Therefore, neither new data should appear nor
any of the existing data can disappear during this transformation. Mathemati-
cally, this can be formulated as the following property:
∀f ∈ P1(MTask × RData) · ran(f) = (
[
rt ∈ dom(RSplit(f)) | RSplit(f)(rt)),
where ran is the function range operator.
The Reduce phase is similar to the Map phase – it takes as input a data
partitioning produced by RSplit and returns transformed data:
Reduce ∈ (RTask 7→ P1(RData))→ P1(OData),
where OData is an abstract type defining the resulting output data.
Finally, the last Combine phase can be simply defined as follows:
Combine ∈ P1(OData)→ OData.
Formalisation of the map and reduce functions. The Map phase is based
on repeated invocations of the user-supplied function map. The map function can
be formally represented in the following way:
map ∈ MData→ P1(RData).
Thus, it takes an input data from MData and produces some intermediate data
to be used in reduce computations. The map function and the Map phase are
tightly linked. To be precise, the union of all the results obtained from all the
map function applications should be equal to the overall result of the Map phase:
Map = {f ·f ∈MTask 7→MData | f 7→ (
[
mt·mt ∈ dom(f) | {mt}×map(f(mt)))}.
The user-supplied reduce function can be specified as follows:
reduce ∈ P1(RData)→ P1(OData).
It takes as an input a subset of the reduce data RData and produces some subset
of output data from OData.
Finally, the overall result of the Reduce phase should be equal to the com-
bined results obtained by repeated application of the reduce function:
Reduce = {f ·f ∈ RTask 7→P1(RData) | f 7→ (
[
rt·rt ∈ dom(f) | reduce(f(rt)))}.
Essentially, the Reduce definition is directly based on the user-supplied reduce
function.
Formalisation of interdependencies between the map and reduce tasks.
The main principle of MapReduce is that all the map and reduce computations
are distributed to multiple independent processing nodes. The reduce inputs
are based on the previously produced map outputs. However, in some cases,
the reduce inputs might depend on only particular map outputs. Therefore, the
reduce stage can be initiated before all the map computations are finished. To
relax the limitation of the original MapReduce computation flow, requiring that
the reduce stage starts only after completing the map stage, we formally define
the dependence relation between the map and reduce tasks as the following
function dep:
dep ∈ IData→ P(RTask×MTask),
with the following property:
∀ idata ∈ IData, rt ∈ RTask, mt ∈ MTask · rt 7→ mt ∈ dep(idata) ⇔
mt ∈ dom(MSplit(idata)) ∧
(∃rd ∈ RData · rt ∈ dom(RSplit(Map(MSplit(idata)))) ∧
rd ∈ RSplit(Map(MSplit(idata)))(rt) ∧ mt 7→ rd ∈ Map(MSplit(idata))).
The property states that for any input data input, a map task mt and a
reduce task rt are in dependence relation (i.e., a reduce task depends on a map
task), if and only if some intermediate data rd has been generated for this
reduce task rt by the computations of the map task mt during the Map phase.
Essentially, the relation dep defines the data interdependencies between the map
and reduce stages. This formalisation allows us to propose (in Section 4) an
alternative architectural solution that weakens blocking between the stages.
Finally, to make it possible for a particular reduce task to start immediately
after all the necessary data have been produced by the map tasks related by
dep, we need a version of RSplit, defining a partial split related with a specific
reduce task. For a given reduce task, it produces the grouped together results
obtained within the Map phase:
rsplit ∈ RTask 7→ (P1(MTask× RData)→ P1(RData)).
Again, the union of the results obtained from all the rsplit function applica-
tions should be the result of the RSplit phase:
∀f ·f ∈ P1(MTask ×RData)⇒
RSplit(f) = (
[
rt·rt ∈ dom(rsplit)|{rt 7→ rsplit(rt)(f)}).
In Section 4 we will demonstrate that, by relying on the proposed formalisa-
tion, we can derive a formal model of the MapReduce framework. There we will
propose two models of MapReduce – blocking and partially blocking models.
3 Formal Development by Refinement: Background
3.1 Event-B
Event-B is a state-based formal approach that promotes the correct-by-construction
development paradigm and formal verification by theorem proving [1]. In Event-
B, a system model is specified using the notion of an abstract state machine.
An abstract state machine encapsulates the model state, represented as a col-
lection of variables, and defines operations on the state, i.e., it describes the
dynamic behaviour of a modelled system. The variables are strongly typed by
the constraining predicates that, together with other important system proper-
ties, are defined as model invariants. Usually, a machine has an accompanying
component, called a context, which includes user-defined sets, constants and their
properties given as a list of model axioms.
The dynamic behaviour of the system is defined by a collection of atomic
events. Generally, an event has the following form:
e =̂ any a where Ge then Re end,
where e is the event’s name, a is the list of local variables, and (the event guard)
Ge is a predicate over the model state. The body of an event is defined by
a multiple (possibly nondeterministic) assignment to the system variables. In
Event-B, this assignment is semantically defined as the next-state relation Re.
The event guard defines the conditions under which the event is enabled, i.e.,
its body can be executed. If several events are enabled at the same time, any of
them can be chosen for execution nondeterministically.
Event-B employs a top-down refinement-based approach to system develop-
ment. A development starts from an abstract specification that nondeterministi-
cally models the most essential functional requirements. In a sequence of refine-
ment steps, we gradually reduce nondeterminism and introduce detailed design
decisions. The consistency of Event-B models, i.e., verification of model well-
formedness, invariant preservation as well as correctness of refinement steps, is
demonstrated by discharging the relevant proof obligations. The Rodin platform
[10] provides an automated support for modelling and verification. In particu-
lar, it automatically generates the required proof obligations and attempts to
discharge them.
3.2 Event Refinement Structure
The Event Refinement Structure (ERS) [3, 6] approach augments Event-B re-
finement with a graphical notation that allows us to explicitly represent the
relationships between the events at different abstraction levels as well as define
the required event sequence in a model. ERS is illustrated by example in Fig-
ure 1. The diagram explicitly shows that AbstractEvent is refined by Event2,
machine M1 refines M0  
 
variables Event1 Event2 
invariants 
  @inv1 Event1  BOOL 
  @inv2 Event2 = TRUE  Event1 = TRUE 
  @inv3 Event2 = AbstractEvent 
 
event INITIALISATION then 
      @act1 Event1  FALSE 
      @act2 Event2  FALSE 
end 
 
event Event1 any par  where 
      @grd1 Event1 = FALSE 
     then 
      @act1 Event1  TRUE 
end 
 
event Event2 refines AbstractEvent  
    any par where 
      @grd1 Event1= TRUE 
      @grd2 Event2 = FALSE 
    then 
      @act1 Event2  TRUE 
end 
AbstractEvent,
Event1, Event2,
Machine M0  
 
variables AbstractEvent 
invariants 
  @inv1 AbstractEvent  BOOL 
 
event INITIALISATION then 
      @act1 AbstractEvent  FALSE 
end 
 
event AbstractEvent any par  where 
      @grd1 AbstractEvent = FALSE  
     then 
      @act1 AbstractEvent  TRUE  
end 
Root,%abstract%event,%is%decomposed%into%sub%events%%%%
The%sub%events%are%read%from%le7%to%right%and%indicate%sequen:al%control%%
A%dashed%line:%refines%skip%
A%solid%line:%refines%AbstractEvent%%%%
Fig. 1. Event Refinement Structure (ERS) Diagram
while Event1 is a new event that refines skip. Moreover, the diagram shows that
the effect achieved by AbstractEvent in the abstract machine is realised in the
refining machine by the occurrence of Event1 followed by Event2.
In ERS, the sequential execution of the leaf events is depicted from left
to right. The event sequencing is managed by additional control variables intro-
duced into the underlying Event-B model. For instance, for each leaf event (node)
represented in Fig. 1, there is one boolean control variable with the same name
as the event. When the event Event1 occurs, the corresponding control variable
is set to TRUE. The following event, Event2, can occur only after Event1. This
is achieved by checking the value of the Event1 control variable in the guard of
Event2.
Boolean variables only allow controlling single execution of events. When
multiple executions of an event are needed, the event is parameterised and set
control variables are used instead of boolean ones. This allows the event to
occur many times with different values of its parameter. A parameter can be
introduced in an event by the ERS constructors. The ERS constructors used
in this paper are illustrated by two simple examples in Fig. 2. The use of all
constructor indicates that Event1 is executed for all instances of the p parameter
before execution of Event2, while the use of the constructor some indicates that
Event1 is executed for some of instances of the p parameter before execution of
Event2. The corresponding control variables for Event1 and Event2 are defined
as sets in the model.
AbstractEvent	  
Event1(p)	  
AbstractEvent	  
Event2	  Event2	  Event1(p)	  
some(p)	  all(p)	  
Fig. 2. ERS all /some Constructors
Event-B adopts an event-based modelling style that facilitates the correct-
by-construction development of complex distributed systems. Since MapReduce
is a framework designed for large-scale distributed computations, Event-B is a
natural choice for its formal modelling and verification.
4 Formal Development with Event Refinement Structure
In this section, we rely on our formalisation presented in Section 2.2 to de-
velop two alternative Event-B models of the MapReduce framework: blocking
and partially blocking. The presented formal developments make use of the Event
Refinement Structure (ERS) approach, presented in Section 3.2. Our develop-
ment strategy is based on gradually unfolding all the MapReduce computational
phases by refinement. Such small model transformation steps allow us to effi-
ciently handle the complexity of the MapReduce framework.
Let us note that our development of the MapReduce framework is generic.
It relies on the use of abstract functions to represent essential data transforma-
tions of MapReduce. These abstract functions can be treated as generic system
parameters that can be later instantiated with their concrete instances for the
specific MapReduce implementations.
4.1 Blocking Model of MapReduce
The mathematical data structures and their properties from our MapReduce
formalisation constitute the basis for defining the Event-B context component
that is used throughout the whole formal development. Essentially, the whole
presented formalisation is incorporated as the context, e.g.
axm8:MSplit ∈ IData→ (MTask 7→MData)
axm9: Map ∈ (MTask 7→MData)→ P1(MTask ×RData)
axm10: RSplit ∈ P1(MTask ×RData)→ (RTask 7→ P1(RData)), ...
We will constantly rely on these definitions to ensure the correctness of the
overall data transformation process within our MapReduce models. Since the
formalised definitions are still abstract (generic), our presented development es-
sentially formally describes a family of possible MapReduce implementations.
Due to space limit, we do not present the complete development but rather give
its graphical representation using the ERS graphical notation. The full Event-B
models of this development can be found in [8].
Abstract model of MapReduce. We start with an abstract model in which
the whole MapReduce computation is done in one atomic step. This behaviour
is modelled by the event OutputMapReduce:
OutputMapReduce b=
any t1, t2, t3, t4
when t1 = MSplit(idata) ∧ t2 = Map(t1) ∧ t3 = RSplit(t2) ∧ t4 = Reduce(t3)
then output := Combine(t4) ‖ done := TRUE end
With help of the ERS approach, we decompose the atomicity of
OutputMapReduce into smaller steps. Verification of the refinement proof obli-
gations ensures that the decomposition preserves correctness. Specifically, in
the next several consecutive refinement steps, we break the atomicity of the
OutputMapReduce event by introducing explicit events for the following MapRe-
duce phases: MSplit, Map, RSplit, and Reduce. Fig. 3 presents the ERS diagram
of the model.
m0m1m2
m3
m4
OutputMapReduceMapSplit MapPhase
ReduceSplitOutputMapReduceReducePhase OutputMapReduceOutputMapReduce
OutputMapReduce	  
Fig. 3. Blocking model: ERS diagram (for OutputMapReduce)
The new model events MapSplit, MapPhase, ReduceSplit and ReducePhase
specify the sequential execution of the MapReduce phases. The sequence between
the events is enforced by following the rules given in Section 3.2. It is also
specified by the invariant properties on the control variables:
OutputMapReduce = TRUE ⇒ ReducePhase = TRUE,
ReducePhase = TRUE ⇒ ReduceSplit = TRUE,
ReduceSplit = TRUE ⇒ MapPhase = TRUE,
MapPhase = TRUE ⇒ MapSplit = TRUE.
Moreover, to store the intermediate results of separate phases, we introduce
a number of variables (msplit, map result, rsplit and reduce result) that are
updated during execution of the corresponding events. The variable updates are
also performed according to the formalisation given in Section 2.2. For instance,
the variable msplit is introduced to store the result of the MSplit phase. After
the execution of the MapSplit event, msplit gets the value equal to MSplit(idata).
Machine MapReduce1 m1 refines MapReduce1 m0
Variables idata, output, msplit, MapSplit, ...
Invariants OutputMapReduce = TRUE⇒MapSplit = TRUE ∧
MapSplit = TRUE⇒msplit = MSplit(idata) ∧ ...
MapSplit b=
when MapSplit = FALSE
then MapSplit := TRUE
msplit := MSplit(idata)
end
OutputMapReduce refines OutputMapReduce b=
any t2, t3, t4
where MapSplit = TRUE ∧OutputMapReduce = FALSE ∧
t2 = Map(msplit) ∧ t3 = RSplit(t2) ∧ t4 = Reduce(t3)
with t1 = msplit
then output := Combine(t4)
OutputMapReduce:= TRUE
end
m5
m4 MapPhase
MTProcess(mt) MapCommitall  (mt)
Fig. 4. Blocking model: ERS diagram (for MapPhase)
Breaking atomicity of the Map phase. In the second refinement step, we
introduce the event MapPhase that abstractly models the Map phase. Essentially,
the Map phase involves parallel execution of all the map tasks. To introduce such
a behaviour, we use the constructor “all constructor”, which is applied to the
MTProcess event that models the execution of a particular map task (see Fig.4).
The expression “all(mt)” means that the MTProcess event can be enabled for
multiple values of mt ∈ dom(msplit). On the other hand, the MapCommit event
can only occur when all the map computations of map tasks have been finished.
In Event-B, we model this by adding a variable MTProcess, which is a set
containing all possible map tasks that should be processed. The order between
the events is ensured by the invariants on the control variables, e.g.,
inv4: MapCommit = TRUE⇒MTProcess = dom(msplit),
where dom(msplit) defines the set of all current map tasks. The invariant states
that if the MapCommit event has been executed, then all the map tasks have
been completed before it. While specifying the MTProcess event, we rely on the
definition of the map function, given in Section 2.2.
Machine MapReduce1 m5 refines MapReduce1 m4
MTProcess b=
any mt
where MapSplit = TRUE ∧mt ∈ dom(msplit) ∧mt /∈MTProcess
then MTProcess := MTProcess ∪ {mt}
MTProcess result(mt) := map(msplit(mt))
end
MapCommit refines MapPhase b=
when MapSplit = TRUE ∧MapCommit = FALSE ∧MTProcess=dom(msplit)
then MapCommit = TRUE
map result := (
S
mt·mt ∈ dom(msplit)|{mt} ×MTProcess result(mt))
end
Further refinements of the Map phase. During the MapReduce execution,
all the map and reduce tasks are parallelised and distributed to multiple process-
ing nodes – the actual software components that carry out the computations.
We name these components as map and reduce workers. Moreover, there is a
special component – master – that controls all the computations and assigns
the map and reduce tasks to the workers. The master periodically pings every
worker. In case of a worker failure, the master re-assigns tasks from the failed
worker to a healthy one. This procedure can be repeated until the master gets
the result for a particular map or reduce task from some worker. To introduce
such functionality, we carry out several further refinements focusing on the Map
phase. These refinements elaborate on modelling of map task execution.
Fig.5 illustrates the event MTProcess and its several consecutive levels of
atomicity decomposition. First, the abstract event MTProcess is broken into two
concrete events, MTok and MTSuccess correspondingly. The MTok event models
the execution of the map task mt by a particular map worker mw. The result
m6
m7
m5 MTProcess(mt)
MTok(mt,  mw)some  (mw) MTSuccess(mt)AssignMT(mt,  mw) ExecMT(mt,  mw)
Fig. 5. Blocking model: ERS diagram (for MTProcess)
of this computation should be approved by the master side, which is modelled
by execution of the MTSuccess event. The “some” constructor indicates that
the event MTok may be executed only for some instances of the mw param-
eter before the MTSuccess event becomes enabled. The MTSuccess and MTok
control variables are defined as sets, which allows for multiple executions of the
MTSuccess and MTok events. Later on, in the next refinement step, the atomicity
of the MTok event is broken into two events AssignMT and ExecMT. The event
AssignMT models an assignment of a map task mt to a particular map worker
mw, while ExecMT models the successful execution of the task by this worker.
Similarly to the Map phase, we refine the Reduce phase by gradually unfold-
ing its computations. The overall refinement structure is presented on Fig.6.
Let us note that the proposed architecture is blocking in the sense that the
reduce computations can be only started after all the map computations have
been finished. The formal derivation of the blocking model and its dynamics is
performed under this condition. Next we propose an alternative architectural
solution of the MapReduce framework that weakens blocking between the map
and reduce stages and, as a result, achieves a higher degree of parallelisation
of the MapReduce computations. For this purpose, we will make use of the
dependence relation between map and reduce tasks introduced in the Section
2.2. We call this model partially blocking model.
m7
m8
m9m10
m5
m6
m4
m1m0m2m3
OutputMapReduceMapSplit MapPhase ReduceSplit
MTProcess(mt) MapCommitall  (mt)
RTProcess(rt) ReduceCommit
RTSuccess  (rt)RTok(rt,  rw)
OutputMapReduce
MTok(mt,  mw)some  (mw) MTSuccess(mt)AssignMT(mt,  mw) ExecMT(mt,  mw)
AssignRT(rt,  rw) ExecRT(rt,  rw)
ReducePhase OutputMapReduceOutputMapReduce
all  (rt)
some  (rw)
OutputMapReduce	  
Fig. 6. MapReduce ERS Diagram: blocking model
m0m1m2 MapSplit OutputMapReduceOutputMapReduceRSplitReducePhase
OutputMapReduce	  
(a)
m3m4
RSplitReducePhase
RTSplitProcess(rt) RTProcess(rt)RSplitReduceCommit
RTSplitReduceProcess(rt)all  (rt)
m2
(b)
Fig. 7. Partially blocking model: ERS diagrams
4.2 Partially Blocking Model of MapReduce
We start from the same initial specification as for the blocking model, in which
the whole MapReduce computation is done in one atomic step, and then refine
it in order to introduce the MSplit phase. Next, in contrast to the previous
derivation, we separate the phase that combines executions of the RSplit and
Reduce phases – RSplitReducePhase. Fig.7 (a) presents the ERS diagram of the
refined model.
RSplitReducePhase involves executions of the RSplit and Reduce phases for
all reduce tasks. Essentially, these computations are parallelised. To introduce
such behaviour, we use the“all” constructor applied to the RTSplitReduceProcess
event that, for a particular reduce task rt, performs split and then reduce com-
putations (see. Fig.7 (b)). Next, we separate these split and reduce executions
of the particular reduce task rt. Namely, the event RTSplitReduceProcess is split
into two concrete events, RTSplitProcess and RTProcess. Here we again rely on
the rsplit and reduce functions formalised in Section 2.2.
Up to now we did not introduce the Map phase explicitly. However, the
results of MapPhase are simulated internally, by storing the intermediate results
in the local variables of the RTSplitProcess event. To explicitly model the Map
phase, the event RTSplitProcess is now split into two events MTProcess and
RSplit (see Fig.8). The constructor “all” is parameterised by (mt ∈ dep[{rt}])”.
It means that the event MTProcess is executed for all those map tasks, mt, that
are in data dependency with the reduce task rt. Therefore, to start the RSplit
phase, we do not need to wait until all the map tasks are completed. Here we
are relying on the definition of data interdependency dep between the map and
reduce stages, formalised in Section 2.2. Finally, the MTProcess and RTProcess
events are refined in the same manner as in the blocking model presented in the
Section 4.1.
m5
m6m7 ExecMT(rt,  mt,  mw)AssignMT(rt,  mt,  mw)MTok(rt,  mt,  mw) MTSuccess(rt,mt)
MTProcess(rt,mt) RSplit(rt)
RTSplitProcess(rt)
some  (mw)
all  (mt  ∈  dep[{rt}]  )  
m4
Fig. 8. Partially blocking model: ERS diagram (for RTSplitProcess)
Let us note that the proposed partially blocking model allows us to achieve a
higher degree of parallelisation of MapReduce computations. Indeed, for a par-
ticular reduce task, when the dependent map tasks have already been executed,
the RSplit phase for this reduce task can be performed, and then reduce com-
putations can be started. In other words, the computations from three different
phases – Map, RSplit, and Reduce – can be performed in parallel, provided the
involved data are independent. Therefore, the proposed architectural solution
weakens blocking between the stages and, as a result, achieves a higher degree of
parallelisation. The overall refinement structure of the partially blocking model
is presented on Fig.9.
4.3 Discussion and Future Work
To verify correctness of the presented models, we have discharged around 270
proof obligations for the first formal development, as well as more than 300 for
the second one. Approximately 93% of them have been proved automatically
by the Rodin platform and the rest have been proved manually in the Rodin
interactive proving environment. With help of the ERS approach, we have de-
composed the atomicity of the MapReduce framework and hereby achieved a
higher degree of automation in proving. Moreover, the ERS diagrammatic nota-
tion has provided us with additional support to represent the model control flow
at different abstraction levels and also simplified reasoning about possible refine-
ment strategies. The whole development and proving effort has taken about one
person-month.
As a result of the presented refinement chains, we have arrived at two dif-
ferent centralised Event-B models of the distributed MapReduce framework. As
a part of the future work, we are planing to derive distributed models by em-
ploying the existing decomposition mechanisms of Event-B. This would result in
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OutputMapReduce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AssignMT(rt,  mt,  mw)MTok(rt,  mt,  mw) MTSuccess(rt,mt)
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 RTSplit  (rt)
RTSplitProcess  (rt)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RSplitReduceCommitRTSplitReduceProcess(rt)
all  (rt)
some  (rw)
some  (mw)
all  (mt  ∈  dep[{rt}]  )  
AssignRT(rt,  rw)RTok(rt,  rw)ExecRT(rt,  rw)RTSuccess  (rt)
OutputMapReduce	  
Fig. 9. MapReduce Event Refinement Structure: partially blocking model
creating separate formal specifications of the involved software components of
the MapReduce framework (such as master, map worker, reduce worker, etc.).
The static part of the modelled system is formally defined in the correspond-
ing context component. The definitions of static data structures in the context
are mostly very abstract, i.e. they state only essential properties to be satis-
fied. This makes them generic parameters of the whole formal development.
In its turn, such formal development becomes generic, representing a family of
the systems that can be described by providing suitable concrete values for the
generic parameters. The proposed formal model can be used then as a starting
point for future development of a specific MapReduce application. The actual
concrete values can be supplied by either the end-user (e.g., the map and reduce
functions) or the developer of the MapReduce framework (e.g., the MSplit or
RSplit transformations).
As a continuation of this work, it would be interesting to create formal models
for a concrete MapReduce implementation, e.g., the word counting example,
by using the Event-B generic instantiation plug-in. Moreover, to analyse the
quantitative characteristics of the proposed models, we are planing to use the
Uppaal-SMC model checker. This would allow us to, e.g., assign different data
processing rates for the map and reduce tasks and then compare the execution
time estimations of two considered architectures.
5 Related Work and Conclusions
The problem of formalisation of the MapReduce framework has been studied in
[12]. The authors present a formal model of MapReduce using the CSP method.
In their work, they focus on formalising the essential components of the MapRe-
duce framework: the master, mapper, reducer, the underlying file system, and
their interactions. In contrast, our focus is on modelling the overall flow of con-
trol as well as the data interdependencies between the MapReduce computational
phases. Moreover, our approach is based on the stepwise refinement technique
that allowed us to gradually unfold the complexity of the MapReduce framework.
Formalisation of MapReduce in Haskel is presented in [9]. Similarly to our
approach, it focuses on the program skeleton that underlies MapReduce compu-
tations and considers the opportunities for parallelism in executing MapReduce
computations. However, in addition to that, we also reason about the involved
software components – the master, map and reduce workers – that are associated
with the respective map and reduce tasks.
The work [7] presents two approaches based on Coq and JML to formally
verify the actual running code of the selected Hadoop MapReduce application.
In our work we are more interested in formalisation of MapReduce computa-
tions and gradual building of different MapReduce models that are correct-by-
construction. The performance issues of MapReduce computations have been
studied in the paper [4], focusing on one particular implementation of the MapRe-
duce – Hadoop. In contrast, we have tried to formally investigate the data in-
terdependencies between the MapReduce phases and their effect on the degree
of parallelisation, independently of a concrete MapReduce implementation.
In this paper we have proposed an approach to formalising the MapReduce
framework. Our main technical contribution of this paper is two-fold. On the one
hand, based on our definition of interdependencies between the processed data as
well as the map and reduce stages, we have derived the conditions under which
blocking between the stages can be relaxed. Therefore, we have rigorously derived
constraints for implementing MapReduce with a higher degree of parallelisation.
On the other hand, we have demonstrated how to use the Event Refinement
Structure (ERS) technique to formally derive and verify a model of a complex
system with a massively parallel architecture and complex dynamic behaviour.
The stepwise refinement approach to deriving a complex system model has
demonstrated good scalability and allowed us to express system properties at
different levels of abstraction and with a different degree of granularity. Moreover,
combining the refinement technique with tool-assisted mathematical proofs have
provided us with a scalable approach to verification of a complex system model.
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Abstract—Multi-agent systems (MAS) are increasingly used
in critical applications. To ensure dependability of MAS, we
need powerful development techniques that would allow us
to master complexity inherent to MAS and formally verify
correctness and safety of collaborative agent activities. In this
paper we present a development of hospital MAS by refinement
in Event-B. We demonstrate that Event-B allows the developers
to rigorously specify complex agent interactions and verify their
correctness and safety.
Keywords-Event-B; refinement; formal modelling; formal
verification; multi-agent system; safety
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile multi-agent systems (MAS) are complex de-
centralised distributed systems composed of agents asyn-
chronously communicating with each other. Agents are com-
puter programs acting autonomously on behalf of a person or
organisation, while coordinating their activities by commu-
nication [1]. MAS are increasingly used in various critical
applications such as factories, hospitals, rescue operations
in disaster areas, etc. However, widespread use of MAS is
currently hindered by the lack of methods for ensuring their
dependability.
In this paper we focus on studying complex agent in-
teractions. In a critical MAS, incorrect execution of these
activities might have devastating consequences. However,
ensuring correctness of complex interactions is a challenging
issue due to faults caused by agent disconnections, dynamic
role allocation and autonomy of the agent behaviour. To
address these challenges, we need the system-level mod-
elling approaches that would support formal verification of
correctness and facilitate discovery of restrictions that should
be imposed on the system to guarantee its safety.
In this paper we develop a hospital MAS by refinement in
Event-B [2]. Refinement is a top-down approach to formal
development of systems that are correct by construction.
The system development starts from an abstract specification
which defines the main behaviour and properties of the
system. The abstract specification is gradually transformed
(refined) into a more concrete specification directly trans-
latable into a system implementation. Correctness of each
refinement step is verified by proofs. The Rodin platform [3]
provides the developers with automated tool support for
constructing and verifying system models in Event-B.
In our development we demonstrate how to gradually
derive a system implementation that satisfies the desired
safety properties. It is different from traditional approaches
to verification of MAS that extract a model from a system
implementation and verify the desired properties by state-
exploration. Our approach is not only free of the state
explosion problem but also allows the designers to dis-
cover restrictions that should be imposed on the system
environment to guarantee system safety. We argue that the
formal development in Event-B offers a useful technique for
development and verification of complex critical MAS.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we
describe our formal modelling framework – Event-B. In
Section III we propose main principles for formal reasoning
about MAS and their properties. Section IV presents our
case study – a hospital MAS. We show here how to
abstractly model a MAS, introduce complex collaborative
agent interactions by refinement, as well as verify safety
properties. Finally, in Section V we overview the related
work and discuss the achieved results.
II. FORMAL MODELLING AND REFINEMENT IN EVENT-B
We start by briefly describing our formal development
framework. The Event-B formalism is a variation of the B
Method [4], a state-based formal approach that promotes
the correct-by-construction development paradigm and for-
mal verification by theorem proving. Event-B has been
specifically designed to model and reason about parallel,
distributed and reactive systems. Currently Event-B is ac-
tively used within the FP7 ICT project DEPLOY to develop
dependable systems from various domains [5].
In Event-B, a system model is specified using the notion
of an abstract state machine [2]. An abstract state machine
encapsulates the model state represented as a collection
of variables, and defines operations on this state, i.e., it
describes the behaviour of the modelled system. A machine
may also have the accompanying component, called context.
A context may include user-defined carrier sets, constants
and their properties, which are given as a list of model
axioms. In Event-B, the model variables are strongly typed
by the constraining predicates called invariants. Moreover,
the invariants specify important properties that should be
preserved during the system execution.
The dynamic behaviour of the system is defined by the
set of atomic events. Generally, an event can be defined as
evt =̂ any vl where g then S end
where vl is a list of new local variables (parameters), g is
the event guard, and S is the event action. The guard is a
state predicate that defines the conditions under which the
action can be executed, i.e., when the event is enabled. If
several events are enabled at the same time, any of them can
be chosen for execution non-deterministically. If none of the
events is enabled then the system deadlocks. In general, the
action of an event is a parallel composition of deterministic
or non-deterministic assignments.
The Event-B refinement process allows us to gradually
introduce implementation details, while preserving func-
tional correctness. The consistency of Event-B models,
i.e., invariant preservation, correctness of refinement steps,
should be formally demonstrated by discharging relevant
proof obligations [2]. The verification efforts, in particular,
automatic generation and proving of the required proof
obligations, are significantly facilitated by the Rodin plat-
form [3]. Proof-based verification as well as reliance on
abstraction and decomposition adopted in Event-B offers the
designers a scalable support for the development of such
complex distributed systems as multi-agent systems.
Recently the Event-B language and Rodin have been
extended with a possibility to define modules [6], [7] –
components containing groups of callable atomic operations.
Modules can have their own (external and internal) state and
invariant properties. An important characteristic of modules
is that they can be developed separately and, when needed,
composed with the main system.
In the next section, we outline main principles of formal
reasoning about MAS and their properties.
III. FORMAL REASONING ABOUT MAS
Let us start by defining a MAS formally.
Definition 1. A multi-agent system MAS is a tuple
(A, µ, E ,R), where A is a collection of different classes
of agents, µ is the system middleware, E is a collection
of system events and R is a set of dynamic relationships
between agents in a MAS.
Each agent belongs to a particular class or type of agents
Ai, i ∈ 1..n, such that Ai ∈ A. This class is dynamic, i.e.,
new class agents can spontaneously appear or the existing
agents may disappear (both normally or abnormally). A
particular agent aij ∈ Ai is characterised by its local state
consisting from agent variables and static agent attributes.
The system middleware µ can be considered as a special
agent that is always present in the system. The responsibility
of the middleware is to ensure communication between
agents, to detect agent appearance or disappearance, recover
from the situations when the required connections between
the system agents are lost, etc.
The system events E include all internal and external
system reactions. An execution of an event may change the
state of the middleware or agents. Each collaborative activity
between different agents (or an agent and the middleware)
may be composed of a set of events. Moreover, system
events may model appearance or disappearance of mobile
agents, sending request from one agent to another, recovery
of lost agent connections, etc. The collaborative action
should preserve the following property:
Property 1. Let Aact and Aina be sets of active and
inactive agents correspondingly, whereA = Aact∪Aina and
Aact ∩ Aina = ∅. Let EAA and EAµ be all the collabo-
rative activities (sets of events) between agents and agents
and between agents and middleware respectively. Moreover,
for each A ∈ A, let EA be a set of events in which the agent
A is involved. Then
∀A· A ∈ Aact⇒EA ∈ EAA
and ∀A· A ∈ Aina⇒EA ∈ EAµ.
For instance, this property implies that while an agent
is recovering from a failure it cannot be involved into
cooperative activities with other agents.
A collection of system events R consists of dynamic
relationships or connections between active agents of the
same or different classes. An agent relationship is modelled
as a relation
R(a1, a2, ..., am) ⊆ C∗1 × C∗2 ...× C∗m,
where C∗j = Cj ∪ {?}, Cj ⊂ Aact, j ∈ 1..m. A rela-
tionship can be pending, i.e., incomplete. This is indicated
by question marks in the corresponding places of R, e.g.,
R(a1, a2, ?, a4, ?). Pending relationships are usually caused
by appearance of new agents or disappearance of the existing
ones. An existing agent may initiate a new relationship.
Property 2. Let Aact be a set of active agents. Let EAA be
all the collaborative activities in which these active agents
are involved. Moreover, for each agent A ∈ Aact, let RA
be all the relationships it is involved. Finally, for each
collaborative activity CA ∈ EAA, let ACA be a set of the
involved agents in this activity. Then, for each CA ∈ EAA
and A1, A2 ∈ ACA, RA1 ∩RA2 6= ∅.
This property restricts the interactions between the agents
– only the agents that are linked by relationships (including
the pending ones) can be involved into cooperative activities.
The system middleware µ keeps a track of pending
relationships and tries to resolve them by enquiring suitable
agents to confirm their willingness to enter into a particular
relationships. Additional data structure PrefR associated
with a relationship R ∈ R can be used to express a specific
preference of one agents over the other ones. The middle-
ware then enforces this preference by enquiring the preferred
agents first. Formally, PrefR is an ordering relation over the
involved agent classes. Thus, for R ⊆ C∗1 × ...× C∗m,
PrefR ∈ C1 × ...× Cm ↔ C1 × ...× Cm.
A responsibility of the middleware is to detect situations
when some of the established or to be established rela-
tionships become pending and guarantee “fairness”, i.e., no
pending request will be ignored forever, as well as try to
enforce the given preferences, if possible.
While developing a critical MAS, we should ensure that
certain cooperative activities, once initiated, are successfully
completed. Those are the activities that implement safety
requirements. The ensure safety we have to verify the
following property:
Property 3. Let EAAcrit, where EAAcrit ⊆ EAA, be a
subset containing critical collaborative activities. Moreover,
let Rpen and Rres, where Rpen ⊆ R and Rres ⊆ R,
be subsets of pending and resolved relationships defined
for these activities. Finally, let RCA, where CA ∈ EAA
and RCA ⊆ R, be all the relationships the activity CA
can affect. Then, for each activity CA ∈ EAAcrit and
relationship R ∈ RCA,
((R ∈ Rpen) (R ∈ Rres)),
where  designates ”always” and  denotes ”leads to”.
This property postulates that eventually all pending rela-
tionships should be resolved for each critical cooperative
activity. In the next section we will present modelling a
hospital MAS in Event-B.
IV. ABSTRACT MODELLING OF A HOSPITAL MAS
A. Requirements
The hospital MAS consists of two types of agents –
patients and medical personnel (called doctors for simplic-
ity). The condition of each patient is monitored by the
corresponding medical equipment – an agent representing a
patient. The doctor agents are running on Pocket PC-based
devices – Personal Digital Assistants (PDA). The hospital
provides the wireless connectivity to the doctor agents. Each
doctor is associated with one agent.
The medical equipment continuously updates the patient’s
medical record consisting of different medical measurements
as well as detects emergencies – dangerous changes of
critical parameters (e.g., blood pressure, pulse rate, etc.).
In case of an emergency, the patient agent generates an
emergency call that is communicated to the doctor(s) treating
the patient. An important safety requirement imposed on the
system is that all emergencies should be promptly handled by
the responsible doctors. In spite of its seeming simplicity,
this requirement is hard to ensure. Indeed, a MAS oper-
ates in a volatile communication environment, i.e., agents
might experience temporal disconnections. Hence the design
of our system should incorporate certain fault tolerance
mechanisms that would guarantee that each emergency call
is eventually handled. Moreover, different doctors can be
associated with the same patient during different shifts.
Therefore, we have to ensure that at the end of a doctor’s
shift all his/her patients are handed over to another doctor.
Another important safety requirement associated with the
system is to guarantee that a doctor always accesses the
most recent patient record and the patient’s data are always
kept in a consistent state. We assume that the patient record
is stored at the equipment associated with her. To ensure
that these requirements are satisfied, we should regulate the
access to the patient’s data. A specific delivery of a medicine,
prescription of a treatment and so on are introduced into the
patient’s log by the medical personnel via their PDAs. To
ensure that the data are updated consistently, we only allow
the doctor to modify the patient’s data when he or she is
in a close proximity to the patient. Specifically, the patient
data become available at the doctor’s PDA only when she/he
arrives to the patient location. All the modifications are
synchronised with the data stored by the patient’s equipment.
When the doctor finishes examining the patient or delivering
a medicine and leaves, the connection to the patient’s data
is lost. Such a restriction allows us to ensure that only a
doctor who is in a close proximity to a patient is allowed
to modify the patient’s record. Moreover, it ensures that the
doctor has the access to the freshest info about the patient.
The safety-critical requirements imposed on the system
should be fulfilled in the course of complex agent interac-
tions. Hence, the properties defined in the previous section
are put in the context of doctor-patients interactions. Indeed,
each patient should be assigned to a certain doctor.
While the doctor is inactive (because the shift is over or
a failure of the corresponding PDA), doctor-patient interac-
tions cannot occur. Finally, each emergency call should be
eventually served. Next we demonstrate how to model and
verify agent interactions in Event-B.
B. Towards modelling agent interdependencies
Our abstract specification models the behaviour of the en-
tire hospital MAS in a highly abstract way. We define the set
of active doctor agents as med agents ⊆ MEDSTAFF .
The events Activate and Deactivate model joining and
leaving hospital location by the agents. While an agent is
active, it can perform certain activities, which is abstractly
modelled by the event Activity.
In our first refinement step we augment our model with
a representation of patients, patients ⊆ PATIENTS,
and introduce the events that abstractly model interactions
between the introduced patients and the doctors.
Each patient arriving at the hospital is associated with
a doctor who has a primary responsibility for treating the
patient:
assigned doctor ∈ patients→ med agents.
We omit showing complete specifications of the subse-
quent refinement steps; complete specifications of the entire
development can be found at [8].
At the first refinement step, resulting in the model Hos-
pital1, we add the new events PatientArrival and Patient-
Discharge to model a patient arrival and patient discharge
from the hospital correspondingly. The event PatientArrival
ensures the following property, which can be considered as
an instance of the Property 3:
(new patient  assigned doctor),
while, similarly, the event PatientDischarge ensures that
(a patient leaves the hospital  all his/her relationships are
removed).
In the refined specification we also elaborate on the
event Activity. Essentially, the medical personnel should
examine the patients and deliver the prescribed medicine.
We generalise these actions under the general term “visiting
a patient”. Events VisitBegin and VisitEnd refine the abstract
event Activity and model a visiting procedure.
In our abstract specification we have assumed that the
doctor agents can leave the hospital at any time. How-
ever, formal modelling has uncovered that safety cannot be
guaranteed under this assumption. Hence we must impose
certain restrictions on the situations when the doctors can
actually leave the hospital. Before a doctor agent can leave
the hospital, we should reassign his/her patients to another
doctor. This is another illustration of the Property 3:
(a doctor leaves the hospital  all his/her patients are
reassigned).
We split the abstract event Deactivate into two corre-
sponding events: AgentLeaving and ReassignDoctor. The
event AgentLeaving models leaving the location by a doctor.
Here we check that a doctor does not have any assigned
patients and is not currently involved in examining a patient:
AgentLeaving =̂ Refines Deactivate
any ma
when
ma ∈ med agents ∧ma /∈ ran(assigned doctor) ∧
ma /∈ last visit[visited]
then
med agents := med agents \ {ma}
end
The event ReassignDoctor models leaving the location by a
doctor who has assigned patients. We must be sure that all
his/her patients will be reassigned to the new doctor.
C. Introducing fault tolerance by refinement
A doctor agent might leave the location because the
doctor’s shift is over or because the doctor agent has ir-
recoverably failed and should be permanently disconnected.
At the second refinement step we introduce a distinction
between the normal agent leaving and its disconnection due
to a failure. Both cases have affect the safety requirements.
In a MAS, the agents often lose connection only for a
short period of time. After the connection is restored, the
agent should be able to continue its operations. Therefore,
after detecting a loss of connection, the location should not
immediately disengage the disconnected agent but rather
set a deadline before which the agent should reconnect.
If the disconnected agent restores its connection before the
deadline then it can continue its normal activities. However,
if the agent fails to do so, the location should permanently
disengage the agent.
We introduce new variables and events that model the
behaviour described above: DisconnectAgent, Reconnection-
Successful, ReconnectionFailed events. The introduction of
an agent disconnection allows us to make a distinction
between two reasons behind leaving the location by a doctor
– because of the end of shift or due to the disconnection
timeout. To model these two cases, we split the event
AgentLeaving into two events NormalAgentLeaving and De-
tectFailedFreeAgent respectively.
While modelling failure of a doctor agent, we again
encounter the Property 3. In both cases we need to reassign
all the patients of the disconnected doctor to another doctor.
The event ReassignDoctor is decomposed into two events
NormalReassignDoctor and DetectFailedAgent:
DetectFailedAgent =̂ Refines ReassignDoctor
any ma,ma new
when
ma ∈ ran(assigned doctor) ∧ma /∈ last visited[visited] ∧
ma new ∈ med agents ∧ma new 6= ma ∧
ma ∈ disconnected ∧ timer(ma) = timeout ∧
(ma new /∈ disconnected ∨
(ma new ∈ disconnected ∧ timer(ma new) = active))
then
med agents := med agents \ {ma} ‖
assigned doctor := assigned doctorC−
(dom(assigned doctor . {ma})× {ma new}) ‖
disconnected := disconnected \ {ma} ‖ timer := {ma}C− timer
end
The second refinement step has resulted in a specification
ensuring that no patients are left unattended neither because
of the doctors shift change nor because of a doctor agent
failure.
D. Ensuring Safety of Cooperative Agent Actions
Our next refinement step introduces abstract modelling of
emergency calls, which are generated by patient monitoring
equipment. We must ensure that each call will be properly
handled by a corresponding doctor. Hence our next refine-
ment step should transform the specification to ensure the
following:
(an emergency call  a medical visit happens).
In this refinement step, we introduce the variable
emergency calls that associates the emergency calls with
the patients:
emergency calls ∈ ALARMS 7→ patients.
Moreover, we define the variable accepted calls that estab-
lishes the correspondence between the emergency calls and
the doctors that answer them:
accepted calls ∈ ALARMS 7→med agents.
We add new events EmergencyCall and HandlingEmer-
gencyCall to abstractly model the occurrence of an emer-
gency and finding a responsible doctor to handle it:
HandlingEmergencyCall =̂ Status convergent
any ec,ma
when
ec ∈ dom(emergency calls) ∧ ec /∈ dom(accepted calls) ∧
ma ∈ med agent ∧ma /∈ disconnected
then
accepted calls := accepted calls ∪ {ec 7→ ma}
end
To guarantee that the refined specification preserves the
global behaviour of the abstract machine, we should demon-
strate that the newly introduced events converge. To prove
it, we need to define a model variant – natural number
expressions on the model variables [2]. A developer should
prove that the variant expression is decreased after an event
execution. In our case, a specific system variant ensures that
the newly introduced events EmergencyCall and HandlingE-
mergencyCall do not take the control forever. Those events
have status convergent. We define the variant as follows:
card(ALARMS \ dom(emergency calls))+
card(ALARMS \ dom(accepted calls)),
and prove that it is decreased by new events. Variants
play an important role in ensuring, e.g., that error recovery
terminates, service requests are eventually served, etc. In our
case the variant allows us to guarantee that eventually some
doctor is chosen to handle an emergency.
Moreover, at this refinement step we distinguish two types
of a patient visit – a regular visit and a visit for handling
an emergency call. To model this, we decompose the event
VisitBegin into events RegularVisitBegin and EmergencyVis-
itBegin, see [8] for details.
The goal of our next refinement step is to introduce a
detailed procedure of selecting a doctor in the case of an
emergency call. The proposed procedure can be described as
follows. We start by selecting an emergency call to answer.
Then we model a loop of finding a suitable candidate and
sending a request to him/her. If the doctor rejects it then we
choose the next candidate. The procedure is repeated until
we get an acceptance of the request.
To model the described procedure, we introduce a number
of events to specify the corresponding steps of the selection
procedure: CallFeed, AcceptCall, ForwardCall, RejectCall,
etc. Note that a doctor agent can refuse to accept a call. For
instance, by checking the doctor schedule it might discover
that he/she is currently performing a scheduled surgery.
While verifying correctness of this refinement step, we
encounter a problem in the system requirements – we cannot
guarantee safety unless we assume that during the search
for a doctor no disconnection of agents can occur. Hence,
our system should ensure (e.g., by implementing a certain
protocol) that finding a doctor takes a very short period
of time. Moreover, we define an additional system variant
– card(med agents \ occupied) – to ensure that the event
RejectCall is convergent, which means that eventually we
should get an acceptance from a doctor to answer the call.
E. Data integrity
To ensure that a patient gets a correct treatment, we should
guarantee that the medical personnel always access the most
recent patient record. As we discussed in Section 3, we allow
a doctor to access and modify the patient’s data only when
he/she is in a close proximity to the patient. We implement
this requirement via the scoping mechanism [9], [10]. A
scope provide a shared data space for a doctor and a patient.
We assume that each patient agent has the scope associated
with it. As soon as a doctor agent appears at a close vicinity
of the patient agent, it automatically joins the scope. While
in the scope, the doctor can modify the patient record (e.g.,
prescribe a new medicine, log the information about the
delivered medicine, etc.).
To model this behaviour, we refine the abstract events
RegularVisitBegin, EmergencyVisitBegin, VisitEnd by events
RegularEnterScope, EmergencyEnterScope, LeaveScope and
add a new event ModifyRecord. We introduce the variable
record that represents the medical history for every patient.
The variable ma data stores the data that appear on the
doctor’s PDA screen. When the doctor agent is in a close
vicinity of a patient, its ma data becomes equal to the value
of the patient data. Finally, we define the variable scopes
– a partial function associating the active scopes with the
doctors participating in them:
record ∈ patients→ P(DATA)
ma data ∈ med agents 7→ P(DATA)
scopes ∈ ScopeName 7med agents
∀ma·ma ∈ disconnected⇒ma /∈ ran(scopes).
The event ModifyRecord models an update of the patient
record by a doctor, when he/she is in the scope of a patient:
ModifyRecord =̂
any ma, sn, pa, da new
when
(sn 7→ ma) ∈ scopes ∧ pa ∈ dom(last visit) ∧ pa ∈ visited ∧
last visit(pa) = ma ∧ da new ∈ P(DATA) ∧ da new 6= ∅
then
ma data(ma) := da new ‖ record(pa) := da new
end
The corresponding safety property stating that the medical
personnel always access the most recent record is formulated
as the invariant:
∀ma, pa. (pa 7→ ma) ∈ (visitedC last visit)⇒
ma data(ma) = record(pa).
F. Decomposition
As a result of the previous refinement steps, we have
arrived at a centralised model of the Hospital MAS. In
the final refinement step we aim at deriving a distributed
architecture. In reality, agents and the location communicate
with each other via message passing. This refinement step
is focused on defining this communication explicitly. To
achieve this, we rely on the modularisation extension of
Event-B.
The abstract model is refined by a model representing the
Location part – the middleware, and two separate modules
– Doctor and Patient. Each modules contain callable opera-
tions and both internal and external data. The Location part
accesses the modules via the provided generic interfaces.
The Location model imports two module interfaces –
Doctor and Patient. The majority of the events of the
abstract machine are now refined by the location events
(ActivateAgent, PatientArrival, etc.). The remaining events,
for instance, AcceptCall, RejectCall, EmergencyCall, etc.,
become a part of the autonomous processes of the doctor
or patient interfaces. The abstract event EmergencyCall
is refined by the patient’s interface event Emergency im-
plementing the occurrence of emergency calls. Similarly,
the abstract events AcceptCall, RejectCall, ModifyRecord
are refined by the corresponding doctors’s interface events
Acceptance, Rejection and ModifyData.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a formal development of a
hospital MAS by refinement in Event-B. We formalised the
main properties of MAS and demonstrated how refinement
process can facilitate their preservation.
This paper focuses on modelling and verification of safety
for two central critical activities – handling emergencies
and consistent updates of patient data. Ensuring correctness
of these activities was especially challenging due to highly
dynamic nature of a hospital, volatile error-prone communi-
cation environment and autonomous agent behaviour.
The work presented in this paper is inspired by our
previous work on modelling context-aware mobile agent
systems [9], [10] in the CAMA framework [11], [12]. In
a similar way, we rely on a timeout mechanism to tolerate
agent disconnections and employ a scoping mechanism to
provide shared data space for patient and doctor agents.
However, in this paper we have focused on modelling and
verification of safety properties of complex agent interac-
tions rather than on reasoning about general mechanisms
for agent interaction with middleware.
Formal modelling of MAS has been undertaken by [13],
[14]. The authors have proposed an extension of the Unity
framework to explicitly define such concepts as mobility and
context-awareness. In our approach we also have studied the
problem of ensuring access to the fresh context. However,
in [13] it is solved at the level of the matching agent
attributes while in our approach we rely on the scoping
mechanism to achieve this.
A formal modelling of MAS for the health care in Z has
be undertaken by Gruer at al. [15]. The work has focused on
specifying a multi-agent system for a medical help system.
The authors aimed at studying how to formally represent
agent interactions, e.g., during negotiations. In our approach
we not only model the agent interactions but also formally
prove their properties. Hence, our approach is especially
suitable for developing critical MAS.
Our approach is different from numerous process-
algebraic approaches used for modelling MAS. Firstly, we
have relied on proof-based verification that does not impose
restrictions on the size of the model, number of agents
etc. Secondly, we have adopted a system’s approach, i.e.,
we modelled the entire system and extracted specifications
of its individual components by decomposition. Such an
approach allows us to express and formally verify safety
of the overall system, i.e., we indeed achieve verification of
safety as a system level property. Finally, the adopted top-
down development paradigm has allowed us to efficiently
cope not only with complexity of requirements but also
with complexity of verification. We have build a large
formal model of a complex system by a number of rather
small increments. As a result, verification efforts have been
manageable because we merely needed to prove refinement
between each two adjacent levels of abstraction. Hence, we
conclude that refinement in Event-B constitutes a suitable
technique for formal modelling and verification of critical
multi-agent systems.
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1 Introduction 
The field of mobile multi-agent systems (MASs) has been actively studied in the last 
decade. MASs are complex decentralised distributed systems composed of agents 
asynchronously communicating with each other. Agents are computer programmes acting 
autonomously on behalf of a person or an organisation, while coordinating their activities 
by communication (OMG Mobile Agents Facility, 1997). MASs are increasingly used in 
various critical applications such as factories, hospitals, rescue operations in disaster 
areas, etc. However, widespread use of MASs is currently hindered by the lack of 
methods for ensuring their dependability. 
In this paper we focus on studying complex agent interactions. In a critical MAS, 
incorrect execution of these activities may have devastating consequences. However, 
ensuring correctness of complex interactions is a challenging issue due to faults caused 
by agent disconnections, dynamic role allocation and autonomy of the agent behaviour. 
To address these challenges, we need the system-level modelling approaches that would 
support formal verification of correctness and facilitate discovery of restrictions that 
should be imposed on the system to guarantee its safety. 
In this paper we propose a refinement-based approach to developing critical MAS. 
Our formal modelling and verification framework is Event-B (Abrial, 2010). The main 
development technique of Event-B is refinement – a top-down approach to a formal 
development of systems that are correct by construction. A development starts from an 
abstract system specification that non-deterministically models the most essential system 
behaviour. In a sequence of refinement steps, we gradually reduce non-determinism and 
introduce detailed design decisions. The refinement technique allows us to ensure that a 
resulting specification preserves the globally observable behaviour and properties of the 
abstract specification it refines. Verification of each refinement step is done by proofs. 
These proofs establish system safety (via preservation of safety invariant properties 
expressed at different levels of abstraction) and liveness (via the provable absence of 
undesirable system deadlocks). Transitivity of the refinement relation allows us to 
guarantee that the system implementation adheres to the abstract specifications. (Rodin 
Platform, 2006) integrated development environment for Event-B – provides effective 
tool support for system modelling and verification. 
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The main novelty of our approach is in demonstrating how to gradually derive a
system implementation that satisfies the desired safety properties. It is different from
traditional approaches to verification of MAS that extract a model from a system
implementation and verify the desired properties by state-exploration. Our approach
is not only free of the state explosion problem but also allows the designers to
discover restrictions that should be imposed on the system environment to guarantee
system safety. The top-down development approach facilitates structuring of complex
requirements and improves comprehensibility of formal models. We argue that the
formal development in Event-B offers a useful technique for development and
verification of complex critical MAS.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe our formal modelling
framework – Event-B. In Section 3 we define the main principles of formal reasoning
about MASs and their properties. In Section 4 we present our case study – a hospital
MAS. We show here how to abstractly model a MAS, introduce complex collaborative
agent interactions by refinement, as well as verify safety properties. Moreover, we
describe the last refinement step that models system decomposition, thus achieving
derivation of a distributed implementation from a centralised specification. Finally, in
Section 5 we overview the related work, discuss the achieved results and outline our
future work.
2 Formal modelling and refinement in Event-B
In this section we present our formal development framework – Event-B. The Event-B
formalism – an evolution of the B method (Abrial, 2005) – is a state-based formal
approach that promotes the correct-by-construction development paradigm and formal
verification by theorem proving. Event-B has been specifically designed to model and
reason about parallel, distributed and reactive systems.
2.1 Modelling in Event-B
In Event-B, a system model is specified using the notion of an abstract state machine
(Abrial, 2010). An abstract state machine encapsulates the model state represented as a
collection of model variables, and defines operations on the state, i.e., it describes the
dynamic behaviour of the modelled system. A machine may also have the accompanying
component, called context. A context might include user-defined carrier sets, constants
and their properties, which are given as a list of model axioms. In Event-B, the model
variables are strongly typed by the constraining predicates called invariants. Moreover,
the invariants specify important properties that should be preserved during the system
execution. A general form of Event-B models is given in Figure 1.
The machine is uniquely identified by its name M . The state variables, v, are
declared in the Variables clause and initialised in the Init event. The variables are
strongly typed by the constraining predicates I given in the Invariants clause. The
invariant clause might also contain other predicates defining properties that should be
preserved during system execution.
The dynamic behaviour of the system is defined by the set of atomic events specified
in the Events clause. Generally, an event can be defined as follows:
evt =̂ any a where Ge then Re end
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where a is a list of new local variables (parameters), Ge is the event guard, Re is the
event action.
Figure 1 Event-B machine and context
Machine M
See C
Variables v
Invariants I
Events
Init
evt1
· · ·
evtn
Context C
Carrier Sets d
Constants c
Axioms A
The occurrence of events represents the observable behaviour of the system. The guard
defines the conditions under which the action can be executed, i.e., when the event is
enabled. If several events are enabled at the same time, any of them can be chosen
for execution non-deterministically. If none of the events is enabled then the system
deadlocks.
In general, the action of an event is a parallel composition of deterministic
or non-deterministic assignments. A deterministic assignment, x := E(x, y), has the
standard syntax and meaning. A non-deterministic assignment is denoted either as
x :∈ S, where S is a set of values, or x :| P (x, y, x′), where P is a predicate relating
initial values of x, y to some final value of x′. As a result of such a non-deterministic
assignment, x can get any value belonging to S or according to P .
2.2 Event-B semantics
The semantics of a Event-B model is completed by formulating a number of
conditions – proof obligations, expressed in the form of logical sequences. Below we
describe only several of the most important proof obligations that should be proved for
the initial and refined models. The full list of proof obligations can be found in Abrial
(2010).
The semantics of Event-B actions is defined using so called before-after (BA)
predicates (Abrial, 2010). A BA predicate describes a relationship between the system
states before and after execution of an event, as shown in Table 1. Here x and y
are disjoint lists (partitions) of state variables, and x′, y′ represent their values in the
after-state.
Table 1 BA predicates
Action (Ge) BA(Ge)
x := E(x, y) x′ = E(x, y) ∧ y′ = y
x :∈ S ∃z · (z ∈ S ∧ x′ = z) ∧ y′ = y
x :| P (x, y, x′) ∃z · (P (x, z, y) ∧ x′ = z) ∧ y′ = y
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The initial Event-B model should satisfy the event feasibility and invariant preservation
properties. For each event of the model, evti, its feasibility means that, whenever the
event is enabled, its BA predicate is well-defined, i.e., there exists some reachable
after-state:
A(d, c), I(d, c, v), gi(d, c, x, v) ⊢ ∃v′ ·BAi(d, c, x, v, v′) (FIS)
where A are model axioms, I are the model invariants, gi is the event guard, d are
model sets, c are model constants, x are the event local variables and v, v′ are the
variable values before and after the event execution.
Each event evti of the initial Event-B model should also preserve the given model
invariant Ij :
A(d, c), Ij(d, c, v), gi(d, c, x, v), BAi(d, c, x, v, v
′) ⊢ Ij(d, c, v′) (INV)
Event-B employs a top-down refinement-based approach to system development.
Development starts from an abstract system specification that models the most essential
functional requirements. While capturing more detailed requirements, each refinement
step typically introduces new events and variables into the abstract specification. These
new events correspond to stuttering steps that are not visible at the abstract level.
Moreover, Event-B formal development supports data refinement, allowing us to replace
some abstract variables with their concrete counterparts. In that case, the invariant of
the refined machine formally defines the relationship between the abstract and concrete
variables.
To verify correctness of a refinement step, we need to prove a number of proof
obligations for a refined model. For brevity, here we show only a few essential ones.
Let us first introduce a shorthand H(d, c, v, w) to stand for the hypotheses
A(d, c), I(d, c, v), I ′(d, c, v, w), where I, I ′ are respectively the abstract and refined
invariants, and v, w are respectively the abstract and concrete variables. Then the
feasibility refinement property for an event evti of a refined model can be presented as
follows:
H(d, c, v, w), g′i(d, c, x, w) ⊢ ∃w′ · BA′i(d, c, x, w,w′) (REF FIS)
where g′i is the refined guard and BA′i is a BA predicate of the refined event, and v, w
are respectively the abstract and concrete variables.
The event guards in a refined model can be only strengthened in a refinement step:
H(d, c, v, w), g′i(d, c, x, w) ⊢ gi(d, c, x, v) (REF GRD)
where gi, g′i are respectively the abstract and concrete guards of the event evti.
Finally, the simulation refinement property requires to show that the ‘execution’ of
a refined event is not contradictory with its abstract version:
H(d, c, v, w), g′i(d, c, x, w), BA
′
i(d, c, x, w,w
′)
⊢ ∃v′ ·BAi(d, c, x, v, v′) ∧ I ′(d, c, v′, w′) (REF SIM)
where BAi, BA′i are respectively the abstract and concrete BA predicates of the same
event evti.
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The Event-B refinement process allows us to gradually introduce implementation
details, while preserving functional correctness. The verification efforts, in particular,
automatic generation and proving of the required proof obligations, are significantly
facilitated by Rodin Platform (2006). Proof-based verification as well as reliance on
abstraction and decomposition adopted in Event-B offers the designers a scalable support
for the development of such complex distributed systems as MASs.
2.3 Modularisation extension
Recently the Event-B language and the tool support have been extended with a
possibility to define modules. Modules are components containing groups of callable
atomic operations (Iliasov et al., 2010; Rodin Modularisation Plug-in, 2010). Modules
can have their own (external and internal) state and invariant properties. An important
characteristic of modules is that they can be developed separately and, when needed,
composed with the main system.
A module description consists of two parts – module interface and module body.
Let M be a module. A module interface MI is a separate Event-B component. A
module interface consists of the external module variables v, the external module
invariants MI I , and a collection of module operations, characterised by their pre- and
postconditions. The general form of the interface is given in Figure 2.
Figure 2 Event-B interface component
Interface MI
Sees MI C
Variables v
Invariants MI I
Initialisation · · ·
Process
P1 = any x where Gp(d, c, x, v) then Rp(d, c, x, v, v′) end
· · ·
Operations
O1 = any b pre Pre(d, c, b, v) post Post(c, s, b, v, v) end
· · ·
In addition, a module interface may contain a group of standard Event-B events defined
in the Process clause. These events describe how the module external variables may
change between operation calls.
A formal module development starts with the design of an interface. Once an
interface is defined, it cannot be altered in any manner. This ensures that a module body
may be constructed independently from a model relying on the module interface. A
module body is an Event-B machine. It implements the interface by providing a concrete
behaviour for each of the interface operations. A set of additional proof obligations
are generated to guarantee that each interface operation has a suitable implementation.
When the module M is imported into another Event-B machine, the importing machine
may invoke the operations of M and read the external variables of M .
A general strategy of a distributed system development in Event-B is to start from
an abstract centralised specification and incrementally augment it with design-specific
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details. When a suitable level of details is achieved, certain events of the specification
are replaced by the calls of interface operations and variables are distributed across
modules. As a result, a monolithic specification is decomposed into separate modules.
Since decomposition is a special kind of refinement, such a model transformation is
also correctness-preserving. Therefore, refinement allows us to efficiently cope with
complexity of distributed systems verification and gradually derive an implementation
with the desired properties and behaviour.
In the next section, we outline main principles of formal reasoning about MASs and
their properties.
3 Formal reasoning about MASs
Let us start by defining a MAS formally.
Definition 1: A MAS MAS is a tuple (A, µ,Σ, E ,R), where A is a collection of
different classes of agents, µ is the system middleware, Σ is the system state space, E
is a collection of system events and R is a set of dynamic relationships between agents
in a MAS.
Each agent belongs to a particular class or type of agents Ai, i ∈ 1..n such that Ai ∈ A.
This class is dynamic, i.e., new class agents can spontaneously appear or the existing
agents may disappear (both normally or abnormally). A particular agent aij ∈ Ai is
characterised by its local state consisting from agent variables and static agent attributes.
The system middleware µ can be considered as a special agent that is always present
in the system. The responsibility of the middleware is to ensure communication between
different agents, to detect appearance of new agents or disappearance (both normal
and abnormal) of the existing agents, recover from the situations when the required
connections between the agents are lost, etc.
The system state space Σ contains all the possible states of agents and the
middleware. The system events E include all internal and external system reactions.
An execution of an event may change the state of the middleware or agents. In other
words, each event is associated with the corresponding relation on Σ, i.e., is of the
type Σ ↔ Σ. Each collaborative activity between different agents (or an agent and
the middleware) may be composed of a set of events. Moreover, system events may
model appearance or disappearance of mobile agents, sending request from one agent
to another, recovery of lost agent connections, etc. The collaborative activity should
preserve the following property:
Property 1: Let Aact and Aina be sets of active and inactive agents correspondingly,
where A = Aact ∪ Aina and Aact ∩ Aina = ∅. Let EAA and EAµ be all the
collaborative activities (sets of events) between agents and agents and between agents
and middleware respectively. Moreover, for each agent A ∈ A, let EA be a set of events
in which the agent A is involved. Then
∀A· A ∈ Aact⇒EA ∈ EAA ∪ EAµ and ∀A· A ∈ Aina⇒EA ∈ EAµ.
For instance, this property implies that while an agent is recovering from a failure it
cannot be involved into cooperative activities with other agents.
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A set R consists of dynamic relationships or connections between active agents
of the same or different classes. An agent relationship is modelled as a mathematical
relation
R(a1, a2, ..., am) ⊆ C∗1 × C∗2 ...× C∗m,
where a1, a2, ..., am are agents, C∗j = Cj ∪ {?}, where an agent class Cj ⊂ Aact,
j ∈ 1..m. A relationship can be pending, i.e., incomplete. This is indicated by question
marks in the corresponding places of R, e.g., R(a1, a2, ?, a4, ?). Pending relationships
are usually caused by appearance of new agents or disappearance of the existing ones.
In addition, an existing agent may initiate a new relationship.
Property 2: Let Aact be a set of active agents. Let EAA be all the collaborative
activities in which these active agents are involved. Moreover, for each agent A ∈ Aact,
let RA be all the relationships it is involved in. Finally, for each collaborative activity
CA ∈ EAA, let ACA be a set of all involved agents. Then, for each CA ∈ EAA and
A1, A2 ∈ ACA,
RA1 ∩RA2 ̸= ∅.
This property restricts the interactions between the agents – only the agents that
are linked by relationships (some of which may be pending) can be involved into
cooperative activities.
The system middleware µ keeps track of pending relationships and tries to resolve
them by enquiring suitable agents to confirm their willingness to enter into a particular
relationships. Additional data structure PrefR associated with a relationship R ∈ R can
be used to express a specific preference of one agents over the others. The middleware
then enforces this preference by enquiring the preferred agents first. Formally, PrefR is
an ordering relation over the involved agent classes. Thus, for R ⊆ C∗1 × ...× C∗m,
PrefR ∈ C1 × ...× Cm ↔ C1 × ...× Cm.
A responsibility of the middleware is to detect situations when some of the established
or to be established relationships become pending and guarantee ‘fairness’. Essentially,
this means that no pending request is ignored forever and middleware tries to enforce
the given preferences, if possible.
While developing a critical MAS, we should ensure that certain cooperative
activities, once initiated, are successfully completed. These are the activities that
implement safety requirements. To ensure safety we have to verify the following
property:
Property 3: Let EAAcrit, where EAAcrit ⊆ EAA, be a subset containing critical
collaborative activities. Moreover, let Rpen and Rres, where Rpen ⊆ R and Rres ⊆ R,
be subsets of pending and resolved relationships defined for these activities. Finally, let
RCA, where CA ∈ EAA and RCA ⊆ R, be all the relationships the activity CA can
affect. Then, for each activity CA ∈ EAAcrit and relationship R ∈ RCA,
2 ((R ∈ Rpen); (R ∈ Rres)),
where 2 designates ‘always’ and ; denotes ‘leads to’.
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This property postulates that eventually all pending relationships should be resolved for
each critical cooperative activity.
In the next section we will illustrate modelling of MAS in Event-B by a case
study – development of a hospital MAS. In particular, we will show how relying on the
proposed principles help us to develop a correct system.
4 Modelling of a hospital MAS
4.1 A case study description
The hospital MAS consists of two types of agents – patients and medical personnel
(called doctors for simplicity). The condition of each patient is monitored by the
corresponding medical equipment – an agent representing a patient. The doctor agents
are running on pocket PC-based devices – personal digital assistants (PDA). The hospital
provides the wireless connectivity to the doctor agents. Each doctor is associated with
one agent. From now on, we will use the terms ‘patient’ and ‘doctor’ to designate both
agents and people that they represent.
The medical equipment continuously updates the patient’s medical record consisting
of different medical measurements as well as detects emergencies – dangerous changes
of critical parameters (e.g., blood pressure, pulse rate, etc.). In case of an emergency,
the patient agent generates an emergency call that is communicated to the doctor(s)
treating the patient. An important safety requirement imposed on the system is that
all emergencies should be promptly handled by the responsible doctors. In spite of
its seeming simplicity, this requirement is hard to ensure. Indeed, a MAS operates
in a volatile communication environment, i.e., agents might experience temporal
disconnections. Hence the design of our system should incorporate certain fault tolerance
mechanisms that would guarantee that each emergency call is eventually handled by
some doctor. Moreover, different doctors can be associated with the same patient during
different shifts. Therefore, we have to ensure that at the end of a doctor’s shift all his/her
patients are handed over to another doctor.
Another important safety requirement associated with the system is to guarantee
that a doctor always accesses the most recent patient record and the patient’s data are
always kept in a consistent state. We assume that the patient record is stored at the
equipment associated with her. To ensure that these requirements are satisfied, we should
regulate the access to the patient’s data. A specific delivery of a medicine, prescription
of a treatment and so on are introduced into the patient’s log by the medical personnel
via their PDAs. To ensure that the data are updated consistently, we only allow the
doctor to modify the patient’s data when she/he is in a close proximity to the patient.
Specifically, the patient data become available at the doctor’s PDA only when she/he
arrives to the patient location. All the modifications are synchronised with the data
stored by the patient’s equipment. When the doctor finishes examining the patient or
delivering a medicine and leaves, the connection to the patient’s data is closed. Such a
restriction allows us to ensure that only a doctor who is in a close proximity to a patient
is allowed to modify the patient’s record. Moreover, it also ensures that the doctor has
the access to the freshest information about the patient. This precludes, e.g., a possibility
of delivering the medicine twice (modelling the security requirements ensuring patient’s
data integrity is outside of the scope of this paper).
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The safety-critical requirements imposed on the system should be fulfilled in the
course of complex agent interactions. Hence, the properties defined in the previous
section are put in the context of doctor-patients interactions. Indeed, each patient should
be assigned to a certain doctor. While the doctor is inactive (because the shift is over or
a failure of the corresponding PDA), doctor-patient interactions cannot occur. Finally,
each emergency call should be eventually served.
Next we demonstrate how refinement process in Event-B can facilitate modelling of
intertangled agent interactions and verification of their properties.
4.2 Modelling agent interdependencies
The main focus of our development is a specification of collaborative behaviour of
patients and doctors in a hospital MAS. We start with an abstract specification. It models
the behaviour of the entire hospital MAS in a highly abstract way. We define the variable
med agents to model the active doctor agents:
med agents ⊆MEDSTAFF,
where MEDSTAFF is a set of all doctor agents.
The events Activate and Deactivate model joining and leaving hospital location by
the doctor agents. While an agent is active, it can perform certain activities, which is
abstractly modelled by the event Activity. Let us remind, that a middleware is concidered
a special agent that is always present in the system.
machine Hospital
Activate =̂
any ma
when ma ∈MEDSTAFF ∧ma /∈ med agents
then med agents := med agents ∪ {ma}
end
Deactivate =̂
any ma
when ma ∈ med agents
then med agents := med agents \ {ma}
end
In our abstract specification we have merely introduced one type of agents – medical
personnel agents. Since these agents perform only engagement and disengagement with
the location, they interact with the middleware only.
In our first refinement step we augment our model with a representation of patients
and introduce the events that abstractly model interactions between the introduced
patients and the doctors. The variable patients defines a set of patients admitted to the
hospital:
patients ⊆ PATIENTS,
where PATIENTS denotes a set of possible patients.
Each patient arriving at the hospital is associated with a doctor who has a primary
responsibility for treating the patient. To model this relationship, we introduce the
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variable assigned doctor, which is defined as a total function associating hospital
patients with the active doctor agents:
assigned doctor ∈ patients→ med agents.
We omit showing complete specifications of the subsequent refinement steps and merely
describe the events and data structures relevant to critical collaborative actions. The
complete specifications of the entire development can be found at Pereverzeva et al.
(2011).
At the first refinement step, resulting in the model Hospital1, we add the new event
PatientArrival to model a patient arrival:
machine Hospital1 =̂ refines Hospital
PatientArrival =̂
any ma, pa
when pa ∈ PATIENTS ∧ pa /∈ patients ∧ma ∈ med agents
then patients := patients ∪ {pa} ∥ assigned doctor(pa) := ma
end
The guard ma ∈ med agents ensures preservation of a specific instance of the
Property 1: only the active medical agents are assigned to the patient agents. We use ∥
to denote a parallel composition of actions.
The dual event PatientDischarge models a patient discharge from the hospital
location in a similar way. Let us observe that the event PatientArrival ensures the
following property, which can be considered as an instance of the Property 3:
2 (new patient ; assigned doctor),
while, similarly, the event PatientDischarge ensures that
2 (a patient leaves the hospital ; all his/her relationships are removed).
In the refined specification we also elaborate on the event Activity. Essentially, the
medical personnel should examine the patients and deliver the prescribed medicine.
We generalise these actions under the general term ‘visiting a patient’. In our refined
model, we define the variable visited representing a subset of patients that are currently
being examined. The new variable last visit stores for every patient the id of the last
doctor agent that has visited her. The interdependencies between the doctor and patient
variables are defined by the following invariants:
last visit ∈ patients 7→MEDSTAFF,
visited ⊆ patients,
last visit[visited] ⊆ med agents,
visited ⊆ dom(last visit).
The new events VisitBegin and VisitEnd refine the abstract event Activity and model a
visiting procedure. The event VisitBegin is specified as follows:
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machine Hospital1 =̂ refines Hospital
V isitBegin =̂ refines Activity
any ma, pa
when ma ∈ med agents ∧ pa ∈ patients ∧
pa /∈ visited ∧ma /∈ last visit[visited]
then last visit(pa) := ma ∥ visited := visited ∪ {pa}
end
Let us note that the event guard ma ∈ med agents ensures preservation of another
instance of the Property 1: only active medical agents are eligible to interact with the
patient agents.
In our abstract specification we have assumed that the doctor agents can leave the
hospital location at any time. However, formal modelling has uncovered that safety
cannot be guaranteed under this assumption. Hence we must impose certain restrictions
on the situations when the doctors can actually leave the hospital. Before a doctor agent
can leave the hospital location, we should reassign his/her patients to another active
doctor. This is another illustration of the Property 3:
2 (a doctor leaves the hospital ; all his/her patients are reassigned).
We split the abstract event Deactivate into two corresponding events: AgentLeaving
and ReassignDoctor. The event AgentLeaving models leaving the hospital location by
a doctor, who does not have any assigned patients and is not currently involved in
examining a patient.
The event ReassignDoctor models leaving the hospital location by a doctor
who has assigned patients. We must be sure that all his/her patients will be
reassigned to the new active doctor. Here we again illustrate a specific case of the
Property 1: only active medical agents are assigned to the patient agents. It ensures by
the guard ma new ∈ med agents. The event is modelled as follows:
machine Hospital1 =̂ refines Hospital
ReassignDoctor =̂ refines Deactivate
any ma,ma new
when ma ∈ ran(assigned doctor) ∧ma /∈ last visited[visited] ∧
ma new ∈ med agents ∧ma new ̸= ma
then med agents := med agents \ {ma}
assigned doctor :=
assigned doctor − (dom(assigned doctor ◃ {ma}) ×{ma new})
end
4.3 Introducing fault tolerance by refinement
In the specification Hospital1, while defining the events AgentLeaving and
ReassignDoctor, we have abstracted away from the reasons behind doctor leaving
and patient reassignment. Essentially, a doctor agent might leave the location because
the doctor’s shift is over or because the doctor agent has irrecoverably failed and
should be permanently disconnected. At the second refinement step, resulting in the
machine Hospital2, we introduce a distinction between the normal agent leaving and
its disconnection due to a failure. Both cases have a direct impact on the safety
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requirements. Next we demonstrate how formal reasoning allows us specify handling of
these situations in a correct way.
In a MAS, the agents often lose connection only for a short period of time. After
the connection is restored, the agent should be able to continue its activities. Therefore,
after detecting a loss of connection, the location should not immediately disengage the
disconnected agent but rather set a deadline before which the agent should reconnect. If
the disconnected agent restores its connection before the deadline then it can continue its
normal activities. However, if the agent fails to do so, the location should permanently
disengage the agent. Here we deal with a particular instance of the Property 3:
2 (an agent’s disconnection happens ; agent reconnects activity
or disengages from the location).
In the refined specification, we define the variable disconnected representing the subset
of active agents that are detected by the location as disconnected:
disconnected ⊆ med agents.
Moreover, to model a timeout mechanism, we define a new variable timer of the
enumerated type {inactive, active, timeout}. Initially, for every active agent, the
timer value is set to inactive. As soon as an active agent loses connection with the
location, its id is added to the set disconnected and its timer value becomes active.
This behaviour is specified in the new event DisconnectAgent as follows:
machine Hospital2 =̂ refines Hospital1
DisconnectAgent =̂
any ma
when ma ∈ med agents ∧ma /∈ disconnected
then disconnected := disconnected ∪ {ma} ∥ timer(ma) := active
end
A temporarily disconnected agent can succeed or fail to reconnect, as modelled by
the events ReconnectionSuccessful and ReconnectionFailed respectively. If the agent
reconnects before the value of timer becomes timeout, the timer value is changed to
inactive and the agent continues its activities virtually uninterrupted. Otherwise, the
agent is removed from the set of active agents. The event ReconnectionSuccessful is
modelled as follows:
machine Hospital2 =̂ refines Hospital1
ReconnectionSuccessful =̂
any ma
when ma ∈ disconnected ∧ timer(ma) = active
then timer(ma) := inactive ∥ disconnected := disconnected \ {ma}
end
The following invariant ensures that any disconnected agent is considered to be
temporarily inactive:
∀ma·(ma ∈ med agents ∧ timer(ma) ̸= inactive⇔ma ∈ disconnected).
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The introduction of an agent disconnection allows us to make a distinction between
two reasons behind leaving the location by a doctor – because of the end of
shift or due to the disconnection timeout. To model these two cases, we split the
event AgentLeaving into two events NormalAgentLeaving and DetectFailedFreeAgent
respectively.
While modelling failure of a doctor agent, we should again deal with the Property 3:
2 (a doctor abnormally disconnects ; all his/her patients are reassigned).
In both cases we need to reassign all the patients of the disconnected doctor to
another active doctor. In a similar way as above, the event ReassignDoctor is
decomposed into two events NormalReassignDoctor and DetectFailedAgent. The event
DetectFailedAgent is specified as follows:
machine Hospital2 =̂ refines Hospital1
DetectFailedAgent =̂ refines ReassignDoctor
any ma,ma new
when ma ∈ ran(assigned doctor) ∧ma /∈ last visited[visited]∧
ma new ∈ med agents ∧
ma new ̸= ma ∧ma ∈ disconnected ∧ timer(ma) = timeout ∧
(ma new /∈ disconnected ∨ (ma new ∈ disconnected ∧ timer(ma new)
= active))
then med agents := med agents \ {ma}
assigned doctor :=
assigned doctor − (dom(assigned doctor ◃ {ma})× {ma new})
disconnected := disconnected \ {ma} ∥ timer := {ma}− timer
end
The second refinement step has resulted in a specification ensuring that no patients are
left unattended neither because of the doctors shift change nor because of a doctor agent
failure.
4.4 Ensuring safety of cooperative agent actions
Our next refinement step introduces abstract modelling of emergency calls, which are
generated by a patient monitoring equipment. We must guarantee that each call will
be properly handled by a corresponding doctor. Hence our next refinement step should
transform the specification to ensure the following property:
2 (an emergency call by a patients ; a medical visit happens).
In this refinement step, we introduce the variable emergency calls, which is defined
as a partial function associating the emergency calls with the patients:
emergency calls ∈ ALARMS 7→ patients.
Moreover, we define the variable accepted calls that establishes the correspondence
between the emergency calls and the doctors that answer them:
accepted calls ∈ ALARMS 7→med agents.
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At this refinement step we abstract away from an actual implementation of how a doctor
handling an emergency call is chosen. A detailed model of this will be introduced at the
next refinement step. Here we add the new event EmergencyCall to abstractly model
the occurrence of an emergency call ec:
machine Hospital3 =̂ refines Hospital2
EmergencyCall =̂ status convergent
any pa, ec
when pa ∈ patients ∧ ec ∈ ALARMS ∧
ec /∈ dom(emergency calls) ∧ pa /∈ ran(emergency calls)
then emergency calls := emergency calls ∪ {ec 7→ pa}
end
In its turn, the new event HandlingEmergencyCall abstractly models finding a
responsible doctor to handle the call ec:
HandlingEmergencyCall =̂ status convergent
any ec,ma
when ec ∈ dom(emergency calls) ∧ ec /∈ dom(accepted calls) ∧
ma ∈ med agent ∧ma /∈ disconnected
then accepted calls := accepted calls ∪ {ec 7→ ma}
end
To guarantee that the refined specification preserves the global behaviour of the abstract
machine, the developer should demonstrate that the newly introduced events converge.
To prove it, the developer should define a variant – a natural number expression on the
model variables – and show that the execution of any of these events decreases it.
In our case, we define a specific system variant to ensure that the newly introduced
events EmergencyCall and HandlingEmergencyCall do not take the control forever.
Those events have status convergent. We define the variant as follows:
card(ALARMS \ dom(emergency calls))
+ card(ALARMS \ dom(accepted calls)),
and prove that it is decreased by the new events. Indeed, when a call
arrives, dom(emergency calls) increases. This in turn decreases the value of
card(ALARMS \ dom(emergency calls)) and, consequently, the whole variant
expression. On the other hand, when a certain call has been accepted, the value
of card(ALARMS \ dom(accepted calls)) decreases and, consequently, the whole
variant expression decreases as well.
Variants play an important role in guaranteeing, e.g., that error recovery terminates,
service requests are eventually served, etc. In our case, the variant allows us to ensure
that eventually some doctor is chosen to handle an emergency. Obviously, this has
important safety implications.
Moreover, at this refinement step, we also distinguish two types of a patient visit – a
regular visit (a scheduled examination or a delivery of a medicine) and a visit for
handling an emergency call. To model this, we decompose the event VisitBegin into the
events RegularVisitBegin and EmergencyVisitBegin. The event EmergencyVisitBegin is
specified as follows:
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machine Hospital3 =̂ refines Hospital2
EmergencyV isitBegin =̂ refines V isitBegin
any ec
when ec ∈ dom(accepted calls) ∧ emergency calls(ec) /∈ visited ∧
accepted calls(ec) /∈ last visit[visited]
with ma = accepted calls(ec)
pa = emergency calls(ec)
then last visit(emergency calls(ec)) := accepted calls(ec)
visited := visited ∪ {emergency calls(ec)}
emergency calls := emergency calls \ {ec 7→ emergency calls(ec)}
accepted calls := accepted calls \ {ec 7→ accepted calls(ec)}
end
The proof of the refinement is often supported by supplying witnesses – the concrete
values for the replaced abstract variables and parameters. Witnesses are specified in
the event clause with. In our case, in the EmergencyV isitBegin event, the abstract
parameters ma and pa are replaced by the concrete values accepted calls(ec) and
emergency calls(ec) respectively.
In the current refinement step we have introduced modelling of emergency calls and
non-deterministic assignment of responsible doctors to handle them. The goal of our
next refinement step is to introduce a detailed procedure of selecting a doctor in the
case of an emergency call. It follows the steps graphically depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 3 Procedure of choosing a doctor for a certain call
The proposed procedure can be described as follows. We start by selecting an emergency
call to handle. Then we model a loop of finding a suitable candidate and sending a
request to him/her. If the doctor rejects it then we choose the next candidate. The
procedure is repeated until we get an acceptance of the request.
To model the described procedure, we introduce a number of new variables
and events to specify the corresponding steps of the selection procedure. The event
ChooseCurrentCall models the beginning of handling of a particular emergency call.
The event CallFeed directs the call to the assigned doctor:
machine Hospital4 =̂ refines Hospital3
CallFeed =̂
when ec handling = TRUE ∧ candidate found = FALSE ∧
assigned doctor(emergency calls(current call)) /∈ disconnected ∧
assigned doctor(emergency calls(current call)) /∈ occupied
then directed(current call) := assigned doctor(emergency calls(current call))
candidate found := TRUE
end
The event ForwardCall forwards the call to next suitable candidate:
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ForwardCall =̂
any ma new
when ec handling = TRUE ∧ candidate found = FALSE ∧
(assigned doctor(emergency calls(current call)) ∈ disconnected ∨
assigned doctor(emergency calls(current call)) ∈ occupied) ∧
ma new ∈ med agents ∧ma new /∈ disconnected ∧ma new /∈ occupied
then directed(current call) := ma new ∥ candidate found := TRUE
end
Let us note that a doctor agent can refuse to accept a call. For instance, by checking
the doctor schedule it might discover that he/she is currently performing a scheduled
surgery. The events AcceptCall and RejectCall model acceptance and rejection of the
call respectively. The variable occupied is used to accumulate the id’s of doctors that
have already refused the call. As soon as we find a suitable candidate to serve the
call, we refresh the variable occupied for the next call, i.e., occupied := ∅. The event
AcceptCall is specified as follows:
machine Hospital4 =̂ refines Hospital3
AcceptCall =̂ refines HandlingEmergencyCall
when ec handling = TRUE ∧ candidate found = TRUE ∧
current call ∈ dom(emergency calls) ∧ current call /∈ dom(accepted calls) ∧
directed(current call) /∈ disconnected
with ec = current call
ma = directed(current call)
then accepted calls(current call) := directed(current call) ∥
ec handling := FALSE
candidate found := FALSE ∥ occupied := ∅
end
We define a special event ForcedAcceptCall to ‘force’ the last available doctor to
accept the call. Feasibility of such a restriction to have only one available doctor agent
in the hospital location to serve the call can be checked probabilistically.
Moreover, we assume here that the whole procedure of finding a doctor in respond
to a certain emergency call takes a short period of time and during this period no
disconnection of agents can occur. As a result, we strengthen the guards in the event
DisconnectAgent to disallow any disconnection while an emergency call is handled.
While verifying correctness of this refinement step, we encounter a problem with
the system requirements – we cannot guarantee safety unless we assume that during
the search for a doctor no disconnection of agents can occur. Hence, our system should
ensure (e.g., by implementing a certain protocol) that finding a doctor takes a very short
period of time. Moreover, we define an additional system variant – card(med agents \
occupied) – to ensure that the event RejectCall is convergent, which means that
eventually we should get an acceptance from a doctor to serve the call.
4.5 Data integrity
To ensure that a patient gets a correct treatment, we should guarantee that the medical
personnel always access the most recent patient record. As we discussed in Section 4.1,
we allow a doctor to access and modify the patient’s data only when she/he is in a close
proximity to the patient. We implement this requirement via the scoping mechanism
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(Laibinis et al., 2006, 2009). A scope provides a shared data space for a doctor and a
patient. We assume that each patient agent has the scope associated with it. As soon
as a doctor agent appears at a close vicinity of the patient agent, it automatically joins
the scope. While in the scope, the doctor can modify the patient record (e.g., prescribe
a new medicine, log the information about the delivered medicine, prescribe a new
procedure, etc.).
To model this behaviour, we refine the abstract events RegularVisitBegin,
EmergencyVisitBegin, VisitEnd by the new events RegularEnterScope,
EmergencyEnterScope, LeaveScope and add a new event ModifyRecord. Moreover, we
introduce the variable scopes, which is defined as a partial function associating the
active scopes with the doctors participating in them:
scopes ∈ ScopeName 7med agents.
Furthermore, we define the model invariant to illustrate preservation of the Property 1:
only active medical agents are eligible to enter the scope:
∀ma·ma ∈ disconnected⇒ma /∈ ran(scopes).
Also we introduce the variable record that represents the medical history for every
patient:
record ∈ patients→ P(DATA).
The variable ma data stores the data that appear on the doctor’s PDA screen:
ma data ∈ med agents 7→ P(DATA).
When the doctor agent is in a close vicinity of a patient, its ma data becomes equal to
the value of the patient data. The event ModifyRecord models an update of the patient
record by a doctor, when she/he is in the scope of a patient:
machine Hospital5 =̂ refines Hospital4
ModifyRecord =̂
any ma, sn, pa, da new
when (sn 7→ ma) ∈ scopes ∧ pa ∈ dom(last visit) ∧ pa ∈ visited ∧
last visit(pa) = ma ∧ da new ∈ P(DATA) ∧ da new ̸= ∅
then ma data(ma) := da new ∥ record(pa) := da new
end
The corresponding safety property stating that the medical personnel always access the
most recent record is formulated as the model invariant:
∀ma, pa·(pa 7→ ma) ∈ (visited last visit)⇒ma data(ma) = record(pa).
4.6 Decomposition
As a result of our previous refinement steps, we have arrived at a centralised
model – Hospital5 of the Hospital MAS. In the final refinement step we aim at
deriving a distributed architecture. In reality, the agents and the location communicate
with each other via message passing. This refinement step is focused on defining this
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communication explicitly. To achieve this, we rely on the modularisation extension of
Event-B. Our goal is to decompose Hospital5 model into separate modules representing
the middleware, the doctor and patient agents and explicitly model communication
between them.
A graphical representation of the system after decomposition refinement is shown in
Figure 4. The abstract model is refined by a model representing the Location part – the
middleware, and two separate modules – Doctor and Patient. Each modules contain
callable operations and both internal and external data. The Location part accesses the
modules via the provided generic interfaces. All the variables and most of operations
of the interface corresponding to the doctor and patient agents appear with the prefixes
doctor and patient respectively. This is a feature of the modularisation extension that
helps to avoid name clashes when importing several interfaces.
Figure 4 Illustration of the decomposition refinement (see online version for colours)
The Location model imports two module interfaces – Doctor and Patient. The majority
of the events of the machine Hospital5 are now refined by the location events. The
remaining events, including AcceptCall, RejectCall, EmergencyCall become a part
of the autonomous processes of the doctor or patient modules. The abstract event
EmergencyCall is refined by the patient’s interface event Emergency implementing the
occurrence of emergency calls. Similarly, the abstract events AcceptCall, RejectCall,
ModifyRecord are refined by the corresponding doctors’s interface events Acceptance,
Rejection and ModifyRecord.
The variables of the centralised model Hospital5 are now refined by the
variables of the Location, Doctor and Patient modules. For instance, the abstract
variable emergency calls is replaced by a new variable from the patient interface
patient emergency. Similarly, the abstract variable ma data is refined by a new
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variable from the doctor interface doctor pda data. An extract from the PatientInterface
is shown below.
Interface PatientInterface
Variables treated, emergency, record
Invariants inv1 : treated ∈ PATIENTS→BOOL
inv2 : emergency ∈ ALARMS 7→ PATIENTS
inv3 : record ∈ PATIENTS 7→ P(DATA)
Process
Emergency
any pa, ec
when pa ∈ dom(treated) ∧ treated(pa) = TRUE ∧ ec ∈ ALARMS∧
ec /∈ dom(emergency) ∧ pa /∈ ran(emergency)
then emergency := emergency ∪ {ec 7→ pa} end
Operations
Arrival
any pa, da
pre pa ∈ PATIENTS ∧ treated(pa) = FALSE ∧ da ⊆ DATA
return void
post
void′ ∈ V OID ∧ treated′ = treated− {pa 7→ TRUE}∧
record′ = record− {pa 7→ da}
end
Let us describe communication between the agents by an example of a patient
arrival. At our previous refinement step this activity has been modelled by the event
PatientArrival. Essentially, a patient arrival corresponds to registering a patient by the
location (middleware). By performing certain internal computations, the location assigns
a doctor to a patient and confirms a successful registration by sending the corresponding
messages to the patient and the doctor agents. This behaviour is specified in the refined
event PatientArrival:
PatientArrival =̂ Refines PatientArrival
any ma, pa, da
when pa ∈ PATIENTS ∧ pa /∈ patients ∧ma ∈ med agents ∧ da ⊆ DATA
then
patients := patients ∪ {pa} ∥ assigned doctor(pa) := ma
void := patient Arrival(pa 7→ da) ∥ void2 := doctor UpdatePatients(ma 7→ {pa})
end
The calls to the corresponding operations from the patient and doctor interfaces,
patient Arrival(pa 7→ da) and doctor UpdatePatients(ma 7→ {pa}), model the
communication between the location and agents respectively. The other events are
decomposed in a similar way.
As a result of the decomposition we arrive at a specification of distributed hospital
MAS. Each type of agents – doctors and patients – are represented by the corresponding
module. The location serves as a communication infrastructure.
To verify correctness of the models, we discharged more than 500 proof obligations.
Around 85% of them have been proved automatically by the Rodin platform and the
rest have been proved manually in the Rodin interactive proving environment.
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5 Conclusions and related work
5.1 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a formal approach to developing MAS by refinement in
Event-B. We formalised the main properties of MAS and demonstrated how refinement
process can facilitate their preservation. Finally, we illustrated the proposed approach
by a large case study – development of a hospital MAS. In our case study we focused
on modelling and verification of safety of two central critical activities – handling
emergencies and consistent updates of patient data. Ensuring correctness of these
activities was especially challenging due to highly dynamic nature of a hospital, volatile
error-prone communication environment and autonomous agent behaviour.
In our development we have explicitly modelled the fault tolerance mechanism that
guarantee correct system functioning in the presence of agent disconnections. We have
verified by proofs the correctness and safety of these two activities. Formal verification
process has not only allowed us to systematically capture complex requirements but
also facilitated derivation of the constraints that should be imposed on the system to
guarantee its safety. Indeed, for instance, while proving convergence of the emergency
handling procedure, we had to explicitly state the assumptions that the system must
fulfil. These assumptions can be seen as a contract that should be checked during system
deployment to guarantee its safety. In our development we have also demonstrated that
the scoping mechanism provides a useful abstraction for ensuring consistent updates of
the patient data.
5.2 Related work
The work presented in this paper is inspired by our previous work on modelling
context-aware mobile agent systems (Laibinis et al., 2006, 2009) in the CAMA
framework (Iliasov and Romanovsky, 2005; Iliasov et al., 2006). In a similar way, we
rely on a timeout mechanism to tolerate agent disconnections and employ a scoping
mechanism to provide shared data space for patient and doctor agents. However, in
this paper we have focused on modelling and verification of safety properties of
complex agent interactions rather than on reasoning about general mechanisms for agent
interaction with middleware.
A large number of techniques for modelling distributed systems has been proposed
in the last decade. For instance, in Schaible and Gotzhein (2003) and Fliege et al. (2005)
the authors have proposed an approach to developing distributed systems based on SDL.
SDL is a standardised language used for the description of architecture, behaviour, data
and static interfaces (ETSI: World Class Standards, 2011). The main advantage of our
approach over SDL is that it employs proof-based verification techniques.
Another technique for modelling distributed systems together with its tool support
(DisCo) have been presented in Katara and Mikkonen (2001) and Aaltonen et al. (2001).
The proposed approach based on temporal logic incorporates a specification language as
well as a methodology and a graphic tool support for developing system specifications.
DisCo also supports composition and refinement techniques. The weakness of the DisCo
toolset is that it does not support verification, proposing to use instead a number of
more general purpose verification tools.
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Formal modelling of MAS has been undertaken by Roman et al. (2007, 2004, 1997).
The authors have proposed an extension of the Unity framework to explicitly define
such concepts as mobility and context-awareness. In our approach we also have studied
the problem of ensuring access to the fresh context. However, in Roman et al. (2007) it
is solved at the level of the matching agent attributes while in our approach we rely on
the scoping mechanism to achieve this.
A formal modelling of MAS for the healthcare in Z has be undertaken by Gruer
et al. (2002). The work has focused on specifying a MAS for a medical help system.
The authors aimed at studying how to formally represent agent interactions, e.g., during
negotiations. In our approach we not only model the agent interactions but also formally
prove their properties. Hence, our approach is especially suitable for developing critical
MAS.
A problem of modelling fault tolerance MAS has been addressed by Ball and
Butler (2009). They illustrated how certain typical fault tolerance mechanisms can be
incorporated into a MAS specification. In our approach we consider fault tolerance as a
part of ensuring safety of MAS.
Our approach is different from numerous process-algebraic approaches used for
modelling MAS. Firstly, we have relied on proof-based verification that does not impose
restrictions on the size of the model, number of agents, etc. Secondly, we have adopted
a system’s approach, i.e., we modelled the entire system and extracted specifications of
its individual components by decomposition. Such an approach allows us to express and
formally verify safety of the overall system, i.e., we achieve verification of safety as a
system level property. Finally, the adopted top-down development paradigm has allowed
us to efficiently cope not only with complexity of requirements but also with complexity
of verification. We have build a large formal model of a complex system by a number of
rather small increments. As a result, verification efforts have been manageable because
we merely needed to prove refinement between each two adjacent levels of abstraction.
Hence, we conclude that refinement in Event-B constitutes a suitable technique for
formal modelling and verification of critical MASs.
As a future work we are planning to generalise the proposed approach and extract
modelling patterns that can be used to automate formal development. Moreover, we
will investigate how to model adaptive agent behaviour that depends on the surrounding
context and various reconfiguration mechanisms.
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Abstract. Goal-Oriented Development facilitates structuring complex
requirements. To ensure resilience the designers should guarantee that
the system achieves its goals despite changes, e.g., caused by failures
of system components. In this paper we propose a formal goal-oriented
approach to development of resilient MAS. We formalize the notion of
goal and goal achievement in Event-B and propose the specification and
refinement patterns that allow us to guarantee that the targeted goals
are reached despite agent failures. We illustrate our approach by a case
study – development of an autonomous multi-robotic system.
Keywords: Event-B, formal modelling, refinement, goal-oriented devel-
opment, multi-agent system.
1 Introduction
Goal-Oriented Development [5] has been recognised as an useful framework for
structuring and specifying complex system requirements. In goal-oriented devel-
opment, the system requirements are defined in terms of goals – the functional
and non-functional objectives that a system should achieve. Often changes in
system operational environment, e.g., caused by failures of agents – independent
system components of various types – might hinder achieving the desired goals.
Hence, to ensure system resilience [7], i.e., guarantee its dependability in spite
of the changes, we need formally verify reachability of the targeted goals. Tra-
ditionally, such a verification is undertaken by abstracting implementation up
to requirements level and model-checking satisfiability of goals. However, such
an approach suffers from a state explosion that is especially prohibitive for such
applications as multi-robotic systems [15].
In this paper we propose a formal development approach that ensures goal
reachability “by construction”. Our approach is based on refinement in Event-B.
Event-B [2] is a formal top-down development approach to correct-by-construction
system development. The main development technique – refinement – allows us
to ensure that a concrete specification preserves globally observable behaviour
and properties of abstract specification. Verification of each refinement step is
done by proofs. The Rodin platform [11] automates modelling and verification
in Event-B. Currently Event-B is actively used within EU project DEPLOY [4]
to model dependable systems from various domains.
We formalise goal-oriented development by defining a set of specification and
refinement patterns. Our formalisation reflects the main concepts of the goal-
oriented engineering. In particular, we demonstrate how to define system goals
at different levels of abstraction and guarantee goal reachability while specifying
collaborative agent behaviour. Moreover, we propose refinement patterns that
allow the system to dynamically reallocate goals from failed agents to healthy
ones and per se, guarantee resilience. A development of an autonomous multi-
robotic system illustrates application of the proposed patterns. We believe that
our approach offers a scalable technique for development and formal verification
of complex resilient multi-agent systems (MAS).
The paper has the following structure. In Section 2 we briefly present our
modelling framework – Event-B. In Section 3 we present the set of specification
and refinement patterns that facilitate goal-oriented development in Event-B.
In Section 4 we present a case study – development of an autonomous multi-
robotic system by refinement. In Section 5 we overview the related work, discuss
the presented approach and outline the directions for the future research.
2 Formal Modelling and Refinement in Event B
In this section we present our formal development framework – Event-B. The
Event-B formalism is an extension of the B Method [1]. It is a state-based formal
approach that promotes the correct-by-construction development paradigm and
formal verification by theorem proving. Event-B has been specifically designed
to model and reason about parallel, distributed and reactive systems.
2.1 Modelling in Event-B
In Event-B, a system model is specified using the notion of an abstract state ma-
chine [2]. An abstract state machine encapsulates the system state represented
as a collection of model variables, and defines operations on this state, i.e., it
describes the dynamic behaviour of the modelled system. A machine may also
have the accompanying component, called context. A context might include user-
defined carrier sets, constants and their properties, which are given as a list of
model axioms. In Event-B, the variables are strongly typed by the constraining
predicates called invariants. Moreover, the invariants specify important prop-
erties that should be preserved during the system execution.
The dynamic behaviour of the system is defined by the set of atomic events.
Generally, an event can be defined as follows:
evt =̂ any vl where g then S end
where vl is a list of new local variables (parameters), g is the event guard, and
S is the event action. The guard is a state predicate that defines the conditions
under which the action can be executed, i.e., when the event is enabled. If several
events are enabled at the same time, any of them can be chosen for execution
non-deterministically. If none of the events is enabled then the system deadlocks.
In general, the action of an event is a parallel composition of deterministic or
non-deterministic assignments.
2.2 Event-B Refinement
Event-B employs a top-down refinement-based approach to system development.
Development starts from an abstract system specification that
non-deterministically models the most essential functional requirements. In a
sequence of refinement steps we gradually reduce non-determinism and intro-
duce detailed design decisions. In particular, we can replace abstract variables
by their concrete counterparts, i.e., perform data refinement. In this case, the
invariant of the refined machine formally defines the relationship between the
abstract and concrete variables. Via such a gluing invariant we establish a cor-
respondence between the state spaces of the refined and the abstract machines.
Often a refinement step introduces new events and variables into the abstract
specification. The new events correspond to the stuttering steps that are not
visible at the abstract level, i.e., they refine implicit skip. To guarantee that the
refined specification preserves the global behaviour of the abstract machine, we
should demonstrate that the newly introduced events converge. To prove it, we
need to define a variant – an expression over a finite subset of natural numbers –
and show that the execution of new events decreases it. Sometimes, convergence
of an event cannot be proved due to a high level of non-determinism. Then the
event obtains the status anticipated. This obliges the designer to prove at some
later refinement step, that the event indeed converges.
Each refinement step requires to verify a number of proof obligations that
ensure that the refined specification adheres to its abstract counterpart [2]. The
verification efforts, in particular, automatic generation and proving of the re-
quired proof obligations, are significantly facilitated by the Rodin platform [11].
Refinement and proof-based verification of Event-B offers the designers a
scalable support for the development of such complex systems as multi-agent
systems (MAS). MAS are decentralised distributed systems composed of agents
asynchronously communicating with each other. Agents are computer programs
acting autonomously on behalf of a person or organisation, while coordinating
their activities by communication [9]. MAS are increasingly used in various crit-
ical applications such as factories, hospitals, rescue operations in disaster areas,
etc. In the next section we show how refinement process can facilitate modelling
MAS and reasoning about goal reachability.
3 A Formal View of Goal-Oriented Multi-Agent System
3.1 Patterns for Goal-Oriented Development
The goal-oriented engineering facilitates structuring complex system require-
ments in terms of goals – objectives that the system should meet [5]. In this
paper we focus on modelling functional goals, i.e., the goals defining objectives
of the services that the system should deliver. We propose a number of specifi-
cation and refinement patterns that interpret essential activities of goal-oriented
engineering in terms of Event-B refinement.
A pattern in Event-B is an abstract machine that defines a generic modelling
solution that can be reused in similar developments via instantiation. Usually, an
Event-B pattern contains abstract types, constants and variables. The context of
such a model constraints the instantiation by defining the properties that should
be satisfied by concrete instantiations of abstract data structures. The invariant
properties of a pattern, once proven, remain valid for all instantiations.
The aim of defining a pattern is to capture experience gained in modelling
a certain problem. To illustrate how patterns are defined, let us now present
a pattern that allows the designers to explicitly define goals while modelling a
system in Event-B. We call it Abstract Goal Modelling Pattern.
3.2 Abstract Goal Modelling Pattern
Let GSTATE be an abstract type defining the system state space3. Moreover,
let Goal be a non-empty proper subset of GSTATE that abstractly defines the
given system goals. We say that the system has achieved the desired goals if its
current state belongs to Goal. Both GSTATE and Goal are the abstract types.
Together with their properties they are defined in the model context as follows:
Goal 6= ∅ and Goal ⊂ GSTATE.
Let us note that GSTATE and Goal are generic parameters of the initial pattern.
During a system development, we should supply their concrete instantiations
that satisfy the properties shown above.
While modelling a system in Event-B, we should ensure that the system
under development achieves the desired goal. We can formally express this by
requiring that the system terminates in a state belong to Goal. The machine
M AGM is defined according to the Abstract Goal Modelling Pattern:
Machine M AGM
Variables gstate
Invariants gstate ∈ GSTATE
Events
Initialisation b=
begin
gstate :∈ GSTATE \Goal
end
Reaching Goal b=
status anticipated
when
gstate ∈ GSTATE \Goal
then
gstate :∈ GSTATE
end
end
The dynamic behaviour of the system is abstractly modelled by the event
Reaching Goal. The system terminates when Reaching Goal becomes disable, i.e.,
when a state satisfying Goal is reached.
The event Reaching Goal has the status anticipated. Hence, in the machine
M AGM goal reachability is postulated rather than proved. However, it also
obliges us to prove (at some refinement step) that the event or its refinements
converge. Therefore, while refining a concrete specification defined according to
Abstract Goal Modelling Pattern, we will be forced to prove goal reachability.
Let us assume that we have a collection of Event-B patterns: P1, P2, ..., Pn
that refine each other in the following way:
P1 is refined by P2 ... is refined by Pn.
Such a refinement chain expresses a generic development by refinement. Ab-
stract data structures of all the involved patterns become generic parameters
of the development. Each pattern abstractly defines a solution for specifying a
certain modelling aspect. Therefore, each refinement step has a rationale be-
hind it – its meta-level description. We use it to formulate modelling aspects
3 In fact, it is sufficient to consider the states that our goal depends on.
that the refinement transformation aims at defining. The result of refinement
transformation is called a refinement pattern.
Next we propose several refinement patterns that allow us to implement the
ideas of goal-oriented engineering in Event-B refinement. We start from defining
Goal Decomposition Pattern.
3.3 Goal Decomposition Pattern
The main idea of goal-oriented development is to decompose the high-level sys-
tem goals into a set of subgoals. This is an iterative process that aims at building
the hierarchy of system goals. Essentially, subgoals define intermediate stages of
the process of achieving the main goal.
The purpose of Goal Decomposition Pattern is to explicitly model subgoals in
the system specification. While defining this pattern, we should ensure that high-
level goals remain achievable. Hence our refinement pattern should reflect the
relation between the high-level goals and subgoals. Moreover, it should ensure
that high-level goal reachability is preserved and can be defined via reachability
of lower-layer subgoals.
In this paper we assume that subgoals are independent of each other. This
means that reachability of any subgoal does not affect reachability of another one.
Moreover, while a certain subgoal is reached, it remains reached, i.e., the system
always progresses towards achieving its goals. Formally, it can be expressed as a
stability property with respect to some state predicate P :
Stable(P ) ⇔ “once P becomes true it remains true”.
In Event-B, stability properties can be easily expressed by introducing auxiliary
variables for storing the previous value of the state and then formulating stability
properties as the invariant properties of the form:
P (prev state) = TRUE ⇒ P (state) = TRUE.
To express a goal decomposition in terms of Event-B, let us define a correspond-
ing refinement pattern. We present it by the machine M GD. The new pattern
allows us to introduce a number of subgoals into our system model and express
their reachability. Moreover, the refinement relation between patterns allows us
to express reachability of the main goal via reachability of its subgoals.
Let us assume for simplicity, that system goal Goal is achieved by reaching
three subgoals. The subgoals are defined as corresponding variables of the M GD
machine: Subgoal1, Subgoal2, and Subgoal3. The goal independence assumption
allows us to partition high-level goal state space GSTATE into three non-empty
subsets: SG STATE1, SG STATE2, SG STATE3. We define the subgoals as
follows:
Subgoali 6= ∅ and Subgoali ⊂ SG STATEi, i ∈ 1..3.
To establish a relationship between the new state spaces SG STATEi, i ∈ 1..3,
of the M GD machine and the abstract state space of M AGM machine we define
the following function:
State map ∈ SG STATE1× SG STATE2× SG STATE3GSTATE,
where  designates a bijection function. Essentially it partitions the original
goal state space into three independent parts.
To postulate that the main goal is reached if and only if all three subgoals
are reached, we add an axiom into the context of the M GD machine:
∀sg1, sg2, sg3· sg1 ∈ Subgoal1 ∧ sg2 ∈ Subgoal2 ∧ sg3 ∈ Subgoal3
⇔ State map(sg1 7→ sg2 7→ sg3) ∈ Goal.
Refinement performed according to the Goal Decomposition Pattern is an exam-
ple of the Event-B data refinement. We replace the abstract variable gstate with
the new variables gstatei ∈ SG STATEi, i ∈ 1..3. The new variables model the
state of the corresponding subgoals. The following gluing invariant allows us to
prove data refinement:
gstate = State map(gstate1 7→ gstate2 7→ gstate3).
Essentially the M GD machine decomposes the Reaching Goal event of the
M AGM machine into three similar events Reaching SubGoali, i ∈ 1..3:
Machine M GD
Reaching SubGoali b= refines Reaching Goal
status anticipated
when
gstatei ∈ SG STATEi \ Subgoali
then
gstatei :∈ SG STATEi
end
...
Let us observe that we can easily verify that the following stability property
holds for the pattern M GD:
Stable(gstate1 ∈ Subgoal1)∧Stable(gstate2 ∈ Subgoal2)∧Stable(gstate3 ∈ Subgoal3).
The proposed Goal Decomposition Pattern can be repeatedly used to refine
subgoals into the subgoals of finer granularity until the desired level of details is
reached.
3.4 Agent Modelling Pattern
Our elaborated Abstract Goal Modelling and Goal Decomposition patterns allow
us to specify the system goal(s) at different levels of abstraction. In multi-agent
systems, (sub)goals are usually achieved by system agents. Agents are indepen-
dent entities that are capable of performing certain tasks. In general, the system
might have several types of agents that are distinguished by the type of tasks that
they are capable of performing. Our next refinement pattern – Agent Modelling
Pattern – allows us to model agents and associate them with goals.
We introduce the set AGENTS that abstractly defines the set of system
agents. In this refinement pattern we also introduce a concept of agent eligibility.
An agent is eligible if it is capable of achieving a certain task (subgoal). We
define the non-empty sets EL AG1, EL AG2, and EL AG3 of the agents eligible
to achieve each particular subgoal.
Agent might fail while trying to achieve a certain subgoal. Then it is removed
from the dynamic set of the eligible agents represented by the variable eligi:
eligi ⊆ EL AGi, i ∈ 1..3.
A goal is achieved if there is at least one eligible agent associated with it.
This is formulated as the corresponding invariant property in our pattern:
elig1 6= ∅ and elig2 6= ∅ and elig3 6= ∅.
The dynamic part of the Agent Modelling Pattern is defined in the machine
M AM. Since we assumed that the agents can fail, the goal assigned to the failed
agent cannot be reached. To reflect this assumption in our model, we refine the
abstract event Reaching SubGoali by two events
Successful Reaching SubGoali and Failed Reaching SubGoali, i ∈ 1..3, which re-
spectively model successful and unsuccessful reaching of the subgoal by some
eligible agent:
Machine M AM
Successful Reaching SubGoali b= refines Reaching SubGoali
status convergent
any ag
when
gstatei ∈ SG STATEi \ Subgoali ∧ ag ∈ eligi
then
gstatei :∈ Subgoali
end
Failed Reaching SubGoali b= refines Reaching SubGoali
status convergent
any ag
when
gstatei ∈ SG STATEi \ Subgoali ∧ ag ∈ eligi ∧ card(eligi) > 1
then
gstatei :∈ SG STATEi \ Subgoali ‖ eligi := eligi \ {ag}
end
In the guard of the event Failed Reaching SubGoali we restrict possible agent
failures by postulating that at least one agent associated with the subgoal re-
mains operational: card(eligi) > 1, i ∈ 1..3. This assumption allows us to change
the event status from anticipated to convergent. In other words, we are now able
to prove that, for each subgoal, the process of reaching it eventually terminates.
To prove the convergence we define the following variant expression:
card(elig1) + card(elig2) + card(elig3).
When an agent fails, it is removed from a corresponding set of eligible agents
eligi. This in turn decreases the value of card(eligi) and consequently the whole
variant expression. On the other hand, when an agent succeeds in reaching the
goal, all the events become disabled, thus ensuring system termination as well.
In practice, the constraint to have at least one operational agent associated
with our model can be validated by probabilistic modelling of goal reachability,
which is planned as a future work. Let us also note that for multi-robotic systems
with many homogeneous agents this constraint is usually satisfied.
3.5 Agent Refinement Pattern
Above we have defined the notion of agent eligibility quite abstractly. We es-
tablish the relationship between subgoals (tasks) and agents that are capable of
achieving them. Our last refinement pattern, Agent Refinement Pattern, aims at
unfolding the notion of agent eligibility. Here we define the agent eligibility by
introducing agent attributes – agent types and agent statuses. An eligible agent
will be an operational agent that belongs to a particular agent type.
We define an enumerated set of agent types AG TY PE = {TY PE1, TY PE2,
TY PE3} and establish the correspondence between abstract sets of eligible
agents and the corresponding agent types by the following axioms:
∀ag ·ag ∈ EL AGi⇔ atype(ag) = TY PEi, i ∈ 1..3.
An agent is eligible to perform a certain subgoal if it has the type associated
with this subgoal.
An agent might be operational or failed. To model the notion of agent status
we define an enumerated set AG STATUS = {OK,KO}, where constants OK
and KO designate operational and failed agents correspondingly.
Below we present an excerpt from the dynamic part of the Agent Refine-
ment Pattern – the machine M AR. We add a new variable astatus to store the
dynamic status of each agent:
astatus ∈ AGENTS→AG STATUS.
Moreover, we data refine the variables eligi. The following gluing invariants
relate them with the concrete sets:
eligi = {a | a ∈ AGENTS ∧ atype(a) = TY PEi ∧ astatus(a) = OK}, i ∈ 1..3.
In our case, the dynamic set of agents eligible to perform a certain subgoal be-
comes a set of active agents of the particular type. The event
Failed Reaching SubGoali is now refined to take into account the concrete def-
inition of agent eligibility. The event also updates the status of the failed agent.
Machine M AR
Successful Reaching SubGoali b= refines Successful Reaching SubGoali
any ag
when
gstatei ∈ SG STATEi \ Subgoali ∧ astatus(ag) = OK ∧ atype(ag) = TY PEi
then
gstatei :∈ Subgoali
end
Failed Reaching SubGoali b= refines Failed Reaching SubGoali
any ag
when
gstatei ∈ SG STATEi \ Subgoali ∧ astatus(ag) = OK ∧ atype(ag) = TY PEi ∧
card({a|a ∈ AGENTS ∧ atype(a) = TY PEi ∧ astatus(a) = OK}) > 1
then
gstatei :∈ SG STATEi \ Subgoali ‖ astatus(ag) := KO
end
Further refinement patterns can be defined to model various fault tolerance
mechanism. However, in this paper instead of building further the collection of
patterns, we will demonstrate how to instantiate and use the described patterns
in a concrete development.
4 Case Study: a Multi-Robotic System
4.1 A Case Study Description
As a case study we consider a multi-robotic system. The goal of the system is
to coordinate identical robots to get a certain area cleaned. The area is divided
into several zones, which can be further divided into a number of sectors. Each
zone has a base station – a static computing and communicating device – that
coordinates the cleaning of the zone. In its turn, each base station supervises a
number of robots by assigning cleaning tasks to them.
A robot is an autonomous electro-mechanical device – a special kind of a
rover that can move and clean. The base station may assign a robot a sector
– a certain area in the zone – to clean. As soon as the robot receives a new
cleaning task, it autonomously travels to this area and starts to clean it. After
successfully completing its mission, it returns back to the base station to receive
a new order. The base station keeps track of the cleaned sectors. A robot may
fail to clean the assigned sector. In that case, the base station assigns another
robot to perform this task. To ensure that the whole area is eventually cleaned,
each base station in its turn should ensure that its zone is eventually cleaned.
The system should function autonomously, i.e., without human intervention.
Such kind of systems are often deployed in hazardous areas (nuclear power plants,
disaster areas, mine fields, etc.). Hence guaranteeing system resilience is an im-
portant requirement. Therefore, we should formally demonstrate that the system
goal is achievable despite possible robot failures.
Next, we will show how to develop a multi-robotic system by refinement in
Event-B and demonstrate how to rely on the patterns proposed in Section 3
to formally specify the system behaviour to ensure reachability of the overall
system goal.
4.2 Pattern-Driven Refinement of a Multi-Robotic System
In this section we will describe our formal development of a multi-robotic system
in Event-B. The development is concluded via instantiation of the proposed
patterns, with the goal decomposition pattern being applied twice in a row.
Abstract model. The initial model defined by the machine MRS Abs specifies
the behaviour of a multi-robotic system according to the Abstract Goal Mod-
elling Pattern. We apply this pattern by instantiating abstract variables with
the concrete values and specifying events that model system behaviour.
The state space of the initial model is defined by the type BOOL. The value
TRUE corresponds to the situation when the desired goal is achieved (i.e., the
whole territory is cleaned), while FALSE represents the opposite situation.
Similarly to the pattern machine M AGM, the machine MRS Abs contains an
event, CleaningTerritory, that models system behaviour. It abstractly represents
the process of cleaning the territory, where a variable completed ∈ BOOL models
the current state of the system goal. This event is constructed according to the
pattern event Reaching Goal by taking all the instantiations into account, as
shown below:
Machine AbsMRS
Variables completed
Invariants completed ∈ BOOL
Events
...
CleaningTerritory b=
status anticipated
when
completed = FALSE
then
completed :∈ BOOL
end
The system continues its execution until the whole territory is cleaned, i.e., as
long as completed stays FALSE. At this level of abstraction, the event
CleaningTerritory has the anticipated status. In other words, similarly to the
abstract pattern, we delay the proof that the event eventually converges to sub-
sequent refinements. It is easy to see that the machine AbsMRS is an instantiation
of the pattern machine M AGM, where the abstract type GSTATE its replaced
with BOOL, the constant Goal is instantiated with a singleton set {TRUE}, and
the variable gstate is renamed into completed.
First refinement. Our initial model specifies system behaviour in a highly
abstract way. It models the process of cleaning the whole territory. The goal of
the first refinement is to model the cleaning of the territory zones. Refinement
is performed according to the Goal Decomposition Pattern.
In the first refinement step resulting in the machine MRS Ref1, we augment
our model with representation of subgoals. The whole territory is divided into n
zones, n ∈ N and n ≥ 1. We associate the notion of a subgoal with the process of
cleaning a particular zone. Thus a subgoal is achieved when the corresponding
zone is cleaned. A new variable zone completed represents the current subgoal
status for every zone. The value TRUE corresponds to the situation when the
certain zone is cleaned:
zone completed ∈ 1..n→BOOL.
The refined model MRS Ref1 is built as an instantiation of the Goal Decompo-
sition Pattern machine M GD, where the subgoal states are defined as elements
of the variable zone completed, i.e.,
gstatei = zone completed(i), for i ∈ 1..n.
This observation suggests the following gluing invariant between the initial and
the refined models:
completed = TRUE⇔ zone completed[1..n] = {TRUE}.
The invariant can be understood as follows: the territory is considered to be
cleaned if and only if its every zone is cleaned.
The pattern events Reaching SubGoali correspond to a single
event CleaningZone:
Machine MRS Ref1
CleaningZone b= refines CleaningTerritory
status anticipated
any zone, zone result
when
zone ∈ 1..n ∧ zone completed(zone) = FALSE∧zone result ∈ BOOL
then
zone completed(zone) := zone result
end
Second refinement. In our development of a multi-robotic system we should
apply the goal decomposition pattern twice, until we reach the level of “prim-
itive” goals, i.e., the goals for which we define the classes of agents eligible for
execution of these goals.
Every zone in our system is divided into k sectors, k ∈ N and k ≥ 1. A
robot is responsible for cleaning a certain sector. We associate the notion of a
subsubgoal (or simply task) with the process of cleaning a particular sector. The
task is completed when the sector is cleaned. A new variable sector completed
represents the current task status for every sector:
sector completed ∈ 1..n→ (1..k→BOOL).
The refined model is again built as an instantiation of the Goal Decomposition
Pattern, where the subsubgoal states are defined as the elements of the variable
sector completed, i.e.,
gstateij = sector completed(i)(j), for i ∈ 1..n, j ∈ 1..k.
A gluing invariant expresses the relationship between subgoals and tasks:
∀zone·zone ∈ 1 .. n⇒ (zone completed(zone) = TRUE ⇔
sector completed(zone)[1 .. k] = {TRUE}).
The invariant postulates that any zone is cleaned if and only if its every sector is
cleaned. The abstract event CleaningZone is refined by the event CleaningSector.
The subsubgoal will be achieved if this section is eventually cleaned:
Machine MRS Ref2
CleaningSector b= refines CleaningZone
status anticipated
any zone, sector, sector result
when
zone ∈ 1..n ∧ sector ∈ 1 .. k ∧ sector completed(zone)(sector) = FALSE ∧
sector result ∈ BOOL
then
sector completed(zone) := sector completed(zone)− {sector 7→ sector result}
end
Now we have reached the desire level of granularity of our subgoals. In the next
refinement step (the machine MRS Ref3) we are going to augment our model
with an abstract representation of agents.
Third refinement. The next refined model of our development is constructed
according to the refinement Agent Modelling Pattern. As a result, we introduce
the abstract set AGENTS, and its subset ELIG containing the eligible agents
for executing the tasks. A new variable elig represents the dynamic set of (cur-
rently available) eligible agents. Following the proposed pattern, we should also
guarantee that there will be at least one eligible agent for cleaning the sector.
This property is formulated as an additional invariant: elig 6= ∅.
Moreover, according to the pattern, we need abstractly introduce agent fail-
ures. This is achieved by refining the abstract event CleaningSector by two events
SuccessfulCleaningSector and FailedCleaningSector, which respectively model suc-
cessful and unsuccessful execution of the task by some eligible agent:
Machine MRS Ref3
SuccessfulCleaningSector b= refines CleaningSector
status convergent
any zone, sector, ag
when
zone ∈ 1..n ∧ sector ∈ 1 .. k ∧
sector completed(zone)(sector) = FALSE ∧ ag ∈ elig
then
sector completed(zone) := sector completed(zone)− {sector 7→ TRUE}
end
FailedCleaningSector b= refines CleaningSector
status convergent
any zone, sector, ag
when
zone ∈ 1..n∧ sector ∈ 1 .. k ∧ sector completed(zone)(sector) = FALSE ∧
ag ∈ elig ∧ card(elig) > 1
then
sector completed(zone) := sector completed(zone)− {sector 7→ FALSE}
elig := elig \ {ag}
end
Following the proposed pattern, we add in the event FailedCleaningSector the
guard card(elig) > 1 to restrict possible agent failure in task performance. Let
us also note that for multi-robotic systems with many homogeneous agents this
constraint is not unreasonable. This assumption allows us to prove the conver-
gence of the goal-reaching events, i.e., to prove that the process of cleaning the
territory eventually terminates.
Fourth refinement. Finally, the Agent Refinement Pattern for introducing
agent types and their statuses is applied to produce the last refined model of
our multi-robotic system. In this refinement step we explicitly define the agent
types – robots and base stations. We partition our abstract set AGENTS by
disjointed non-empty subsets RB and BS, that represent robots and base sta-
tions respectively. In this case study robots perform the cleaning task. Hence our
abstract set of eligible agents is completely represented by robots: ELIG = RB.
Robots might be active or failed. We introduce the enumerated set STATUS,
which in our case has two elements {active, failed}.
At previous refinement step we have modelled agent faults while performing
their tasks in a very abstract way. Now we will specify them more concretely.
We assume that only robots may fail in our multi-robotic system. Their dynamic
status is stored in the variable rb status:
rb status ∈ RB→ STATUS.
The abstract variable elig is now data refined by the concrete set:
elig = {a|a ∈ AGENTS ∧ atype(a) = RB ∧ rb status(a) = active}.
The concrete events are also built according to the proposed pattern. For in-
stance, the event FailedCleaningSector can now be specified as follows:
Machine MRS Ref4
FailedCleaningSector b= refines FailedCleaningSector
any zone, sector, ag
when
zone ∈ 1..n∧ sector ∈ 1 .. k ∧ sector completed(zone)(sector) = FALSE ∧
ag ∈ RB ∧ card({a|a ∈ RB ∧ rb status(a) = active}) > 1
rb status(ag) = active
then
sector completed(zone) := sector completed(zone)− {sector 7→ FALSE}
rb status(ag) := failed
end
An overview of the development of an autonomous multi-robotic system ac-
cording to the proposed specification and refinement patterns
is shown in the Fig. 1.
5 Conclusions
5.1 Discussion
In this paper we have proposed a formal goal-oriented approach to develop-
ment of resilient MAS. We have demonstrated how to rigorously define goals in
Event-B and ensure goal reachability by refinement. We have defined a set of
modelling and refinement patterns that describe generic solutions common to
formal modelling of MAS. Rigorous modelling of the impact of agent failures on
goal achieving allowed us to propose a dynamic goal reallocation mechanism that
Fig. 1. Overview of the development
guarantees system resilience in presence of agent failures. We have illustrated our
approach by a case study – development of an autonomic multi-robotic system.
While modelling the behaviour of a multi-robotic system, we have shown
that refinement process allows us also to discover restrictions that we have to
impose on system behaviour to guarantee its resilience. In our case, the goal
was achievable only if at least one robot remains healthy. Feasibility of such a
restriction can be checked probabilistically based on the failure rates of robots. In
our future work we are planning to integrate stochastic reasoning in our formal
development. Moreover, it would be also interesting to experiment with different
schemes for goal decomposition and dynamic goal reallocation.
5.2 Related Work
Our approach is different from numerous process-algebraic approaches used for
modeling MAS. Firstly, we relied on proof-based verification that does not im-
pose restrictions on the size of the model, number of agents, etc. Secondly, we
adopted a system’s approach, i.e., we modeled the entire system and extracted
the specifications of its individual components by decomposition. Such an ap-
proach allows us to ensure resilience by enabling goal reallocation at different
architectural levels. Furthermore, by incrementally increasing complexity of our
models, we have successfully managed to cope both with complexity of require-
ments and verification.
Formal modelling of MAS has been undertaken by [13, 12, 14]. The authors
have proposed an extension of the Unity framework to explicitly define such
concepts as mobility and context-awareness. Our modelling pursued a different
goal – we aimed at formally guaranteeing that the specified agent behaviour
achieves the defined goals. Formal modelling of fault tolerant MAS in Event-B
has been undertaken by Ball and Butler [3]. They have proposed a number of
informally described patterns that allow the designers to add well-known fault
tolerance mechanisms to the specifications. In our approach, we implemented
goal reallocation to guarantee goal reachability that can be also considered as a
goal-specific fault tolerance.
The foundational work on goal-oriented development has been done by van
Lamsweerde [5]. The original motivation behind the goal-oriented development
was to structure the requirements and derive properties in the form of temporal
logic formulas that the system design should satisfy. Over the last decade the
goal-oriented approach has received several extensions that allow the designers
to link git with formal modelling [6, 8, 10]. These works aimed at expressing
temporal logic properties in Event-B. In our work, we have relied on goals to
facilitate structuring of system behaviour but derived system specification that
satisfies the desired properties by refinement.
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Abstract. Multi-robotic systems are typical examples of complex multi-
agent systems. The robots – autonomic agents – cooperate with each
other in order to achieve the system goals. While designing multi-robotic
systems, we should ensure that these goals remain achievable despite
robot failures, i.e., guarantee system fault tolerance. However, designing
the fault tolerance mechanisms for multi-agent systems is a notoriously
difficult task. In this paper we describe a case study in formal devel-
opment of a complex fault tolerant multi-robotic system. The system
design relies on cooperative error recovery and dynamic reconfiguration.
We demonstrate how to specify and verify essential properties of a fault
tolerant multi-robotic system in Event-B and derive a detailed formal
system specification by refinement. The main objective of the presented
case study is to investigate suitability of a refinement approach for spec-
ifying a complex multi-agent system with co-operative error recovery.
Keywords: Event-B, formal modelling, refinement, fault tolerance, multi-
robotic system
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the field of autonomous multi-robotic systems has grown
dramatically. There are several research directions that are continuously receiv-
ing significant attention: autonomous navigation and control, self-organising be-
haviour, architectures for multi-robot co-operation, to name a few. The robot
co-operation is studied from a variety of perspectives: delegation of authority
and control, heterogeneous versus homogeneous architectures, communication
structure etc. In this paper we focus on studying the fault tolerance aspects of
multi-robotic co-operation. Namely, we show by example how to formally derive
a specification of a multi-robotic system that relies on dynamic reconfiguration
and co-operative error recovery to achieve fault tolerance.
Our paper presents a case study in formal development of a cleaning multi-
robotic system. That kind of systems are typically employed in hazardous areas.
The system has a heterogenous architecture consisting of several stationary de-
vices, base stations, that coordinate the work of respective groups of robots. A
base station assigns a robot to clean a certain segment. Since both base sta-
tions and robots can fail, the main objective of our formal development is to
formally specify co-operative error recovery and verify that the proposed design
ensures goal reachability, i.e., guarantees that the whole territory will be eventu-
ally cleaned. The proposed development approach ensures goal reachability ”by
construction”. It is based on refinement in Event-B [2] – a formal top-down ap-
proach to correct-by-construction system development. The main development
technique – refinement – allows us to ensure that a resulting specification pre-
serves the globally observable behaviour and properties of the specifications it
refines. The Rodin platform [8] automates modelling and verification in Event-B.
In this paper we demonstrate how to formally define a system goal and, in a
stepwise manner, derive a detailed specification of the system architecture. While
refining the system specification, we gradually introduce a representation of the
main elements of the architecture – base stations and robots – as well as failures
and the fault tolerance mechanisms. Moreover, we identify the main properties
of a fault tolerant multi-robotic system and demonstrate how to formally specify
and verify them as a part of the refinement process. In particular, we show how
to derive a mechanism for cooperative error recovery in a systematic way.
Traditionally, the behaviour of multi-robotic systems is verified by simulation
and model checking. These approaches allow the designers to investigate only a
limited number of scenarios and require a significant reduction of the state space.
In our paper, we discuss advantages and limitations of a refinement approach to
achieve full-scale verification of a multi-robotic system.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly overview the
Event-B formalism. Section 3 describes the requirements for our case study – a
multi-robotic cleaning system – and outlines the development strategy. Section
4 presents a formal development of the cleaning system and demonstrates how
to express and verify its properties in the refinement process. Finally, in Section
5 we conclude by assessing our contributions and reviewing the related work.
2 Modelling and Refinement in Event-B
The Event-B formalism – a variation of the B Method [1] – is a state-based formal
approach that promotes the correct-by-construction development paradigm and
formal verification by theorem proving. In Event-B, a system model is specified
using the notion of an abstract state machine [2]. An abstract state machine
encapsulates the model state represented as a collection of variables and defines
operations on the state, i.e., it describes the behaviour of the modelled system.
Usually, a machine has an accompanying component, called context, which may
include user-defined carrier sets, constants and their properties given as a list
of model axioms. In Event-B, the model variables are strongly typed by the
constraining predicates. These predicates and the other important properties
that must be preserved by the model constitute model invariants.
The dynamic behaviour of the system is defined by a set of atomic events.
Generally, an event has the following form:
e =̂ any a where Ge then Re end,
where e is the event’s name, a is the list of local variables, the guard Ge is
a predicate over the local variables of the event and the state variables of the
system. The body of the event is defined by the next-state relation Re. In Event-
B, Re is defined by a multiple (possibly nondeterministic) assignment over the
system variables. The guard defines the conditions under which the assignment
can be performed, i.e., when the event is enabled. If several events are enabled at
the same time, any of them can be chosen for execution non-deterministically.
If an event does not have local variables, it can be described simply as:
e =̂ when Ge then Re end.
Event-B employs a top-down refinement-based approach to system devel-
opment. A development starts from an abstract system specification that non-
deterministically models the most essential functional requirements. In a se-
quence of refinement steps, we gradually reduce non-determinism and introduce
detailed design decisions. In particular, we can add new events, split events as
well as replace abstract variables by their concrete counterparts, i.e., perform
data refinement. When data refinement is performed, we should define so called
gluing invariant as a part of the invariant of the refined machine. The gluing
invariant defines the relationship between the abstract and concrete variables.
Often a refinement step introduces new events and variables into the abstract
specification. The new events correspond to the stuttering steps that are not
visible at the abstract level, i.e., they refine implicit skip. To guarantee that the
refined specification preserves the global behaviour of the abstract machine, we
should demonstrate that the newly introduced events converge. To prove it, we
need to define a variant – an expression over a finite subset of natural numbers –
and show that the execution of new events decreases it. Sometimes, convergence
of an event cannot be proved due to a high level of abstraction. Then the event
obtains the status anticipated. This obliges the designer to prove, at some later
refinement step, that the event indeed converges.
The consistency of Event-B models, i.e., verification of well-formedness and
invariant preservation as well as correctness of refinement steps, is formally
demonstrated by discharging the relevant proof obligations generated by the
Rodin platform [8]. Rodin also provides an automated tool support for proving.
3 Multi-Robotic Systems
Our paper focuses on formal modelling and development of multi-robotic systems
that should function autonomously , i.e., without human intervention. Such kind
of systems are often deployed in hazardous areas, e.g., nuclear power plants,
disaster areas, minefields, etc.
Typically, the main task or goal that a multi-robotic system should accom-
plish is split between the deployed robots. The robot activities are coordinated
by a number of stationary units – base stations. Since both robots and base
stations may fail, to ensure success of the overall goal we should incorporate the
fault tolerance mechanisms into the system design. These mechanisms rely on co-
operative error recovery that allows the system dynamically reallocate functions
from the failed agents to the healthy ones.
Designing co-operative error recovery for multi-agent systems is a notori-
ously complex task. The complexity is caused by several factors: asynchronous
communication, a highly decentralised system architecture and the lack of the
”universally known” global system state. Yet, the designers should guarantee
that the system goals are achievable despite failures. A variety of failure modes
and scenarios makes verification of goal reachability of the co-operative error re-
covery difficult and time-consuming. Therefore, there is a clear need for rigorous
approaches that support scalable design and verification in a systematic manner.
Next we present the requirements of our case study – a multi-robotic system
for cleaning a territory. Then we will demonstrate how we can formally develop
the system in Event-B and prove its essential properties.
3.1 A Case Study: Cleaning a Territory
The goal of the system is to get a certain territory cleaned by robots. The whole
territory is divided into several zones, which in turn are further divided into a
number of sectors. Each zone has a base station that coordinates the cleaning
activities within the zone. In general, one base station might coordinate several
zones. In its turn, each base station supervises a number of robots attached to
it by assigning cleaning tasks to them.
A robot is an autonomous electro-mechanical device that can move and clean.
A base station may assign a robot a specific sector to clean. Upon receiving the
assignment, the robot autonomously moves to this sector and performs cleaning.
After successfully completing its mission, the robot returns back to the base
station to receive a new assignment. The base station keeps track of the cleaned
and non-cleaned sectors. Moreover, the base stations periodically exchange the
information about their cleaned sectors.
While performing the given task, a robot might fail which subsequently leads
to a failure to clean the assigned sector. We assume that a base station is able
to detect all the failed robots attached to it. In case of a robot failure, the base
station may assign another active robot to perform the failed task.
A base station might fail as well. We assume that a failure of a base station
can be detected by the others base stations. In that case, the healthy base sta-
tions redistribute control over the robots coordinated by the failed base station.
Let us now to formulate the main requirements and properties associated
with the multi-robotic system informally described above.
(PR1) The main system goal: the whole territory has to be cleaned.
(PR2) To clean the territory, every its zone has to be cleaned.
(PR3) To clean a zone, every its sector has to be cleaned.
(PR4) Every cleaned sector or zone remains cleaned during functioning of the
system.
(PR5) No two robots should clean the same sector. In other words, a robot gets
only non-assigned and non-cleaned sectors to clean.
(PR6) The information about the cleaned sectors stored in any base station has
to be consistent with the current state of the territory. More specifically, if a
base station sees a particular sector in some zone as cleaned, then this sector
is marked as cleaned in the memory of the base station responsible for it.
Also, if a sector is marked as non-cleaned in the memory of the base station
responsible for it, then any base station sees it as non-cleaned.
(PR7) Base station cooperation: if a base station has been detected as failed then
some base station will take the responsibility for all the zones and robots of
the failed base station.
(PR8) Base station cooperation: if a base station has no more active robots, a
group of robot is sent to this base station from another base station.
(PR9) Base station cooperation: if a base station has cleaned all its zones, its
active robots may be reallocated under control of another base station.
The last three requirements essentially describe the co-operative recovery
mechanisms that we assume to be present in the described multi-robot system.
3.2 Formal Development Strategy
In the next section we will present a formal Event-B development of the described
multi-system robotic system. We demonstrate how to specify and verify the given
properties (PR1)–(PR9). Let us now give a short overview of this development
and highlight formal techniques used to ensure the proposed properties.
We start with a very abstract model, essentially representing the system
behaviour as a process iteratively trying to achieve the main goal (PR1). The
next couple of data refinement steps decompose the main goal into a set of
subgoals, i.e., reformulate it in the terms of zones and sectors. We will define and
prove the relevant gluing invariants establishing a formal relationship between
goals and the corresponding subgoals.
While the specification remains highly abstract, we postulate goal reacha-
bility property by defining anticipate status for the involved events. Once, as
a result of the refinement process, the model becomes sufficiently detailed, we
change the event status into convergent and prove their termination by supplying
the appropriate variant expression.
Next we introduce different types of agents (i.e., base stations and robots).
The base stations coordinate execution of the tasks required to achieve the cor-
responding subgoal, while the robots execute the tasks allocated on them. We
formally define the relationships between different types of agents, as well as
agents and respective subgoals. These relationships are specified and proved as
invariant properties of the model.
The consequent refinement steps explicitly introduce agent failures, the in-
formation exchange as well as co-operation activities between the agents. The
integrity between the local and the global information stored within base stations
is again formulated and proved as model invariant properties.
We assume that communication between the base stations as well as the
robots and the base stations is reliable. In other words, messages are always
transmitted correctly without any loss or errors. The main focus of our develop-
ment is on specifying and verifying the co-operative recovery mechanisms.
4 Development of a Multi-Robotic System in Event-B
4.1 Abstract Model
We start our development by abstractly modelling the described multi-robotic
system. We aim to ensure the property (PR1). The main system goal is to clean
the whole territory. The process of achieving this goal is modelled by the simple
event Body presented below. A variable goal ∈ STATE models the current
state of the system goal. It obtains values from the enumerated set STATE=
{incompl, compl}, where the value compl corresponds to the situation when
the goal is achieved, otherwise it is equal to incompl. The system continues its
execution until the whole territory is not cleaned, i.e., while goal stays incompl.
Body =̂
status anticipated
when
goal 6= compl
then
goal :∈ STATE
end
The event Body has the status anticipated. This means that goal reachability
is postulated rather than proved. However, at some refinement step it also obliges
us to prove that the event or its refinements converge, i.e., to prove that the
process of achieving goal eventually terminates.
4.2 First Refinement: Zone Cleaning
Our initial model represents the system behaviour at a high level of abstraction.
The objective of our first refinement step is to elaborate on the process of cleaning
the territory. Specifically, we assume that the whole territory is divided into n
zones, where n ∈ N and n ≥ 1, and aim at ensuring the property (PR2).
We augment our model with a representation of subgoals. We also associate
the notion of a subgoal with the process of cleaning a particular zone. A subgoal
is achieved only when the corresponding zone is cleaned. A new variable zones
represents the current subgoal status for every zone:
zones ∈ 1..n→ STATE.
In this refinement step we perform a data refinement: we replace the abstract
variable goal with a new variable zones. To establish the relationship between
those variables, we formulate the following gluing invariant:
goal = compl⇔ zones[1..n] = {compl}.
The invariant can be understood as follows: the territory is considered to be
cleaned if and only if its every zone is cleaned. Hence, hereby we have formalised
the property (PR2). The refined event Body is presented below:
Body =̂ refines Body
status anticipated
any z, res
when
z ∈ 1..n ∧ zones(z) 6= compl ∧ res ∈ STATE
then
zones(z) := res
end
Moreover, while a certain subgoal is reached, it stays such, i.e., the system always
progresses towards achieving its goals. Thereby we ensure the property (PR4).
4.3 Second Refinement: Sector Cleaning
In the next refinement step we further decompose system subgoals into a set of
subsubgoals. Specifically, we assume that each zone in our system is divided into
k sectors, where k ∈ N and k ≥ 1, and aim at formalising the property (PR3). We
establish the relationship between the notion of a subsubgoal (or simply a task)
and the process of cleaning a particular sector. A task is completed when the
corresponding sector is cleaned. A new variable territory represents the current
status of each sector:
territory ∈ 1 .. n→ (1 .. k→ STATE).
The refinement step is again an example of a data refinement. Indeed, we replace
the abstract variable zones with a new variable territory. The following gluing
invariant expresses the relationship between subgoals and subsubgoals (tasks)
and correspondingly ensures the property (PR3):
∀j ·j ∈ 1 .. n⇒ (zones(j) = compl⇔ territory(j)[1 .. k] = {compl}).
The invariant postulates that a zone is cleaned if and only if each of its sectors
is cleaned.
The abstract event Body is further refined. It is now models cleaning of a
previously non-cleaned sector s in a zone z. The task is achieved when this
sector is eventually cleaned, i.e., result becomes compl.
Body =̂ refines Body
status anticipated
any z, s, result
when
zone ∈ 1..n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ∧ territory(z)(s) 6= compl ∧ result ∈ STATE
then
territory(z) := territory(z)− {s 7→ result}
end
Let us observe that the event Body also preserve the property (PR4).
At this refinement step we have achieved a sufficient level of detail to intro-
duce an explicit representation of the agents – base stations and robots. This
constitutes the main objective of our next refinement step.
4.4 Third Refinement: Introducing Agents
We start by defining, in the model context, the abstract finite set AGENTS
and its disjointed non-empty subsets RB and BS that represent the robots and
the base stations respectively. To define a relationship between a zone and its
supervising base station, we introduce the variable responsible, which is defined
as the following total function:
responsible ∈ 1 .. n→BS.
Each robot is supervised by a certain base station. During system execution
robots might become inactive (failed). We model the relationship between robots
and their supervised station by a variable attached, defined as partial function:
attached ∈ RB 7→BS.
The new function variables asgn z and asgn s model respectively the zone and
the sector assigned to a robot to clean. When a robot is idle, i.e., it does not
have a task assigned to it, the corresponding function value is 0:
asgn z ∈ RB 7→ 0 .. n, asgn s ∈ RB 7→ 0 .. k.
We require that only the robots that have a supervisory base station might
receive a cleaning task:
dom(attached) = dom(asgn z), dom(asgn z) = dom(asgn s).
Now we can formulate the property (PR5) – no two robots can clean the certain
sector at the same time – as a model invariant:
∀rb1, rb2·rb1 ∈ dom(attached)∧rb2 ∈ dom(attached)∧asgn z(rb1) = asgn z(rb2) ∧
asgn s(rb1) 6= 0 ∧ asgn s(rb2) 6= 0 ∧ asgn s(rb1) = asgn s(rb2)⇒ rb1 = rb2.
To coordinate the cleaning process, a base station stores the information
about its own cleaned sectors and periodically updates information about the
status of the other cleaned sectors. Therefore, we assume that each base station
has a “map” – a knowledge about all sectors of the whole territory. To model
this, we introduce a new variable, local map:
local map ∈ BS→ (1 .. n 7→ (1 .. k→ STATE)).
The “maps” are defined only for the base stations that have any zone cleaning
to coordinate, i.e., bs ∈ ran(responsible):
∀bs·bs ∈ ran(responsible)⇒ local map(bs) ∈ 1 .. n→ (1 .. k→ STATE),
∀bs·bs ∈ BS ∧ bs /∈ ran(responsible)⇒ local map(bs) = ∅.
The abstract variable territory represents the global knowledge on the whole
territory. For any sector and zone, this global knowledge has to be consis-
tent with the information stored by the base stations. Namely, if in the lo-
cal knowledge of any base station bs a sector s is marked as cleaned, i.e.,
local map(bs)(z)(s) = compl, then it should be cleaned according to the global
knowledge as well, i.e., territory(z)(s) = compl; and vice versa: if a sector s is
marked as non-cleaned in the global knowledge, i.e., territory(z)(s) = incompl,
then it remains non-cleaned according the local knowledge of any base station
bs, i.e., local map(bs)(z)(s) = incompl. To establish those relationships, we for-
mulate and prove the following invariants:
∀bs, z, s·bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ⇒
(local map(bs)(z)(s) = compl⇒ territory(z)(s) = compl),
∀bs, z, s·bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ⇒
(territory(z)(s) = incompl⇒ local map(bs)(z)(s) = incompl).
For each base station, the local information about its zones and sectors always
coincides with the global knowledge about these zones and sectors:
∀bs, z, s·bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ responsible(z) = bs ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ⇒
(territory(z)(s) = incompl⇔ local map(bs)(z)(s) = incompl).
All together, these three invariants formalise the property (PR6).
A base station assigns a cleaning task to its attached robots. This behaviour
is modelled by a new event NewTask. In the event guard, we check that the
assigned sector s is not cleaned yet, i.e., local map(bs)(z)(s) = incompl, and no
other robot is currently cleaning it. The last condition can be formally expressed
as s /∈ ran((dom(asgn z  {z})) asgn s), i.e., the sector s is not assigned to
any robot that performs cleaning in the zone z:
NewTask =̂
any bs, rb, z, s
when
bs ∈ BS ∧ rb ∈ dom(attached) ∧ attached(rb) = bs ∧ z ∈ 1 .. n ∧
responsible(z) = bs ∧ asgn z(rb) = 0 ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ∧ asgn s(rb) = 0 ∧
local map(bs)(z)(s) = incompl ∧ s /∈ ran((dom(asgn z  {z})) asgn s)
then
asgn s(rb) := s
asgn z(rb) := z
end
The robot failures have impact on execution of the cleaning process. The
cleaning task cannot be performed if a robot assigned for this task has failed.
To reflect this behaviour in our model, we refine the abstract event Body by
two events TaskSuccess and TaskFailure, which respectively model successful and
unsuccessful execution of the task. If the task has been successfully performed
by the assigned robot rb, its supervising base station bs changes the status of the
sector s to cleaned, i.e., we override the previous value of local map(bs)(z)(s)
by the value compl.
TaskSuccess =̂ refines Body
status convergent
any bs, rb, z, s
when
bs ∈ BS ∧ rb ∈ dom(attached) ∧ attached(rb) = bs ∧
z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ responsible(z) = bs ∧ asgn z(rb) = z ∧
s ∈ 1 .. k ∧ asgn s(rb) = s ∧ local map(bs)(z)(s) = incompl
then
territory(z) := territory(z)− {s 7→ compl}
local map(bs) := local map(bs) − {z 7→ local map(bs)(z)− {s 7→ compl}}
asgn s(rb) := 0
asgn z(rb) := 0
counter := counter − 1
end
The dual event TaskFailure abstractly models the opposite situation caused by
a robot failure. As a result, all the relationships concerning the failed robot rb
are removed:
TaskFailure =̂ refines Body
status convergent
any bs, rb, z, s
when
bs ∈ BS ∧ rb ∈ dom(attached) ∧ attached(rb) = bs ∧
z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ responsible(z) = bs ∧ asgn z(rb) = z ∧
s ∈ 1 .. k ∧ asgn s(rb) = s ∧ local map(bs)(z)(s) = incompl
then
territory(z) := territory(z)− {s 7→ incompl}
asgn s := {rb}− asgn s
asgn z := {rb}− asgn z
attached := {rb}− attached
end
At this refinement step, we are ready to demonstrate that the events
TaskSuccess and TaskFailure converge. To prove it, we define the following variant
expression over system variables:
counter + card(dom(attached)),
where counter is an auxiliary variable that stores the number of all non-cleaned
sectors of the whole territory. The initial value of counter is equal to n ∗ k.
When a robot fails to perform a task, it is removed from the corresponding
set of the attached robots dom(attached). This in turn decreases the value of
card(dom(attached)) and consequently the whole variant expression. On the
other hand, when a robot succeeds in cleaning a sector, the variable counter de-
creases and consequently the whole variant expression decreases as well. If there
are no sectors to clean, the events become disabled and the system terminates.
A base station keeps track of the cleaned and non-cleaned sectors and repeat-
edly receives the information from the other base stations about their cleaned
sectors. This knowledge is inaccurate for the period when the information is sent
but not yet received. In this refinement step we abstractly model receiving the
information by a base station. In the next refinement step, we are going to define
this process of information broadcasting more precisely.
The new event UpdateMapmodels updating the local map of a base station bs.
Here we have to ensure that the obtained information is always consistent with
the global one. Specifically, the base station updates a sector s as cleaned only if it
has this status according to the global knowledge, i.e., territory(z)(s) = compl.
UpdateMap =̂
any bs, z, s
when
bs ∈ BS ∧ z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ∧
responsible(z) 6= bs ∧ bs ∈ ran(responsible)∧
territory(z)(s) = compl
then
local map(bs) := local map(bs) − {z 7→ local map(bs)(z)− {s 7→ compl}}
end
In this refinement step we also introduce an abstract representation of the
base station co-operation defined by the property (PR7). Namely, we allow to
reassign a group of robots from one base station to another. This behaviour is
defined by the event ReassignRB. In the next refinement steps we will elaborate
on this event and define the conditions under which this behaviour takes place.
Additionally, we model a possible redistribution between the base stations
their pre-assigned responsibility for zones and robots. This behaviour is defined
in the new event GetAdditionalResponsibility presented below. The event guard
defines the conditions when such a change is allowed. A base station bs j can
take the responsibility for a set of new zones zss if it has the accurate knowledge
about these zones, i.e., the information about their cleaned and non-cleaned
sectors. Specifically, in the guard we check that the global status of each sector
s from the zone z, i.e., territory(z)(s), coincides with the local information that
the base station bs j has about this sector. In that case, we reassign responsibility
for the zone(s) zss and the robots rbs to the base station bs j:
GetAdditionalResponsibility =̂
any bs i, bs j, rbs, zs
when
bs i ∈ BS ∧ bs j ∈ BS ∧ zs ⊂ 1 .. n ∧
zs = dom(responsible  {bs i}) ∧ rbs ⊂ dom(attached) ∧
rbs = dom(attached {bs i}) ∧ bs i 6= bs j ∧ bs j ∈ ran(responsible) ∧
(∀z, s·z ∈ zs ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k⇒ territory(z)(s) = local map(bs j)(z)(s))
then
responsible := responsible − (zs × {bs j})
attached := attached− (rbs× {bs j})
asgn s := asgn s − (rbs× {0})
asgn z := asgn z − (rbs× {0})
local map(bs i) := ∅
end
Modelling this behaviour allows us to formalise the property (PR9). Our next
refinement step will elaborate on our chosen communication model that is needed
to achieve such co-operative recovery.
4.5 Fourth Refinement: a Model of Broadcasting
In the fourth refinement step we aim at defining an abstract model of broad-
casting. After receiving a notification from a robot about successful cleaning the
assigned sector, a base station updates its local map and broadcasts the message
about the cleaned sector to the other base stations. In its turn, upon receiving
the message, each base station correspondingly updates its own local map. We
assume that the communication between base stations is reliable: no message is
lost and eventually every base station receives it. In further refinement steps, this
model of the broadcasting can be further refined by a more concrete mechanism.
To model the described behaviour, we introduce a new relational variable,
msg, that models the message broadcasting buffer:
msg ∈ BS↔ (1 .. n× 1 .. k).
If a message (bs 7→ (z 7→ s)) belongs to this buffer, this means that the sector
s from the zone z has been cleaned, i.e., territory(z)(s) = compl. The first
element of the message, bs, determines the base station the message is sent to.
We formulate this property by the following system invariant:
∀z, s·z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ∧ (z 7→ s) ∈ ran(msg)⇒ territory(z)(s) = compl.
If there are no messages in the msg buffer for any particular base station then
the local map of this base station is accurate, i.e., it coincides with the global
knowledge about the teritory:
∀bs, z, s·z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ∧ bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ (bs 7→ (z 7→ s)) /∈ msg⇒
territory(z)(s) = local map(bs)(z)(s),
∀bs·bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ bs /∈ dom(msg)⇒
(∀z, s·z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ⇒ territory(z)(s) = local map(bs)(z)(s)).
After receiving a notification about successful cleaning of a sector, a base
station marks this sector as cleaned in its local map and then broadcasts the
message about it to other base stations. To model this, we refine the abstract
event TaskSuccess. Specifically, in the event body we add a new assignment
msg := msg ∪ (bss×{z 7→ s}) to add a new message to the broadcasting buffer.
We also refine the abstract event UpdateMap. In particular, we replace the
guard territory(z)(s) = compl by the guard (bs 7→ (z 7→ s)) ∈ msg. This guard
checks that there is a message for the base station bs about the cleaned sector s
from the zone z. As a result of the event, the base station bs reads the message
and marks the sector s in the zone z as cleaned in its local map.
UpdateMap =̂ refines UpdateMap
any bs, z, s
when
bs ∈ BS ∧ z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ∧ responsible(z) 6= bs ∧
bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ (bs 7→ (z 7→ s)) ∈ msg
then
local map(bs) := local map(bs) − {z 7→ local map(bs)(z)− {s 7→ compl}}
msg := msg \ {bs 7→ (z 7→ s)}
4.6 Fifth Refinement: Introducing Robot Failures
Now we aim at modelling possible robot failures and elaborate on the abstract
events concerning robot and zone reassigning.We start by partitioning the robots
into active and failed ones. The current set of all active robots is defined by a
new variable active with the following invariant properties:
active ⊆ dom(attached), active ⊆ dom(asgn s), active ⊆ dom(asgn z).
Initially all robots are active, i.e., active = RB. A new event RobotFailuremodels
possible robot failures that can happen at any time during system execution:
RobotFailure =̂
any rb
when
rb ∈ active ∧ card(active) > 1
then
active := active \ {rb}
end
We make an assumption that the last active robot can not fail and add
the corresponding guard card(active) > 1 to the event RobotFailure to restrict
possible robot failures. Let us note that for multi-robotic systems with many
homogeneous robots this constraint is not unreasonable.
A base station monitors all its robots and detects the failed ones. The abstract
event TaskFailure abstractly models such robot detection.
To formalise the property (PR8), we should model a situation when some base
station bs j does not have active robots anymore, i.e., dom(attached{bs j}) *
active. In that case, some group of active robots rbs has to be sent to this
base station bs j from another base station bs i. This behaviour is modelled by
the event ReassignNewBStoRBs that refines the abstract event ReassignRB. As a
result, all the robots from rbs become attached to the base station bs j:
ReassignNewBStoRBs =̂ refines ReassignRB
any bs i, bs j, rbs
when
bs i ∈ BS ∧ bs j ∈ BS ∧ rbs ⊂ active ∧
ran(rbs attached) = {bs} ∧ bs i ∈ ran(responsible) ∧
ran(rbs asgn s) = {0} ∧ rbs 6= ∅ ∧ bs j ∈ ran(responsible) ∧
bs i 6= bs j ∧ bs i ∈ ran(rbs− attached) ∧ dom(attached {bs j}) * active
then
attached := attached− (rbs× {bs j})
end
This event can be further refined by a concrete procedure to choose a particular
base station that will share its robots (e.g., based on load balancing).
Finally, to ensure the property (PR9) , let us consider the situation when all
the sectors for which a base station is responsible are cleaned. In that case, all
the active robots of the base station may be sent to some other base station that
still has some unfinished cleaning to co-ordinate. This functionality is specified
by the event SendRobotsToBS (a refinement of the event ReassignRB):
SendRobotsToBS =̂ refines ReassignRB
any bs i, bs j, rbs
when
bs i ∈ operating ∧ bs j ∈ operating ∧ rbs ⊂ active ∧
ran(rbs attached) = {bs i} ∧ bs i ∈ ran(responsible) ∧
ran(rbs asgn s) = {0} ∧ rbs 6= ∅ ∧ bs j ∈ ran(responsible) ∧
bs i 6= bs j ∧ bs i ∈ ran(rbs− attached) ∧ rbs = dom(attached {bs i}) ∧
(∀z ·z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ responsible(z) = bs i⇒ local map(bs i)(z)[1 .. k] = {compl})
then
attached := attached− (rbs× {bs j})
end
4.7 Sixth Refinement: Introducing Base Station Failures
In the final refinement step presented in the paper, we aim at specifying the
base station failures. Each base station might be either operating or failed. We
introduce a new variable operating to define the set of all operating base stations.
The corresponding invariant properties are as follows.
operating ⊆ BS,
∀bs· bs ∈ BS ∧ local map(bs) = ∅ ⇒ bs /∈ operating.
Also, similarly to the event RobotFailure, we introduce a new event
BaseStationFailure to model a possible base station failure.
In the fourth refinement step we assumed that a base station can take over the
responsibility for the robots and zones of another base station. This behaviour
was modelled by the event GetAdditionalResponsibility. Now we can refine this
event by introducing an additional condition – only if a base station is detected
as failed, another base station can take over its responsibility for the respective
zones and robots:
GetAdditionalResponsibility =̂ refines GetAdditionalResponsibility
any bs i, bs j, za, rbs
when
bs i ∈ BS ∧ bs j ∈ operating ∧ zs ⊂ 1 .. n ∧
zs = dom(responsible  {bs i}) ∧ rbs ⊂ active ∧ rbs = dom(attached {bs i}) ∧
bs i 6= bs j ∧ bs j /∈ dom(msg) ∧ bs i /∈ operating
then
responsible := responsible − (zs × {bs j})
attached := attached− (rbs× {bs j})
asgn s := asgn s − (rbs × {0})
asgn z := asgn z − (rbs× {0})
local map(bs i) := ∅
end
As a result of the presented refinement chain, we arrived at a centralised model
of the multi-robotic system. We can further refine the system to derive its dis-
tributed implementation, relying on the modularisation extension of Event-B to
achieve this.
5 Discussion
Assessment of the development. The development of the presented multi-
robotic system has been carried out with the support of the Rodin platform [8].
We have derived a complex system specification in six refinement steps. In gen-
eral, the refinement approach has demonstrated a good scalability and allowed
us to model intricate dependencies between the system components. We have
been able to express and verify all the desired properties defined for our system.
Therefore, we can make a general conclusion about suitability of the refinement
technique for formal development and verification of the multi-robotic systems.
However, we have also identified a number of problems. Firstly, in spite of
seeming simplicity, the relationships between the base stations, zones and sectors
have been modelled using quite complex nested data structures (functions). The
Rodin platform could not comfortably handle the proofs involving manipulations
with the nested functions and required rather time-consuming interactive prov-
ing efforts. Secondly, the Rodin platform does not support the direct assignment
to a function with nested arguments. For instance, instead of simply specifying
local map(bs)(z)(s) := compl, we have to express it as the following intricate
statement local map(bs)−{z 7→ local map(bs)(z)−{s 7→ compl}}, i.e., use the
overriding relation twice. These two problems can be alleviated with a mathe-
matical extension of the Rodin platform that is currently under development.
Despite certain technical difficulties, we have found the refinement approach
as such to be beneficial for deriving precise requirements and the corresponding
model of a multi-robotic system. In the refinement process, we have discovered a
number of subtleties in the system requirements. The proving effort has helped
us to localise the present problems and ambiguities and find the appropriate so-
lutions. For instance, we had to impose extra restrictions on the situations when
a base station takes a new responsibility for other zones and robots. Moreover,
we had to make our assumptions about robot failures more precise.
Related work. Formal modelling of multi-agent systems has been undertaken
in [10, 9, 11]. The authors have proposed an extension of the Unity framework to
explicitly define such concepts as mobility and context-awareness. Our modelling
have pursued a different goal – we have aimed at formally guaranteeing that the
specified agent behaviour achieves the pre-defined goals. Formal modelling of
fault tolerant MAS in Event-B has been undertaken by Ball and Butler [3].
They have proposed a number of informally described patterns that allow the
designers to incorporate well-known (static) fault tolerance mechanisms into
formal models. In our approach, we have implemented a more advanced fault
tolerance scheme that relies on goal reallocation and dynamic reconfiguration to
guarantee goal reachability.
The foundational work on goal-oriented development has been done by van
Lamsweerde [4]. The original motivation behind the goal-oriented development
was to structure the requirements and derive properties in the form of temporal
logic formulas that the system design should satisfy. Over the last decade, the
goal-oriented approach has received several extensions that allow the designers to
link it with formal modelling [5–7]. These works aimed at expressing temporal
logic properties in Event-B. In our work, we have relied on goals to facilitate
structuring of the system behaviour and derived a detailed system model that
satisfies the desired properties by refinement.
Conclusions. In this paper we have presented a formal development of a fault
tolerant multi-robotic system. The development has been carried out by refine-
ment in Event-B. As a result of the formal development process, we have achieved
the desired goal – formally specified the complex system behaviour and proved
the desired properties. The formal development has allowed us to uncover miss-
ing requirements and rigorously define the relationships between agents. The
refinement approach has also allowed us to derive a complex mechanism for
cooperative error recovery in a systematic manner.
Our approach has demonstrated a number of advantages comparing to var-
ious process-algebraic approaches used for modelling multi-agent systems. The
reliance on a proof-based verification has allowed us to derive a quite complex
model of the behaviour of a multi-agent robotic system. We have not needed to
avoid complex data types and could comfortably express intricate relationships
between the system goals and the employed agents. As a result, our approach
scales well with respect to the number of system states, agents, and their com-
plex interactions. We believe that, once the mentioned technical difficulties of
handling complex nested functions are resolved in the Rodin platform, Event-B
and the associated tool set will provide a suitable framework for formal modelling
of complex multi-robotic systems.
References
1. Abrial, J.R.: The B-Book: Assigning Programs to Meanings. Cambridge University
Press (2005)
2. Abrial, J.R.: Modeling in Event-B. Cambridge University Press (2010)
3. Ball, E., Butler, M.: Event-b patterns for specifying fault-tolerance in multi-agent
interaction. In: Methods, Models and Tools for Fault Tolerance, pp. 104–129 (2009)
4. van Lamsweerde, A.: Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering: A Guided Tour.
In: RE. pp. 249–263 (2001)
5. Landtsheer, R.D., Letier, E., van Lamsweerde, A.: Deriving tabular event-based
specifications from goal-oriented requirements models. In: Requirements Engineer-
ing, 9(2). pp. 104–120 (2004)
6. Matoussi, A., Gervais, F., Laleau, R.: A Goal-Based Approach to Guide the De-
sign of an Abstract Event-B Specification. In: 16th International Conference on
Engineering of Complex Computer Systems. IEEE (2011)
7. Ponsard, C., Dallons, G., Philippe, M.: From Rigorous Requirements Engineering
to Formal System Design of Safety-Critical Systems. In: ERCIM News (75). pp.
22–23 (2008)
8. Rodin: Event-B Platform, online at http://www.event-b.org/
9. Roman, G.C., Julien, C., Payton, J.: A Formal Treatment of Context-Awareness.
In: FASE’2004. LNCS, vol. 2984. Springer (2004)
10. Roman, G.C., Julien, C., Payton, J.: Modeling adaptive behaviors in Context
UNITY. In: Theoretical Computure Science. vol. 376, pp. 185–204 (2007)
11. Roman, G.C., P.McCann, Plun, J.: Mobile UNITY: Reasoning and Specification in
Mobile Computing. In: ACM Transactions of Software Engineering and Method-
ology (1997)

Paper VII
Formal Development and Quantitative Assessment
of a Resilient Multi-robotic System
Anton Tarasyuk, Inna Pereverzeva, Elena Troubitsyna and
Linas Laibinis
Originally published in: Anatoliy Gorbenko, Alexander Romanovsky, Vy-
acheslav S. Kharchenko (Eds.), Proceedings of 5th International Workshop
on Software Engineering for Resilient Systems (SERENE 2013), LNCS 8166,
109–124, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-
3-642-40894-6 9
c©2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. Reprinted, with permission
of Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
197

Formal Development and Quantitative
Assessment of a Resilient Multi-Robotic System
Anton Tarasyuk2, Inna Pereverzeva1,2,
Elena Troubitsyna2, and Linas Laibinis2
1 Turku Centre for Computer Science
2 A˚bo Akademi University
Joukahaisenkatu 3-5, 20520 Turku, Finland
{anton.tarasyuk, inna.pereverzeva,
elena.troubitsyna, linas.laibinis}@abo.fi
Abstract. Ensuring resilience of multi-robotic systems is a notoriously
difficult task. Decentralised architectures and asynchronous communica-
tion require powerful modelling techniques to demonstrate system re-
silience. In this paper, resilience of a multi-robotic system is defined as
the ability to achieve goals despite robot failures. We demonstrate how to
rigorously specify and verify essential properties of resilience mechanisms
of multi-robotic systems by refinement in Event-B. To assess the desired
resilience characteristics, we augment our formal models with statistical
data and rely on probabilistic verification. The automated support pro-
vided by the PRISM model checker allows us to calculate the probability
of goal reachability in the presence of robot failures and compare differ-
ent reconfiguration strategies for selected architectures. We demonstrate
our approach by a case study – development and assessment of a cleaning
multi-robotic system.
Keywords: Formal modelling, resilience, Event-B, refinement, proba-
bilistic model checking, multi-robotic system.
1 Introduction
Development and assessment of resilience – a property of a system to remain
dependable despite changes [9] – of complex multi-robotic systems constitute
a significant engineering challenge. Asynchronous communication, highly dis-
tributed architecture and a large number of components puts high scalability
and expressiveness demands on the techniques for reasoning about resilience of
multi-robotic systems. Typically, the behaviour of such systems is analysed us-
ing simulation. However, simulation allows us to validate the system behaviour
only for selected scenarios, environments and architectural configurations. In this
paper we propose an alternative approach to development and assessment of re-
silient multi-robotic systems. Our approach is based on combination of formal
goal-oriented development by refinement in Event-B [1] and probabilistic model
checking in PRISM [11].
Event-B is a formal top-down approach to correct-by-construction system
development. Usually development starts from a high-level abstract specifica-
tion that is transformed into a detailed model by a number of refinement steps.
While developing multi-robotic systems, we start from a highly abstract model
defining the main system goal. Our refinement steps unfold the system archi-
tecture and introduce the required resilience mechanisms. In our case study –
a multi-robotic cleaning system this corresponds to specifying the behaviour of
cleaning robots and supervising base stations both in nominal conditions and
in the presence of failures. When a detailed logical architecture is derived by
refinement, we augment the obtained model with the probabilistic information
required to conduct probabilistic resilience assessment. We rely on the probabilis-
tic model checker PRISM to assess the probability of achieving the goal as well
as to compare several alternative system configurations. We believe that the pro-
posed approach facilitates development and verification of complex multi-robotic
systems. It complements our previous work [12] on fault tolerant multi-robotic
systems by removing an artificial assumption that a perfect robot would be al-
ways available to achieve the system goal. Instead, in this paper we compute the
actual probabilities of success for different architectural configurations.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly overview the Event-
B formalism. Section 3 describes the requirements for our case study – a multi-
robotic cleaning system – and outlines the formal development strategy. Section 4
briefly presents a formal development of the cleaning system and demonstrates
how to express and verify its properties in the refinement process. Section 5
describes quantitative assessment of the system goal reachability via probabilistic
model checking in PRISM. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude by discussing the
paper contribution and reviewing the related work.
2 Modelling and Refinement in Event-B
Event-B is a state-based formal approach that promotes the correct-by-construc-
tion development paradigm and formal verification by theorem proving [1]. In
Event-B, a system model is specified using the notion of an abstract state ma-
chine. An abstract state machine encapsulates the model state represented as
a collection of variables, and defines operations on this state, i.e., it describes
the behaviour of the modelled system. A machine usually has the accompany-
ing component, called context. A context may include user-defined carrier sets,
constants and their properties (model axioms). In Event-B, the model variables
are strongly typed by the constraining predicates called invariants. Moreover,
the invariants specify important properties that should be preserved during the
system execution.
The dynamic behaviour of the system is defined by a set of atomic events.
An event is essentially a guarded command that, in the most general form, can
be defined as follows:
evt b= any vl where g then S end
where vl is a list of new local variables, g is the guard, and S is the action. The
guard is a state predicate that defines the conditions under which the action
can be executed. In general, the action of an event is a parallel composition of
deterministic or non-deterministic assignments.
Event-B employs a top-down refinement-based approach to system develop-
ment. A development starts from an abstract system specification that nondeter-
ministically models the most essential functional requirements. In a sequence of
refinement steps, we gradually reduce non-determinism and introduce detailed
design decisions. In particular, we can add new events, split events as well as
replace abstract variables by their concrete counterparts, i.e., perform data re-
finement. When data refinement is performed, we should define so called gluing
invariant as a part of the invariant of the refined machine. The gluing invariant
defines the relationship between the abstract and concrete variables.
The Event-B refinement process allows us to gradually introduce implementa-
tion details, while preserving functional correctness. The consistency of Event-B
models, i.e., invariant preservation, correctness of refinement steps, should be
formally demonstrated by discharging the relevant proof obligations. The veri-
fication efforts, in particular, automatic generation and proving of the required
proof obligations, are significantly facilitated by Event-B tool support – the
Rodin platform [14].
3 Case Study: a Multi-Robotic Cleaning System
We start by briefly describing our case study – a multi-robotic cleaning system
– and formulating a formal development strategy for such a system.
3.1 Case Study Description
The main goal of the considered multi-robotic system is to get a certain territory
cleaned by available robots. The whole territory is divided into several zones,
which in turn are further divided into a number of sectors. Each zone has a base
station that coordinates the cleaning activities within the zone. In general, the
coordination activities of one base station may span over several zones. Moreover,
each base station supervises a number of robots attached to it by assigning
cleaning tasks to them.
A robot is an autonomous electro-mechanical device that can move and clean.
A base station may assign a robot a specific sector to clean. Upon receiving an
assignment, the robot autonomously moves to this sector and performs cleaning.
After successfully completing its mission, the robot returns back to the base
station to receive a new assignment. The base station keeps track of the cleaned
and non-cleaned sectors. Moreover, the base stations periodically exchange the
information about their cleaned sectors.
While performing the given task, a robot might fail. It subsequently leads
to a failure to clean the assigned sector. We assume that a base station is able
to detect all the failed robots attached to it. In case of a robot failure, the base
station may assign another active robot to perform the failed task.
A base station might fail as well. We assume that a failure of a base station
can be detected by the others stations. In that case, some healthy base stations
redistribute control over the robots coordinated by the failed base station.
Below we formulate the main requirements and properties associated with
the multi-robotic system informally described above.
(PR1) The main system goal: the whole territory has to be cleaned.
(PR2) To clean the territory, every its zone has to be cleaned.
(PR3) To clean a zone, every its sector has to be cleaned.
(PR4) Every cleaned sector or zone remains cleaned during functioning of the
system.
(PR5) No two robots should clean the same sector. In other words, a robot gets
only non-assigned and non-cleaned sectors to clean.
(PR6) The information about the cleaned sectors stored in any base station has
to be consistent with the current state of the territory. More specifically, if a
base station sees a particular sector in some zone as cleaned, then this sector
is marked as cleaned in the memory of the base station responsible for it.
Also, if a sector is marked as non-cleaned in the memory of the base station
responsible for it, then any other base station considers it to be non-cleaned.
(PR7) Base station cooperation: if a base station has been detected as failed then
some base station will take the responsibility for all the zones and robots of
the failed base station.
(PR8) Base station cooperation: if a base station has cleaned all its zones, its
active robots may be reallocated under control of another base station.
The last two requirements essentially describe the co-operative recovery mech-
anisms that we assume to be present in the described multi-robot system.
3.2 A Formal Development Strategy
In the next section we will present a formal Event-B development of the de-
scribed multi-system robotic system. Let us now give a short overview of this
development and highlight the formal techniques used to ensure the proposed
properties (PR1)–(PR8).
We start with a very abstract model, essentially representing the system
behaviour as a process iteratively trying to achieve the main goal (PR1). The
next couple of data refinement steps decompose the main goal into a set of
subgoals, i.e., reformulate it in terms of zones and sectors. We will define and
prove the relevant gluing invariants establishing a formal relationship between
goals and the corresponding subgoals.
Next we introduce different types of agents – base stations and robots. The
base stations coordinate execution of the tasks required to achieve the corre-
sponding subgoal, while the robots execute the tasks allocated to them. We
formally define the relationships between different types of agents, as well as
agents and the respective subgoals. These relationships are specified and proved
as invariant properties of the model.
The consequent refinement steps explicitly introduce agent failures, the infor-
mation exchange, as well as the co-operation activities between the agents. The
integrity between the local and global information stored within base stations is
again formulated and proved as model invariant properties.
We assume that communication between the base stations as well as the
robots and the base stations is reliable. In other words, messages are always
(eventually) transmitted correctly without any loss or errors.
4 Formal Development of a Multi-Robotic System
In this section, we briefly present a formal development of our case study, by only
highlighting essential elements (i.e., data structures, events, proved properties)
of models. The detailed description of the case study can be found in [12].
4.1 Modelling system goals and subgoals
Abstract model. The initial model abstractly represents the behaviour of the
described multi-robotic system. Essentially, we aim at ensuring the property
(PR1). We define a variable goal ∈ STATE modelling the current state of the
system goal, where STATE= {incompl, compl}. The value compl corresponds
to the situation when the goal is achieved, i.e., the whole territory is cleaned.
In the process of achieving the goal, modelled by the event Body, the vari-
able goal may eventually change its value from incompl to compl. The system
continues its execution until the whole territory is not cleaned:
Body b= when goal 6= compl then goal :∈ STATE end
First and second refinement. First, we assume that the whole territory is
divided into n zones, where n ∈ N+. We augment our model with a representation
of subgoals and aim at ensuring the property (PR2). We associate the notion of
a subgoal with the process of cleaning a particular zone. A subgoal is achieved
only when the corresponding zone is cleaned. A new variable zones represents
the current subgoal status for every zone, i.e., zones ∈ 1..n→ STATE.
To establish the relationship between goal and subgoals and formalise the
property (PR2) per se, we formulate the following gluing invariant:
goal = compl⇔ zones[1..n] = {compl}.
The invariant can be understood as follows: the territory is considered to be
cleaned if and only if its every zone is cleaned. To model cleaning of a zone(s),
we refine the abstract event Body. In the refined event we reflect on a fact that
once a subgoal is reached, it stays reached. Hence we ensure the property (PR4).
In the second refinement step, we further decompose system subgoals into a
set of subsubgoals. We assume that each zone in our system is divided into k
sectors, where k ∈ N+, and aim at formalising the property (PR3). We establish
the relationship between the notion of a subsubgoal (or simply a task) and the
process of cleaning a particular sector. A task is completed when the correspond-
ing sector is cleaned. A new variable territory represents the current status of
each sector:
territory ∈ 1 .. n→ (1 .. k→ STATE).
The following gluing invariant expresses the relationship between subgoals and
subsubgoals (tasks) and correspondingly ensures the property (PR3):
∀j ·j ∈ 1 .. n⇒ (zones(j) = compl⇔ territory(j)[1 .. k] = {compl}).
The invariant says that a zone is cleaned if and only if its each sector is cleaned.
4.2 Introducing Agents
In the third refinement step, we augment our model with a representation of
agents. The structure of the refined model is presented in Fig. 1. In the model
context, we define an abstract finite set AGENTS and its disjoint non-empty
subsets RB and BS that represent the robots and the base stations respectively.
New variables responsible and attached formalise, respectively, the relationship
between a zone and its supervising base station and the relationship between a
robot and the base station associated to it:
responsible ∈ 1 .. n→BS, attached ∈ RB 7→BS.
Here 7→ denotes a partial function, which reflects the fact that some robots may
be not attached to any base station (e.g., failed).
To coordinate the cleaning process, a base station stores the information
about its own cleaned sectors and updates the information about the status of
the other cleaned sectors. We assume that each base station has a “map” – the
knowledge about all sectors of the whole territory. To model this, we introduce
a new variable local map:
local map ∈ BS→ (1 .. n 7→ (1 .. k→ STATE)).
The abstract variable territory represents the global knowledge on the whole
territory. For any sector and zone this global knowledge has to be consistent with
the information stored by the base stations. In particular, if in the local knowl-
edge of any base station a sector is marked as cleaned, then it should be cleaned
according to the global knowledge as well. To establish those relationships, we
formulate and prove the following invariant:
∀bs, z, s·bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ⇒
(territory(z)(s) = incompl⇒ local map(bs)(z)(s) = incompl).
Moreover, for each base station, its local information always coincides with
the global knowledge about the corresponding zones and sectors:
∀bs, z, s·bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ responsible(z) = bs ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ⇒
(territory(z)(s) = incompl⇔ local map(bs)(z)(s) = incompl).
All together, these two invariants formalise the property (PR6).
A base station may only assign a cleaning task to its attached robots. Here,
we have to ensure the property (PR5) – no two robots can clean the certain sector
at the same time. We model this behaviour by a new event NewTask.
The robot failures have some impact on execution of the cleaning process.
The task cannot be performed if the robot assigned to it has failed. To reflect this
behaviour, we refine the event Body by two events TaskSuccess and TaskFailure,
which respectively model successful and unsuccessful execution of the task.
A base station keeps track of the cleaned and non-cleaned sectors and repeat-
edly receives the information from the other base stations about their cleaned
sectors. The knowledge is inaccurate for the time span when the information is
Machine RoboticSystem ref3 refines RoboticSystem ref2
Variables territory, responsible, attached, asgn z, asgns
Invariants...
Events...
NewTask ... // assigning a cleaning task to a robot
TaskSuccess refines Body ... // successful execution of a cleaning task
TaskFailure refines Body ... // unsuccessful execution of a cleaning task
UpdateMap ... // update of the local map of a base station
ReassignRB ... // reassigning robots from one station to another
ResetRB ... // cancelling assignment for a group of robots
GetAdditionalResponsibility ... // reassigning sections and robots from one station
to another
Fig. 1. Multi-Robotic System: the third refinement step
sent but not yet received. In this refinement step, we abstractly model receiving
the information by a base station by introducing a new event UpdateMap.
In this refinement step, we also introduce an abstract representation of the
base station cooperation defined by the property (PR8). Namely, we allow to
reassign a group of robots from one base station to another. We define such a
behaviour in a new event ReassignRB. In that case, all the robots of the base
station may be sent to some other base station that still has some unfinished
cleaning to co-ordinate. We also reserve a possibility to cancel all the current as-
signments for a group of robots in another new event ResetRB. This functionality
will be needed later on, e.g., to describe the effect of base station failures.
Finally, we model a possible redistribution between the base stations their
pre-assigned responsibility for zones and robots by a new event
GetAdditionalResponsibility. Note that a base station can take the responsibil-
ity for a new zone only if it has the accurate knowledge about this zone, i.e., the
information about its cleaned and non-cleaned sectors. Modelling this behaviour
allows us to formalise the property (PR7).
4.3 Modelling of Broadcasting
In the next, fourth refinement step, we aim at defining an abstract model of
broadcasting. After receiving a notification from a robot about successful clean-
ing the assigned sector, a base station updates its local map and broadcasts the
message about the cleaned sector to the other base stations. In its turn, upon
receiving the message, each base station correspondingly updates its own local
map. A new relational variable msg models the message broadcasting buffer:
msg ∈ BS↔ (1 .. n× 1 .. k).
If a message (bs 7→ (z 7→ s)) belongs to this buffer then the sector s from the zone
z has been cleaned. The first element of the message, bs, determines to which
base station the message is sent. If there are no messages in the msg buffer for
any particular base station then the local map of this base station is accurate,
i.e., it coincides with the global knowledge about the territory:
∀bs, z, s·z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ∧ bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ (bs 7→ (z 7→ s)) /∈ msg ⇒
territory(z)(s) = local map(bs)(z)(s),
∀bs·bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ bs /∈ dom(msg) ⇒
(∀z, s·z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ⇒ territory(z)(s) = local map(bs)(z)(s)).
After receiving a notification about successful cleaning of a sector, a base
station marks this sector as cleaned in its local map and then broadcasts the
message about it to other base stations. To model this, we refine the abstract
events TaskSuccess and UpdateMap.
4.4 Introducing Robot and Base Station Failures
Fifth refinement. Now we aim at modelling possible robot failures. To achieve
this, we partition the robots into active and failed ones. The current set of all
active robots is defined by a new variable active. Initially all robots are active,
i.e., active = RB. Moreover, new events RobotFailure and TaskFailure model
respectively possible robot failures and their detection by the base stations.
In our modelling, we assume that a robot may fail only during its cleaning
assignments.
The events NewTask, ReassignRB and GetAdditionalResponsibility are now re-
fined to reflect that only active robots can be given cleaning assignments and
reattached to other base stations.
In our previous work [12], in order to verify goal reachability, we made an
assumption that the last active robot and the last active base station can not
fail. In this paper, we drop this artificial constraint and verify goal reachability
by means of probabilistic model checking, as explained in Section 5.
Sixth refinement. In the final refinement step presented in the paper, we aim
at specifying the base station failures. The structure of the final refined model
is presented in Fig. 2.
Each base station might be either operating or failed. We introduce a new
variable operating ⊆ BS to define the set of all operating base stations. The
event BaseStationFailure (extension of the abstract event ResetRB) models a pos-
sible base station failure. It removes the failed base station from the set operating
and cancels all the cleaning assignments to the attached robots of the station.
Let us note that, once BaseStationFailure is executed, the events TaskSuccess
and RobotFailure cannot be executed any more for this particular zone, i.e.,
the failure of a base station leads to interruption of all the cleaning activi-
ties performed by the robots that the station coordinates. Moreover, the event
GetAdditionalResponsibility is now refined by introducing an additional condition
– only if a base station is detected as failed, another base station can take over
its responsibility for the respective zones and robots.
Once again, verification of reachability of the system goals despite possible
failures of base stations is addressed by probabilistic model checking presented
in Section 5.
Machine RoboticSystem ref6 refines RoboticSystem ref5
Variables territory, responsible, attached, asgn z, asgns
Invariants ...
Events ...
NewTask refines NewTask ... // assigning a cleaning task to a robot
TaskSuccess refines TaskSuccess ... // successful execution of a cleaning task
TaskFailure refines TaskFailure ... // unsuccessful execution of a cleaning task
UpdateMap refines UpdateMap ... // update of the local map of a base station
RobotFailure refines RobotFailure ... // robot failure
BaseStationFailure refines ResetRB ... // base station failure
ReassignRB refines ReassignRB ... // reassigning robots from one station
to another
GetAdditionalResponsibility refines GetAdditionalResponsibility ...
// reassigning sections and robots from one station to another
Fig. 2. Multi-Robotic System: the sixth refinement step
4.5 Discussion
As a result of the presented refinement chain, we arrived at a centralised model
of the multi-robotic system. We can further refine the system to derive its dis-
tributed implementation, relying on the modularisation extension of Event-B to
achieve this.
The development of the presented multi-robotic system has been carried out
with the support of the Rodin platform. To verify correctness of the models, we
have discharged more than 230 proof obligations. Around 80% of them have been
proved automatically by the Rodin platform and the rest have been proved man-
ually in the Rodin interactive proving environment. As s result, we have derived
a complex system specification in six refinement steps. In general, the refinement
approach has demonstrated a good scalability and allowed us to model intricate
dependencies between the system components. We have been able to express
and verify all the desired properties defined for our system.
In the refinement process, we have discovered a number of subtleties in the
system requirements. The proving effort has helped us to localise the present
problems and ambiguities and find the appropriate solutions. For instance, we
had to impose extra restrictions on the situations when a base station takes a
new responsibility for other zones and robots.
In contrast to our previous work, we did not postulate the goal reachability
property nor make any assumptions related to robot and base station failures. To
evaluate goal reachability properties in the presence of agent failures, we employ
quantitative assessment – probabilistic model checking techniques, which we
discuss in the next section.
5 Quantitative Assessment
In this paper, we aim at applying probabilistic model checking for the quanti-
tative reasoning about goal reachability of a resilient multi-robotic system mod-
elled in Event-B. To achieve this, we use the probabilistic symbolic model checker
PRISM [11] – one of the leading software tools in the domain of formal modelling
and verification of probabilistic systems.
5.1 Probabilistic Model of a Multi-Robotic Cleaning System
To enable probabilistic analysis of Event-B models in PRISM, we rely on the
continuous-time probabilistic extension of the Event-B framework [17]. This ex-
tension allows us to annotate actions of all model events with real-valued rates
and then transform a probabilistically augmented Event-B specification into a
continuous-time Markov chain. It also implicitly introduces the notion of time
into Event-B models: for any state, the sum of action rates of all enabled in this
state events defines a parameter of the exponentially distributed time delay that
takes place before some enabled action is triggered.
We assume that all the base station and robots in our multi-robotic system
are identical and define five action rates as constants in its PRISM model (see
Fig. 3). Specifically, we define the cleaning task assignment rate (λ) of a base
station, the failure rates of a base station (δ) and a robot (γ), the robot’s ser-
vice (cleaning) rate (µ) and, finally, the reconfiguration rate (τ) – the rate of
reassigning the robots and sectors (if any) to another station.
To apply model checking for verification of our robotic system, we also have
to instantiate some constants declared in the model’s context. In particular,
we need to specify the total number of sectors in the territory as well as the
initial number of active robots. In the PRISM specification shown in Fig. 3,
these two values equal to 60 and 12 correspondingly. Furthermore, we need to
evenly distribute the sectors and robots among several zones. Here we consider
two different arrangements, namely, the territories consisting of two and three
zones. In our PRISM models, we represent the behaviour of each separate zone
as a single module. As a result, in the model with three zones there are three
identical – up to variable names and synchronisation labels – modules Station1,
Station2 and Station3. In addition, the module End models system deadlock
in one of three possible terminating states: the successfully accomplished main
goal, failure of all base stations and failure of all the available robots.
Let us now consider in more detail the module Station1 (Fig. 3). Its first three
commands model respectively (1) failure of a base station, (2) assigning of a new
task to an idle robot, and (3) task completion or failure of an assigned robot. We
assume that all the system failures are permanent, i.e., there is no possibility to
repair a failed base station or a robot. The next two pairs of guarded commands
correspond to the event ReassignRB and describe system reconfiguration after
some other base station has achieved its subgoal. Specifically, the commands (4)
and (5) represent transferring robots from the second station to the first one,
while the (6) and (7) represent reassigning the robots from the third station.
Similarly, the guarded commands from the (8) to (11) correspond to the
event GetAdditionalResponsibility and model reassigning of both robots and non-
cleaned sectors in the case of failure of the second or third base station. Let us
describe how the reconfiguration procedure is resolved if there are two potential
target stations capable of accepting new robots (and sectors): operational base
stations that have their own unfinished tasks “compete” for getting new robots
(and tasks), and the reassignment rate for each base station is τ/2. Obviously,
in such a case the time delay required to perform the reconfiguration procedure
const double λ = 0.2; // task (sector) assignment rate
const double δ = 0.0007; // base station failure rate
const double µ = 0.035; // robot service (work) rate
const double γ = 0.003; // robot failure rate
const double τ = 0.07; // robots (and sectors) reassignment rate
const int n = 3; // number of zones (and base stations)
const int k = 20; // initial number of sectors in each zone
const int m = 4; // initial number robots in each zone
module Station1
z1 : bool init true; // base station’s status (true=operational, false=failed)
s1 : [0..k · n] init k; // number of unfinished tasks
r1 : [0..m · n] init m; // number of active robots
a1 : [0..m · n] init 0; // number of currently assigned robots
(1) [] z1 & s1 + s2 + s3 > 0 & r1 + r2 + r3 > 0→ δ : (z′1 = false) & (a′1 = 0);
(2) [] z1 & a1 < r1 & a1 < s1 → λ : (a′1 = a1 + 1);
(3) [] z1 & a1 > 0 & s1 > 0 & r1 > 0→ a1 · µ : (s′1 = s1 − 1) & (a′1 = a1 − 1)+
a1 · γ : (r′1 = r1 − 1) & (a′1 = a1 − 1);
(4) [tr21] z1 & s1 > 0 & s2 = 0 & r2 > 0 & (!z3 | s3 = 0) & r1 + r2 ≤ m · n→ τ : (r′1 = r1 + r2);
(5) [tr21] z1 & s1 > 0& s2 = 0& r2 > 0& z3 & s3 > 0& r1 + r2 ≤ m · n→ τ/2 : (r′1 = r1 + r2);
(6) [tr31] z1 & s1 > 0 & s3 = 0 & r3 > 0 & (!z2 | s2 = 0) & r1 + r3 ≤ m · n→ τ : (r′1 = r1 + r3);
(7) [tr31] z1 & s1 > 0& s3 = 0& r3 > 0& z2 & s2 > 0& r1 + r3 ≤ m · n→ τ/2 : (r′1 = r1 + r3);
(8) [tr21] z1& !z2 & s2 > 0 & (!z3 | s3 = 0) & (r1 + r2 ≤ m · n) & (s1 + s2 ≤ k · n)→
τ : (s′1 = s1 + s2) & (r
′
1 = r1 + r2);
(9) [tr21] z1& !z2 & s2 > 0 & z3 & s3 > 0 & (r1 + r2 ≤ m · n) & (s1 + s2 ≤ k · n)→
τ/2 : (s′1 = s1 + s2) & (r
′
1 = r1 + r2);
(10) [tr31] z1& !z3 & s3 > 0 & (!z2 | s2 = 0) & (r1 + r3 ≤ m · n) & (s1 + s3 ≤ k · n)→
τ : (s′1 = s1 + s3) & (r
′
1 = r1 + r3);
(11) [tr31] z1& !z3 & s3 > 0 & z2 & s2 > 0 & (r1 + r3 ≤ m · n) & (s1 + s3 ≤ k · n)→
τ/2 : (s′1 = s1 + s3) & (r
′
1 = r1 + r3);
(12) [tr12] true→ 1 : (r′1 = 0) & (s′1 = 0);
(13) [tr13] true→ 1 : (r′1 = 0) & (s′1 = 0);
endmodule
. . .
module End
[] (!z1 & !z2 & !z3) | r1 + r2 + r3 = 0 | s1 + s2 + s3 = 0→ true;
endmodule
Fig. 3. PRISM model: 3 zones with 20 sectors and 4 robot in each zone initially
is exponentially distributed with parameter τ . Finally, the last two commands
– (12) and (13) – of the module Station1 are required to reset the number
of station’s active robots and unfinished tasks to zero while reassigning them to
another station. To synchronise the commands modelling reassignment of robots
(and sectors) from Stationi to Stationj , we label them with actions trij.
Note that our PRISM specification has less “events” than its Event-B coun-
terpart. To reduce the size of the model, we have suppressed, yet without loss
of generality, those Event-B events that do not affect the non-functional system
behaviour. Usually, such events represent certain steps of the functional system
behaviour that must be individually addressed in an Event-B model, yet, from
the point of view of the non-functional behaviour, they can be considered as
a whole. For instance, in our PRISM model, the event TaskFailure is omitted
because task failure is implicitly modelled by the event RobotFailure, which is
characterised by the failure rate γ. Moreover, we abstract away from modelling
the broadcasting as the communication channel is perfectly reliable and, conse-
quently, any broadcasted message will be eventually delivered. Hence we assume
that, in the case of system reconfiguration, the delay required to update the local
knowledge of a base station (UpdateMap) is covered by the rate τ .
5.2 Probabilistic Reasoning about Goal Reachability
Our first objective is to compute the probability that the system goal – cleaning
of the whole territory – is eventually reachable. We have mentioned earlier that
we consider two different system configurations – the territory partitioned into
two and three zones. Each zone has a single base station. In the first configuration
each zone initially has 30 sectors and 6 robots, while in the second one each zone
has 20 sectors and 4 robots. In the PRISM property specification language,
the eventual goal reachability for our models is defined as the following CSL
(Continuous stochastic logic) formulae
P=? {F s1 + s2 = 0} and P=? {F s1 + s2 + s3 = 0}.
After verifying these formulae in the PRISM model checker, we can state that
the probability to eventually clean the whole territory, with the work and failure
rates as given in Fig. 3, is 0.939 for the first system configuration and 0.979 for
the second one.
In addition, it is interesting to assess the sources of system failure, i.e., to
check how robots and base station failures affect goal reachability. The negative
outcomes all robots have failed and all base stations have failed (for the case of
three zones) can be specified in the PRISM language as
P=? {F r1 + r2 + r3 = 0} and P=? {F !z1 & !z2 & !z3}.
The verification results for the 2-zones and 3-zones configurations are 0.008,
0.053 and 0.009, 0.012 respectively. It is easy to see that, for the given size of
the model and probabilistic characteristics of agents, the arrangement with three
zones is slightly better, and that in both cases the goal unreachability is mostly
induced by failures of the base stations.
Moreover, one can be interested in not only the eventual goal reachability but
also in performance of the system. This can be especially important when the
system must achieve its goal within a specified time interval. PRISM provides
us with means for such kind of analysis. Specifically, we define two formulae
P=? {F≤T s1 + s2 = 0} and P=? {F≤T s1 + s2 + s3 = 0}
which we will use to verify the time-bounded reachability of the main system
goal. After specifying a desirable upper time bound T , we can analyse goal
reachability progress over the time interval [0, T ]. However, sometimes it is also
useful to identify a lower time bound T0 since often there is a period of time
[0, T0] during which the probability to reach the goal is negligible. This can be
done by repeatedly verifying the formulae above while gradually increasing the
constant value T . After the lower bound is defined, in the same manner one can
define a suitable value for the upper bound T (if the one is not predefined) and
run necessary experiments in PRISM for the time interval [T0, T ].
(a) λ = 0.2, δ = 0.0007, µ = 0.035,
γ = 0.003, τ = 0.07
(b) λ = 0.5 δ = 0.0007, µ = 0.043,
γ = 0.003, τ = 0.1
Fig. 4. Case study: results of probabilistic analysis by PRISM
Fig. 4 shows the verification results for two different sets of probabilistic char-
acteristics of agents. These results can be understood as follows. Fig. 4 (a) shows
the goal reachability progress within the time interval from 3 to 9 hours of work,
while time units used in the definition of rates are minutes (e.g., the expected
time required for a robot to clean one sector is approximately 29 minutes). The
similar interpretation is apparently valid for Fig. 4 (b).
We need to say that, even for the reduced models considered in this paper, the
state space explosion problem is very prominent. For a relatively small territory
and quite a small number of robots – 60 and 12 respectively – the size of the
model grows from approximately 106 states and 6 · 106 transitions in the case
of two zones to approximately 7 · 107 states and more than 5 · 108 transitions in
the case of three zones. For the latter model, the verification process, especially
concerning the time-bounded properties, is quite time-consuming. As a matter
of fact, the use of probabilistic model checking to analyse of a multi-robotic
system that has a larger territory and more than three base stations is getting
rather problematic. It is also worth to mention that for the conducted case study
the sparse computation engine of PRISM demonstrated the best performance in
terms of model checking time.
6 Conclusions and Related Work
In this paper, we have presented an integrated approach to development and
assessment of resilient multi-robotic systems. We have demonstrated how the
proposed approach can be applied to develop and assess a cleaning multi-robotic
system. Our approach combines the strengths of two formal techniques – refine-
ment and probabilistic model checking – to achieve scalability and expressiveness
required for reasoning about resilience of multi-robotic systems. Indeed, formal
development by refinement allows us derive a complex system architecture, for-
mally verify correctness of robot interactions as well as logical properties of
the incorporated resilience mechanisms. On the other hand, probabilistic model
checking allows us to reason about the probability of achieving the system goal
despite robot failures as well as compare the resilience characteristics of different
configurations. An integration with probabilistic model checking has allowed us
to avoid an artificial assumption about the presence of a perfect robot that was
required to prove goal reachability in [12]. PRISM could cope sufficiently well
with scalability challenge for reasonably sized systems, yet its application to very
large multi-agent systems typical for, e.g., Internet of Things, would be limited.
We argue that our approach allows us to achieve a certain degree of generality
in the development and assessment – the models can be reused for a wide class
of multi-robotic systems that comply to the defined architectural style.
Formal modelling of MAS has been undertaken in [16, 15]. The authors have
proposed an extension of the Unity framework to explicitly define such concepts
as mobility and context-awareness. Our modelling have pursued a different goal
– we have aimed at formally guaranteeing that the specified agent behaviour
achieves the pre-defined goals. Formal modelling of fault tolerant MAS in Event-
B has been also undertaken by Ball and Butler [2]. They have proposed a number
of informally described patterns that allow the designers to incorporate well-
known (static) fault tolerance mechanisms into formal models. In our approach,
we have implemented a more advanced fault tolerance scheme that relies on goal
reallocation and dynamic reconfiguration to guarantee goal reachability.
The foundational work on goal-oriented development has been done by van
Lamsweerde [7]. The original motivation behind the goal-oriented development
was to structure the system requirements and derive properties in the form
of temporal logic formulae. Over the last decade, the goal-oriented approach
has received several extensions that allow the designers to link it with formal
modelling [8, 13]. These works aimed at expressing temporal logic properties in
Event-B. In our work, we have relied on goals to facilitate structuring of the
system behaviour and, as a result, derived a detailed system model that satisfies
the desired properties by refinement.
The use of model checking techniques for reasoning about MAS properties
has been largely studied in MAS research communities (see, e.g., [3, 4, 10]). In
particular, [4] presents a framework for verification of agent programs against
BDI (belief-desire-intention) agent specifications. In the proposed approach, an
agent system is first programmed using the logic-based agent oriented program-
ming language AgentSpeak(F). Then the AgentSpeak(F) programs are trans-
lated into Promela – the specification language of the SPIN model checker – to
verify the resulting system. The paper [10] presents the symbolic model checker
MCMAS, specifically tailored for verification of MAS. The MCMAS tool takes
as inputs models written in the Interpreted Systems Programming Language,
which allows for describing both agents and working environment of a multi-
agent system. MCMAS also benefits from the dedicated specification language
that supports, in addition to the traditionally used Computation tree logic, the
epistemic logic that has proved useful in the robotics domain. The discussed
approaches are illustrated by many case studies from different domains. How-
ever, unlike the PRISM model checker, none of the above techniques provide the
means for probabilistic assessment of the system behaviour.
There is a number of papers that discuss the use of probabilistic model tech-
niques for analysis of multi-agents systems. For example, in [6], the authors
address model-checking of probabilistic knowledge (relative to the agent knowl-
edge) by developing an algorithm in the MCK model checker, while in [5], the
authors represent a MAS as a discrete-time Markov chain and verify such system
properties as convergence and convergence rate in the PAT model checker. Yet,
to the best of our knowledge, the approaches combining both theorem proving
and verification via model checking are still scarce.
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Abstract
In this paper we present our formalisation of a resilient goal-oriented multi-
agent system and its essential properties. The formalisation covers the no-
tions of system goals and agents, various formal structures (functions and
relations) defining different interrelationships between these notions, as well
as constraints on the system dynamics allowing a multi-agent system to be-
come more reconfigurable and thus resilient in order to achieve the system
goals. The formalisation results in establishing connections between goals
at different levels of abstraction, system architecture and agent responsibil-
ities. The proposed formal systematisation of the involved concepts can be
seen as generic guidelines for formal development of reconfigurable systems.
Moreover, we demonstrate how such guidelines can be interpreted within the
Event-B framework.
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1 Introduction
Resilience is an ability of a system to remain trustworthy despite changes
[15]. It is an evolution of dependability concept that puts an emphasis on
the ability of a system to adapt to different operating conditions. In this
paper, we view adaptability as an ability of a system to reconfigure and
continue to function in the presence of faults and other changes. Our aim
is to propose a comprehensive theoretical study of relevant aspects of the
system architecture and dynamic behaviour to facilitate formal development
of reconfigurable distributed systems.
We consider distributed systems that are composed of asynchronously
communicating heterogeneous components. The components interact with
each other to execute functions required from the system. Moreover, to facil-
itate system resilience, the system components cooperatively perform fault
tolerance activities as well as exchange information about their current sta-
tus. The cooperative nature of the component behaviour makes it convenient
to consider them as collaborating agents and the overall distributed system
as a multi-agent system correspondingly.
Often research on multi-agent systems focuses on studying the emerging
behaviour, i.e., it adopts a bottom-up approach that investigates whether
agent interactions give rise to the desired behaviour or properties. In our
work, we take an opposite approach: we aim at deriving the architectural and
behavioural constraints to guarantee system resilience, i.e., ensure that the
system, besides correct execution of its functions in the nominal conditions,
can also reconfigure and remain operational in the presence of faults and
other changes.
We rely on the goal-oriented paradigm because it provides us with a
suitable conceptual basis for our reasoning. Goals are functional and non-
functional1 objectives that the system should achieve [34, 36]. High-level
goals representing the overall system objectives can be decomposed into sub-
goals. Decomposition facilitates unfolding of the layered system architecture
and reasoning about system properties at different levels of abstraction. It
also allows us to eventually derive constraints on the agent behaviour and
ensure that their collaboration guarantees achieving the desired goals. The
goal-oriented framework also provides us with an especially suitable basis
for reasoning about reconfigurability. In particular, it allows us to define
reconfigurability as an ability of agents to redistribute their responsibilities
to ensure goal reachability.
Reasoning about reconfigurability within the goal-oriented multi-agent
framework spans over a large set of inter-twined concepts addressing both
system architecture and its dynamic behaviour. Therefore, there is a clear
need for a formal systematic study of these complex interdependencies. This
1The non-functional aspect is not considered in the paper.
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is the task that we tackle in this paper. Namely, we propose a systematic
set-theoretic formalisation of the reconfigurability concept for multi-agent
goal-oriented framework. The formalisation results in establishing connec-
tions between goals at different levels of abstraction, system architecture
and agent responsibilities. The proposed formal systematisation of these
concepts can be also seen as generic guidelines for formal development of
reconfigurable systems. In this paper, we demonstrate how such guidelines
can be interpreted within the Event-B framework [1].
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 overviews the kind of systems
and their properties we are interested in studying and briefly describes an
illustrative example of such systems – a multi-robotic cleaning system. In
Section 3 we gradually present our formalisation of a resilient goal-oriented
multi-agent system and its reconfiguration mechanisms. Section 4 discusses
how the formalised notions can be represented in a concrete formal framework
– Event-B. Finally, we overview the related work and give some concluding
remarks in Section 5.
2 Resilient Goal-Oriented Multi-Agent
Systems
Resilience is an ability of a system to remain trustworthy despite changes
[15]. To react on such changes, the system needs to reconfigure. The recon-
figuration might be reactive or proactive. In the former case, reconfiguration
is usually triggered by a component failure and the system should reconfig-
ure to achieve fault tolerance, i.e., perform error recovery. In the latter case,
the system might attempt to execute some of its services more efficiently,
e.g., by deploying the available idle components. In both cases, the system
components should collaborate to ensure system resilience.
In this paper, we study reconfigurability as an essential mechanism of
achieving resilience of distributed systems. Since the collaborative aspect
of the component behaviour is important for our study, we represent sys-
tem components as agents and the overall system as a multi-agent system
correspondingly.
Agents are autonomous software components that asynchronously com-
municate with each other. Each agent has a certain functionality that it
provides. In this paper, we consider heterogeneous multi-agent systems, i.e.,
agents may have different functionalities. Moreover, some agents might play
a role of supervisors of another agent or a group of agents. As a result
of reconfiguration, an agent might receive additional responsibilities, i.e., it
should become involved into an execution of tasks that were not allocated on
it initially. We assume that agents are co-operative, i.e., they always accept
new responsibilities. At the same time, the agents are unreliable, i.e., they
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might fail and cease performing their functions. This might trigger system
reconfiguration. As a result, the responsibilities of the failed agents can be
re-allocated to the healthy ones. If an agent is healthy and idle, it can be
deployed to perform the functions of failed agents or it might also become
engaged into an execution of some other task, e.g., to improve the system
performance and/or increase the likelihood of successful task completion.
While developing a multi-agent system, we should establish a link be-
tween system requirements and the agent behaviour. It is widely recognised
that the goal-oriented development framework facilitates achieving this. The
key concept of the framework is the notion of a goal – a functional or non-
functional objective that a system should satisfy. Goals also constitute a
convenient mechanism for structuring requirements via goal decomposition.
In the decomposition process, the high-level system goals are iteratively de-
composed into subgoals. Moreover, the low-level subgoals can be directly
linked with the behaviour of agents, i.e., they can be used to derive require-
ments and constraints on the agent behaviour.
The goal-oriented framework provides us with a suitable basis for rea-
soning about reconfigurable multi-agent systems. It enables reasoning about
the system behaviour at different levels of abstraction. At the same time,
goal-decomposition process facilitates incremental unfolding of the system
architecture. It also helps us to build a hierarchy of agents according to
their responsibilities in achieving certain kind of goals. Moreover, the goal-
oriented framework allows us to formulate reconfigurability as an ability of
agents to redistribute their responsibilities to ensure goal reachability.
To summarise, in the rest of the paper we aim at studying the systems
that have the following characteristics:
• There is a number of main (global) goals defined for the system. The
goals can be decomposed into a subset of corresponding subgoals;
• The system consists of a number of agents – autonomic software com-
ponents;
• The agents are organised hierarchically, i.e., one agent may be a super-
visor of one or a group of other agents;
• The agents interact with each other in order to achieve the system
goals;
• In general, agent interactions can vary from simple information ex-
changes to requests for specific actions or services to be performed;
• The system agents are unreliable components that might fail during
system execution;
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• In the case of agents failures, the system should, if possible, dynamically
reconfigure itself to achieve the overall system goal;
• The system can also reconfigure to achieve some of its goals more effi-
ciently by means of, e.g., deploying idle agents.
Next we describe our running example – a multi-robotic cleaning system
– that can be considered as an illustrative instance of the systems whose
properties we described above.
A Multi-Robotic Cleaning System. The main goal of the multi-
robotic system is to get a certain area cleaned by the means of involved system
agents. There are two types of agents that are responsible for achieving the
goal. The first type is base stations – the stationary devices that coordinate
cleaning activities by assigning cleaning tasks to the second type of agents
– robots. The robots are autonomous electro-mechanical devices that can
move, clean, as well as communicate with the base stations. Both base
stations and robots are unreliable, i.e., they can fail at any moment. In the
case of these failures, the system should, if possible, dynamically reconfigure
itself to achieve the overall system goal.
The whole territory to clean is divided into several zones, which are fur-
ther divided into a number of sectors. To clean the territory, every its zone
has to be cleaned. In its turn, to clean a zone, every its sector has to be
cleaned. Each zone has the associated base station that coordinates the
cleaning activities within the zone. In general, the coordination activities of
one base station may span over several zones. Moreover, each base station
supervises a number of robots attached to it by assigning cleaning tasks to
them.
Figure 1: Multi-Robotic Cleaning System
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A base station might assign a robot a specific sector to clean. Upon re-
ceiving a cleaning assignment, the robot autonomously moves to this sector
and performs cleaning. After successfully completing its mission, the robot
returns back to the base station to receive a new assignment. The base sta-
tion keeps track of the cleaned and non-cleaned sectors. Moreover, the base
stations periodically exchange the information about their cleaned sectors.
While performing a given task, a robot might fail at any moment. In
that case, the base station may assign another active robot to perform the
failed task. A base station might fail as well. In that case, the healthy base
stations should redistribute the responsibility over the zones as well as the
control over the associated robots of the failed base station.
As we can see, such a multi-robotic system exhibits the general charac-
teristics and properties that we described above. We are going to use this
system as the running example for the rest of this paper.
3 Formalisation of a Resilient Goal-Oriented
MAS
In this section we present our formalisation of a resilient goal-oriented sys-
tem and its essential properties. The formalisation will cover the notions
of system goals and agents, various formal structures (functions and rela-
tions) defining different interrelationships between these notions, as well as
constraints on the system dynamics allowing a multi-agent system to be-
come more reconfigurable and thus resilient in order to achieve the system
goals. The formalisation summarises our experience in formal modelling and
verification of resilient goal-oriented multi-agent systems [22, 23, 24, 32, 13].
Notational conventions. In addition to the standard set-theoretical no-
tation we are going rely on (e.g., ∈,⊆,∩,∪,∅, etc), the operator \ is used
to denote set subtraction. T1 × T2 is a cartesian product of two types (sets)
T1 and T2. The notation P(T ) stands for the powerset (set of all subsets)
type over elements of the type T , while T1 ↔ T2 denotes a relation between
elements of two types (sets), i.e.,
R : T1 ↔ T2 ⇔ R : P(T1 × T2).
Moreover, dom and ran are respectively the relation domain and range
operators, while R1;R2 stands for relational composition of two relations R1
and R2. Id represents the identity relation, while R
∗ denotes the reflexive
transitive closure of a relation R, i.e.,
R∗ = Id ∪ R ∪ R;R ∪ R;R;R ∪ ... .
5
We will also use the transitive closure of a relation R, denoted as R+ and
defined as R+ = R∗\Id, or
R+ = R ∪ R;R ∪ R;R;R ∪ ... .
We will treat functions as a special kind of relations and relations as a special
kind of sets (i.e., sets of pairs, triples, etc). The notation (e1 7→ e2) ∈ R
will be used to check that two elements are related by the binary relation
or function R. Similarly, (e1 7→ e2 7→ e3) ∈ R will be used for checking
membership in a ternary relation.
3.1 A Goal-oriented State Transition System
We are going to build our formalisation of a goal-oriented multi-agent system
by gradually extending the standard definition of a state transition system,
typically defined as a triple (Σ, Init,Trans), where Σ represents all the system
states, Init stands for its possible initial states, and Trans defines all the al-
lowed transitions between system states. We start by introducing the notion
of system goals that such a state transition system should try to achieve.
Definition 1 Goal-oriented state transition system (GSTS). A GSTS
system is a tuple (G,Σ, Init, Trans,GMap), where G is a set of all possible
system goals, Σ is the system state space, Init is a set of initial system states,
Trans is a next-state relation of a GSTS system, and GMap is a function
mapping a system goal to a subset of system states, such that
(1.1) Init : P(Σ),
(1.2) Trans : Σ↔ Σ,
(1.3) GMap : G → P(Σ),
(1.4) Init ̸= ∅,
(1.5) Init ⊆ dom(Trans),
(1.6) ∀g : G.GMap(g) ̸= ∅,
(1.7) ∀g : G. ∃σ, σ′ : Σ. σ ∈ Init ∧ (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans∗ ∧ σ′ ∈ GMap(g).
The required properties (1.1), (1.2), (1.4), and (1.5) are inherited from the
standard definition of a state transition system. The two new elements of
a GSTS introduce the abstract notion of system goals (as the type G) and
relate these goals (via the function GMap) with specific system states where
these goals are considered to be achieved. Essentially, the function GMap
assigns semantics to any goal from G by associating it with a non-empty set of
states (a predicate) of Σ, as stated in (1.3) and (1.6). Finally, the last (1.7)
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property of a GSTS requires that all the system goals must be achievable
after system initialisation, i.e., they should be true either initially or after a
number of system transitions defined by Trans.
Let us recall our running example – the multi-robotic cleaning system
described in Section 2. The set G of this system contains two kinds of goals:
“The zone j must be cleaned”, for any j ∈ 1..NumberOfZones, and “The
sector i of the zone j must be cleaned”, for any i ∈ 1..NumberOfSectors and
j ∈ 1..NumberOfZones.
What would be a possible definition of GMap for this system? Let us
consider the goal g =“The sector k of the zone l must be cleaned”, for some
fixed k ∈ 1..NumberOfSectors and l ∈ 1..NumberOfZones. The mapping
GMap(g) then may be defined as, e.g.,
GMap(g) = {σ | (SectorCleaned(σ))[l, k] = TRUE},
where SectorCleaned is a state variable (binary array) storing information
about the cleaned sectors. The type of such a variable is
Σ→ (1..NumberOfZones× 1..NumberOfSectors→ BOOL).
An important dynamic property of a GSTS system is stability with respect
to its goals, i.e., the system ability to retain the goals that have been already
achieved.
Definition 2 Stable GSTS. A GSTS system (G,Σ, Init,Trans,GMap) is
called stable if
(2.1) ∀σ, σ′ : Σ, g : G. (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans ∧ σ ∈ GMap(g) ⇒
σ′ ∈ GMap(g)
The system stability is a very desirable system property to have (espe-
cially for formal verification), however, it is also quite strong constraint on
the system behaviour. For our example of the cleaning system, such an
assumption would mean that all the cleaning goals are achievable in short
duration, i.e., none of the cleaned sectors or zones gets ”dirty” again before
system termination.
So far, we considered system goals as members of a given set, which
can be pursued and accomplished completely independently. Often, we can
talk about some structure introducing inter-relationships between the sys-
tem goals, e.g., distinguishing particular goals and their subgoals. This also
implies that their semantic definitions (i.e., GMap functions) should be inter-
related too. We can define these interrelationships by introducing two new
structures – G graph and SGMap.
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Definition 3 Structured GSTS. A GSTS system (G,Σ, Init,Trans,GMap)
is called structured if exist a relation on goals G graph and a function SGMap,
such that
(3.1) G graph : G ↔ G,
(3.2) SGMap : G → P(Σ),
(3.3) ∀g : G. (g 7→ g) /∈ G graph+,
(3.4) ∀g : G. GMap(g) ⊆ SGMap(g),
(3.5) ∀g, g′ : G. g′ ∈ Subgoals(g) ⇒ SGMap(g) ∩ GMap(g′) ̸= ∅,
where Subgoals(g) = {g′ : G | (g 7→ g′) ∈ G graph}.
Moreover, the following is true
(3.6) ∀σ : Σ, g : G. σ ∈ SGMap(g) ∧ σ /∈ GMap(g) ⇒
∃σ′ : Σ. (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans ∧ σ′ ∈ GMap(g).
Mathematically, G graph stands for an acyclic graph on goals. It describes
relationships between different goals, e.g., how a particular goal can be split
into its subgoals and so on. The property (3.3) states that a goal cannot be a
subgoal of itself, i.e., the graph does not contains loops. The properties (3.4)
- (3.6) give an alternative definition of the states associated with a particular
goal, given as a function SGMap, in connection to the corresponding states
of its subgoals. Specifically, (3.4) states that achieving g according to GMap
implies that the goal g was achieved according to SGMap as well, while
(3.5) requires that achieving any of subgoals must contribute to that of the
parent goal. Intuitively, SGMap(g) stands for the necessary precondition for
achieving g, relating it with an arbitrary expression on the subgoals of g.
Finally, the last property (3.6) requires that, once the associated expres-
sion on subgoals SGMap is satisfied, the system always has an opportunity (a
respective state transition) to complete the parent goal g, i.e., reach a state
from GMap(g). We deliberately allow such a “gap” in terms of an extra
transition between achieving the main goal and that of its subgoals in the
system dynamics because, as we will see later, achieving different goals can
be responsibility of different system agents.
Let us go back to our running example. Since any zone is considered
cleaned only after all its sectors are cleaned, the relation G graph can be
simply defined as
{“The zone j must be cleaned” 7→ ”The sector i of the zone j must be cleaned” |
i ∈ 1..NumberOfSectors ∧ j ∈ 1..NumberOfZones}.
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Moreover, for the goal g = “The zone l must be cleaned”, for some fixed l ∈
1..NumberOfZones, and its subgoals Subgoals(g) = {“The sector k of the zone l
must be cleaned” | k ∈ 1..NumberOfSectors}, the mapping SGMap(g) can be
defined as
SGMap(g) = {σ | ∀k ∈ 1..NumberOfSectors. (SectorCleaned(σ))[l, k] = TRUE},
where SectorCleaned is a state variable described above.
Having the goal structure defined, we can easily distinguish the top goals
of a structured GSTS. These are the goals that do not participate as subgoals
for any other goal.
Definition 4 Top goals. For a structured GSTS and its relation on goals
G graph, the system top goals are defined as
(4.1) TopG = dom(G graph)\ran(G graph).
Since G graph is acyclic, the set TopG is always non-empty.
In particular, the top goals are especially important when we consider
terminating GSTSs. The system termination can be easily formally defined
by analysing their next state relation Trans as follows.
Definition 5 Terminating GSTS. A GSTS is terminating if
(5.1) ran(Trans)\dom(Trans) ̸= ∅.
When such a system terminates, we usually expect a certain property to be
true on its top goals. A concrete choice depends of course on the considered
system. Two obvious solutions are formalised below. The first one requires
that the system in its terminating states achieves all its goals:
∀σ : Σ, g : G. σ ∈ ran(Trans)\dom(Trans) ∧ g ∈ TopG ⇒ σ ∈ GMap(g).
Alternatively, we can require that at least one top goal is achieved:
∀σ : Σ. σ ∈ ran(Trans)\dom(Trans) ⇒ ∃g : G. g ∈ TopG∧σ ∈ GMap(g).
For our running example, the top goals are obviously those that are re-
lated with zone cleaning. In the terminating states of the system, the cleaning
system is required to achieve all its goals (a property of the first kind). Alter-
natively, the system could have a failsafe mechanism installed, which must
be activated when completion of the cleaning (for whatever reason) becomes
impossible. In this case, a property of the second kind can be enforced,
requiring that either all the zones are cleaned or the failsafe procedure is
successfully finished.
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3.2 Introducing Agents
Now we extend the definition of a goal-oriented state transition system pre-
sented in the previous section by introducing agents that can carry out tasks
leading to achieving the system goals.
Definition 6 Multi-agent goal-oriented state transition system (MAGSTS).
A MAGSTS system is a tuple (G,Σ, Init,Trans,GMap,A,Active) such that
(G,Σ, Init,Trans,GMap) is a GSTS, A is a set of all system agents, and
Active is a function returning a subset of active agents in a particular system
state, where
(6.1) Active : Σ→ P(A).
The definition introduces a type (set) A for all possible system agents
and also associates a subset of active agents in the current system state via
the function Active. Our interpretation of “active” agents is that only active
agents can carry out the tasks in order to achieve the system goals. Inactive
agents are either those are not currently present in the system or those that
are failed and thus incapable to carry out any tasks.
If a multi-agent systems allows the agents to become active or inactive
(e.g., failed) at any moment, we call such a system open. Formally, we define
it as follows.
Definition 7 OpenMAGSTS. A MAGSTS system (G,Σ, Init,Trans,GMap,
A,Active) is open if the following properties hold:
(7.1) ∀σ : Σ, a : A. σ ∈ dom(Trans) ∧ a ∈ Active(σ) ⇒
∃σ′. (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans ∧ Active(σ′) = Active(σ)\{a}
and
(7.2) ∀σ : Σ, a : A. σ ∈ dom(Trans) ∧ a /∈ Active(σ) ⇒
∃σ′. (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans ∧ Active(σ′) = Active(σ) ∪ {a}.
In our running example, the set A include all the system base stations
and robots, active as well as inactive ones. Both base stations and robots
can fail at any moment, thus becoming inactive. If we require the described
cleaning system open, this would mean that some recovery mechanism must
be in place, allowing any failed base station or robot to be reintroduced into
the system as an active agent.
Since the set A contains all possible system agents, some of them may
have very different functionalities (abilities). In order to associate certain
classes of agents with specific types of system goals they are able to accom-
plish, we first introduce classifications of system agents and goals and then
define relationships between the introduced classes.
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Definition 8 Typed MAGSTS. A structured MAGSTS system (G,Σ, Init,
Trans,GMap,A,Active) is typed if there exist the functions atype and gtype,
such that
(8.1) atype : A → AType,
(8.2) gtype : G → GType,
(8.3) ∀at : AType. ∃a : A. atype(a) = at,
(8.4) ∀gt : GType. ∃g : G. gtype(g) = gt,
(8.5) ∀g1, g2 : G, gt : GType. gtype(g1) = gt ∧ gtype(g2) = gt ∧ g1 ̸= g2 ⇒
GMap(g1) ∩GMap(g2) = ∅,
where AType and GType are abstract types containing all possible agent and
goal types respectively.
In (8.1) and (8.2), the functions atype and gtype associate each agent and
goal with their respective type. Both agent and goal types are nonempty in
the sense that they must have at least one agent or goal associated with them
(properties (8.3) and (8.4)). The last property (8.5) is introduced to ensure
that distinct goals of the same goal type can be achieved independently, i.e.,
can be assigned to different agents to accomplish them in parallel. However,
before giving such assignments to agents, we have to be sure that they are
able to accomplish the assigned tasks. To formalise this, we introduce a
special relation to represent interrelationships between different agent and
goal types.
Definition 9 Relationship between agent and goal types We say that
agent and goal types are related if there exists a relation AG Rel, such as
(9.1) AG Rel : AType↔ GType,
(9.2) dom(AG Rel) = AType, and
(9.3) ran(AG Rel) = GType.
For convenience, the relation AG Rel can be represented as a pair of
functions A goals, A goals : AType → P(GType), and G agents, G agents :
GType→ P(AType), such that
∀at : AType, gt : GType. gt ∈ A goals(at) ⇔ (at 7→ gt) ∈ AG Rel
and
∀gt : GType, at : AType. at ∈ G agents(gt) ⇔ (at 7→ gt) ∈ AG Rel.
11
From this definition, we immediately get that
∀at : AType, gt : GType. gt ∈ A goals(at) ⇔ at ∈ G agents(gt)
In our running example, AType can be easily defined as the set
{BaseStations, Robots}, whileGType is simply {CleaningZones,CleaningSectors}.
The relation AG Rel then interconnects the introduced agent and goal types
as follows:
{BaseStations 7→ CleaningZones,Robots 7→ CleaningSectors}.
Knowing the interrelationships between the agent and goal types allows
us to check in a straightforward way whether a concrete agent is able to
accomplish a specific goal.
Definition 10 Agent ability We say that an agent a : A is able to accom-
plish a goal g : G if
(10.1) atype(a) ∈ G agents(gtype(g))
or, equivalently,
(10.2) gtype(g) ∈ A goals(atype(a)).
Often, the hierarchical structure between goals and subgoals, formalised
by G graph, is reflected on the goal types as well.
Definition 11 Hierarchy of goal types We say a structured MAGSTS
system supports a hierarchy of goal types if there is exists a relation GT graph,
such that
(11.1) GT graph : GType↔ GType,
(11.2) ∀gt ∈ GType. (gt 7→ gt) /∈ GT graph+,
(11.3) ∀g1, g2 : G. (gtype(g1) 7→ gtype(g2)) ∈ GT graph ⇒
gtype(g1) ̸= gtype(g2) ∧ (g1 7→ g2) ∈ G graph+.
For our running example, GT graph is simply a singleton set
{CleaningZones 7→ CleaningSectors}.
The hierarchical structures between goals and subgoals introduced above
define the existing dependencies between the goals and thus imply the manner
their achievement can be coordinated among the involved agents. Moreover,
the formalised connection between the agent and goal types clarifies which
agents can be given the tasks related with specific system goals.
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3.3 Agent Subordination and Supervision
Having agent types and hierarchy of goal types defined makes it possible to
introduce a subordination structure between agent types.
Definition 12 Subordinated MAGSTS. A MAGSTS system (G,Σ, Init,
Trans,
GMap,A,Active)) is called subordinated if it is typed, supports a hierarchy
of goal types, and exists a relation on agent types A Sub, such that
(12.1) A Sub : AType↔ AType,
(12.2) dom(A Sub) ∪ ran(A Sub) = AType,
(12.3) ∀at ∈ AType. (at 7→ at) /∈ A Sub+.
Moreover, for each at1, at2 : AType, such that (at1 7→ at2) ∈ A Sub, the
following property must hold
(12.4) ∃gt1, gt2 : GType.
(gt1 7→ gt2) ∈ GT graph ∧ gt1 ∈ A goals(at1) ∧ gt2 ∈ A goals(at2).
According to the definition (properties (12.1)–(12.3)), A Sub is acyclic
graph covering all system agent types. The last property (12.4) states the
required connection between two hierarchical structures: the goal type struc-
ture GT graph and the agent subordination structure A Sub. Namely, for
each pair of subordinated agent types, exists (at least one) pair of the re-
lated goal types such that goals of the parent goal type can be handled by
agents of the “master” agent type, while goals of the subgoal type can be
handled by agents of the subordinate agent type.
It is obvious that, for our running example, the only possible way to define
A Sub is as a singleton set {BaseStations 7→ Robots}. The base stations are
responsible for zone cleaning, which can be decomposed into cleaning of the
constituent sectors by robots. Since base stations are responsible for a higher
level goal (i.e., are aware of a ”bigger picture”), it is natural to appoint them
as supervisors with respect to robots.
If a system is centralised one, even members of the top agent type may
be needed to be supervised. In that case, the agent type hierarchy can be
artificially extended with the top element SystemType, which has a single
agent System as its member.
Similarly as for AG Rel, the relation A Sub can be represented as a
pair of functions AS goals, AS goals : AType → P(GType), and GS agents,
GS agents : GType→ P(AType), such that
∀at : AType, gt : GType. gt ∈ AS goals(at) ⇔
∃gt′ : GType. (gt′ 7→ gt) ∈ GT graph ∧ gt′ ∈ A Goals(at)
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and
∀gt : GType, at : AType. at ∈ GS agents(gt) ⇔
∃gt′ : GType. (gt′ 7→ gt) ∈ GT graph ∧ gt′ ∈ A Goals(at).
From this definition, we immediately get that
∀at : AType, gt : GType. gt ∈ AS goals(at) ⇔ at ∈ GS agents(gt)
The above definitions allow us to check in a straightforward way whether a
concrete agent is able to supervise accomplishing a specific goal.
Definition 13 Agent supervision We say that an agent a : A is able to
supervise a goal g : G if
(13.1) atype(a) ∈ GS agents(gtype(g))
or, equivalently,
(13.2) gtype(g) ∈ AS goals(atype(a)).
The notions about agents introduced so far (agent types, subordination,
ability to accomplish or supervise a particular goal) define required static
properties of a multi-agent goal-oriented system. The only exception is a
function Active, which returns a set of active agents in a particular system
state. Since agents can change their active/inactive status during system
execution, the function expresses a dynamic system characteristic.
In subordinated MAGSTSs, a part of system agents supervise activities
of other agents. Moreover, they can give concrete goal assignments to subor-
dinate agents, which, in turn, should “report” to their supervisors once the
assigned goal has been accomplished. The unreached system goals can be
also dynamically partitioned among the supervisor agents.
This allows us to introduce a few additional dynamic system character-
istics. Namely, in a specific dynamic system state, a particular agent can
be “attached” to another agent, which serves as its supervisor. A specific,
yet unreached goal can be put under responsibility of a particular supervisor
agent. Finally, a specific goal can be “assigned” by a supervisor to one of its
subordinate agents.
Let us now to define these dynamic notions formally.
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Definition 14 Agent attachment A MAGSTS system (G,Σ, Init,Trans,
GMap,A,Active) supports agent attachment if there is a dynamic attribute
(function) Attached, such that
(14.1) Attached : Σ→ P(A×A),
(14.2) ∀σ : Σ, a1, a2 : A. (a1 7→ a2) ∈ Attached(σ) ⇒
a1 ∈ Active(σ) ∧ a2 ∈ Active(σ) ∧ atype(a1) 7→ atype(a2) ∈ A Sub ∧
¬(∃a3 : A. a3 ̸= a1 ∧ (a3 7→ a2) ∈ Attached(σ)).
Moreover, the following property is true
(14.3) ∀σ : Σ, a1, a2 : A. a1 ∈ Active(σ) ∧ a2 ∈ Active(σ) ∧
atype(a1) 7→ atype(a2) ∈ A Sub ∧ ¬(∃a′1 : A. (a′1 7→ a2) ∈ Attached(σ))
⇒
∃(σ′ : Σ). (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans ∧ (a1 7→ a2) ∈ Attached(σ′).
Therefore, for any agents a1, a2 and system state σ, the expression (a1 7→
a2) ∈ Attached(σ) implies that (i) both agents are active in σ, (ii) the agent
type of a2 is subordinate to that of a1, and (iii) the agent a2 is not currently
attached to any other supervisor agent (property (14.2)).
Moreover, a MAGST system supports agent attachment if, at any point
where the conditions for agent attachment are satisfied, the system has an
opportunity (but not an obligation) to do such an action (property (14.3)).
In our running example, any active and yet unattached robot can be
attached to any active base station. It can also change its supervisor base
station to a different active one.
Definition 15 Goal responsibility A MAGSTS system (G,Σ, Init,Trans,
GMap,A,Active) supports goal responsibility if there is a dynamic attribute
(function) Responsible, such that
(15.1) Responsible : Σ→ P(G ×A),
(15.2) ∀σ : Σ, g : G, a : A. (g 7→ a) ∈ Responsible(σ) ⇒
a ∈ Active(σ) ∧ gtype(g) ∈ AS goals(atype(a)) ∧
¬(∃a′ : A. a′ ̸= a ∧ (g 7→ a′) ∈ Responsible(σ)).
Moreover, the following property is true
(15.3) ∀σ : Σ, g : G, a : A. a ∈ Active(σ) ∧ gtype(g) ∈ AS goals(atype(a)) ∧
¬(∃a′ : A. (g 7→ a′) ∈ Responsible(σ))
⇒
∃(σ′ : Σ). (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans ∧ (g 7→ a) ∈ Responsible(σ′).
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Therefore, for any goal g, agent a and system state σ, the expression
(g 7→ a) ∈ Responsible(σ) implies that (i) the agent a is active in the state σ,
(ii) the agent type allows it to supervise g, and (iii) the goal g is not currently
under responsibility of any other supervisor agent (property (15.2)).
Moreover, a MAGST system supports goal responsibility if, at any point
where the conditions for an agent taking responsibility for some goal are
satisfied, the system has an opportunity (but not an obligation) to do this
action (property (15.3)).
In our running example, any active base station can take responsibility
over a zone which is not yet responsibility of any other base station. Zone
responsibility can also “migrate” from one base station to another as a part
of the system reconfiguration.
Definition 16 Goal assignment A MAGSTS system (G,Σ, Init,Trans,
GMap,A,Active) supports goal assignment if there is a dynamic attribute
(function) Assigned, such that
(16.1) Assigned : Σ→ P(G ×A×A),
(16.2) ∀σ : Σ, g : G, a1, a2 : A. (g 7→ a1 7→ a2) ∈ Assigned(σ) ⇒
(a1 7→ a2) ∈ Attached(σ) ∧ (g 7→ a1) ∈ Responsible(σ) ∧
gtype(g) ∈ A goals(atype(a2)) ∧
¬(∃g′ : G, a′ : A. g′ ̸= g ∧ a′1 ̸= a1 ∧ (g′ 7→ a′1 7→ a2) ∈ Assigned(σ)) ∧
¬(∃a′1, a′2 : A. a′1 ̸= a1 ∧ a′2 ̸= a2 ∧ (g 7→ a′1 7→ a′2) ∈ Assigned(σ)) ∧
σ /∈ GMap(g) ∧ ∃σ′ : Σ. (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans ∧ σ′ ∈ GMap(g).
Moreover, the following property is true
(16.3) ∀σ : Σ, g : G, a : A. (a1 7→ a2) ∈ Attached(σ) ∧
gtype(g) ∈ A goals(atype(a2)) ∧ (g 7→ a1) ∈ Responsible(σ) ∧
¬(∃g′ : G, a′ : A. g′ ̸= g ∧ a′1 ̸= a1 ∧ (g′ 7→ a′1 7→ a2) ∈ Assigned(σ)) ∧
¬(∃a′1, a′2 : A. (g 7→ a′1 7→ a′2) ∈ Assigned(σ))
⇒
∃(σ′ : Σ). (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans ∧ (g 7→ a1 7→ a2) ∈ Assigned(σ′),
Therefore, for any agents a1, a2, a goal g and system state σ, the ex-
pression (g 7→ a1 7→ a2) ∈ Assigned(σ) implies that (i) a2 is attached to a1
in the state σ, (ii) a1 is responsible for achieving the goal g in the state σ,
(iii) a2 is able to accomplish any goal of the type gtype(g), (iv) the agent
a2 is not assigned to any other goal, (v) the goal g is not assigned to any
other agent, (vi) the goal g is not yet completed, and (vii) once the goal g is
16
assigned, it can be completed at any moment (property (16.2)). The last two
properties allow us to associate the goal reachability with goal assignment,
and by transitivity, goal responsibility and agent attachment mechanisms.
Moreover, a MAGST system supports goal assignment if, at any point
where the conditions for goal assignment are satisfied, the system has an
opportunity (but not obligation) to do this action (property (16.3)).
In our running example, any attached and active robot without the cur-
rent cleaning assignment (e.g., just after finishing the previous one) can be
given a new cleaning assignment by its supervisor base station.
3.4 System Reconfiguration and Goal Reachability in
the Presence of Agent Failures
Even though the above definitions require the existence of system transitions
for the agents and goals that are “free”, i.e., have not been attached or
assigned, they implicitly cover two more kinds of system transitions:
1. Since all the definitions depend on the assumptions that the involved
agents are active, change of the agent status to inactive (e.g., agent
failure) during system transitions would mean automatic update of
Attached, Responsible and Assigned by removing all those records that
refer to the failed agents;
2. In situations when the involved agents remain active during the system
transitions, the above definitions do not forbid changing the actual
relationships between the agents and the goals. In other words, the
agents can be reattached, goal responsibility can be redistributed, and
goals can be reassigned among the active agents.
Let us explicitly define multi-agent systems that support the dynamic
reconfiguration described in the latter observation. Specifically, these are the
systems that allow redistributing (unassigned) goals to different responsible
agents or reattaching (unassigned) agents to different supervisor agents. The
multi-robotic cleaning system that we have used as the running example is
an instance of such systems.
Definition 17 Reconfigurable agent system A MAGSTS system (G,Σ,
Init,Trans,GMap,A,Active) is reconfigurable if it is structured, open, and
supports agent attachment, goal responsibility, and goal assignment. More-
over, the following properties hold
(17.1) ∀σ : Σ, g : G, : a1, a2 : A. (g 7→ a1) ∈ Responsible(σ) ∧
gtype(g) ∈ AS goals(atype(a 2)) ∧
¬(∃a3 : A. (g 7→ a1 7→ a3)) ∈ Assigned(σ)) ⇒
∃σ′ : Σ. (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans ∧ (g 7→ a2) ∈ Responsible(σ′)
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and
(17.2) ∀σ : Σ, a1, a2, a3 : A. (a1 7→ a2) ∈ Attached(σ) ∧
(atype(a3) 7→ atype(a2)) ∈ A Sub ∧
¬(∃g : G. (g 7→ a1 7→ a2)) ∈ Assigned(σ)) ⇒
∃σ′ : Σ. (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans ∧ (a3 7→ a2) ∈ Attached(σ′)
In our first definition of a goal-oriented multi-agent system, we required
that any system goal is reachable from some initial system state. For a recon-
figurable MAGSTS system, we can formulate and prove a stronger property:
“Any goal that is not yet reached at any (non-final) system state is reach-
able.”
Theorem 1 Goal reachability in a reconfigurable agent system. For
a reconfigurable MAGSTS system (G,Σ, Init,Trans,GMap,A,Active), the fol-
lowing property is true:
∀σ : Σ, g : G. σ ∈ dom(Trans) ∧ σ /∈ GMap(g) ⇒
∃σ′ : Σ. (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans+ ∧ σ′ ∈ GMap(g).
Proof 1 Let us consider an arbitrary state σ : Σ, such that σ ∈ dom(Trans),
and an arbitrary goal g : G, such that σ /∈ GMap(g). Moreover, as the
worst case scenario, let us assume that there is no single active agent able to
supervise this goal nor single active agent able to accomplish it. Formally,
¬(∃a : A. a ∈ Active(σ) ∧ gtype(g) ∈ AS goals(atype(a)))
and
¬(∃a : A. a ∈ Active(σ) ∧ gtype(g) ∈ A goals(atype(a))).
According to Definition 8 of a typed MAGSTS system, there should exists
an agent able to supervise the goal g as well as a one able to accomplish it.
Moreover, since our system is open, the second property of an open MAGSTS
system (Definition 7) states a possibility to activate any agent at an arbitrary
moment.
Let a super : A, such that
a super /∈ Active(σ) and gtype(g) ∈ AS goals(atype(a super))
be an agent able to supervise the goal g. Moreover, let σ1 : Σ, such that (σ 7→
σ1) ∈ Trans and Active(σ1) = Active(σ) ∪ {a super}, be a next state where
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this agent is activated. The existence of such state is required by Definition
7.
In a similar way, we activate an agent for accomplishing the goal g,
a worker, such that
a worker /∈ Active(σ) and gtype(g) ∈ A goals(atype(a worker))
in a next state, σ2, such that
(σ1 7→ σ2) ∈ Trans and Active(σ2) = Active(σ1) ∪ {a worker}.
Relying on the definitions of agent attachment, goal responsibility and
goal assignment (Definitions 14, 15 and 16), we can construct a chain of
further states σ3, σ4, σ5, where a super and a workers become attached,
a super takes responsibility for the goal g, and a worker gets assigned the
goal g respectively. There could be also as many as necessary intermediate
state transitions where the statuses of a super and a worker are unaffected.
Finally, the definition of agent assignment (more specifically, the last con-
sequent of property (16.2) of Definition 16) also connects this notion with goal
reachability. Namely, for any state where a particular agent is assigned a spe-
cific goal, there exists a possible subsequent state where this goal is reached.
Since the state σ5 satisfies these criteria, we can claim that there exists a
state, σ′, such that
(σ5 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans ∧ σ′ ∈ GMap(g).
By transitivity, we proved that
(σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans+ ∧ σ′ ∈ GMap(g),
which is exactly what the theorem states.
In a similar manner, we can construct proofs for less adverse cases in-
volving agent failures (i.e., becoming inactive), which in turn lead to specific
agents becoming unattached, unassigned or specific goals losing the supervi-
sors responsible for their completion.
To complete the proof, we have also consider the system states when the
system has all the active agents needed to achieve a particular unreached goal,
however the specific agent attachment and goal responsibility distribution has
to be adjusted first. In other words, the system has to be reconfigured before
proceeding.
Let us again consider an arbitrary state σ : Σ, such that σ ∈ dom(Trans),
and an arbitrary goal g : G, such that
σ /∈ GMap(g) and ¬(∃a1, a2 : A. (g 7→ a1 7→ a2) ∈ Assigned(σ)).
The completion of g in the state σ is responsibility of the agent a super, i.e.,
(g 7→ a super) ∈ Responsible(σ).
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Moreover, there exist the agents a other and a worker such that
(a super 7→ a worker) ∈ Attached(σ) and gtype(g) ∈ A goals(atype(a worker)).
In other words, a worker is attached to a other and is able to accomplish the
goal g. This also implies that a other is able to supervise the goal g.
Relying on the definition of a reconfigurable multi-agent system (Defini-
tion 17), we can state that exists a next state σ′′, where the agent a worker
is now attached to the new supervisor a super, i.e.,
(g 7→ a super) ∈ Responsible(σ′′) and (a super 7→ a worker) ∈ Attached(σ′′).
Alternatively, we can state that exists a next state σ′′, where the respon-
sibility of completing g is now moved to the new supervisor a other, i.e.,
(g 7→ a other) ∈ Responsible(σ′′) and (a other 7→ a worker) ∈ Attached(σ′′).
In both cases, we can proceed by assigning the goal g to the agent a worker
and completing the goal as described above. In other words, we can show that
there is the state σ′ : Σ such that
(σ′′ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans+ ∧ σ′ ∈ GMap(g).
By transitivity, we get that
(σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans+ ∧ σ′ ∈ GMap(g),
which is again exactly what we needed to prove.
2
The theorem requires for a multi-agent system to be open, which is not
always the case in practice. In general, even without the openness assump-
tion, we can still demonstrate goal reachability provided there always exists
at least one agent which is able to accomplish this goal as well as one agent
which is able to supervise it. The incorporated reconfigurability mechanisms
will be then still sufficient to enable completion of the goal. Alternatively, we
can quantitatively assess (based on the given agent failure and service rates)
goal reachability using probabilistic model checking. In our previous work
[32], we have employed such techniques for quantitative assessment of goal-
oriented multi-agent systems using the PRISM probabilistic model checker.
To enable probabilistic analysis of system models in PRISM, we have relied
on our continuous-time probabilistic extension of the Event-B framework
[33].
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4 Formal Development of a Goal-Oriented
MAS in Event-B
In the previous section we presented a general theory for reasoning about
goal-oriented multi-agent state transition systems with incorporated recon-
figuration mechanisms. There are many formalisms that support modelling
and verification of state transition systems. In this section we will briefly
overview one of them – Event-B – and present a number guidelines demon-
strating how the notions defined above can be easily transferred and incorpo-
rated in Event-B. In a sense, by doing this we show a possible instantiation
of our general theory in a concrete formalism. In turn, this should facilitate
formal development of a goal-oriented MAS in Event-B.
4.1 Event-B: Background
Event-B is a state-based framework that promotes the correct-by-construc-
tion approach to system development and formal verification by theorem
proving. In Event-B, a system model is specified using the notion of an
abstract state machine [1]. An Abstract State Machine encapsulates the
model state, represented as a collection of variables, and defines operations on
the state, i.e., it describes the dynamic behaviour of a modelled system. The
variables are strongly typed by the constraining predicates that together with
other important properties of the systems are defined in the model invariants.
Usually, a machine has an accompanying component, called context, which
includes user-defined sets, constants and their properties given as a list of
model axioms.
Machine M
Variables v
Invariants I
Events
Init
evt1
· · ·
evtN
−→
Context C
Carrier Sets d
Constants c
Axioms A
Figure 2: Event-B machine and context
A general form for Event-B models is given in Fig. 2. The machine is
uniquely identified by its name M . The state variables, v, are declared in the
Variables clause and initialised in the Init event. The variables are strongly
typed by the constraining predicates I given in the Invariants clause. The
invariant clause might also contain other predicates defining properties (e.g.,
safety invariants) that should be preserved during system execution.
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The dynamic behaviour of the system is defined by a set of atomic events.
Generally, an event has the following form:
e =̂ any a where Ge then Re end,
where e is the event’s name, a is the list of local variables, the guard Ge is a
predicate over the local variables of the event and the state variables of the
system. The body of an event is defined by a multiple (possibly nondeter-
ministic) assignment over the system variables. In Event-B, an assignment
represents a corresponding next-state relation Re. The guard defines the
conditions under which the event is enabled, i.e., its body can be executed.
If several events are enabled at the same time, any of them can be chosen
for execution nondeterministically.
If an event does not have local variables, it can be described simply as:
e =̂ when Ge then Re end.
Event-B employs a top-down refinement-based approach to system devel-
opment. Development starts from an abstract specification that nondeter-
ministically models the most essential functional requirements. In a sequence
of refinement steps, we gradually reduce nondeterminism and introduce de-
tailed design decisions. In particular, we can add new events, split events
as well as replace abstract variables by their concrete counterparts, i.e., per-
form data refinement. When data refinement is performed, we define gluing
invariants as a part of the invariants of the refined machine. They define the
relationship between the abstract and concrete variables.
Often a refinement step introduces new events and variables into the
abstract specification. The new events correspond to the stuttering steps
that are not visible at the abstract level, i.e., they refine implicit skip. To
guarantee that the refined specification preserves the global behaviour of the
abstract machine, we should demonstrate that the newly introduced events
converge. To prove it, we need to define a variant an expression over a
finite subset of natural numbers and show that the execution of new events
decreases it. Sometimes, convergence of an event cannot be proved due to a
high level of non-determinism. Then the event obtains the status anticipated.
This obliges the designer to prove at some later refinement step, that the
event indeed converges.
The consistency of Event-B models, i.e., verification of well-formedness
and invariant preservation as well as correctness of refinement steps, is demon-
strated by discharging a number of verification conditions – proof obligations.
The Rodin platform [27] provides an automated support for formal mod-
elling and verification in Event-B. In particular, it automatically generates
the required proof obligations and attempts to discharge them. The remain-
ing unproven conditions can be dealt with by using the provided interactive
provers.
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Context C0
Sets Goals, Agents
Constants G graph,GraphClosure,Subgoals
Axioms
axm1: Goals ̸= ∅
axm2: Agents ̸= ∅
axm3: G graph ∈ Goals↔Goals
axm4: GraphClosure ∈ Goals↔Goals
axm5: G graph ⊆ GraphClosure
axm6: ∀g1, g2·(g1 7→ g2) ∈ G graph⇔
(g1 7→ g2) ∈ G graph ∨ (∃g3·(g1 7→ g3) ∈ G graph ∧ (g3 7→ g2) ∈ GraphClosure)
axm7: ∀g ·g ∈ Goals⇒ (g 7→ g) /∈ GraphClosure
axm8: ∀g ·g ∈ Goals⇒ Subgoals(g) = {g1 | (g 7→ g1) ∈ G graph}
...
Figure 3: Context C0
4.2 A Goal-Oriented MAS in Event-B
To formally develop a multi-agent system based on the theory presented in
the previous section, we have to translate or represent the introduced notions
and definitions in terms of the corresponding Event-B elements. Below we
present our guidelines for such a translation.
Event-B separates the static and dynamic parts of a model, putting them
into distinct yet dependent components called a context and a machine. Sim-
ilarly, for our theory, we must first distinguish static and dynamic concepts
and then do, if necessary, a further classification of them to translate the
resulting cases into specific Event-B elements. The obvious criterion for such
a separation is the direct dependence of the concept in question on the type
Σ denoting the system state space. To be precise, if its type depends on Σ
(see Table 1 for particular cases of such dependence), we consider a concept
is a dynamic one and it must be represented as one of the elements (e.g.,
state variables or events) in the model machine component(s). Otherwise, it
is considered static and becomes one of the elements of a model context.
Representation of static concepts of goal-oriented MAS in Event-
B. Using the above criterion, the static notions of our theory include the
types for all possible goals and agents (G and A) and their types (GType and
AType) as well as different structures defining various classifications and in-
terdependencies between elements of these types. The latter include G graph,
GT graph, atype, gtype, A goals, G agents, AG Rel, A Sub, AS goals,
GS agents, and so on.
We introduce static notions as sets and constants of a model context
and define their properties as a number of context axioms. For instance, the
following excerpt (Fig.3) defines the sets Goals and Agents (i.e., G and A) as
well as the constants G graph, GraphClosure (i.e., G graph+), and Subgoals.
Note that, since both our theory and Event-B are based set theory and
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Context C1 extends C0
Sets GType, AType
Constants atype, gtype,GT graph,ROBOT,B STATION,ZONE CLEANING,AG Rel
SECTOR CLEANING,Robots,BStations,ZCleaning,SCleaning
Axioms
axm1: ZCleaning ⊆ Goals ∧ SCleaning ⊆ Goals
axm2: Robots ⊆ Goals ∧ BStations ⊆ Goals
axm3: (Goals = ZCleaning ∪ SCleaning) ∧ (ZCleaning ∩ SCleaning = ∅)
axm4: (Agents = Robots ∪ BStations) ∧ (Robots ∩ BStations = ∅)
axm5: GType = {ZONE CLEANING,SECTOR CLEANING}
axm6: AType = {ROBOT,B STATION}
axm7: gtype ∈ Goals→ GType
axm8: atype ∈ Agents→ AType
axm9: gtype[Robots] = {ROBOT}
axm10: gtype[BStations] = {B STATION}
axm11: atype[ZCleaning] = {ZONE CLEANING}
axm12: atype[SCleaning] = {SECTOR CLEANING}
axm13:GT graph ∈ GType↔GType
axm14:GT graph = {ZONE CLEANING 7→ SECTOR CLEANING}
axm15:AG Rel ∈ AType↔GType
axm16:AG Rel = {B STATION 7→ ZONE CLEANING,ROBOT 7→ SECTOR CLEANING}
...
Figure 4: Context C1
predicate calculus, the considered definitions are translated in a rather straight-
forward way. Such a translation gives a generic context that may be used
for modelling of a class of suitable systems or, alternatively, used in very
abstract models which are later refined by constraining (instantiating) the
defined structures for concrete cases.
In the following excerpt of a refined context (Fig.4), we constrain the
abstract definitions of Goals and Agents to those of our running example
(the multi-robotic cleaning system described in Section 2), as defined in the
axioms 1–4. We also give concrete definitions for the introduced types GType
and AType (axioms 5–6), the functions gtype and atype (axioms 7–12), and
the relation structures GT graph and AG Rel (axioms 13–16). It can be eas-
ily demonstrated that these axioms are proper instantiations of their general
definitions given in Definition 8 (atype, gtype), Definition 9 (AG Rel) and
Definition 11 (GT graph).
Representation of dynamic concepts of goal-oriented MAS in Event-
B. In general, the system dynamics (formalised as state transitions on state
space Σ constrained by the relation Trans) is represented as machine events
in Event-B. However, various introduced concepts that affect this dynamics
(e.g., connecting particular state transitions with goal and agent structures,
supervision and reconfiguration mechanisms, the properties to be preserved,
etc.) can be represented as different elements of an Event-B machine, such as
model variables, invariants, predicate expressions, or specific events. Table 1
gives a summary of such possible representations.
For instance, a number of dynamic system attributes (such as Active,
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Table 1: Translation guidelines
Theory definition Event-B counterpart
Trans : Σ↔ Σ initialisation and events of a machine
functions of the form Σ→ T machine variables of the type T
GMap(g), SGMap(g) : G → P(Σ) a predicate over machine variables
a property of the form ∀σ : Σ. P (σ) a machine invariant
a property of the form
∀σ : Σ. P (σ)⇒ ∃σ′. σ 7→ σ′ ∈ Trans ∧R(σ, σ′) a specific machine event
Machine M1
Sees C1
Variables Active,Attached, ...
Invariants
inv1: Active ∈ P(Agents)
inv2: Attached ∈ P(Agents×Agents)
inv3: ∀a1, a2· (a1 7→ a2) ∈ Attached ⇒ a1 ∈ Active ∧ a2 ∈ Active
inv4: ∀a1, a2· (a1 7→ a2) ∈ Attached ⇒ atype(a1) 7→ atype(a2) ∈ A Sub
inv5: ∀a1, a2· (a1 7→ a2) ∈ Attached⇒ ¬(∃a3. a3 ̸= a1∧(a3 7→ a2) ∈ Attached)
...
Events
...
end
Figure 5: Model variables and invariants
Attached, Responsible, Assigned, etc.) are formalised as functions of the
form Σ → T . They can be naturally represented as model variables of the
type T . In their definitions, these attributes are usually associated with some
defining properties that are supposed to be preserved in each reachable state.
These properties then become invariants of the resulting Event-B model.
As an example, let us consider the definition of agent attachment (Def-
inition 14). It introduces a dynamic attribute (function) Attached : Σ →
P(A×A) with the following property (14.2)
∀σ : Σ, a1, a2 : A. (a1 7→ a2) ∈ Attached(σ) ⇒
a1 ∈ Active(σ) ∧ a2 ∈ Active(σ) ∧ atype(a1) 7→ atype(a1) ∈ A Sub ∧
¬(∃a3 : A. a3 ̸= a1 ∧ (a3 7→ a2) ∈ Attached(σ)).
In its turn, Attached depends on another dynamic attribute (state vari-
able) Active defined as Active : Σ → P(A). The following excerpt from an
Event-B machine (Fig.5) demonstrates how both Active and Attached can
be represented.
Another kind of dynamic properties is often expressed in the form
∀σ : Σ. P (σ)⇒ ∃σ′. σ 7→ σ′ ∈ Trans ∧R(σ, σ′).
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Events
...
Attach =̂
any a1, a2
where
a1 ∈ Active
a2 ∈ Active
atype(a1) 7→ atype(a2) ∈ A Sub
a1 7→ a2 /∈ Attached
¬(∃a3· a3 ∈ A ∧ (a3 7→ a2) ∈ Attached)
then
Attached := Attached ∪ {a1 7→ a2}
end
Figure 6: Model events
Essentially, such properties require existence a particular kind of state tran-
sitions in the system. Since state transitions are represented as model events
in Event-B, this is an indication that a specific model event should be con-
structed, thus implementing the given property.
Let us go back to the definition of agent attachment (Definition 14). The
last definition property (14.3) requires that
∀σ : Σ, a1, a2 : A. a1 ∈ Active(σ) ∧ a2 ∈ Active(σ) ∧
atype(a1) 7→ atype(a2) ∈ A Sub ∧ ¬(∃a′1 : A. (a′1 7→ a2) ∈ Attached(σ))
⇒
∃(σ′ : Σ). (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans ∧ (a1 7→ a2) ∈ Attached(σ′).
As a result of event construction, the left hand side of implication then
becomes the event guard, while the right hand side defines the required action
of the event (see Fig.6).
Finally, in our formalisation the functions GMap : G → P(Σ) and
SGMap : G → P(Σ) relate goals with specific states where goals (or some
expressions on their subgoals) are considered as reached. In Event-B, we
can model these functions as particular predicates on state variables storing
such information about reached goals. Often, such information is partitioned
(stored on distinct variables) according to the involved goal type.
Let us consider again our example of the system with cleaning robots and
coordinating base stations. We have two types of goals – zone cleaning and
sector cleaning – which are responsibilities of base stations and robots respec-
tively. The information about reached goals can be stored in two distinct
boolean array variables: zone is cleaned for the goals in CleaningZones,
and sector is cleaned for the goals in CleaningSectors. Then GMap(g)
can be represented as the predicate zone is cleaned(g) = TRUE, if g ∈
CleaningZones, and sector is cleaned(g) = TRUE otherwise.
Recall that SGMap(g) serves as the precondition for reaching the goal
g, while the goal completion of g may not be officially recorded yet. In our
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Variables state
Invariants
inv1: state ∈ State
Events
Goal not reached =̂
any g
status anticipated
where
state /∈ GMap(g)
then
state :| state′ ∈ State
end
Figure 7: Anticipated goal reachability
example system, SGMap(g) for g ∈ CleaningSectors may be represented,
e.g., as
CoverageSensor(r 7→ s) = TRUE,
for some robot r and sector s, indicating that the whole sector area has been
covered by the cleaning robot r, which may not yet reacted on that.
Goal reachability . In Definition 1, we define a goal-oriented multi-agent
system as such that has ability to reach any of its goal from its initial states:
∀g : G. ∃σ, σ′ : Σ. σ ∈ Init ∧ (σ 7→ σ′) ∈ Trans∗ ∧ σ′ ∈ GMap(g).
How can we enforce this property in Event-B? One possibility is to start with
a very abstract system with a single event (see Fig.7).
Here the single state variable state is completely non-deterministically
updated in the event Goal not reached. The anticipated status of the event
indicates that we promise to prove convergence of this event, thus showing
reachability of any system goal. The actual proof of such convergence is
postponed until some later refined model, which has enough implementation
details prove overall convergence based on a formulated variant expression.
Alternatively, we can rely on ProB, a model checker for Event-B, and ver-
ify goal reachability by formulating and checking the corresponding temporal
logic property for the considered system model.
5 Related Work and Conclusions
Related Work. The field of design of multi-agent systems has consider-
able evolved over the last decade. Surveying the literature on MAS reveals
a significant amount of research devoted to different agent organisation con-
cepts, agent specification languages and platforms, modelling and verification
agent behaviour, etc. The resulting approaches vary significantly in terms
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of the covered topics, such as agent interoperability, communication, roles,
goals and beliefs. Below we outline only a few works most relevant to our
research.
The Tropos methodology [6] supports analysis and design in the develop-
ment of agent-based software systems. UML diagrams are used to represent
the system goals, agents, their capabilities and interdependencies, as well as
system properties and agent interactions. An extension of this work [21] also
supports modelling of agent errors and recovery activities.
Another proposed methodology - Multi-Agent System Engineering (MaSe)
[8] – guides the designer through the software lifecycle of a multi-agent sys-
tem. It allows graphically represent the system goals, the associated use cases
and agent roles. Finite state automata are used to express communications
between agent classes. The accompanied tool, the Agent Tool, supports the
agent system development following the MaSe methodology. An extension
of this work, Organization-based MaSE (O-MaSe) [9], provides a mechanism
for defining agent interactions with the environment via external actors as
well as defining the interaction protocols between the system and the actors.
O-MaSE makes use of UML class diagrams and does not support formal
notation.
Formal modelling of agent systems has been undertaken by [31, 30, 28, 29].
The authors have proposed an extension of the UNITY framework to explic-
itly define such concepts as mobility and context-awareness. The mobile
UNITY [31] extension proposes the notation to express mobile computations
and a logic for reasoning about components temporal properties. It also sup-
ports formal reasoning about mobile components and their behaviour. On
the other hand, the Context UNITY extension [29] formalises context-aware
computing, with the proposed notation to represent the system context. The
sensed aspects of the environment are used by the system to adjust its be-
haviour. In our formalisation we have pursued a different goal – we aimed
at formally guaranteeing that the specified agent behaviour with the incor-
porated reconfiguration mechanisms facilitates achieving the defined system
goals.
Formal modelling of fault tolerant MAS in Event-B has been also under-
taken by Ball and Butler [3]. They have proposed a number of informally
described patterns that allow the designers to incorporate well-known (static)
fault tolerance mechanisms into formal models. In our approach we consider
fault tolerance as a part of ensuring resilience of MAS. Moreover, we have
formalised a more advanced fault tolerance scheme that relies on goal real-
location and dynamic reconfiguration to guarantee goal reachability.
The use of model checking techniques for reasoning about MAS prop-
erties has been actively researched as well (see, e.g., [4, 5, 17, 11, 18]). In
particular, [5] presents a framework for verification of agent programs against
BDI (belief-desire-intention) agent specifications. In the proposed approach,
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an agent system is first programmed using the logic-based agent oriented
programming language AgentSpeak(F). Then the AgentSpeak(F) programs
are translated into Promela – the specification language of the SPIN model
checker – to verify the resulting system. Ferrari et al. [10] describe a verifica-
tion of pi-calculus based process algebra for mobile agents, while [18] presents
modelling of fault-tolerant agents by stochastic Petri nets. The paper [17]
describes the symbolic model checker MCMAS, specifically tailored for ver-
ification of MAS. The MCMAS tool takes as inputs models describing both
agents and working environment of a multi-agent system and applies the
epistemic logic to analyse it. However, model checking approaches typically
suffer from the state space explosion problem, which is especially acute for
large systems. As demonstrated by the proposed guidelines, our formalisa-
tion can be easily represented in the Event-B formalism. Since Event-B is
based on theorem proving, this would help to avoid the mentioned problem.
The foundational work on goal-oriented development has been done by
van Lamsweerde [7, 34, 36]. The proposed KAOS framework [7] provides a
goal-oriented approach for requirements modelling, specification, and anal-
ysis, to address both functional and non-functional system requirements.
Based on the KAOS framework, Lamsweerde [35] has proposed a method
for deriving the software architecture from its requirements. Specifically,
according to the method, the software specification is developed from the re-
quirements which is then used to build the architectural design. The design
is based with consecutive refinements, which take into account constraints
and non-functional goals. The KAOS approach is supported by the GRAIL
tool [7].
Over the last decade the goal-oriented approach has also received sev-
eral extensions that allow the designers to link it with formal modelling
[14, 25]. In particular, the work [14] presents the technique of translating
KAOS operational models into event-based tabular specifications that can
be then analysed by SCR* toolset [12]. The technique consists of a number
of transformation steps each of which solves semantic, structural or syntactic
dereferences between the KAOS and SCR (Software Cost Reduction) lan-
guages.
Significant amount of research has been devoted for translating formal
specifications of software operations built according to the KAOS goal-oriented
method into event-based transition systems. For example, the work [16]
presents an approach to use the formal analysis capabilities of LTSA (La-
belled Transition System Analyser) to analyse and animate KAOS opera-
tional models. The mapping allows designers to translate goal-oriented op-
erational requirements into a black-box event-based model of the software
behaviour expressed in a formalism appropriate to reason about behaviours
at the architectural level.
One of the first attempt to bridge KAOS operations with B specifica-
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tion was presented in [26]. More recently, the study to formalise KAOS in
Event-B was attempted in [2]. The paper proposes a constructive approach
that allows to link high-level system requirements expressed as linear tem-
poral logic formulae to the corresponding Event-B elements. The notion of
a triggered event is used to translate time operators that are used in KAOS
models. Similar, Matoussi et al. [19, 20] describe works on coupling require-
ments engineering methods with formal methods. In contrast, in our work
we have relied on goals to facilitate structuring of the system behaviour,
while connecting them with agent collaboration and system reconfiguration
mechanisms.
In our previous work on goal reachability and agent collaboration, we
have investigated a colony of ants [13]. We have formalised the behaviour of
cooperative ants in Event-B and verified by proofs that the desired system-
level properties become achievable via agent collaboration. The proposed
approach allows the designers to rigorously define constraints on the envi-
ronment and the ant behaviour at different abstraction levels and systemat-
ically explore the relationships between system-level goals, environment and
autonomous ants.
Conclusions. The main paper contribution is the proposed theoretical
study of resilient goal-oriented multi-agent systems. The formalisation grad-
ually defines the main notions of such systems, together with their intricate
relationships between different agent and goal structures as well as the incor-
porated dynamic reconfiguration mechanisms. The latter allow the system to
become more resilient with respect to the system goals and also more collabo-
rative with respect to the involved system agents. The final theorem is proved
to formally demonstrate that all the introduced notions and mechanisms are
sufficient to ensure goal reachability in such a system. The presented work
is based on our experience in formal modelling and verification of resilient
goal-oriented multi-agent systems, see, e.g., [22, 23, 32, 13].
There is a number of features and properties of such systems that were
left out from this formalisation. For instance, it would be interesting to
more deeply investigate how the information about goal reachability is stored
(distinguishing the local and global knowledge) and later propagated from
agents to their supervisors and beyond. This issue is also directly related
with the representation of different levels of perception that some goal is
now completed, how this perception is propagated through the agent and
goal hierarchies, the order of this propagation and delays related with it.
In turn, such knowledge can be used to make the system reconfiguration
mechanisms more efficient by, e.g, avoiding in some cases to redo an already
accomplished goal after the supervisor agent responsible for this goal has
failed. The listed topics constitute the basis for our future work in this
research area.
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Abstract. Reliable and highly performant handling of large data stores
constitutes one of the major challenges of cloud computing. In this pa-
per, we propose a formalisation of a cloud solution implemented by
F-Secure – a provider of secure data storage services. The solution is
based on massive replication and the write-ahead logging mechanism.
To achieve high performance, the company has abandoned a transac-
tional model. We formally derive a model of the proposed architectural
solution and verify data integrity and consistency properties under pos-
sible failure scenarios. The proposed approach allows the designers to
formally define and verify essential characteristics of architectures for
handling large data stores.
Keywords: Formal modelling, Event-B, refinement, replication, data
integrity, large data stores
1 Introduction
Rapid development of digital technology puts a high demand on reliable handling
and storage of large volumes of data. It is forecasted that worldwide consumer
digital storage needs will grow from 329 exabytes in 2011 to 4.1 zettabytes in
2016 [3]. Often algorithms for data storage in cloud reuse the ones that have been
proposed for databases. The transactional model adopted in databases guaran-
tees ACID properties – Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation and Durability, and
as such delivers high resilience guarantees. However, in a pursue of high per-
formance, cloud data storages rarely rely on the transactional model and hence
deliver weaker guarantees regarding data integrity. In this paper, we undertake a
formal study of data integrity and consistency properties that can be guaranteed
by several different architectures of cloud data stores.
Our work is motivated by a cloud solution developed by F-Secure – a provider
of secure data storage services. To achieve a high degree of fault tolerance, the
company has combined write-ahead logging (WAL) [7, 10] – a widely used mech-
anism for database error recovery – and massive data replication. As such, this
combination gives very high resilience guarantees (usually in the form of even-
tual consistency). However, these guarantees are different in non-transactional
settings typical for cloud. Moreover, data integrity and consistency properties
vary in the synchronous, semi-synchronous and asynchronous architectures used
for data replication. Therefore, it is useful to rigorously define and compare the
properties that can be ensured by different solutions.
In this paper, we use the Event-B method and the associated Rodin plat-
form to formally model write-ahead logging in replicated data stores. Event-B
[1] is a formal framework that is particularly suitable for the development of
distributed systems. System development starts from an abstract specification
that is transformed into a detailed specification in a number of correctness-
preserving refinement steps. In this paper, we separately model the synchronous,
semi-synchronous and asynchronous replication architectures. Event-B and the
Rodin platform [11] allow us to explicitly define the data integrity and con-
sistency properties as model invariants and compare them in all three models.
We believe that the proposed approach allows the designers to gain formally
grounded insights on properties of cloud data stores and their resilience.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we give a brief overview of
the Event-B formalism. In Section 3 we describe the WAL mechanism as well
as the general architecture of a cloud data store. In Section 4 we present a for-
mal development of the asynchronous replication model. In Section 5, we briefly
(due to similarity with the asynchronous model) overview the models for the
synchronous and semi-synchronous architectures and compare the data consis-
tency properties of three replication modes. Finally, in Section 6 we overview
the related work, discuss the obtained results and outline future work.
2 Modelling in Event-B
Event-B is a state-based formal approach that promotes the correct-by-construc-
tion development paradigm and formal verification by theorem proving. In Event-
B, a system model is specified using the notion of an abstract state machine [1].
An abstract state machine encapsulates the model state, represented as a col-
lection of variables, and defines operations on the state, i.e., it describes the
dynamic behaviour of a modelled system. The variables are strongly typed by
the constraining predicates that together with other important system properties
are defined as model invariants. Usually, a machine has an accompanying com-
ponent, called a context, which includes user-defined sets, constants and their
properties given as a list of model axioms.
The dynamic behaviour of the system is defined by a collection of atomic
events. Generally, an event has the following form:
e =̂ any a where Ge then Re end,
where e is the event’s name, a is the list of local variables, and (the event guard)
Ge is a predicate over the model state. The body of an event is defined by
a multiple (possibly nondeterministic) assignment to the system variables. In
Event-B, this assignment is semantically defined as the next-state relation Re.
The event guard defines the conditions under which the event is enabled, i.e.,
its body can be executed. If several events are enabled at the same time, any of
them can be chosen for execution nondeterministically.
Event-B employs a top-down refinement-based approach to system develop-
ment. A development starts from an abstract specification that nondetermin-
istically models the most essential functional requirements. In a sequence of
refinement steps we gradually reduce nondeterminism and introduce detailed
design decisions. In particular, we can add new events, refine old events as well
as replace abstract variables by their concrete counterparts, i.e., perform data
refinement. In the latter case, we need to define gluing invariants, which define
the relationship between the abstract and concrete variables. The proof of data
refinement is often supported by supplying witnesses – the concrete values for
the replaced abstract variables. Witnesses are specified in the event clause with.
The consistency of Event-B models, i.e., verification of model well-formedness,
invariant preservation as well as correctness of refinement steps, is demonstrated
by discharging the relevant proof obligations. The Rodin platform [11] provides
an automated support for modelling and verification. In particular, it automat-
ically generates the required proof obligations and attempts to discharge them.
Event-B adopts an event-based modelling style that facilitate a correct-by-
construction development of a distributed system. Since cloud data storage is a
large-scale distributed system, Event-B is a natural choice for its formal mod-
elling and verification. In the next section, we give an overview of the general
data storage architecture that we will formally develop in Event-B.
3 Resilient Cloud Data Storage
Essentially, a cloud data storage can be seen as a networked online data storage
available for its clients as a cloud service. Data are stored in virtualised data
stores (pools) usually hosted by third parties. Physically, the data stores may
span across multiple distributed servers. Cloud data storage providers should
ensure that their customers can safely and easily store their content and access
it from their computers and mobile devices. Therefore, there is a clear demand
to achieve both resilience and high performance in handling data.
Write-ahead logging (WAL) is a standard data base technique for ensuring
data integrity. The main principle of WAL is to apply the requested changes to
data files only after they have been logged, i.e., after the log has been stored
in the persistent storage (disk). The WAL mechanism ensures fault-tolerance
because, in case of a crash, the system would be able to recover using the log.
Moreover, the WAL mechanism helps to optimise performance, since only the
log file (rather than all the data changes) should be written to the permanent
storage to guarantee that a transaction is (eventually) committed.
The WAL mechanism has been thoroughly studied under the reliable per-
sistent storage assumption, i.e., if the disk containing the log never crashes.
However, in the cloud implementing such a highly-reliable data store is rather
unfeasible. Therefore, to ensure fault tolerance, F-Secure has proposed a solution
that combines WAL with replication. The resulting system – distributed data
store (DDS) – consists of a number of nodes distributed across different physical
locations. One of the nodes, called master, is appointed to serve incoming data
requests from DDS clients and report on success or failure of such requests. As
a result, for instance, the client may receive an acknowledgment that the data
have been successfully stored in the system. The remaining nodes, called standby
nodes, contain replicas of the stored data.
Each request received by the master is translated into a number of reading
and writing commands. These commands are first recorded in the master log and
then applied to the stored data. After this, an acknowledgement is sent to the
client. (In the non-replicated version of WAL widely used in the databases, an
acknowledgement to the client is sent already after the request is written in the
log). The standby nodes are constantly monitoring and streaming the master log
records into their own logs, before applying them to their persistent data in the
same way. Essentially, the standby nodes are continually trying to “catch up”
with the master. If the master crashes, one of the standby nodes is appointed
to be the master in its stead. At this point, the appointed standby effectively
becomes the new master and starts serving all data requests.
DDS can implement different models (architectures) of logging. In the asyn-
chronous model, the client request is acknowledged after the master node has
performed the required modifications in its persistent storage. The second option
– the cascade master-standby – is a semi-synchronous architecture. The client
receives an acknowledgement after both the master and its warm standby (called
upper standby) has performed the necessary actions. Finally, in the synchronous
model, only after all replica nodes have written into their persistent storage,
i.e., fully synchronised with the master node, the transaction can be committed.
Obviously, such different logging models deliver different resilience guarantees.
In our formal modelling, we aim at formally defining and comparing data
integrity and consistency properties that can be ensured by each architecture.
In the next section, we present a development of the asynchronous architecture.
4 Modelling the Asynchronous Architecture
In the asynchronous model of replication, the standby nodes may stream the
master log records only after the required changes have been committed and re-
ported to the client. If the master crashes shortly after committing the required
modifications, some changes will not be replicated thus leading to an inconsis-
tent system state. In particular, this might happen because a standby node has
not yet received (streamed) all the master log records when the master failed.
To minimise such a data loss, the node that has the freshest (and hence the
most complete) copy of the master log is chosen to become the next master. A
graphical representation of the system architecture is shown in Fig.1.
Abstract specification. The initial model – the machine Replication1 m0 ab-
stractly describes the behaviour of the master node – receiving and processing
of the received requests. The overall model structure is given on Fig.2.
The variable comp, comp ⊆ COMP , represents the dynamic set of active
system nodes (data stores), where COMP is a set (type) of all available data
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Fig. 1. Asynchronous model
stores. The variable master, such that master ∈ comp, represents the master
node. The other variables buffer, inprocess and processed represent the received
data requests at different stages of their processing by the master. They are
modelled as disjoint sets of the abstract data type REQUESTS. In particular,
the variable buffer stores the requests that have been received by the master
and are waiting to be handled. The variable inprocess contains the requests
that the master node is currently processing, while the variable processed keeps
the requests that are completed and acknowledged to the client.
The event RequestIn specifies arriving of a new request to the master. Process-
ing of the received requests and sending notifications to the client are modelled
by the events Process and RequestOut respectively. The events update the vari-
ables buffer, inprocess and processed to reflect the progress in request handling.
Machine Replication1 m0
Variables comp,master, buffer, inprocess, processed
Invariants comp ⊆ COMP ∧ master ∈ comp ∧ buffer ⊆ REQUESTS ...
Events
RequestIn =̂ // arriving of a new request
any r
where r ∈ REQUESTS ∧ r /∈ buffer ∧ r /∈ inprocess ∧ r /∈ processed
then buffer := buffer ∪ {r}
end
Process ... // request processing
RequestOut =̂ // completion of a request
any r
where r ∈ inprocess
then processed := processed ∪ {r} ‖ inprocess := inprocess \ {r}
end
ChangeMaster =̂ // changing the master
any new master, n buffer, n inprocess, n processed
where
new master ∈ comp ∧ new master 6= master ∧ n inprocess∩n buffer = ∅ ∧
n inprocess ∩ n processed = ∅ ∧ n processed ∩ n buffer = ∅ ∧
n buffer ∪ n inprocess ∪ n processed ⊆ buffer ∪ inprocess ∪ processed
then
master := new master ‖ buffer := n buffer ‖ inprocess := n inprocess ‖
processed := n processed ‖ comp := comp \ {master}
end
CompActivation ... // activation of a new system component
CompDeactivation ... // deactivation of a system component
Fig. 2. Asynchronous model: the abstract model
The event ChangeMaster models a crash of a master and selection of a new
master. One of the remaining nodes is non-deterministically chosen to become a
new master, while the old master is removed from the set of active nodes. Due
to possible data loss, the requests being handled by the new master may be only
a subset of those of the failed master. This is reflected by the guard condition:
n buffer ∪ n inprocess ∪ n processed ⊆ buffer ∪ inprocess ∪ processed,
where n buffer, n inprocess, and n processed are the corresponding data struc-
tures of the new master.
Finally, the last two events, CompActivation and CompDeactivation, model
a possibility to add new data storage nodes from the cloud and remove some
currently active nodes from the system respectively. Only standby nodes can be
activated and deactivated in this way.
First Refinement. In the first refinement step (defined by the machine
Replication1 ref1), we extend the abstract model by explicitly representing the
behaviour of the standby nodes.
To accomplish this, we lift the abstract variables buffer, inprocess, processed
to become node-dependent functions. In Event-B, this is achieved by data refine-
ment that replaces these variables with the new variables
comp buffer, comp inprocess and comp processed. The following gluing invari-
ants are defined to to prove correctness of data refinement:
comp buffer ∈ comp→ P(REQUESTS) ∧ comp buffer(master) = buffer ∧
comp inprocess ∈ comp→ P(REQUESTS) ∧ comp inprocess(master) = inprocess ∧
comp processed ∈ comp→ P(REQUESTS) ∧ comp processed(master) = processed.
The overview of the refined model is presented in the Fig. 3. The set of
model events includes the refined versions of the abstract events (RequestInMst,
ProcessMst, RequestOutMst, ChangeMaster, CompActivation, and CompDeactiva-
tion) as well as new events describing the behaviour of standby nodes.
We refine the event ChangeMaster to a deterministic procedure of choosing
the node with the freshest log as a new master to the failed master. We formulate
this condition as a new guard of the event ChangeMaster in the following way:
(∀c· c ∈ comp ∧ c 6= new master ∧ c 6= master ⇒
comp buffer(c) ∪ comp inprocess(c) ∪ comp processed(c) ⊆
comp buffer(new master) ∪ comp inprocess(new master) ∪
comp processed(new master)). (1)
The standby nodes are continuously streaming the master log. Essentially,
this means that, as soon as the master node completes the request(s), i.e., per-
forms the required modifications in its persistent storage, the standby nodes start
copying the corresponding entries in the master log. This behaviour is modelled
by the new event RequestInStb. Similarly as for the master node, the processing
of requests and their completion by the standby nodes are respectively modelled
by the events ProcessStb and RequestOutStb.
In our model, we assume that the nodes might become temporary unavailable
(i.e., crush and recover). The new variable failed, failed ⊆ comp, is introduced to
Machine Replication1 ref1 refines Replication1 m0
Variables comp,master, comp buffer, comp inprocess, comp processed, failed, in transit
Invariants ...
Events
RequestInMst refines RequestIn ... // arriving of a new request to the master
ProcessMst refines Process ... // request processing by the master
RequestOutMst refines RequestOut ... // completion of a request by the master
RequestInStb =̂ ... // reading the master by a standby
any r
where c ∈ comp ∧ c 6= master ∧ r ∈ comp processed(master) ∧
r /∈ comp buffer(c) ∧ r /∈ comp inprocess(c) ∧ r /∈ comp processed(c)
c /∈ failed ∧ master /∈ failed
then comp buffer(c) := comp buffer(c) ∪ {r}
end
ProcessStb ... // request processing by a standby
RequestOutStb ... // completion of a request by a standby
ChangeMaster refines ChangeMaster =̂ // changing the master
any new master
where new master ∈ comp ∧ new master 6= master ∧
master ∈ failed ∧ new master /∈ failed ∧
(∀c·c ∈ comp ∧ c 6= new master ∧ c 6= master⇒
comp buffer(c) ∪ comp inprocess(c) ∪ comp processed(c) ⊆
comp buffer(new master) ∪ comp inprocess(new master) ∪
comp processed(new master))
with n buffer = comp buffer(new master)
n inprocess = comp inprocess(new master)
n processed = comp processed(new master)
then master := new master ‖ comp buffer := {master}− comp buffer ‖
comp inprocess := {master}− comp inprocess ‖
comp processed := {master}− comp processed ‖
comp := comp \ {master} ‖ failed := failed \ {master} ‖ in transit := TRUE
end
CompActivation ... // activation of a new component into the system
CompDeactivation ... // deactivation of a component from the system
CompFailure ... // modelling a component failure
CompStbRecovery ... // recovery of a standby
TransitionOver ... // all the standby nodes have only the requests already processed by
the new master
Fig. 3. Asynchronous model: the first refinement
store such failed nodes. The new event CompFailure and CompStbRecovery model
possible node crashes and recoveries correspondingly.
Now we are ready to formulate and prove some data consistency properties
expressing the relationships between the requests handled by the master and
those handled by the standby nodes. Since any standby node is continuously
copying the master log, we can say that any standby node is logically “behind”
the master node. Mathematically, this means that all the standby requests (no
matter what stage of processing they are in) are subset of those of the master
node. Moreover, all the requests that are now handled by a standby node should
have been already completed by the master before. We can formulate these two
properties as the following system invariants:
(∀c·c ∈ comp ∧ c 6= master ⇒
comp buffer(c) ∪ comp inprocess(c) ∪ comp processed(c) ⊆
comp buffer(master) ∪ comp inprocess(master) ∪ comp processed(master)), (2)
(∀c·c ∈ comp ∧ c 6= master ⇒
comp buffer(c) ∪ comp inprocess(c) ∪ comp processed(c) ⊆
comp processed(master)). (3)
As it turns out, the last property cannot be proven as an (unconditional)
invariant of the system. Indeed, it can be violated right after one of the standby
nodes is appointed the new master. A short transitional period may be needed
for the new master to “catch up” with some of the standby nodes that got ahead
by handling the requests still not committed by the new master. It is easy to
show termination of this transitional period, since all such standby nodes are
blocked from reading any new requests from the master until the master catches
up with them by processing its requests.
We can formally model this transitional stage by introducing the variable
in transit, in transit ∈ BOOL. The variable obtains the value TRUE when
a new master is appointed, and reobtains the value FALSE (in the new event
TransitionOver) when all the remaining standby nodes have the requests already
processed by the new master.
Then we can reformulate the property (3) as a system invariant and prove
its preservation:
in transit = FALSE ⇒ (∀c·c ∈ comp ∧ c 6= master ⇒
comp buffer ∪ comp inprocess(c) ∪ comp processed(c) ⊆
comp processed(master)). (4)
Second Refinement. In the previous refinement step we introduced the standby
nodes and their interactions with the master. We also modelled how the received
data requests are transferred through the different processing stages on the mas-
ter and standby sides. The variables buffer, inprocess and processed were used
to store incoming, processing and processed requests. The goal of our second
refinement step is explicitly model the WAL mechanism and the resulting inter-
dependencies between the master and standby logs.
Mathematically, any log can be represented as a sequence, i.e., as a function
of the type
any log ∈ 1..k → ELEMENTS,
where k is the index of the last written element.
In our case, we want to store in the node log all the requests – received,
being processed, or completed. This can be represented as partitioning of the
component log into three separate parts. To achieve that, we introduce three
variables index written, index inprocess, and index processed:
index written ∈ comp→NAT, index inprocess ∈ comp→NAT,
index processed ∈ comp→NAT,
such that
∀c·c ∈ comp ⇒ index inprocess(c) ≤ index written(c),
∀c·c ∈ comp ⇒ index processed(c) ≤ index inprocess(c).
For any component c, index written(c) defines the index of the last written log
entry, index inprocess(c) – the index of the last request being processed, and
index processed(c) – the index of the last completed request. Graphically, this
can be represented as shown in Fig.4.
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Fig. 4. The log partition
Then the logs of all the components can be defined as the following function:
log ∈ comp→ (NAT 7→REQUESTS),
such that
∀c ∈ comp· dom(log(c)) = 1 .. index written(c),
where dom is the functional domain operator.
The function log is introduced to replace (data refine) the abstract variables
comp buffer, comp inprocess, and comp processed. To prove correctness of such
data refinement, the following gluing invariants are added:
∀c·c ∈ comp⇒ log(c)[index inprocess(c) + 1 .. index written(c)] = comp buffer(c),
∀c·c ∈ comp⇒ log(c)[index processed(c) + 1 .. index inprocess(c)] = comp inprocess(c),
∀c·c ∈ comp⇒ log(c)[1 .. index processed(c)] = comp processed(c),
where R[S] denotes relational image of R with respect to the given set S.
An introduction of the sequential representation of the component log allows
us to refine some proven invariants as well as prove some new ones. For instance,
the invariant property (4) now can be reformulated in terms of new variables:
in transit = FALSE ⇒ (∀c·c ∈ comp ∧ c 6= master ⇒
log(c)[1 .. index written(c)] ⊆ log(master)[1 .. index processed(master)]). (5)
The formulated data refinement also affects all the events where the abstract
variables were used. For instance, the event RequestOutMst (see Fig. 5) now
specifies completion of master request processing by recording this in the node
log, i.e., by increasing index processed(master).
We can refine the procedure of choosing a new master by reformulating the
guard condition (1) of the event ChangeMaster as follows:
∀c·c ∈ comp ∧ c 6= master ∧ c 6= new master ⇒
index written(c) ≤ index written(new master). (6)
Here we check that the new candidate for the master has the largest index written,
i.e., the freshest log copy. The other events are refined in a similar way. The
overview of the refined model is presented in Fig. 5.
Moreover, we can explicitly formulate and prove the log data integrity prop-
erties as model invariants:
∀c, i·c ∈ comp ∧ i ∈ 1 .. index written(c) ⇒ log(c)(i) = log(master)(i),
∀c1, c2, i·c1 ∈ comp ∧ c2 ∈ comp ∧ i ∈ 1 .. index written(c1) ∧
i ∈ 1 .. index written(c2) ⇒ log(c1)(i) = log(c2)(i). (7)
Machine Replication1 ref2 refines Replication1 ref1
Variables comp,master, comp buffer, comp inprocess, comp processed, failed, in transit
Invariants...
Events
RequestInMst =̂ refines RequestInMst ... // arriving of a new request to the master
ProcessMst refines ProcessMst ... // request processing by the master
RequestOutMst =̂ refines RequestOutMst ... // completion of a request by the master
when index processed(master) 6= index inprocess(master) ∧ master /∈ failed
with r = log(master)(index processed(master) + 1)
then index processed(master) := index processed(master) + 1
end
RequestInStb =̂ refines RequestInStb ... // reading the master by a standby
any c
where c ∈ comp ∧ c 6= master ∧ c /∈ failed ∧ master /∈ failed ∧
index written(c) < index processed(master)
with r = log(master)(index written(c) + 1)
then log(c) := log(c) ∪ {index written(c) + 1 7→ log(master)(index written(c) + 1)} ‖
index written(c) := index written(c) + 1
end
ProcessStb =̂ refines ProcessStb ... // request processing by a standby
RequestOutStb =̂ refines RequestOutStb ... // completion of a request by a standby
ChangeMaster =̂ refines ChangeMaster ... // changing the master
...
Fig. 5. Asynchronous model: the second refinement
These properties state that the corresponding log elements of any two storage
(master or standby) nodes are always the same. In other words, all logs are
consistent with respect to the log records of the master node.
5 The Cascade Master-Standby and Synchronous
Architectures
An alternative, semi-syncronous replication model is the cascade master-standby.
Besides the master node that serves incoming data base requests, we single
out another functional node – upper standby. The upper standby node starts
streaming the master log as soon as the master records the requests in its log.
Moreover, the master node waits until the upper standby reads its processed
records and, only after that, commits the changes and reports to the client.
In its turn, the other standby nodes are constantly monitoring and streaming
the upper standby log records into their own logs and applying them in the same
way as described in Section 4. Essentially, the standby nodes are continually
trying to catch up with the upper standby.
If the master node goes down, the upper standby node is automatically ap-
pointed to be the master in its stead. Moreover, the next candidate for the new
upper standby node becomes the node that is closest (with respect to the copied
log file) to the current upper standby.
Let us note that this proposed cascade replication mode allows to decrease
the possibility of loss of the committed changes if the master node fails. Indeed,
at that point, when the master node fails, the upper standby node had already
recorded all the changes that were committed and reported to the client by
master before. Therefore, such an architectural solution increases the system
resilience. A possibility of data loss leading to an inconsistent system state is still
present. However, for this to happen, the master node and the upper standby
node should both fail in a very short time period. A graphical representation of
the system architecture is shown on Fig.6.
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Fig. 6. Cascade system architecture
The formal development of the proposed replication model consists of an ini-
tial specification and its two refinements. The initial model abstractly describes
the system behaviour focusing on the master and the upper standby nodes. The
first refinement step introduces the remaining standby nodes and their interop-
eration with the upper standby, while the second refinement explicitly models
the sequential logging mechanism and the interdependencies between the master,
the upper standby and others standby logs. Let us note that the development is
similar to that of the asynchronous model. Due to the lack of space we will only
highlight the most significant differences between them.
Abstract specification. In the initial model defined by the machine
Replication2 m0 we focus on the master and upper standby components and
their interoperation. The overall model structure is given on Fig. 7.
In addition to the master node, we single out one more node to serve as an
upper standby node. We model this by introducing the variable ups stanbdy,
such that ups stanbdy ∈ comp and ups standby 6= master.
The variables m buffer, m inprocess, m processed represent the received re-
quests at different stages of their processing by the master. Similarly, the vari-
ables ups buffer, ups inprocess, ups processed are introduced to model the re-
spective data structures for the upper standby. The events RequestInMst,
ProcessMst, RequestOutMst and RequestInUps, ProcessUps, RequestOutUps spec-
ify the corresponding request stages for the master and upper standby nodes.
The master node can not commit the changes until the upper standby reads
them. We model this requirement by adding the following guard condition in the
event RequestOutMst:
r ∈ ups buffer ∪ ups inprocess ∪ ups processed.
The process of changing of the master node by the upper standby is modelled
by the event ChangeMaster. The event also specifies the selection procedure of a
new upper standby. Due to possible data loss, the requests being handled by the
new upper standby may be only a subset of those of the current upper standby:
n buffer ∪ n inprocess ∪ n processed ⊆ ups buffer ∪ ups inprocess ∪ ups processed.
Machine Replication2 m0
Variables comp,master, ups standby,m buffer,m inprocess,m processed,m buffer, ...
Invariants comp ⊆ COMP ∧master ∈ comp ∧ ups standby ∈ comp...
Events ...
RequestInMst ... // arriving of a new request to the master node
ProcessMst ... // request processing
RequestOutMst =̂ // completion of a request by the master
any r
where r ∈ m inprocess ∧ (r ∈ ups buffer ∪ ups inprocess ∪ ups processed)
then m processed := m processed ∪ {r} ‖ m inprocess := m inprocess \ {r} end
ProcessUps ... // request processing by the upper standby
ChangeMaster =̂ // changing the master
any new ups standby, n buffer, n inprocess, n processed
where
new ups standby ∈ comp ∧ new ups standby 6= ups standby ∧
new ups standby 6= master ∧ ...
(n buffer ∪ n inprocess ∪ n processed ⊆
ups buffer ∪ ups inprocess ∪ ups processed)
then
master := ups standby ‖ ups standby := new ups standby ‖
m buffer := ups buffer ‖ m inprocess := ups inprocess ‖
m processed := ups processed ‖ comp := comp \ {master}...
end
ChangeUpsStb ... // changing the upper standby node
CompActivation ... // activation of a new system component
CompDeactivation ... // deactivation of a system component
Fig. 7. Cascade architecture: abstract model
Moreover, a similar event, ChangeUpsStb, models the selection of a new upper
standby in the case when the current one fails.
First Refinement. In the first refinement step we extend the abstract model by
explicitly introducing the behaviour of the remaining standby nodes. Similarly
as for the asynchronous model, we data refine the abstract variables m buffer,
m inprocess, m processed and ups buffer, ups inprocess, ups processed by the
new functional variables comp buffer, comp inprocess and comp processed.
In addition, a number of the new events are added to describe the be-
haviour of standby nodes, node failures and recovery (RequestInStb, ProcessStb,
RequestOutStb, CompFailure, CompStbRecovery).
As for the asynchronous model, we can formulate and prove data consistency
properties between the involved components. The property (2) (stating that a
standby node is always behind the master in terms of handled requests) corre-
sponds to two properties for the cascade replication mode: the first one stating
this property between any standby and the upper standby, while the second one
stating the same property between the upper standby and master nodes.
(∀c·c ∈ comp ∧ c 6= master ∧ c 6= ups standby ⇒
comp buffer(c) ∪ comp inprocess(c) ∪ comp processed(c) ⊆
comp buffer(ups standby) ∪ comp inprocess(ups standby)
∪ comp processed(ups standby)), (8)
comp buffer(ups standby) ∪
comp inprocess(ups standby) ∪ comp processed(ups standby) ⊆
comp buffer(master) ∪ comp inprocess(master) ∪ comp processed(master), (9)
The property (4) for the asynchronous mode expresses the relationships be-
tween the processed requests of the master node and read requests of the standby
nodes. This property again corresponds to two properties for the cascade mode:
one between the upper standby and remaining standbys, and the other one be-
tween the master and upper standby nodes. In both cases, the properties may
be violated for a short period (indicated by in transit = TRUE) right after a
new upper standby node is chosen to replace a failed one:
in transit = FALSE ⇒ (∀c·c ∈ comp ∧ c 6= master ∧ c 6= ups standby ⇒
(comp buffer(c) ∪ comp inprocess(c) ∪ comp processed(c)
⊆ comp processed(ups standby)), (10)
in transit = FALSE ⇒ (comp processed(master) ⊆ comp buffer(ups standby) ∪
comp inprocess(ups standby) ∪ comp processed(ups standby)). (11)
Note how the requirement that the master cannot commit a request before it is
read by the upper standby reverses the inclusion relationship in the (11).
Second Refinement. The goal of our second refinement step is explicitly model
the write-ahead logging mechanism and the resulting interdependencies between
the master, upper standby and other standby logs.
We data refine the abstract variables comp buffer, comp inprocess, and
comp processed by the introduced function log. The following gluing invariants
allow us to prove correctness of such a data refinement:
∀c·c ∈ comp⇒ log(c)[index inprocess(c) + 1 .. index written(c)] = comp buffer(c),
∀c·c ∈ comp⇒ log(c)[index processed(c) + 1 .. index inprocess(c)] = comp inprocess(c),
∀c·c ∈ comp⇒ log(c)[1 .. index processed(c)] = comp processed(c).
Introducing the sequential representation of the component log allows us to
reformulate some proven invariants as well as prove some new ones. For instance,
the invariant properties (10) and (11) now can be reformulated in terms of the
new variables as follows:
in transit = FALSE ⇒
(∀c·c ∈ comp ∧ c 6= master ∧ c 6= ups standby ⇒
log(c)[1 .. index written(c)] ⊆
log(ups standby)[1 .. index processed(ups standby)]). (12)
in transit = FALSE ⇒ log(master)[1 .. index processed(master)]
⊆ log(ups standby)[1 .. index written(ups standby)]. (13)
Finally, the log data integrity properties (in the exact form as in (7)) are
formulated and proved for this replication mode as well.
Synchronous Architecture. The last development formalises the synchronous
replication architecture, which can be considered as a combination of both asyn-
chronous and cascade models. The essential differences of this model are follow-
ing. The standby nodes start streaming the master log records as soon as master
records the commands in its log. Moreover, the master node waits until all the
standby nodes read processed records from its log and, only after that, commits
the corresponding changes and reports to the client. If the master goes down,
one of the standby nodes is appointed to be the master in its stead. Essentially,
it is a generalisation of the cascade model where all the standby nodes play the
role of upper standby.
This architecture allows to avoid a possibility of loss of the committed changes
if the master fails. Indeed, at that point, all the standby nodes have already
recorded all the changes that were committed and reported to the client by
master. On the other hand, the necessity for the master to synchronise in such a
way with all the standbys may negatively affect the performance of this model.
Developing the formal model of this architecture, we essentially repeat the
refinement steps of the asynchronous model. In particular, the initial model is the
same as the abstract model presented on Fig.2. In the first refinement step, in the
RequestOutMst event modelling the commitment of the changes by master, we
have to impose an additional restriction for this behaviour. Namely, the master
node can not commit the changes until all the standby nodes have read them.
We model this requirement by adding the following guard condition to the event:
∀c·c ∈ comp ∧ c 6= master ⇒
r ∈ comp buffer(c) ∪ comp inprocess(c) ∪ comp processed(c),
where we check that the request r has already been recorded by all the standby
nodes. Moreover, in the eventRequestInStb, we relax its guard by allowing to
copy the master log as soon as the master records requests in its log.
Similarly as for the first two models, we formulate and prove log data consis-
tency properties. Specifically, the property (2), stating that the standby nodes
are continuously trying to catch up with the master in terms of handled re-
quests, can be proved for this architecture as well. Moreover, since the master
can not commit the changes until the all standbys have read the corresponding
log records, it means that all the requests committed by the master have been
previously read by all standbys. We can formulate this property as follows:
in transit = FALSE⇒ (∀c·c ∈ comp ∧ c 6= master ⇒
comp processed(master) ⊆ comp buffer(c) ∪ comp inprocess(c)∪
comp processed(c)). (14)
Note that, once again, this property can be violated right after a new master is
appointed and thus a transitional period is needed. This property is very similar
to that of (11) (for the cascade architecture) and is inverse, with respect to the
inclusion relation, to that of (4) (for the asynchronous architecture).
As in the previous two developments, in the second refinement step we in-
troduce component logs as sequences. In terms of the new variables, the (14)
property can be then reformulated as follows:
in transit = FALSE ⇒ (∀c·c ∈ comp ∧ c 6= master ⇒
log(master)[1 .. index processed(master)] ⊆ log(c)[1 .. index written(c)]). (15)
Finally, the log data integrity properties (7), stating that the corresponding
log elements of any two storage components are always the same, are proved for
this model as well. The full formal developments can be found in [9].
Proof Statistics To verify correctness of the presented formal developments,
we have discharged around 400 proof obligations for the first model, more than
750 proof obligations for the second model, and around 400 for the third model.
In total, around 90% of them have been proved automatically by the Rodin
platform and the rest have been proved manually in the Rodin interactive proving
environment. The proof statistics in terms of generated proof obligations for the
presented Event B developments is shown in the Table 1. The numbers represent
the total number of proof obligations and the percentage of manual effort for
each model in each refinement step. The whole development and proving effort
has taken around one person-month.
Table 1. The proof statistics
Asynchronous model Cascade model Synchronous model
step Total Manual Manual % Total Manual Manual % Total Manual Manual %
m0 18 0 0 53 0 0 18 0 0
ref1 145 0 0 257 1 0.3 146 0 0
ref2 193 42 21.7 442 75 16.9 232 42 18.1
Overall 356 42 11.7 752 76 10.1 396 42 10.6
6 Conclusions and Related Work
In this paper, we formalised an industrial approach to implementing resilient
cloud data storage. To ensure resilience, F-Secure combined the WAL mecha-
nism with the log replication. We have formally expressed data integrity and
consistency properties in three different replication architectures and explicitly
identified situations that lead to data loss. These properties can inform industry
practitioners on resilience guarantees inherent to each solution. The proposed
modelling approach can facilitate early design exploration and evaluate benefits
of different fault tolerance mechanisms in implementing resilience requirements.
The problem of data consistency in replicated data stores, in particular for
the cloud, has been actively studied in both database and fault tolerance com-
munities, e.g., see [2, 8]. However, most of these approaches aim at proposing
new protocols guaranteeing correctness of data replication. For instance, the
work [8] presents a Dynamic Multi-Replica Provable Data Procession scheme. It
is based on probabilistic encryption used to periodically verify the correctness
and completeness of multiple data copies stored in the cloud. In our work we
aim at modelling architectural aspects of data stores and verifying qualitative
characteristics of data handling in the cloud.
Formal analysis of data base replication protocols has been proposed in [6].
The authors establish safety and liveness correctness criteria that need to be
verified by a replication protocol. In contract, in our work we focus on ensur-
ing data integrity and consistency properties based on the concrete write-ahead
logging mechanism.
The WAL has been investigated in [4, 5]. In those works the authors analyse
the performance aspects of this technique. They distinguish four types of the de-
lays that the WAL mechanism can impose on transaction handling and propose
an approach to increase log scalability. In our work, we focus on verifying prop-
erties concerning data consistency and data loss under possible failure scenarios
using the WAL mechanism.
In [12] the authors investigate data properties in the presence of server fail-
ures, however considering the full ACID properties. A formal modelling of fault-
tolerant transactions for replicated database systems using Event-B has been
also undertaken by D. Yadav et al. [13]. The work focuses on data atomic com-
mitment of distributed transactions.
In our future work we are planning to analyse performance and other quanti-
tative characteristics of different replication architectures. It particular, it would
be interesting to integrate probabilistic verification to evaluate the trade-offs
between performance and reliability.
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Abstract. Ensuring resilience of large data stores in the cloud is a
challenging engineering issue. It requires the development techniques
that allow the designers to predict the main resilience characteristics —
fault tolerance and performance — at the early design stages. In this
paper, we experiment with integrating Event-B modelling with discrete-
event simulation. Event-B allows us to reason about correctness and
data integrity properties of data stores, while discrete-event simulation
in SimPy enables quantitative assessment of performance and reliability.
Since testing in a real cloud environment is expensive and time-consuming,
the proposed approach offers several benefits in industrial settings.
Keywords: Formal modelling, Event-B, discrete-event simulation
1 Introduction
Development and verification of cloud-based data stores constitutes a challenging
engineering task. To guarantee resilience and satisfy Service Level Agreement
(SLA) that regulates service behaviour with respect to its customers, the deve-
lopers should ensure two main properties – data integrity and performance. To
achieve this goal, F-Secure Corporation – a company providing secure data storage
solutions – relies on massive replication and the non-transactional approach.
In our previous work [10], we have undertaken formal modelling of resilient
data store and logically defined data integrity properties of different architec-
tural solutions. To analyse performance/fault tolerance ratio of architectural
alternatives, we have attempted to integrate quantitative verification. However,
complexity of the system turned out to be prohibitive for probabilistic model
checkers and the quantitative analysis, which is essential for engineering resilient
cloud data stores, has not been performed.
To address this issue, in this paper we propose an approach to integrating
formal modelling in Event-B with discrete-event simulation in SimPy [14] –
a library and development framework in Python. Event-B [2] is a state-based
approach to correct-by-construction system development. A powerful tool support
– the Rodin platform [11] – automates the development and provides us with a
scalable proof-based verification. In this paper, we rely on Event-B to formally
represent and verify system-level logical properties, while simulation in SimPy
is used for the quantitative analysis. SimPy [14] is a popular discrete-event
simulation framework offering versatility and attractive visualisation features.
To facilitate an integration with SimPy and discussions with the industrial
engineers, we have created a simple graphical notation – a process-oriented model.
The notation is light-weight and introduces only the core concepts of the domain
together with the key artefacts required for formal modelling and simulation. Such
a graphical model defines the component interactions, representation of statistical
parameters as well as reactions on faults. The process-oriented model plays the
role of a unifying blue-print of the system and allows us to define the structure
of the Event-B and simulation models as well as provide an easy-to-comprehend
visual representation to the engineers. Once the initial models are derived from
the process-oriented model, the Event-B model is refined to represent and verify
data integrity properties, while the simulation model is executed to analyse
performance/reliability ratio, e.g., under different service and failure rates.
We believe that the proposed approach constitutes a promising direction in
the development of complex resilient systems. A combination of formal modelling
and simulation amplifies the benefits of both approaches. Reliance on formal
modelling not only guarantees system correctness but also increases confidence in
the created simulation models, while simulation supports quantitative assessment
of various design alternatives.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly presents our case study,
resilient cloud data storage, which serves as a motivation of this work. Section
3 overviews the approaches we aim to integrate – Event-B and Discrete-Event
Simulation. Our integration proposal is described in detail and illustrated by
a small example in Section 4. In Section 5, we demonstrate how to apply the
proposed approach to perform quantitative assessment of our case study. Finally,
Section 6 overviews the related work and gives some concluding remarks.
2 Resilient Data Storage in the Cloud
Our work is motivated by an industrial case study – a resilient cloud data storage
[10]. The system is developed by F-Secure to provide highly performant and
secure storage of client data on the cloud. Essentially, a cloud data storage can be
seen as a networked online data storage available for its clients as a cloud service.
Cloud data storage providers should ensure that their customers can safely and
easily store their content and access it from their devices. Therefore, there is a
clear demand to achieve both resilience and high performance in handling data.
Write-ahead logging (WAL) is a standard data base technique for ensuring
data integrity. The main principle of WAL is to apply the requested changes to
data files only after they have been logged, i.e., after the log has been stored in
the persistent storage. The WAL mechanism ensures fault tolerance because, in
case of a crash, the system can recover using the log. The WAL mechanism also
helps to optimise performance, since only the log file should be written to the
permanent storage to guarantee that a transaction is (eventually) committed.
The WAL mechanism has been studied under the reliable persistent storage
assumption, i.e., if the disk containing the log never crashes. However, implement-
ing such a highly-reliable data store in the cloud is rather unfeasible. Therefore,
to ensure resilience, F-Secure has chosen a solution that combines WAL with
replication. The resulting system – distributed data store (DDS) – consists of a
number of nodes distributed across different physical locations. One of the nodes,
called master, is appointed to serve incoming data requests from DDS clients
and report on success or failure of such requests. The remaining nodes, called
standby or worker nodes, contain replicas of the stored data.
Each request received by the master is recorded in the master log and then
applied to the stored data. After this, an acknowledgement is sent to the client.
The standby nodes are constantly monitoring and streaming the master log
records into their own logs, before applying them to their persistent data. If the
master crashes, one of the standby nodes becomes a new master in its stead.
DDS can implement different models of logging. In the asynchronous model,
the client request is acknowledged after the master node has performed the
required modifications in its persistent storage. In the synchronous model, the
transaction is committed only after all the replica nodes have written into their
persistent storage, i.e., synchronised with the master node. Obviously, such logging
models deliver different resilience guarantees in cases of component crashes.
In our previous work [10], we have formally defined and verified data integrity
properties for each described architecture using the Event-B framework. Our
development provided the designers with a qualitative assessment of system
resilience. However, while developing cloud software, it is also vital to obtain a
quantitative assessment of resilience to optimise the choice of a resource man-
agement strategy. Usually such an assessment is achieved via testing. However,
testing in the cloud requires the same usage of the resources as the real system
operation, and hence is expensive. Moreover, it is often hard to reproduce the
conditions of the peak load and hence obtain the insights on system resilience
during the stress conditions. Therefore, there is a strong demand on the integrated
approaches that enable both qualitative and quantitative analysis of resilience.
The earlier in the development process such an analysis can be performed,
the better architecture can be build. To address this issue, in this paper we
propose an approach to integrating formal modelling in Event-B and discrete-
event simulation. Next we give a short background overview of both techniques.
3 Background
Event-B. Event-B is a state-based formal approach that promotes the correct-by-
construction development paradigm and formal verification by theorem proving.
In Event-B, a system model is specified using the notion of an abstract state
machine [2]. An abstract state machine encapsulates the model state, represented
as a collection of variables, and defines operations on the state, i.e., it describes
the dynamic behaviour of a modelled system. The important system properties
to be preserved are defined as model invariants. A machine usually has the
accompanying component, called context. A context may include user-defined
carrier sets, constants and their properties (defined as model axioms).
The dynamic behaviour of the system is defined by a collection of atomic
events. Generally, an event has the following form:
e =̂ any a where Ge then Re end,
where e is the event’s name, a is the list of local variables, and (the event guard)
Ge is a predicate over the model state. The body of an event is defined by
a multiple (possibly nondeterministic) assignment to the system variables. In
Event-B, this assignment is semantically defined as the next-state relation Re.
The event guard defines the conditions under which the event is enabled, i.e., its
body can be executed. If several events are enabled at the same time, any of
them can be chosen for execution nondeterministically.
Event-B employs a top-down refinement-based approach to system develop-
ment. A development starts from an abstract system specification. In a sequence
of refinement steps we gradually reduce system nondeterminism and introduce
detailed design decisions. The consistency of Event-B models, i.e., invariant
preservation, correctness of refinement steps, is demonstrated by discharging
the relevant proof obligations. The Rodin platform [11] provides an automated
support for modelling and verification.
Discrete-event simulation. Simulation is the act of imitating how an actual
system behaves over time [3]. To achieve this goal, a simulation generates an
artificial system history, thereby enabling analysis of its general behaviour. It also
allows sensitivity analysis, which can be highly beneficial in the system design.
Table 1 shows an ad-hoc simulation of a bank with a single teller and 5
customers. Customers arrive at a uniformly distributed rate between 1 and 10
minutes. A customer requires a dedicated service from the teller in between 1 to
6 minutes. Each row represents a customer, with an identifier in column (1). Next
columns show the generated random inter-arrival times, (2), specific computed
arrival time for each customer, (3), and generated random service times, (4).
From this information, we can derive a system history and study its performance.
The conducted simulation allows us to obtain the following system estimates:
Average time in system 18
5
= 3.6 min
The clerk is idle 9
25
= 36 % of the time
Average queuing time 2
5
= 0.4 min
Ratio of customers having to queue 1
5
= 20 %
Average queuing time for those that queued 2
1
= 2 min
One type of simulation is known as discrete-event simulation (DES). In a DES,
system state remains constant over an interval of time between two consecutive
events. Thus events signify occurrences that change the system state. Events can
be classified as either internal or external. Internal events, e.g., the bank teller has
finished serving a customer, occur within the modelled system. External events,
like customer arrivals, occur outside the system, but still affect it. A simulation
is run by a mechanism that repeatedly moves simulated time forward to the
starting time of the next scheduled event, until there are no more events [13].
Architecturally, a DES system consists of a number of entities (e.g., compo-
nents, processes, agents, etc.), which are either producers or recipients of discrete
events. Entities can have attributes, e.g., the busy status of the bank teller. There
are two kinds of entities: dynamic entities, moving into or out of the system, like
Table 1: Ad-hoc simulation of a bank system with one teller
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Client
Count
Arrival
Interim
Arrival
Time
Service
Time
Service
Begins
Service
Ends
System
Time
Idle
Time
Queue
Time
1 — 0 5 0 5 5 0 0
2 3 3 2 5 7 4 0 2
3 6 9 5 9 14 5 2 0
4 10 19 3 19 22 3 5 0
5 5 24 1 24 25 1 2 0
18 9 2
the bank customer, and static entities, serving other entities, like the bank teller.
Static entities can often be represented as resources. Waiting for a particular
event to occur can lead to a delay, lasting for an indefinite amount of time. In
other cases, the time estimate may be known apriori, e.g., when bank customers
receive service by the teller. Events can be also interrupted and pre-empted, e.g.,
in reaction to component failures or pre-defined high-priority events.
There are four primary simulation paradigms [3]: process-interaction, event-
scheduling, activity scanning, and the three-phase method. Our simulation model
uses SimPy [14], a simulation framework based on process-interaction in Python.
Motivation and plan for integration. DES constitutes an attractive technol-
ogy for quantitative assessment of various characteristics of cloud applications.
Firstly, it allows the designers to perform various ”what-if” type of analysis that
demonstrates sensitivity of the service architecture to changes of its parameters.
For instance, it gives an insight on how the system reacts on peak-loads, how
adding new resources affects its performance, what is the relationships between
the degree of redundancy and fault tolerance, etc. Secondly, while simulating
the service behaviour, the designers also obtain the insights on which parame-
ters should be monitored at run-time to optimise a resource allocation strategy.
However, to obtain all the above-mentioned benefits, we have to ensure that the
simulation models are correct and indeed representative of the actual system.
This is achievable via integration of simulation with formal modelling.
To adequately model complex cloud services, we need a framework with a
good automated tool support and scalability. We have chosen Event-B because
it satisfies these criteria and has been successfully applied to model data stores
in the cloud [10]. However, the fine granularity of Event-B models made it
cumbersome to communicate the modelling decisions across a diverse team
of experts. Therefore, we needed an easy-to-understand light-weight graphical
notation that would allow us to generate both Event-B and simulation models in
a compatible way.
One alternative to creating a visual system model would be to choose one
of the existing architectural languages. However, to achieve simplicity and com-
prehensibility, we decided against it. The introduced graphical notation, called
a process-oriented model, is domain-specific and minimal in a sense that each
element is introduced only if it is required either in our formal modelling or a
DES representation. It captures only the key concepts of the domain and hence
alleviates the burden of customising a general-purpose architectural language.
The proposed approach also gives us a full control over defining the interpretation
of all elements of the introduced graphical notation in Event-B and SimPy mo-
dels, thus ensuring a mutually-compatible derivation of these models. Once the
models are derived from the common process-oriented model, each of them is used
independently. The Event-B model is refined to reason about the logical system
properties, while the simulation model is exercised to perform the quantitative
analysis. Obviously, if the simulation indicates that the chosen architecture is
unable to fulfil the target SLA, the architecture should be amended together with
its process-oriented model. This inevitably leads to redesign of the corresponding
Event-B and SimPy models to faithfully represent the changed architecture.
As a result of such integration, we gain more flexibility and control over
the simulation models. We can experiment more freely with different service
configurations and perform sensitivity analysis in a more efficient way. The formal
backbone gives us more confidence in the simulation models and we can clearly
see the entire effect of model changes, thus alleviating the verification burden.
4 Process-Oriented Model
In this section we will present a process-oriented system model that serves as
a “common ground” for both formal modelling in Event-B and simulation in
SimPy. The model has the associated graphical notation for representing system
architecture in terms of its units (components and processes) and interaction
mechanisms between these units.
In general, we are interested in modelling, simulating, and analysing the
systems that have the following characteristics:
– A system consists of a number of parallel processes, interacting asynchronously
by means of discrete events;
– System processes can be grouped together into a number of components. The
discrete events triggering interactions between the component processes then
become internal process events, while the remaining discrete events can be
considered as the external component interface for its interaction with other
components or the environment;
– Within a process, execution follows the pre-defined scenario expressed in
terms of functional blocks (activities) and transitions between them. Each
such functional block is typically associated with particular incoming events
the process reacts to and/or outgoing events it produces;
– A system component can fail and (in some cases) recover. In other words,
component failures and recovery mechanisms are a part of the component
description. They can be described as the special component processes simu-
lating different types of failures and recovery procedures of the component;
– Some events (e.g., component failures) should be reacted on immediately upon
their occurrence, thus interrupting the process current activities. Such special
events (interrupts) are explicitly described in the component description and
associated with dedicated functional blocks (interruption handlers).
An example of such a component is graphically presented on Fig.1. The component
interface consists of one incoming event (arrival evn) and two outgoing events
(rejection evn and completion evn). The component itself contains two processes
describing its “nominal” behaviour: the first one stores requests to perform a
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Fig. 1. Example of a system component
certain service, and the second one performs a requested service and returns the
produced results. The internal event perform evn triggers the request execution
by the second process. In addition, the component includes the Failure and
Recovery processes to simulate possible component failures and its recovery. More
specifically, the Failure process generates an internal interrupt event for both
nominal processes, which is then handled by the Handler block. In general, a
component can have several such processes and handler blocks.
In our process-oriented model, time progress is associated with either waiting
for an incoming event or an internal activity requiring time (e.g., data processing
of a received service request, see Service in Fig.1). Only such functional blocks
(marked by “t” in a diagram) can be interrupted.
Some functional blocks may indicate activities related to accessing the under-
lying storage resource (e.g., putting the received data into a buffer). Such blocks
are decorated by a circle from below, for example, see Store in Fig.1.
The component state is mostly hidden in a process-oriented model, focusing
instead on the required control flow and interaction between the processes.
However, sometimes we need to reveal a part of this state to be able to constrain
incoming or outgoing events as well as internal transitions between functional
blocks. For this purpose, we use the following pre-defined component attributes:
– (for each component) the component unique identifier id;
– (for each process) the process activity status PAS, which can be either Active
or Inactive. Changing this attribute to Inactive allows us to explicitly block
a particular process. The process will remain blocked and thus irresponsive
to any events until the attribute is not changed to Active again;
– (for each storage-related functional block) the storage availability status SAS,
which can be either Full or NotFull. The attribute value reflects whether the
operation of adding data into the storage can be successfully completed;
– (for each component) the component operational mode Mode, which can
be one of pre-defined values for this type of a component. For instance, the
component on Fig.1 can be used in two different modes, either as a “server”
or a “slave”. This assumption allows us to redefine the description of the
Nominal proc1, see Fig.2. If the mode is “server”, it forwards the request to
another (slave) component by generating the outgoing event forward evn.
If the attribute we are referring to is clear from the context, we will use a
shorthand notation [attribute value] to stand for the condition attribute name =
attribute value. For instance, in Fig.2 the transitions of Nominal proc1 from
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Fig. 2. Using component’s attributes
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its Store to either Reject or Accept are dependant on whether the used storage
is currently full or not. We specify this by the added conditions [Full] and [not
Full] on the corresponding process transitions. Similarly, the outgoing events
perform evn and forward evn for Accept are created depending on the component
role, which is reflected by the conditions [server] and [slave] on the corresponding
arrows. We also assume that all the events and internal transitions have implicit
conditions [Active], checking that the process in question is not currently blocked.
If we need to change the attribute value, we again use the notation [at-
tribute value], however within a functional block. In addition, for quickly changing
the process activity status for a number of processes, we employ another shorthand
notation: activate(Proc1, ..., ProcN) and deactivate(Proc1, ..., ProcN).
By default, we assume that the processes are created and terminated together
with their encompassing component. However, sometimes we need to dynamically
create and terminate component processes. Let us consider an alternative version
of Nominal proc2, presented in Fig.3. Here the process Nominal proc2 is created
each time a request from Nominal proc1 is ready to be served. Moreover, once
the outgoing event for successful service completion is created, the process is
terminated (depicted as a black circle).
To collect the quantitative information about the considered system, we
assume the implicit presence of a monitor component. The information is collected
about the occurrence of particular events of interest. The arrows representing the
events of a component to be monitored by such a component are decorated with
small circles in a process-oriented model. If the system contains other components,
they should be explicitly composed by matching their external interfaces.
”Common ground”. A process-oriented model serves as a basis for both Event-
B development and system simulation in SimPy. Translating a process-oriented
model into Event-B gives us the starting point of our formal development with
the already fixed system architecture and control flow between main system
components. The corresponding system properties are explicitly formulated and
proved as system invariants. Additional properties (e.g., the relationships between
processes being active or inactive) can be verified too. By the definition of Event-
B refinement, the following refined models preserve these properties, elaborating
only on the newly introduced data structures and intermediate system transitions.
While translating a process-oriented model to SimPy, we augment the resulting
code with concrete values for its basic quantitative characteristics, such as data
arrival, service, and failure rates. This allows us to compare system performance
and reliability for different system parameter configurations. If a satisfactory
configuration values can be found and thus re-design of the base process-oriented
model is not needed, the simulation results does not affect the Event-B formal
development and can be considered completely complementary to it.
Translating to Event-B. Here we present general guidelines how to proceed
from a process-oriented model of a system component to the corresponding
Event-B specification. From now on, we refer to Event-B events as operations to
avoid confusion with DES events. During the translation, the respective elements
of a process-oriented model may become one or several Event-B operations, the
corresponding guard or action expressions within a particular operation, or the
invariant predicates to be verified for the resulting Event-B model. Moreover,
a number of Event-B variables standing for component attributes, incoming or
outgoing events, as well as the variables ensuring the required control flow have
to be introduced. The translation guidelines are summarised in Fig.4.
We will demonstrate the use of these guidelines on the component example
from the previous section (Fig.1). Each functional block of the process-oriented
model is translated to one or two Event-B operations. Two operations are needed
in the cases when the block in question is interruptible. Then the first operation
specifies a possible start of the block, while the second one models its completion.
For instance, the block Store will be represented as two Event-B operations:
Store step1 =̂
when Nominal proc1 = Active
Arrived env = FALSE
then Arrived env :∈ BOOL
end
Store step2 =̂
any j
when Nominal proc1 = Active
failure interrupt = TRUE
Arrived evn = TRUE
j ∈ JOBS \ {NILL}
then ArrivedJob := j
Arrived evn := FALSE
Storage status :∈ {Full, NotFull}
end
Here the boolean variables Arrived evn and failure interrupt model occurrence
of the corresponding system events. Moreover, the process activity attributes (e.g.,
Nominal proc1 ) are represented as eponymous variables that can take values from
the set {Active,Inactive}. Similarly, the storage availability attribute is introduced
as a separate variable Storage status taking values from {Full,NotFull}. The other
functional blocks (Reject, Service, Delay, Result) are modelled in a similar way.
During the system execution a failure of the component might happen at any
time. In that case, the component halts its nominal processes and is only involved
in its recovery process. Upon successful recovery, the component reactivates its
nominal processes. The corresponding blocks Failure and Handler are as follows:
Failure =̂
when Failure proc = Active
failure interrupt = FALSE
then failure interrupt :∈ BOOL
end
Handler =̂
when failure interrupt = TRUE
then Failure proc := Inactive
failure interrupt := FALSE
Nominal proc1 := Inactive
Nominal proc2 := Inactive
Recovery := Active
end
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Fig. 4. Guidelines for integration
The Failure operation models non-deterministic occurrence of a system failure,
which leads to a creation of the failure interrupt event. The Handler operation
models handling of this interrupt by blocking the nominal and Failure processes,
while activating the Recovery process.
In this simple system, the Recovery process is active only when all the rest
processes are inactive. This is formulated as the following invariant to be verified:
Recovery = Active⇔ Nominal proc1 = Inactive∧Nominal proc2 = Inactive∧...
Similarly, the invariants ensuring the required control flow and component inter-
action order can be added and verified in the resulting Event-B model.
Translating to SimPy. This section describes how to represent the system in
Fig. 1 using SimPy. In SimPy, we represent components as classes. Component
processes become SimPy processes, which are based on Python’s generators.
Functional blocks are represented as sequences of instructions that alter the
system state and wait for events. Events are used for inter-process communication
and can take optional values as arguments (see Fig. 4 for a detailed guide).
A partial code listing corresponding to the system in Fig. 1 is shown in
Listing 1.1. This component has four processes. Lines 3–6 in Listing1.1 create
these processes upon initialisation of the component object, using a method for
process creation provided by the SimPy simulation environment. Process creation
requires a Python generator as its argument, which will become the body of
the process. On Lines 8–9 we initialise two shared events which will be used to
activate and deactivate the processes.
Lines 11–26 constitute the generator for Nominal proc1. A sub-generator
used for interrupt handling is defined in Lines 12–15. Upon invocation, this
generator will activate the recovery process and wait until the activation event
is triggered, which makes Nominal proc1 inactive while recovery is in progress.
Because all processes in this example are non-terminating, every process generator
contains an infinite loop, as in Lines 17–27.
Since Nominal proc1 is interruptible, we need to surround the yield statement
with exception handling (Lines 18–27), which will catch possible interrupts.
Interrupts can only occur at yield statements, because an interrupt must come
from another process and other processes cannot run until the active process has
yielded execution, similarly to cooperative multitasking. Line 19 corresponds to
the store activity, which uses a discrete resource, a store, as a pipe for interprocess
communication. Execution of the process is halted until a job is put in the pipe.
When a job arrives through the pipe, the status of the buffer is checked and
the requested is either rejected or accepted and put in the pipe connecting
Nominal proc1 and Nominal proc2.
Similarly to Nominal proc1, Nominal proc2 waits until a job arrives in its
incoming pipe (Line 35). Thereafter, Line 36 simulates time required for serving
the job. An interrupt may occur at either of these two yield statements.
The generator for the failure process spans Lines 44–50. The process waits for
an exponentially distributed amount of time (46), the time between failures. Upon
failure, the two nominal processes are interrupted (48–49) and the failure process
becomes inactive until the recovery process triggers the activation event.
Contrary to the other processes, the recovery process starts in an inactive state.
We achieve this by waiting until the recovery activation event is triggered
(Line 54). When activated, the recovery process waits for some time (Line 55)
before activating the other processes (Lines 56–57) and becoming inactive again.
5 Applying the Integrated Approach
In this section, we will demonstrate the proposed approach on our case study – a
replicated data storage in the cloud. As explained in Section 2, we consider two
different system architectures: asynchronous and synchronous models.
In Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, we present the process-oriented models for the node
components of these architectures. The component has a similar structure to the
example we considered in the previous section. Additionally, there is a separate
process FailureDet proc that models reaction to a new master notification. The
node components can be also employed either in the master or standby (worker)
modes. In addition, each system also contains the (implicit) Monitor component
as well as the Failure Detector component, responsible for detecting a failed master
and then assigning a new one. The Failure and Recovery processes are similar to
the ones from Fig.1 and are not presented here.
Listing 1.1. SimPy representation of the Component class
1 class Component:
2 def __init__(self , env , ...):
3 self.p1 = self.env.process(self.proc1 ())
4 self.p2 = self.env.process(self.proc2 ())
5 self.failure_proc = self.env.process(self.fail ())
6 self.recovery_proc = self.env.process(self.recover ())
7
8 self.activation_event = self.env.event ()
9 self.recovery_activation_event = self.env.event ()
10
11 def proc1(self):
12 def handle_interrupt ():
13 self.recovery_activation_event.succeed ()
14 self.recovery_activation_event = self.env.event ()
15 yield self.activation_event
16
17 while True:
18 try:
19 rq = yield self.arrival_pipe.get()
20 if len(self.buffer) < self.capacity:
21 self.buffer.append(rq)
22 yield self.interproc_pipe.put(rq)
23 else:
24 self.rejected += 1
25 except Interrupt as interrupt:
26 yield from handle_interrupt ()
27 continue
28
29 def proc2(self):
30 def handle_interrupt ():
31 yield self.activation_event
32
33 while True:
34 try:
35 yield self.interproc_pipe.get()
36 yield self.env.timeout(expovariate(self.service_rate ))
37 self.buffer.pop()
38 self.completed += 1
39
40 except Interrupt as interrupt:
41 yield from handle_interrupt ()
42 continue
43
44 def fail(self):
45 while True:
46 yield self.env.timeout(expovariate(self.failure_rate ))
47 self.failures += 1
48 self.p1.interrupt(’failure1 ’)
49 self.p2.interrupt(’failure1 ’)
50 yield self.activation_event
51
52 def recover(self):
53 while True:
54 yield self.recovery_activation_event
55 yield self.env.timeout(expovariate(self.repair_rate ))
56 self.activation_event.succeed ()
57 self.activation_event = self.env.event ()
Event-B modelling. The resulting Event-B models become starting points
of our formal development, with main architectural system elements and their
communication already in place. In the following refinement steps, we extend the
abstract models by elaborating on the WAL mechanism and explicitly expressing
the required data interdependencies between the master and standby logs.
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Fig. 6. Synchronous model
For instance, for the asynchronous model, we formulate and prove the data
consistency property. Specifically, it states that all the requests that are now
handled by a standby node should have been already completed by the master
before. Moreover, we explicitly formulate and prove (as a model invariant) the
log data integrity property stating that the corresponding log elements of any
two storage nodes are always the same. In other words, all logs are consistent
with respect to the log records of the master node. For more details, see [10].
Simulation in SimPy. Creating simulations for the models in Fig.5 and Fig.6
allows us to compare the two architectures as well as evaluate how different
parameters affect the results within an architecture. Let us consider the system
operating with the master and 3 workers. The workers poll the master 30 times
per minute. The buffer capacity is set to 5. The arrival rate is exponentially
distributed with mean 7.5/min. Each component requires 5s to process a request.
Components randomly fail at an exponentially distributed rate of 1.8/h, rendering
them inoperable until they have been repaired, which takes 4 seconds.
Fig.7 shows the results of a simulation involving the two models. With
identical operating conditions and parameters, the asynchronous model has
higher throughput, completing 99.3 % of requests in 1 hour. This is expected,
because the asynchronous model involves less delay than the synchronous one,
which completes 97.2 % of requests in 1 hour. Table 2 summarises the results.
Let us take a closer look at the asynchronous architecture. What happens if the
buffer capacity was lowered from 5 to 2? What if the mean failure rate then was
increased to 18/h? These questions are easy to answer with DES. According to
Fig. 8, reducing the buffer capacity has a large negative impact on the throughput
of the system, which only manages to complete 87.4% of requests within an hour.
Contrary to the previous experiment, a substantial amount of arriving requests,
11.9%, are rejected. Additionally increasing the mean failure rate by a factor
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Fig. 7. Comparison of the two models. Mean arrival rate is 7.5/min, service time is 5s,
buffer capacity is 5 and mean failure rate is 1.8/h.
Table 2: Results from model comparison
Completed (%) Rejected (%) Failed (%)
Asynchronous 99.3 0 0.2
Synchronous 97.2 1.6 0.7
of 10 has less impact on the system than the previous change, with 83.4% of
requests completed. Table 3 summarises the results.
Further experiments can reveal more information about the system. For
example, changing the number of workers does not have great impact on the
performance of the asynchronous model, because its primary work-flow only
involves the master. For the synchronous model, the number of workers does not
affect performance much by itself, as processing on the workers occurs in parallel,
but if the repair rate is very low, increasing the number of workers actually
results in worse performance. This is because each request requires processing on
each component and, whenever a component fails, the system has to wait for it
to be repaired before pending requests can be completed. Increasing the number
of workers in the synchronous model then results in an effective increase in the
mean failure rate of the system.
6 Related Work and Conclusions
This work augments with formal modelling our previous research [5] on using
DES to analyse reliability and cost of different session management policies in
the cloud. The problem of inadequate support for development of cloud services
has also been identified by Boer et al [4]. Similarly to us, they aim at integrating
reasoning about correctness with simulation. In our case, Event-B allows us to
formally represent and verify system-level properties, while in [4] the stress is
put on creating executable specifications and analysis of corresponding traces.
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Fig. 8. Sensitivity analysis (Async. model). Arrival rate is 7.5/min, service time is 5 s.
Table 3: Results from sensitivity analysis with the asynchronous model
Completed (%) Rejected (%) Failed (%)
Less Capacity 87.4 11.9 0.2
Less Capacity and More Failures 83.4 13.3 0.9
Our proposed process-oriented model is similar to Activity Cycle Diagrams
(ACD) [6, 9] – a graphical notation to model discrete events and interactions. In
particular, [6] presents an extension of ACS to enable automatic translation to
Java programs, while [9] proposes extended ACD to represent the relationship
between conditions and events in a discrete event system that are not covered by
the classical ACD. In contrast, our process-oriented models allow us to represent
a high level system architecture in terms of components, processes and their
interactions. Moreover, our proposed models can be both used as a basis to
formal modelling and simulation at the same time.
The WAL mechanism has been investigated in [8, 7], where the authors analyse
the performance aspects of this technique. They distinguish four types of the
delays that the WAL mechanism can impose on transaction handling and propose
an approach to increase log scalability. In our work, we focus on integrating formal
verification and DES to evaluate the system both qualitatively and quantitatively.
The problem of a formal verification and simulation-based validation is ad-
dressed in the ADVANCE project [1]. However, the focus of the proposed method-
ologies is related to cyber-physical systems, which are characterised by a mixture
of discrete-event and continuous-time components. The proposed simulation-
based approach combines the Event-B development and co-simulation with
tool-independent physical components via the FMI interface [12]. In our work we
deal with discrete-event systems and focus on integrating separate approaches
for qualitative and quantitative reasoning about such systems.
In this paper, we have proposed a pragmatic approach to integrating formal
modelling in Event-B and discrete-event simulation in SimPy. Our aim was to
find a scalable solution to integrated engineering of resilient data stores in the
cloud. We have succeeded in overcoming the scalability problems experienced
while attempting to apply probabilistic model checking and achieved the desired
goal – quantitative assessment of system resilience. Since testing cloud services in
general is expensive and time consuming, we believe that the proposed approach
offers benefits for the designers of cloud services.
Proof of concept integration of formal modelling and DES presented in this
paper can be seen as an initial step towards creating an automated tool support
for an integrated engineering environment of cloud services. Our future work will
continue in two directions: one the one hand, we will create a tool for automatic
translation of Event-B models in SimPy as well as work on visualisation of formal
and simulation models. On other hand, we will experiment with deriving resilience
monitors from system models to enable proactive resilience at run-time.
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